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Part two - Rethinking the organisation of 
companies at the light of the national patterns of 
Corporate Governance and Employee 
Representation
Chapter 4
4.1. Introduction – distinct coalitions within a contractarian 
conception of the company
The preliminary part of this thesis enunciated that it would adopt a contractarian 
conception of the company, i.e a single contracting party, regulated to some 
extent by law, that coordinates the activities of suppliers of inputs and of 
consumers of products and services. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt 
to identify and describe the organisation of companies, the forms by which the 
relationships between the providers of capital, managers and workers have 
evolved through time. This chapter will depart from the assumption that the 
predominant patterns of Corporate Governance, Employee Representation and 
Collective Bargaining must be seen within the context of the organisation of 
companies: the concrete form by means of which each company decided to 
organise capital, management and labour must be seen within its due context. 
This chapter will consider that the bargain reached in each one of the 
“contractual” relationships that composes the firm obeys a certain logic and 
must be seen in context with the others; this implies that a change in one 
relationship  will inevitably affect all the other relationships since all of them are 
devised to provide an answer to a specific need. This chapter focuses on the 
evolution in the organisation of companies and it is structured in the following 
form: the first part will attempt to explain what the organisation of a company is; 
the second part will proceed to attempt to describe the distinct models of 
production that have been experienced during the XXth century in Europe (craft 
production, Fordism and Post-fordism); the final part will present the 
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conclusion. The assumption underpinning this chapter is that the concrete 
organisation of a company depends of the macro-economic endowment, 
Corporate Governance and Employee Representation patterns  in which it is 
active and must be seen in complementarity with the prevalent forms of 
corporate governance and employee representation.   
4.2. The organisation of a company – distinct strategies for the 
coordination of the actions of the interest groups. 
The organisation of a company depends upon the creation of a structure, a 
predetermined scheme destined to coordinate the actions of a number of 
individuals. The basic idea of an organisation consists in exerting control over 
the actions of individuals so as to conciliate them towards the production of a 
final result. Max Weber made extremely influential studies concerning the 
organisation of societies and asserted that “bureaucratisation” - in the sense of 
a functional organisation of oersons and resources that did not depend on the 
force of some or the charisma of the leader - was the most efficient form of 
organisation of inputs. Weber analysed extensively the internal features of a 
functioning organisation and concluded that every organisation had four distinct 
characteristics: abstract rules, institutionalisation, formalisation and the 
alignment of the interests of the participants with the organisation. To put it 
briefly, abstraction this means that every organisation must be composed by a 
number of predetermined rules governing the admission of persons, the powers 
and duties that each person holds within it and the performance of work; 
institutionalisation means that there is a separation between the person holding 
the position and the position in itself, i.e the authority  derives from the position 
and not from the person’s personal charisma; formalisation means that each 
organisation must communicate and keep  a number of written records that 
should work as a collective memory; finally, the alignment of interests means 
that the participants of the organisation should feel that the maximisation of 
their interests depends on the maximisation of the interests of the organisation. 
The basic idea behind these four characteristics can be traced to what 
economists name as the reduction of transaction costs: since the organisation 
had an enforceable pre-determined structure combining the actions of self-
interested individuals, there would be no need to bargain permanently the best 
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interests of each one of them. The combination of these four characteristics 
should provide the foundations for the coordination of the actions of individuals 
to occur and the organisation to function and create value. 395
 The organisation that European companies adopted varied to a great 
extent in accordance with the concrete economic circumstances of the time. 
The following lines will attempt to defend the assumption that the organisation 
that companies adopted in terms of capital and labour was designed to the 
specific economic needs of the time; it will focus  on the evolution that the 
structures of European companies underwent during the XXth century  (craft 
production, Fordism and post-fordism) in particular as regards the relationships 
that they established with each one of their constituents (supply, labour and 
finance) and attempt to connect them to the general evolution in the economic 
conditions described earlier. The basic idea that is going the be defended 
throughout this chapter is that the evolutionary “institutionalisation” of the 
organisation of companies must be contextualised with the predominant 
patterns of Corporate Governance, Employee Representation and Collective 
Bargaining: firms were organised in such a form because the macro-economic 
environment demanded the existence of certain types of companies and the 
predominant patterns of Corporate Governance, Employee Representation and 
Collective Bargaining needed to organise in such a form as to coordinate the 
joint result of their inputs and provide an answer to the needs of the time. The 
patterns of organisation of companies allows capital and labour to organise 
themselves accordingly. 
4.2.1 craft production - small companies
the first type of organisation of companies that prospered during the first half of 
the XXth century  in Europe can be named as craft-production. Craft production 
refers to a method of organising companies in which productive structures are 
designed to be of no more than medium size (circa 100 workers) and producing 
for local and regional markets. Craft production bets on a very high degree of 
specialisation; its competitive advantage derives from the fact that it can 
compete in niche markets and produce products of a very high degree of 
quality, often customer tailored. It can easily  adapt and readapt to the changing 
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economic circumstances of the time and to the specific needs of customers. 
The internal organisation is entirely  dependent of the guidance of the master of 
production. The master of production is itself an expert that guides the whole 
production process, from the purchase of the materials to the performance of 
work and the delivery of the final product. 
The relationship of the company with its stakeholders is relatively 
unique: as regards the control over the supply, the company purchases its 
supplies from other craft producers, who often tailor their products to the 
specific needs of the producer. There is no sharp  distinction between supplier 
and producer since the small size of the company and the small size of the 
markets in which they operate make them simultaneously suppliers and 
producers; they produce the supplies of other companies in a small network of 
production. The majority  of firms specialize either in primary, intermediary  or 
finished products; in a sense, each one of them produces a final product that, in 
turn, functions as a supply  to the purchaser of the product. The greatest 
competitive advantage of the company here consists in specialisation; each 
company specialises in a certain niche market for which they provide added 
value. The coordination of the activities of the companies is left to the invisible 
hand of the market; the small size of companies and the specialised market in 
which they  operate make it relatively  easy for them to adapt to the winds of 
competition and quickly modify  their production in accordance with the needs of 
the final consumer, who is normally another company operating in the net stage 
of the production chain in the market.        
Its relationship  with labour is often underpinned in personal ties and 
compromises. There is no scope for unionism outside the company or 
representation because the relationship  of the employee with the employer is 
unique and personal. There is a high degree of dialogue within the company by 
means of direct conversations or on-the-job relationships. Each party knows 
that the personal relationships are the most important asset within the 
productive unit in order to ensure the alignment of interests of all parties with 
the success of the unit. The competitive advantage of this form of work 
organisation is connected to the special nature of the production; since firms 
operate in niche markets and the production is tailored to the specific needs of 
the customer, the employer must acquaint the employees with those needs in 
order for them to readapt and adjust to the specific needs of the market. Job 
401
tenure is normally not very high but there is a high degree of circulation of 
craftsmen between firms of the market because the voluble structure of the 
market makes that the redundancy of one craft in a company can become the 
competitive advantage of another. These firms normally have training systems 
in which apprentices normally  receive their training in one firm and then leave 
to work for another firm. 
As regards the control over finances, craft production regimes are 
destined to become short-timed. There are usually two types of financing of the 
productive unit: either the owner of the unit invests its personal assets in it or it 
has resource to credit. In any case, the unit must deliver fast profit in order to 
ensure its financial stability. In the event that the owner is willing to invest its 
personal assets in the business, he will most likely intend to have a quick return 
of investment because the relatively volatile structure of the markets in which 
they operate does not create incentives for long-term commitments; in the 
event that the owner has resource to credit, banks will inevitably want to 
receive its loan quickly and the business will inevitably have to be run to pay for 
the loan and leave some profit for the owner. Therefore, craft production units 
are destined to be run in the short-term perspective.          
 Craft production has a number of advantages: firstly, the small-size of 
the company and the personal relationships between the employer and the 
employees ensure that there is easy dialogue and understanding between both 
parties; secondly, its small structure makes it easy to know exactly each 
person’s position and its role in the productive process; thirdly, its relatively 
informal structure ensures a high degree of internal flexibility and dialogue 
between all stages of the productive process, making it easy to understand the 
functioning of the system as a whole and readapting the company  to the 
fluctuations of the market; fourthly, it is relatively easy to align the interests of 
the craftsman with the employee on account of the personal relationships 
usually established between them; finally, the final result is usually unique and 
tailored to the specific needs of the customer. However, it also has its 
disadvantages: since there is no great degree of institutionalisation, normally 
the company is heavily dependent on the crafts of the concrete persons 
working in it; a modification of the concrete person holding the position will 
usually entail a modification to the internal dynamics of the company; the final 
product is also usually more expensive since the productive scale is smaller 
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and there is no room for economies of scale; finally, it is difficult to compete in 
terms of prices because the end product is usually unique and the competitive 
advantage lies in diversification. Therefore, it is easy to understand that craft 
production is an adequate productive structure for small markets and markets 
in which the competitive advantage does not lie in price but in diversification.396 
4.2.2. Fordism – large vertically integrated units
The second stage of development of the organisation structure of companies 
came to be known as Fordism.397  Fordism consists in an organisational 
strategy that aims at creating mass production in large vertically integrated 
firms, on the basis of formal hierarchies, producing for mass markets. The 
greatest competitive advantage of this form of organisation consists in 
economies of scale achieved by  a rigorous standardisation of all stages of the 
productive structure. There are a number of elements distinguishing a Fordist 
productive structure: firstly, there is a sharp division between management and 
labour in responsibilities and rewards: managers do the thinking and make the 
key decisions regarding long-range planning and setting of long-term goals; 
workers do the physical work necessary to implement the decisions of 
management. Secondly, work is structured around the principles of scientific 
management, with each job  specified in an explicit description and tasks clearly 
differentiated across jobs. Work is organised around departments, with each 
department corresponding to a key business function (e.g: production, sales, 
R&D, human resources). Most workers and managers spent the entirety  of their 
careers around a single organisational area. Managers were recruited from 
business schools, joining the company at the lower end of the management 
ladder and building their way  up  over the course of a career; workers were 
recruited usually young to unskilled positions and also build up  their career on 
the blue-collar hierarchy. The way that the company  ensured the alignment of 
interests of both managers and employees with the company consisted in job 
security; people were offered jobs for life in exchange for exclusive dedication; 
in order to prevent desertion, pay  was connected to seniority  and not merit; 
therefore there was no incentive to change firms since the increases in pay did 
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not depend on individual evaluations but on the number of years that the 
person spent in the company.398 
It is also necessary to take into account the economic environment and 
the type of industry in which these companies competed. Fordism was an 
organisation structure that prospered under environments of demand side 
economic policies; in the USA, Fordist productive structures mushroomed 
around the country during the New Deal, in the hope that the large number of 
persons that they employed and the fact that these productive structures 
operated in key sectors of the economy would trigger the economic 
development; similarly in Europe, Fordism prospered during the time of 
coordinated capitalism having played an essential role in providing the inputs 
that European economies needed to develop themselves. Fordist productive 
structures also normally operated in regulated environments; Governments 
undertook efforts to ensure that their national champions would not be harmed 
by the chill winds of competition; entry costs were high and incumbent 
companies enjoyed preferential access to credit in order to finance their 
activities. It is interesting to observe that the majority  of Fordist companies in 
Europe were involved in a number of conglomerates. A conglomerate consists 
in a method of organising companies in which the several departments of the 
company are often seemingly  unrelated businesses. The greatest advantage of 
a conglomerate consists in the possibility to diversify  risk and allocate capital 
from surplus businesses to needing businesses. They prospered in the 1950s 
and 1960s due to a combination of low interest rates and the protectionism of 
Governments, who saw those conglomerates as a means to provide the 
necessary inputs to the economic activity under the idea of demand side 
economics.399
As regards the control over the supply of inputs, Fordism is 
characterised by the vertical integration of all stages of the productive structure. 
This idea of governed by Coase’s theorem, according to which the size of the 
firm is to be decided in accordance with the option to internalise the production 
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or to purchase it on the market.400 The option to control the supply of inputs in 
house is connected with the reduction of transation costs and the control over 
the quality of the materials; if the firm expands its activities towards the supply 
of inputs, it will avoid having to pay the added value that the supplier would 
demand by its service and control the quality of the inputs, its quantity and 
delivery. In some firms  - such as IBM – this is a vital component of it strategy 
since the quality of their products depends to a great extent of the quality  of 
their inputs (in this case computer chips), which often have to be specifically 
designed in accordance with the needs of the consumer.  But there are also a 
number of disadvantages connected with the vertical integration of inputs: 
firstly, the stock of components waiting to be used tends to be high, obliging the 
firm to invest in storage space and increasing the amount of time necessary to 
achieve the return of the investment in the integration; secondly, in-house 
production reduces the link with technology developments in other places; 
thirdly, in-house production is viable only for the supply of large quantities of 
materials being unsuited for small and occasional supplies. However, 
considering that the greatest competitive advantage of Fordism consists in 
economies of scale and the fact that, in fordist Europe, the technology  needed 
had all been licensed from the USA (reducing the need to invest in R&D) there 
were incentives for the vertical integration of companies in order to reach the 
highest economies of scale possible. This also explains the building up  of 
conglomerates during the 1950s and 1960s.401    
 As regards the control over the organisation of work, there is a 
connection between Fordism and the development of mass labour unions. The 
fordist assembly lines puts large numbers of homogeneous workers within one 
company under comparable working conditions and comparable wages. This 
enhances workers’ ability to organise and bargain at company and sector 
levels. This explains why, in Europe, Fordism was most extensively 
implemented under the auspices of coordinated capitalism; in order to achieve 
the labour peace and wage moderation that the development of those 
companies demanded, workers were organised around sectoral unions and 
legislators undertook efforts to create governance mechanisms that could 
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prevent defection from isolated bargaining units. The need to ensure wage 
stability and the licensing of American mass production technology that 
provided the fuel for the development of European growth favoured the creation 
of mass labour unions destined to control the labour market. In some countries, 
unionisation was even made mandatory (such as in Portugal during the 
dictatorship) or strong incentives were created to achieve unionisation (such as 
granting trade unions with the task of managing training and unemployment 
funds) in order to control the free forces of the labour market. The idea was to 
moderate wages to ensure the retention of profits to finance further investment. 
The rigorous standardisation of all stages of the productive process, the large 
size of the plants, the extensive job tenure and the need to moderate wages 
also provided a most valuable field for collective bargaining to occur. The rigid 
hierarchy characteristic of fordist production regimes needed an extensive 
degree of abstraction, institutionalisation and formalisation; since the best way 
to ensure the implementation of these three main characteristics of large 
organisations consisted in direct dialogue with labour, collective agreements 
were seen as the ideal instruments for achieving this aim. Finally, Fordist 
assembly lines achieved the alignment of interests between the workers and 
the company by means of job  tenure; there was a guarantee for job  security; 
wages were connected with seniority  and not productivity; there was a rigid 
internal hierarchy  in which the progression was made by means of seniority on 
a full or quasi-automatic basis. Fordism favoured to a great degree unionisation 
and collective bargaining, especially at the level of the sector.402 
 The influence of Fordism was so extensive that it spilled towards small- 
and medium-sized companies. Even though the vast majority of workers were 
employed in small- and medium-sized companies, the influence of large fordist 
assembly units in the economic life was so overwhelming that the large 
company became the de facto dominant force in business culture. The 
dimension and power of the large corporation is nothing to be surprised at 
since its weight in national economies was absolutely intentional. These large 
assembly lines were destined to provide the remaining economy activity with 
the necessary inputs for its development and therefore the well-being of the 
economy depended on the well-being of these companies. The most interesting 
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thing to observe was that its work practices also spread to small and medium 
companies always with due regard to their dimensions and specifications. 
Small and medium companies emulated the technique of scientific work 
organisation and long job tenures to ensure the alignment of interests between 
management and employees in their smaller units. Since labour costs were a 
very  important competitive factor in these units aiming at small economies of 
scale, these small and medium companies gathered around sectoral 
employers’ associations with the purpose of bargaining wages and the 
organisation of work with the trade unions. The spill-over of fordism into small 
and medium companies also provided an incentive for the building up  of large 
sector-level trade unions since it provided both workers and employers with a 
means to control the unit labour costs and guarantee employment and decent 
working conditions around the smaller units of the sector. Therefore, Fordism 
also contributed to mass-unionism in small- and medium sized companies. 
 As regards the control over finance, the strategy of vertical integration 
has also been applied to the area of finances. Since their growth and 
development is based on the rise of production and consumption, they have 
from an early stage aimed at achieving a maximum degree of financial 
autonomy and the self-financing of activities. The idea behind coordinated 
capitalism was to moderate wages in order for firms to retain profits for 
reinvestment; this is nothing but the structure of growth that Fordist firms 
typically  use. The connection between fordism and credit has limited itself to 
two different very  specific areas: (1) consumer credit and (2) investment 
banking. As regards consumer credit, the economies in which fordist firms 
operate usually  have generous consumer credit regimes in order to boost the 
consumption needed for firms to use their full productive capacity and generate 
the necessary profits for reinvestment. As regards the particular case of 
investment banking, which was widely used in Germany, it is not normally 
found in Fordist productive structures because the short-term horizons of 
investors are inadequate to the long-term perspectives that fordist productive 
units need to be profitable. The German case of investment banking was 
particular in this sense because the patient capital that they provided provided 
firms with the financial resources that they needed to finance their activities 
while ensuring an efficient monitoring mechanism of managers in order to 
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safeguard the long term objectives of the company. Therefore, Fordism is 
connected with long-term growth and perspectives.403      
Fordism has a number of advantages and disadvantages; as regards the 
advantages, Fordism is ideal for the production of homogeneous goods, taking 
advantage of economies of scale and in which the greatest competitive factor is 
price. It is ideal for the production of consumer goods destined for mass-
markets. As regards the disadvantages, it is vulnerable to the bargaining power 
of workers, it is unfit for diversification and competition in markets in which the 
competitive advantage lies not only  in price but also on innovation and it is 
vulnerable to the fluctuations in the prices of inputs.
4.2.3. Post-Fordism  
Fordism was an extremely influential method of work organisation that enjoys 
the unmistakable attribute of being capable of having established a before and 
an after. The main attributes of fordism consisted in (1) sharp division of tasks 
between management and workers and the workers themselves, (2) long job 
tenures and progression based on seniority, (3) vertical integration of all stages 
of the production procedure, (4) large labour unions and high degree of sector 
social dialogue; (5) competitive advantage based on economies of scale. The 
period that followed fordism attempted to recover the competitive advantage of 
craft production ((1) flexible structure, (2) easy adaptation to markets, (3) 
intense company-level social dialogue) without giving up  on the merits of 
fordism. Post-fordism refers to a plethora of work processes that attempts to 
introduce the merits of craft production within fordist assembly units. But before 
analysing the characteristics of these methods of work there is a need to 
analyse the reasons for the decline in fordism.
(a)  reasons for the decline in fordism – the reasons for the decline in fordism 
have been extensively analysed in the description of the evolution in the 
general economic conditions.404  This chapter intends to make a connection 
between those evolutions and the inadequacy of fordism to the new economic 
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conditions. The previous paragraph mentioned that fordism bets on a sharp 
division of tasks between management and labour according to which the 
former do the planning and the latter limit themselves to performing each stage 
of the productive process and in taking advantage of the economies of scale 
that the vertical integration of all stages of the productive process offers. In 
exchange for this division of tasks, the owners of the company offer job stability 
and internal labour markets; workers agree to moderate their wages in large 
sector level negotiations in exchange for reinvestment of profits in order to 
finance the expansion of the company towards other stages of the productive 
process. 
 The evolution in the general economical conditions from the 1970s 
onwards brought an end to this compromise. Firstly, rising input prices caused 
by the oil wars and the galloping wages caused a decline in profitability that 
jeopardised further expansion. Rising prices of inputs also put at stake the 
incentives for companies to integrate vertically. Companies suddenly  saw 
themselves limited in their capacity to integrate vertically  and were unable to 
proceed with their strategy  of retention of profits and expansion. Secondly, 
companies had to deal with a decrease in the productivity of labour. This 
breakdown in productivity was caused not only by the rise in wages but also by 
the reduction in the capacity utilisation of existing technology. The technologies 
that fuelled mass-production had been licensed from previous investments 
made in the USA. They were designed towards achieving an ideal level of 
productivity, which had been reached and could no longer be supplanted. More 
productivity  demanded radical innovation. Thirdly, companies had to face new 
competition from the Eastern-Asia countries, led by Japan. Japanese products 
were considered to be of high-quality and low price and western European 
products were unable to compete with their standards using the existing rules 
of the game. Finally, the general macro-economic structure, which had been 
underpinned on Keynesian standards, began to fail. Countries could no longer 
use the demand side of the economy and the tax system in order to foster 
continuous growth. They now had to deal with inflation and instability, which are 
highly detrimental to the fordist organisational structure because the long-term 
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planning the strategy of expansion that characterises it are underpinned on a 
forecast of stability in the prices of inputs and the demand.405
 Similarly, the extensive wave of reforms undertaken during the late 
1970s and 1980s were not kind to fordist production structures. The turn to free 
market policies undertaken by the majority of European governments had a 
pervasive effect on the pillars of fordism: state intervention in the economy, 
social dialogue and regulated markets in order to ensure the stability of 
incumbent companies. Since companies could no longer rely on the state to 
ensure the macro-economical stability necessary  undertake long-term strategic 
planning of investment, on trade unions to achieve the moderation of wages to 
ensure the retention of profits and on regulation to protect their competitive 
position, they had to rethink their productive strategies towards more short-term 
horizons. The financialisation of the economy that sparkled during the 1980s 
intensified the role of the financial sector in the behaviour of companies, either 
by means of the stock market or by means of an enlargement of credit to 
companies, which influences its behaviour towards short-termism. Finally, the 
liberalisation program undertaken at the European level had a chilling effect on 
formerly nationally  protected sectors and champions, forcing them to readapt to 
the chill winds of competition.    
 Therefore, it becomes easy to observe that the fordist production 
structures suddenly became inadequate to the sharp modification occurred 
from the 1970s onwards. Whereas before companies had to bet on expansion 
and on achieving economies of scale, now companies had to readapt to 
fluctuating markets and bet on innovation as the main competitive advantage.    
(b) new work procedures – the exhaustion of the fordist method of organising 
work and the need to create new means of extracting value from workers and 
using labour as a competitive advantage in companies led to the development 
of new organisational logics. The organisational logic that gradually replaced 
fordism cannot be conducted to a single pattern since it encompasses a 
number of distinct procedures that are normally sector specific. The 1980s and 
1990s witnessed the introduction within organisations of a number of distinct 
work procedures with names such as quality circles, just-on-time production, 
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continuous improvement processes and team-work just to name a few.406 
These distinct procedures obey  a common logic however: in the same way that 
the principles of economies of scale and sharp division of work oriented the 
organisation of fordist production structures, the new organisation of work was 
guided by  the ideas of decentralisation of decision-making structures and the 
projectification of labour. 
 The decentralisation of decision-making structures referred to the 
progressive attenuation and elimination of hierarchies; it attempts to describe a 
movement of rearrangement of organisational structures according to which 
there is an increasing trend of competence sharing and delegation towards the 
lower levels of the organisational structure in the performance of work, putting 
at stake the sharp division of competences that characterised the fordist era. 
There are several types of decentralisation that can be configured in the 
following scheme:  
 (1) operational
b.1) parallel
b.2) true (entrepreneur model / self-organisation)
        (2) strategic
Operational decentralisation refers to the movement of decentralisation within 
existing hierarchies; the fundamental structure of the company  is not radically 
changed but merely  rearranged so as to face the requirements of the new 
economical conditions. There are two distinct types of operational 
decentralisation that may be classified in accordance with the durability of the 
intervention: parallel decentralisation and true decentralisation. Parallel 
decentralisation refers to a situation in which the delegation and communication 
with the lower ranks of the company is limited to a number of specific tasks; it 
consists in timely and objectively limited decentralisation of the decision making 
structure towards a working group so as to improve the efficiency of that stage 
of the procedure. This represents a break-up  with the fordist division of work; 
instead of taking the decision itself, the management of the company decides 
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to enter into dialogue with the lower ranks of the company in order to 
collaborate with them by mean of an agreement so as to increase the efficiency 
of that stage of the productive procedure. It consists in a sharing of 
competences, whereby the responsibility for the reform of the productive unit 
and the competence to take that decision are delegated towards the lower 
ranks (although not entirely). Since it does not alter fundamentally  the pre-
existing structure but rather completes it, it may be named as parallel 
decentralisation. It was designed to close the information gap  that existed 
between the different stages of the productive procedure. True decentralisation 
represents a more advanced stage of decentralisation whereby the existing 
structure is generally  and permanently modified; the vertical and horizontal 
division of competences are radically  altered in accordance with the following 
principles: firstly, the decision-making competences are transferred from the 
indirect segments of production towards the operational segments; secondly, 
there is a reduction in the horizontal division of competences, with an emphasis 
on overlapping competences and team-work so as to reach the best result. The 
members of the operational unit themselves must reach the best working 
arrangement so as to maximise the efficiency of the unit. There are two types 
of true decentralisation, the self-organisational model and the entrepreneur 
model: within the self-organisational model the competences and 
responsibilities are transferred directly to continuous homogeneous groups, 
who accept these tasks in formal autonomy without any pre-determined 
functional division of tasks; within the entrepreneur model the competences 
and responsibilities are transferred to circles of specialists within their own 
competences; there is no formal division between direct and indirect tasks but 
merely an increase in the autonomy of each rank of the productive procedure 
by means of a boost in its competences.407 
 Strategic decentralisation consists in a more advanced mode of 
decentralisation that has been raising questions as to the boundaries of the 
firm. Strategic decentralisation consists in the involvement of firms in intricate 
contractual networks of collaborations with outsiders, who continuously assume 
the responsibility for performing some stages of the productive procedure of 
companies. The company itself concentrates on its core-competences whereas 
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the non-core competences are outsourced towards other participants outside 
the company by  means of a contractual arrangement. The company decides to 
contract out every non-essential part of its productive procedure from whoever 
provides the best result. There are a number of advantages of having resource 
to sub-contractors: firstly, the company does not have to undertake the 
necessary investments. The company merely has to expect the other to make 
the necessary investment and then purchase the final result of the investment; 
secondly, the company may benefit from the advantages of specialisation: 
subcontractors are usually companies who specialise in niche markets and 
then sell the results of their specialisation to the demanding large firms. Since 
the subcontractor is focused only on a niche market, the core company does 
not have to make investments in R&D or to be attentive to the evolution of the 
market in that specific stage of the production but merely to purchase the final 
result of a company which is completely concentrated on maximising its 
competences in the niche market. Since the relationship  between the core 
company and the supplier is merely contractual, it may shift subcontractors as it 
deems fit to its best needs.408
 Another feature of the post-fordist organisation of work consisted in the 
projectification of labour.409  The fordist system of production drew a line with 
the former craft-based system of production in dividing work in strictly divided 
tasks where the margin of autonomy of the worker was almost – if not entirely - 
absent and the same task was done repeatedly for days without end. The idea 
was for the worker to gain certain job-specific skills in order to perform its work 
more rapidly  and contribute to the economies of scale that characterise 
fordism. Post-fordism has brought about the end of this scheme. Work is 
progressively  being organised in short- and medium-term projects, with well-
defined time horizons. Workers are continuously  organised around production 
teams without any formal pre-existing structure or hierarchy and must organise 
themselves towards the fulfilment of a specific project. A process of iterated 
goal setting coordinates the activities of work teams. All the remaining 
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members control the performance of each individual member of the team in 
order to prevent the taking advantage of the work of others (peer-pressure). 
This is a mechanism of self-control of the performance of work (rather than 
external control). This form of production integrates conception and execution 
as parallel tasks. The margin of autonomy that these teams have – when 
combined with the decentralisation of productive structures – is such that some 
of them may be almost characterised as independent firms. They may 
determine their own internal organisation, communicate horizontally within the 
organisation, build close collaborative relationships with the other participants 
of the productive process, adapting it to the best needs of the firm and the 
productive process and there is a high-degree of circulation of persons among 
teams, in order for the competences acquired in one team to be applied in 
other projects. Therefore, the organisation of work has progressively departed 
from strict hierarchical tasks performed by individuals constrained by rules and 
procedures towards a collective effort undertaken by a team with diverse skills, 
working with considerable discretion and judged on results and outcomes. The 
compartmentalisation of jobs has evolved towards the interdependence and 
involvement.410 
The way that these firms ensured the alignment of interests between 
workers and firms also contributed a great deal to the modification of the 
employment relationship. A report on the evolution of labour made by Fortune 
magazine in 1994 (13th June 1994, pp.44) describes the modifications occurred 
boldly: 
“There will never be job  security. You will be employed by us as long as 
you add value to the organisation, and you are continuously responsible 
for finding ways to add value. I return, you have the right to demand 
interesting and important work, the freedom and resources to perform it 
well, pay that reflects your contribution, and the experience and training 
needed to be employable here and elsewhere.”
It is easy to observe that this new logic represents a sharp-contrast with 
Fordism. Whereas in fordism, workers had the incentive to work and remain in 
the company in exchange for job  security and pay connected with seniority, in 
post-fordism workers are encouraged to find autonomous ways to add value to 
the firms; their incentive to do so consists in pay in proportion to contribution 
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(and not seniority) and skills that may be employed in other projects and with 
other employers. 
 The decentralisation and projectification brought about a sharp  contrast 
with fordism. In a certain sense, one may say that they attempted to bring into 
large organisations the competitive advantages of craft production 
(specialisation, fluid hierarchies, easy adaptation).411  This change in the 
philosophy of work is connected with the modifications that occurred in the 
general economical conditions. The former paragraphs mentioned that the 
1970s brought about with them a sharp decrease in the productivity of the 
workforce, which reduced the rhythm of accumulation. This meant that the 
traditional formula of extracting value from the workforce by means of a sharp 
division of tasks and the reduction in the autonomy of labour had been 
exhausted and new work methods needed to be implemented. The competition 
from new markets with low cost products also exhausted the possibility to 
reduce unit prices to achieve a competitive advantage; the competitive 
advantage of companies now needed to be underpinned in differentiation and 
added value; the company needed to bring about a contribution that 
distinguished it from its competitors and this reinforced the role of R&D in the 
strategy of companies. The general macro-economic structure also was 
modified to a great extent: whereas fordist companies normally operated in 
regulated markets and stable economies based on the balance of demand and 
taxation to sustain growth and avoid inflation, now companies had to operate in 
unstable markets based on the supply side of the economy and they were 
subject to the pressure of financial actors; this jeopardised their possibilities to 
maintain their old long-term strategies of growth through vertical integration and 
conquer of market shares. The decentralisation of labour relations and the 
projectification of labour were seen as the answer to these problems because 
they introduced the advantages of craft production in large assembly units: the 
delegation of decision-making power to the lower levels and the emphasis on 
short-termism that projectification brings with it allowed companies to better 
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readapt to the fluctuations of the market and allowed employees to bring about 
a positive contribution of their skills to the company.412 
(c)  the reorganisation of companies – after having analysed the reasons for 
the decline in fordism and the labour strategies that companies adopted in 
order to cope with the new economic environment, it is not time to analyse the 
organisational structure that companies adopted in order to cope with the new 
times. The strategies that companies have been progressively adopting since 
the 1980s are manifold but they may be reconducted to the principles 
enumerated in two very influential works published in the 1980s: Peter and 
Waterman’s “In search of excellence” and Alfred Rappaport’s “Shareholder 
value: the new standard for business performance”.413  The following lines will 
attempt to describe their content and impact in its due place. In order to 
understand how companies managed to achieve these aims one needs to 
distinguish between large companies and small and medium sized companies. 
(a)  large companies -  as regards large companies, post-fordism changed the 
structure of companies both internally and externally. The modifications 
occurred in the internal structure of companies were already sketched above: 
there was in increase in the decentralisation of decision-making power towards 
the lower ranks of the hierarchy and the reorganisation of work towards more 
participatory work procedures. It is only worthwhile noting the fundamental 
changes that this brought about to the structure of companies: firstly, there was 
a flattening of the hierarchy  in terms of a decrease in the number of leading 
positions the compartmentalisation of labour. The division of labour became 
more fluid and horizontal, with the organisation of workers circulating around 
project-teams. Secondly, the participatory character of the new work procedure 
does not mean that employees were gifted with co-determination rights; the 
participatory character of the new organisation of work implies a greater degree 
of communication and understanding between the levels of the hierarchy and 
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the different departments of the company; the emphasis is not so-much placed 
upon obtaining the consent of the other party  to introduce a modification but in 
generating a climate of constant communication, flow of information, dialogue 
and understanding. The German language has a very expressive word to 
describe this dynamic: Mitwirkung, i.e. the co-influence on the conformation of 
the work. The idea is to generate constant dialogue and compromise and not 
antagonism in terms of a zero-sum game between management and rank and 
file. This obliges management and policy-makers to implement new forms of 
cooperation and participation of the workforce, the elevation of the qualification 
levels of the workforce in order to induce positive participation and the 
modification of the internal structure of companies in order to induce 
participation and encourage the encourage the expression of positive 
contributions to the work procedure. The innovations of the company are no 
longer introduced vertically but horizontally by means of medium-termed project 
teams and open processes of development of the product as it is being 
manufactured. The greatest resource of a company became its human 
resources and the capacity of the human factor to generate value.414 
 The external structure of companies was also impressively  modified. 
The main modifications occurred in accordance with two specific principles: the 
organisation around strategic business units and the rise of the networked 
company. The organisation of companies around strategic business units was 
heavily influenced by a managerial philosophy developed in the debut of the 
1980s by Alfred Rappaport, which first introduced the idea of shareholder 
value. According to this very influential report, managers should divide the 
company into strategic business units and concentrate in extracting cash-flows 
to the shareholders from those same units. A strategic business unit consists in 
a division of the company gifted with a properly defined market, competing in 
an external market (as opposed to being an internal supplier) and being 
separable, distinct and identifiable. The management of the company should be 
fully decentralised towards the managers of those same units: the managers of 
each strategic business unit should be fully responsible for extracting value 
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from the unit constrained only  by  the overall corporate strategy.415 In order for 
the managers to extract the greatest value of each strategic business unit, each 
unit should have a bias for action, stay close to the customer, have autonomy 
and entrepreneurship, bet on productivity through people, bet on value driven 
management, have a simple organisation and lean-staff, concentrate on core-
activities and have autonomy in shop-floor. This change of managerial 
philosophy must be reconducted to the general movement of financialisation of 
the economy that occurred during the 1980s under the new philosophy of 
supply-side economics. Since companies were under a stronger pressure to 
compete they needed to deliver profits.416 
The organisation of the company around strategic business units 
considerably modified the structure of existing companies: firstly, post-fordistm 
bet on the dismantling of the existing conglomerates. Considering that the 
building up of conglomerates was supported in a combination of low interest 
rates and protectionism, the new managerial philosophy considered that the 
company should rather concentrate in its core competences. Large holding 
companies then sold and dismantled the conglomerates that they had 
constructed and concentrated on their core businesses. Secondly, in order to 
reduce the risk and better define the markets in which they were active, large 
companies decided to split and build up  groups of companies (Konzern). These 
groups of companies are not to be confused with conglomerates because the 
companies under a common control were companies in related businesses in 
which the managers could extract synergies from the coordination of their 
activities. Finally, many companies simply gave up producing ancillary products 
and decided to reduce their activities to their core competences: the company 
would identify its main activity, its strong arm and concentrate on developing 
that same activity while outsourcing the ancillary activities to a network of 
secondary firms. 
This introduces the second great modification in the external structure of 
companies: the rise of the network company. The network company consists in 
a new method of organizing the company that is between markets and 
hierarchies: on the one hand there is no vertical integration such as fordism but 
418
415 Rappaport, A. (1986). Shareholder value - the new standard for business performance. New 
York, The Free Press.
416 Peters, T. J. and R. H. Waterman (1982). In Search of Excellence Profile Business.
on the other hand the companies that are part of the network are not fully 
independent such as to be considered  - at least economically – as purely 
independent contractors acting on an atomic basis within a market.417 Networks 
consist in a distinct form of coordination and amalgamation of the activities of 
companies, whose specificity  in the legal and economic plans raise several 
questions as regards the traditional assumptions of the limits of the firm. 
Traditionally, the legal and economic thinking about the limits of the firm was 
strongly influenced by the economic analysis undertaken by Coase, which 
determined the limit of the firm in accordance with the decision to internalise 
the product or service within the hierarchy or to contract it out on the market to 
an independent contractor. The network consists in a form of coordination of 
the activities of firms in which the aggregation of the activity of each distinct firm 
is not so deep  as to configure a merger, acquisition or group  relation – at least 
legally – but at the same time is sufficiently strong as to render the activities of 
each company partially or totally dependent of the other. This collaboration 
between companies may be accomplished by means of legal contracts (often 
by means of incomplete contracts – in the economic sense of the term – which 
are to be progressively fulfilled by means of legal contracts) or by means of the 
set up of a new organisation whose object is the coordination of the activities of 
companies. Networks may also be either paritary or hierarchical: a paritary 
network consists in a network of companies in which no member of the network 
enjoys a preponderant position in terms of influencing the governance of the 
other company; a hierarchical network consists in a network in which one or 
more members enjoy a preponderant position over the governance of the other 
company, either by means of an explicit contract or, more often, by means of 
the strong economic dependency of one party  in relation to the other; this 
economic dependency does not amount to a group  relation however, at least in 
the legal sense of the word: the legal system leaves empty  an important 
regulatory space, build up of situations  in which there is no contractual control 
in the technical sense but in which the power and information asymmetries 
have relevant effects over the hierarchy, the distribution of decision-making 
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power and the relationships between companies and creditors.418 The central 
task of the network consists in the ensuring the circulation of information 
between the companies that compose the network and reduce the scope for 
opportunistic behaviour of each company, ensuring the stability of the 
relationships established between the companies and that the behaviour of 
each individual company does not harm and other stakeholders.419 
There are several forms of coordination of the activities of companies by 
means of networks. The following lines  will proceed to examine the most 
relevant ones for this study, which are: contractual models (outsourcing 
contracts and intellectual property  rights contracts) and organisational models 
(bureaucratic contracts, proprietary contracts and hybrid contracts). 
(1)  contractual models – the contractual models of the network encompass a 
variety of situations in which the coordination of the activities of companies is 
achieved by means of contracts. Contracts, bilateral and multilateral, complete 
and incomplete, are the governance mechanism used to determine the rights 
and obligations of each party in the network and the means by which the 
coordination of the activities of companies is to be achieved. In order to 
understand the functioning of the contractual network one must begin by 
referring its main competitive advantage: the maintenance of the autonomy of 
the parties despite the establishment of a relationship  of collaboration and the 
great degree of flexibility in the setting up  of the rights and duties of the parties 
within the network. Since contracts are mechanisms underpinned in the private 
autonomy of the parties, they  allow for a wide scope of flexibility in determining 
the mechanisms of collaboration and the prevention of opportunism. Contracts 
may be used for the setting up  of both hierarchical and paritary  networks: the 
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level of hierarchy is directly correlated to the concentration of directive power in 
the hands of one of the parties to the contract. 
 The organisation of the network by means of contracts may obey one of 
the following three schemes: linear schemes, radial schemes and mixed 
schemes. Linear networks consist in networks in which the several contracts 
composing the network are laid out sequentially, with each company being 
party  to at least two contracts (with the exception of the extremes). Each 
company performs a part of the productive process and the failure of one 
company to perform its stage of the productive procedure will jeopardise the 
whole process because the sequential company will not be able to fill-in the 
gap. Radial networks resemble a star in which one company will act as the 
centre of the network and celebrate a number of contracts with distinct parties, 
who have no relationship  to one another. The central company is the common 
party  to all the contracts of the network (e.g: franchising). Mixed networks 
consist in networks that combine each one of these models; one can imagine a 
linear network in which one of the parties sets up a radial network in the middle 
of the procedure.420 All of these models refer to situations in which companies 
are in a relation of interdependence and in which the actions of one is liable to 
have externalities over the situation of others. Since contractual networks are 
characterised by  a position of independence (at least legal) of each member of 
the network, this raises the question of the governance devices that one may 
use to prevent opportunistic behaviour. Although the question of the prevention 
of opportunism is common to any network, the problem is particularly  serious in 
hierarchical networks, which are by definition networks characterised by a 
strong imbalance of power between the contracting parties. Unlike what 
happens in groups of companies, hierarchical network relations do not allow 
the dominating party to pursue its own self-interest at the expense of the 
contractually weaker party. There is a need to prevent that the discrepancy of 
economic power and the meagre residual control that the dependent company 
has left do not translate into abuses on the part of the dominating company, in 
the form of the reallocation of risk towards the dependent company. This could 
place serious problems to weaker constituencies, such as employees, creditors 
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and minority shareholders, endangering the economic advantages of the 
network form. 
 The governance mechanisms that contractual networks may employ to 
prevent opportunist may be summarised in two large types: sanction 
mechanisms and reward mechanisms. Sanction mechanisms impose a penalty 
over the party that refuses to collaborate, making it incur on a loss that 
otherwise it would not have incurred. Penalty clauses (the ones that oblige the 
uncooperative party to pay a sum to the other that goes beyond the value of the 
loss incurred by the weaker party) exemplify these mechanisms. Reward 
mechanisms create incentives for collaborative behaviour. Instead of simply 
expecting the party  to behave correspondingly, the contract attributes a 
premium to the party that best contributes to the success of the network. This is 
a mechanism designed to align the interests of the constituent parties with 
those of the network. An example may be, for instance, the distribution of 
profits in accordance with the success of the network. Since these mechanisms 
are contractual in nature, general contract law rules such as general clauses, 
good faith and remedies for breach of contract have a particular importance in 
this context.421 
Contractual networks have an inherent dialectic tension between 
flexibility and stability. The fact that the contract is by definition underpinned in 
the private autonomy of the parties, grants the network with a very high degree 
of flexibility, since the parties to the contract are gifted with an almost 
unrestricted margin of manoeuvre to develop their own mechanisms to prevent 
opportunism and pursue their own interests. This inherent flexibility is however 
in a dialectic tension with a tendentially lower degree of stability; although 
stability is an element of extreme importance in order to induce cooperation 
and allow for the amortization of the investments undertaken, it should not be 
confused with rigidity. Dense and inflexible contracts jeopardise the possibilities 
for further cooperation because there is the possibility that the parties will feel 
so burdened by rigid schemes of cooperation that they will manage the network 
towards more short-termism in order to avoid being trapped in the future. The 
stability that the network needs must be reconciliated with the possibility  for the 
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revision of the agreement in the event of a modification of circumstances. The 
contractual mechanisms for the prevention of the opportunistic behaviours that 
this possibility of revision opens consist in a high level of rigidity as for the 
objectives and scope pursued by the parties (normally by means of general 
clauses) and a high level of flexibility  for the means to be achieved. Normally, 
these contracts provide for reflexive mechanisms of posterior bargaining of 
subsequent contracts that will complete the standard contract of cooperation in 
more short-term contracts. These contracts therefore should be gifted with a 
combination of declarations of intent and general clauses and decision-making 
mechanisms to render the contract more flexible during its performance.422  
There are several types of contractual networks. The following lines will 
attempt to analyse here two very common types of contractual networks, 
outsourcing networks and associative networks. Their description will help us to 
comprehend the functioning of the network and the several control problems 
present within the network. 
Outsourcing contracts consist in an the operation whereby a company 
trusts to another company the task of executing, on her behalf and in 
accordance with a pre-established set of instructions, a part of it productive 
process, maintaining the final economic responsibility for the result.423 In sharp 
contrast to the ideas of vertical integration in order to reduce costs by sparing 
the profit margin of the intermediary, post-fordism bet on the concentration in 
core-activities and on the contracting out of every non-essential part of the 
production. Initially, the main idea behind outsourcing was to combine the 
advantages of craft-production and fordism: a company would specialise in 
producing a specific product that could function as an input for another 
company (being thus an intermediary step  in a productive procedure), with the 
possibility – if necessary  – to produce it in large scale. Since the company 
would be focused merely on the production of that particular product, this would 
allow both the achievement of economies of scale as well as of a high quality of 
the final product. Outsourcing then spread to all sectors of the economic 
activity, with the increasing externalisation of ancillary activities that used to be 
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performed within the company, such as mensae, cleaning services, accounting, 
systems’ administration, etc. To the gaudy of the contractualist theorists of the 
firm, companies increasingly  resembled more bundles of contracts than proper 
organisations.424
Outsourcing obeys to the principle of rationalisation: the bundle of 
companies that are in a contractual relation of interdependence (whether 
symmetrical or hierarchical) with the contracting company should be capable of 
providing for a set of functions to provide and control the elementary  pieces, 
the assembly and sub-assemblies of the final product. This transfer of 
competences to the contracted companies increases to a great extent the 
technical and economical responsibility of the contracted companies in the 
productive process. This renders necessary  a contractual policy  that 
guarantees the contracted companies participation in the whole or in the part of 
the programs to allow them to extract profit from the necessary investments. 
There are three distinct forms of outsourcing: global outsourcing, global 
production outsourcing and systematic outsourcing. Global outsourcing 
consists in a production logic whereby a contractor has full responsibility for the 
duration of a program, both the project and the execution; global production 
outsourcing consists in an operation whereby the principal makes the projects 
and then contracts the execution to the sub-contractor; systematic outsourcing 
is normally  used in small and medium companies and consists in the 
subcontracting of small components or services of a very specialised nature to 
the subcontractor and its application and assembly  within the principal 
company. These different forms of outsourcing possess a definite partnership 
dimension; they are accompanied with so strong demands of competitiveness 
over prices and technicality that they are bound to have important 
consequences over the investments, management of the production and of the 
staff of the sub-contractor company. This renders the sub-contracting 
companies highly competitive because they know that if they do not correspond 
to the demands of the principal company they will not see their contract 
renovated. This is in accordance with the logic of projectification, 
decentralisation and autonomy of each productive unit mentioned above on 
occasion of  the analysis of the work procedures: although the subcontractor 
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works for the principal, it retains full-autonomy over the methods to achieve the 
demands of the principal.425 
Outsourcing relations are characterised by the autonomy – at least 
formal – of the sub-contractor in relation to the principal. Sub-contractors are 
even normally so keen in maintaining this autonomy that they developed three 
distinct strategies in order to reinforce their position vis-à-vis the principals: 
firstly, they diversified the principals, in order to avoid being extremely 
dependent of one principal; secondly, they  developed their own products, which 
allows them to retain a certain degree of know-how and compete autonomously 
in international markets; thirdly, they decided to outsource themselves some of 
their operations. This did not avoid however, that the outsourcing operations be 
often characterised by a high degree of asymmetry and dependence of the 
sub-contractor in relation to the principal: some markets are characterised by a 
sharp atomisation and high degree of competitiveness of the sub-contractors in 
relation to the principals; also, the obligation of result pending upon the sub-
contractor often provides full control of the relation to the principal. This raises 
the question of risk-allocation and opportunism: how are we to avoid that 
principals use outsourcing agreements in order to avoid labour protection and 
transfer the company risk to the subcontractor; and how are we to avoid that 
the principal await the subcontractor to make the necessary investments and 
then rip  the profits of the investment without giving a chance to the sub-
contractor to amortize its investment? This raises some very complicated 
governance problems because the subcontractor is de facto run in accordance 
with the interests of the principal, disregarding the interests of minority 
shareholders, creditors and employees.426  Contractual governance 
mechanisms are normally inefficient to fight this given the disparity  of the 
bargaining position of the parties; the only result is legislative intervention such 
as the one that occurred in Italy with the Legge 192/98, which contains a 
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general clause prohibiting the abuse of the economic dependence of the 
subcontractor.427
Associative networks consist in the second type of contractual network. 
This category comprehends all contracts through which the companies 
operating in the network regulate the exercise of their autonomy and coordinate 
it towards the achievement of common interests. They may be regulatory 
contracts (e.g: codes of conduct), cooperative contracts (e.g: consortia, 
strategic alliances, partnerships) or distributional contracts (e.g: agency, 
franchising, licensing). The determining feature of these contracts consists in 
the setting up  of a tendentialy  long-term relation between the companies. 
Unlike what happens in outsourcing contracts, in which a company 
subcontracts a part of its productive procedure to another, in associative 
networks the two companies have a very precise object, which is coordinated 
towards a common interest.
These contracts have an inherent tension between a transactional and a 
relational character. A contract is said to have a transactional character when 
its object consists in a trade between two parties (e.g: a licensing contract, in 
which a company pays to use a technology); it is said to have a relational 
character when its object consists in the establishment of a relationship 
between the parties that might lead to letter transactional contracts (e.g: 
partnerships). This is normally correlated to the structure of the market and the 
position of the parties: if the market is highly competitive and the parties are 
developing complementary  activities, the contracts tend to be more relational; if 
the market allows for a certain lassitude and the parties are competing then the 
contracts tend to be more transactional. The more a contract tends to be 
relational, the more incomplete it tends to be. This raises the question of the 
prevention of opportunism and the tension between flexibility and stability  that I 
mentioned in the former paragraph. These points have a particular significance 
in relational contracts.
These networks have a particular relevance today as relates to the 
question of know-how. Since technology and know-how are the main 
competitive advantages of modern companies, it is no wonder that it is 
increasingly becoming the object of relation between companies. A study 
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undertaken by Bessy and Brousseau has attempted to devise a typology of 
these contracts. According to these authors, contracts relating to the transfer of 
know-how could be characterised in the following categories: (1) transactional 
technology licensing agreements (TLA), (2) one-shot complete transfer, (3) 
relational commercial TLA, (4) development TLA and (5) relational TLA.428 The 
first have as their object the simple transfer of a right; the second have as their 
object the transfer of the right to use a technology by a limited period of time; 
the third have as their object the transfer of the right to develop an existing 
technology; the fourth have as their object the right to develop  an existing 
technology with the obligation to develop with the former company the profits to 
be ripped from the development; the fifth have as their object the allocation of 
several resources over a long period of time. It becomes easy to observe that 
there is a crescendo of interdependence between the companies, with the first 
contract being strictly  transactional and the latter being strictly  relational. There 
is a gradual increase of the level of interdependence between the companies 
as to the level of complementary of the resources in relation to the others 
present in the company. Companies become gradually more dependent and 
their actions are liable to have externalities over the other. This raises the 
omnipresent question of the internal governance of the network.429 
(2)  organisational models -  in contrast to what happens in contractual 
networks, organisational networks give rise to the setting up of a new entity 
designed to coordinate the activities of the companies. Organisational networks 
may be either hierarchical or paritary and the presence of a new entity to 
coordinate the activities of companies does not necessarily give rise to the 
setting up  of a group relation. Organisational networks go beyond contractual 
networks in the sense that the setting up of a new entity  gives rise to a more 
stable governance system, ideally  suited to the coordination of long-term 
relationships. The entity  set up for the governance of the network most often 
has a purely regulatory function, destined to safeguard a collective interest of 
the firms that compose the network. An example could be an entity set up for 
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the certification of the quality of a certain product: although each company 
produces the product individually, the certification of quality  ensures a collective 
reputation that benefits all the companies that are part of the network. The 
distinguishing feature of the organisational network consists in the fact that the 
partners of the company whose object consists in the coordination of the 
activities of companies are themselves the companies whose activity  is 
coordinated. 
 The application of the organisational model for the governance of the 
network gives rise to specific governance problems connected to the several 
relations established within the network. The main agency problems that occur 
within the organisational network structure can be condensed in two large 
groups: (1) between the majority  shareholders of each company that composes 
the network and the administrators of the network and (2) between the minority 
shareholders of each company that composes the network and the 
administrators of those companies. The reasons for these agency problems are 
easy to guess: as regards the first group, the majority shareholders of each 
company will want the administrators of the network to manage the network on 
their interest; as regards the second group, the minority shareholders are in a 
delicate position because the administrators of those companies are at the 
hand of the majority shareholders and tend to influence the governance of the 
network at the interest of those majority shareholders. Each organisational 
network must provide an answer to these specific agency problems in order to 
avoid that the network falls prey to the majority shareholders’ powers.430 
 There are three types of organisational networks: social, bureaucratic 
and proprietary. Each one of them has distinguishing features that provide an 
answer to the agency problems mentioned beforehand. There is also the 
possibility to have a combination of the characteristics of each one of these 
networks, giving rise to hybrid networks. 431 
 Social networks consist in a type of organisational network underpinned 
in informal, direct and interpersonal bonds. Social networks are usually  set up 
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in environments in which the possibilities of opportunism are low and are 
characterised by a high level of trust. The sanctions against opportunistic 
behaviour are essentially reputational, which might provide a very  strong 
deterrence mechanism because the personal bonds that connect the persons 
part of the network may break up easily  in the presence of opportunistic 
behaviour. The main example of these social networks consists in interlocking 
directorates. Interlocking directorates refer to a situation in which there is the 
presence of one alien administrator in the board of another company. They  may 
be direct, indirect or reciprocal: in direct interlocking directorates, one 
administrator sits at the boards of two companies; in indirect directorates, two 
administrators of distinct companies sit at the board of a third company; in 
reciprocal directorates, each management board of the networked companies 
appoints one or more of its members to sit in the management board of the 
other company. Interlocking directorates are a very  effective system to set up  a 
bond between two companies because the mix of the members of the 
management boards ensures an easier flow of information between the 
companies and facilitates the coordination of their activities. It facilitates 
collusive behaviours. Empirical research has highlighted that interlocking 
directorates are particularly  apt for situations of dependency of resources: for 
instance, when a company requests credit from another, the company providing 
the credit may introduce a member in the management board in order to control 
the application of the money; or when two companies collude to gain a specific 
contract, they may set up  a reciprocal interlocking directorate in order to 
prevent opportunistic behaviours during the performance of the contract.432
 Bureaucratic networks correspond to a foundational logic in which the 
companies, although having diverse interests, agree to submit to common rules 
and procedures for the distribution of resources. This implies a structure with a 
certain degree of formalisation when the number of actors to coordinate is 
relevant. The choice of the organisational model should take into account that 
these networks have an interest in aggregating the biggest possible number of 
subjects. They  are destined to provide an answer to collective action problems, 
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by establishing specific governance features for the attainment of a common 
objective. The most common type of bureaucratic networks consists in 
consortial networks. A consortium consists in an instrument of coordination 
between companies whereby two of more companies coordinate their activities 
to the attainment of a specific undertaking, normally  demanding very  specific 
and technical expertises.433  It is a very flexible instrument of coordination that 
corresponds to a variety of needs. A consortium may be used, for instance, for 
(1) the attainment of economies of scale (distribution networks, R&D), (2) 
reinforcement of the market power, (3) control of a market, (4) control of the 
quality  of the products of the members of the consortium, among others. The 
most common uses of the consortium may be classified in two large groups: (a) 
the reaching of economies of scale or an increase in the reach of action or (b) 
the aggregation of means for the promotion of innovation. The consortium 
might have two distinct forms: (1) it may consist in a simple agreement between 
the parties (giving rise to a contractual network) or (2) it may consist in the 
setting up  of a company to manage the consortium (giving rise to an 
organisational network). The second type is preferred when the companies 
which to develop a long term relationship because it has two great advantages: 
firstly, it has a stable internal governance mechanism, consisting in the 
company law rules to which the companies are subject; secondly, it acts as a 
lock-in device, preventing opportunistic behaviours. The consortium is a very 
appreciated instrument of coordination because it may give rise either to 
contractual or to organisational networks and it provides the parties with a large 
degree of flexibility in the choice of the most appropriate organisational form (a 
foundation, a private company, a public company, a partnership) that best suits 
its needs. 
 Proprietary  networks consist in models of coordination that act by means 
of a co-division of the resources and the residual results of their enjoyment. 
They are appropriate for those situations in which the parties must make 
investments towards a common end and there is a high risk of opportunism. 
They are often used in the development of innovative activities, of high 
technological content and with a high degree of insecurity in relation to the 
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results. There is a collusive logic here and the division of property seems to be 
the most adequate instrument to perform the interests of the parties. 
Proprietary  networks may be designed either for the solution of transactional 
problems or collective action problems: the most adequate instrument for the 
solution of transaction problems is the venture capital; the most appropriate 
instrument for the solution of collective action problems is the joint venture.
 Venture capital consists in an organisational form of the coordination of 
the activities of companies designed to the financing of young companies with 
a high growth potential. Venture capital is usually made by means of 
professional investors (venture capitalists), who collect funds from private 
parties and institutional investors in order to reinvest them in sectors of high 
potential of growth and high risk. The investment is made with a view to 
obtaining a return consisting in the allocation of intellectual property rights over 
the company and the results of the research. It is the most adequate means of 
financing in a context in which none of the parties knows beforehand the profits 
to be gathered from the investment, the relevance of the other contributions 
and it is difficult to monitor and control the quality  and quantity of the 
performance of the other part. These are situations characterised by strong 
informational asymmetries and a high risk of opportunistic behaviour, giving rise 
to high agency costs. Venture capital consists in an organisational form of 
coordination because it presupposes a certain degree of collaboration between 
the companies in the attainment of the objective. The financer does not simply 
put its capital at risk, it also controls the application of the capital and gathers 
profit from its investment not only by means of the profits of the financed 
company but also by  licensing the intellectual property rights arising from the 
innovation and participating in the exploration of the results of the research. It is 
usually made by means of a foundation set up between the financer and the 
financed. The professional investor is compensated for choosing the activity in 
which to invest, monitoring the recipient of the finance and participating in the 
management of the venture-backed company. Therefore, the venture capitalist 
is not simply a mere provider of finance; it also collaborates actively in the 
attainment of the desired result by offering management and commercial 
consultation to the financed company; it also reserves to himself large powers 
of control and active administration in the common company in order to 
condition its action in the best interests of the providers of finance. The entire 
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operation is structured in such a way as to stimulate cooperative behaviour 
between the parties: although the manager of the venture backed company 
normally has the right to manage the company in its best interest, the venture 
capitalist has large supervisory  powers, reserving to himself a number of 
mechanisms to serve the interests of the providers of finance. These are 
mechanisms to reduce agency costs and may consist in: (1) restrictive 
covenants (such as veto rights over some investment decisions, special rights 
to information, special nomination rights, etc), (2) step-by-step  financing and (3) 
special shareholdings (such as fixed revenues).    
 Joint ventures are a distinct organisational form designating every form 
of integration between companies whose scope is the development in common 
of a business. It is characterised by  the setting up of a common company 
between the parties (the joint subsidiary) for a common enterprise. It consists in 
a stable cooperation between companies by means of the setting up  of new 
entity  subject to the control of the participating companies. It ensures a high 
degree of stability, its flexibility  consists in the choice of the most appropriate 
business form and the reduction of agency costs consists in the internal 
mechanisms that characterise that business form. All joint ventures have at 
their basis the celebration of a joint venture agreement between the 
participating companies. 
 Hybrid networks are networks of companies that combine characteristics 
of each one of the former organisational networks. The legal thinking has 
tended to characterise two distinct types of networks as hybrid networks due to 
the fact that their position stands in between bureaucratic and proprietary 
networks: these are the shareholders’ agreements and the cross-
shareholdings. Shareholders’ agreements consist in agreements celebrated 
between the shareholders of a company or between the shareholders and third 
parties that stand side-by-side with a company. Their scope is normally the 
stabilisation of corporate assets, the consolidation of the position of the 
partners of a company or other governance issues and is gifted with a certain 
degree of formalisation. They set up  networks destined to govern the 
interdependence between the companies that are part of the network; however, 
since they are instrumental to the company, they build up an isolated scheme: 
they are bureaucratic networks that are inherent to a proprietary network. 
These agreements are generally licit; however, they are subject to a number of 
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limitations. In Italy, although there is no discipline for the shareholders’ 
agreements (patti parasociali) in private companies (società di responsabilità 
limitata), public companies admitted to trade in stock markets have a number of 
limitations: firstly, they are subject to an obligation of transparency; secondly, 
they are limited to a period of five years with the possibility of a unilateral 
breach. This regime is lighter in the context of companies that are involved in 
networks of companies as long as they are limited to the participants.434 
Portugal also has similar regulations as regards shareholders’ agreements. 
Although they are generally licit and may be celebrated for a variety of scopes 
(see art.17 of the Portuguese Company Code) they are subject to a number of 
limitations: firstly, if they are celebrated in public companies admitted to trade in 
a stock market, they must be made public in accordance with some obligations 
of transparency; secondly, in the event that the shareholders have special 
nomination rights of managers and the managers are made liable for the 
damages caused to the company, the shareholders with whom it has 
shareholders’ agreements will respond solidarity with the manager (art.83º of 
the Portuguese Company Statute). 
 Cross-shareholdings amount to a distinct hybrid network. They consist in 
proprietary networks that are instrumental to a contractual network, typically a 
contract of collaboration. Cross-shareholdings may constitute a means of 
collaboration because they create a more stable alliance between the 
companies that are part of the network. Although they favour cooperation they 
are seen as dangerous by the legal thinking on account of three reasons: firstly, 
there is the danger of mixing waters. Since the shareholding in the other 
company represents a participation in its legal capital, this has the effect that 
(1) the losses incurred in one company will have repercussions over the other 
and (2) the company  will indirectly acquire its own shares. Secondly, crossing 
votes will reduce the autonomy of each company, since each one will vote on 
the general meeting of the other. However, they are usually permitted with 
precautions because (a) they reduce the scope for opportunistic behaviour and 
(b) they favour the coordination of strategies.     
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(3)  comparative perspectives – contractual networks and organisational 
networks correspond to two distinct forms of organisation of the activities of 
companies that are suited to provide an answer to distinct interests. One is 
tempted to say that there is a game between flexibility and stability on the one 
hand and transaction and relation on the other. Contractual networks are 
characterised by a high degree of flexibility but lack lock-in devices and other 
internal governance mechanisms that prevent the opportunistic behaviours that 
jeopardise long-term relations; if we add the often overwhelming contractual 
imbalance between the parties to this game, then it becomes easy to observe 
that they are not ideally  suited to long term relations; organisational networks 
enjoy a less wide degree of flexibility (it depends on the concrete organisational 
form that companies choose) and are ideally  suited for long-term relations 
because the structure that the parties choose to govern their relation has 
several internal governance devices to prevent opportunism imbedded within it; 
however, they lack the flexibility  recognised to contractual models. The reality 
shows that each network combine one or more of these types of coordination, 
all depending on the concrete objectives pursued by the parties; it is quite 
possible that within a contractual consortium the parties decide to set up  a joint 
venture for a specific investment. It all depends on the specific parties and their 
intentions.     
                    
(b) small and medium sized companies – a final word must be given to the 
reorganisation of small and medium sized companies (SMC). The importance 
of the SMC contrasts sharply with the lack of attention of the legal and financial 
literature, which is more often concerned with the financing of the large public 
company. This is appalling not only  because the great majority  of companies 
are effectively SMC (circa 80% in all industrialised countries) but also because 
the great majority  of the population works in SMC. Therefore, a brief note must 
be given to the reorganisation of SMC. 
 In order to understand the reorganisation of SMC, a word must be given 
to its economic structure. SMC are characterised by three distinct features: 
firstly, there is a small number of participants in the company; they are normally 
family run businesses or businesses in which there are strong personal 
relationships between the parties that condition their behaviour. Secondly, the 
dominating shareholder of SMC  is most often also the manager of the 
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company, having effective control over it the company; this conjugation of the 
control of the general meeting and of the effective management of the company 
raises several agency problems in relation to minority shareholders and 
stakeholders. Thirdly, the labour relations in these SMC are normally 
characterised by an informal working environment and a high-degree of 
dialogue between the management and the rank and file. This is normally 
achieved by informal means, such as a daily walk and conversation with the 
employees and strong fiduciary relations.435  The economic structure of SMC 
differs sharply from the one encountered in large companies; therefore, the 
solutions that have been presented to the reorganisation of companies must be 
readapted to the specificities of the SMC.
 The main question concerning the networks of SMC consists in the 
interaction between governance, growth and financial structure.436  The former 
paragraph mentioned that the governance structure of SMC is underpinned in 
the pre-existing personal relationships established between the shareholders of 
these SMC and between the shareholders and managers. These personal 
relationships will have very strong implications in the ways that companies are 
managed and the means that companies will use in order to establish the 
cooperation between undertakings. The very  strong personal ties established 
between the constituents of the companies ensure a very effective deterrence 
mechanism to prevent opportunistic behaviour because the consequences that 
might arise from this non-cooperative behaviour are potentially  very harmful for 
the network of relationships and the social position that the defective member 
has; this means that these personal relationships are able to underpin forms of 
coordination of the activities of companies that do not necessarily  presuppose 
formal mechanisms of control such as the ones to be found in group relations. 
Interlocking directorates and the acquisition of non-controlling shares are 
usually very effective organisational means to ensure the collaboration between 
companies because they ensure the existence of monitoring mechanisms to 
prevent desertion and the social sanctions arising from the personal 
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relationships will serve as the necessary  deterrence mechanisms. Also, unlike 
what many people believe, the presence of families in shareholding structures 
is not impeditive of the presence of outside managers in those same 
companies or the acquisition of non-controlling shares by banks and other 
providers of finance. The intention that usually the founders of the companies 
have of maintaining the ownership of the company in the hands of future 
generations is not impeditive that the owners of the company take special 
precautions that the company is run by the most effective persons; this leads to 
an atypical structure of control in SMC  characterised by the separation of 
ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problems that the literature 
on corporate governance has pointed out to the large public corporation.437 
These agency problems are normally solved by the free appointment and 
replacement of managers (which depends only  of a decision by the general 
meeting). The acquisition of non-controlling shares by banks and other 
providers of finance is also not an uncommon phenomenon, although it is 
circumscribed. The usual operation consists in the provision of a loan to the 
company that will function as an entry to the shareholding structure of the 
company; the other owners of the company simply will have to buy-back 
progressively  the share of the bank as the business is run. The shareholding 
ensures sufficient monitoring mechanisms of the allocation of the capital 
provided. These phenomena, although not altogether rare, are nevertheless not 
so widespread as they ought to be. 
 As regards the growth strategy of SMC, one must begin by questioning 
the reasons why a company will choose to grow as member of a network rather 
than by setting up  a group. SMC are growingly preferring to use networks as a 
strategy of growth as opposed to groups on account of a number of factors: the 
overwhelming presence of interpersonal relations between the members of the 
network exemplified in the former paragraph reduces the agency and 
monitoring costs that account for the greatest advantage of the group  in relation 
to the other forms of collaboration between companies; there is also empirical 
data revealing that the participation in networks is preferred when the 
companies intend (1) to valorise the complementarities of the resources in the 
performance of new projects, (2) to face the competition from new markets and 
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(3) to try out new materials and productive procedures. The group strategy is 
preferred by SMC when the growth of companies is destined to consolidate 
family or personal assets; the network strategy is preferred when experiencing 
innovative features that frequently  involve the presence o external 
collaborators. This preference of the network strategy is also heavily  connected 
to the forms of financing of these companies and the strategies that they 
undertake in their relationship with banks and other financial agents.438
 Finance is the Achilles’ heel of SMC. Banks and other financial entities 
have a very  important role in the growth strategies of SMC  because the low 
possibilities that these small companies have to have access to funds makes 
them heavily  dependent of banks and other financial agents to get the leverage 
they need in order to foster their growth. However, the relationship of banks 
with SMC has undergone a period of transformation on account of the coalition 
of these companies in networks that will have an impact on the type of relations 
that the financial agents are likely to establish with the networked SMC. In 
general terms, the economists used to present three types of critics to the 
financial position of SMC: firstly, they were chronically undercapitalised, making 
them heavily  dependent on leverage; they needed credit to finance each one of 
their operations and they were essentially  run in the latter period to pay for 
those debts; secondly, the banks used to present critics to the low degree of 
transparency of companies and the common mixture between the personal and 
corporate assets. Since banks did not have any reliable data on the true 
financial position of those companies and the effective guarantees that those 
companies could present for their credits – rather than the legal capital, which 
may be an illusory figure439 - they were fearful of providing long-term credits or 
credits of high-figures. This presented obstacles to companies that intended to 
undertake long-term costly projects and served as a barrier to business start-
ups in high-risk sectors. Finally, there is the perception that the existing 
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guarantees to credits are not sufficient for the new needs of financing. They 
may be personal, real or commercial: the first favour an unhealthy mixture 
between personal and company assets; the second do not bind the success of 
the enterprise to the payment of the debts; the third gives rise to abuses of 
small undercapitalised companies desperately  in need of credit. This places 
obstacles to the margin of manoeuvre that companies have in pursuing growth 
strategies and led to the development of new financial instruments.440
 These difficulties led to the development of new strategies that were 
specifically designed for the networked company. These strategies might be 
classified in two large groups, financial strategies and non-financial strategies. 
Financial strategies refer to a plethora of processes destined to facilitate 
the access of SMC to credit. These financial strategies may consist in common 
funds, new forms of guarantees and the participation of banks in the capital of 
networks.
Common funds consist in organisational networks set up  in the form of 
commercial companies or cooperatives whose social object consists in the 
provision of assistance to the access to credit of the SMC  that set up the 
network. This provision of assistance might consist either in the provision of 
financial guarantees or in the provision of counselling services that are 
designed to ensure that the SMC meet the requirements of banks to have 
access to their funds. They are particularly important in the drawing up  of 
business plans and investment projects, as we will see further. The capital of 
these common funds is composed by the contributions of SMC and they work 
in close cooperation with banks in order to know the requirements and interests 
of the banks. One may say that they function as intermediaries between banks 
and customers. Some of these funds effectively work as intermediaries 
between companies and banks by requiring themselves the access to the 
credit. The companies that wish to have access to credit will have to subscribe 
a number of shares of the fund and will have access to credit in proportion to its 
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participation in the fund. The fund will then work in close collaboration with the 
bank ensuring that it has sufficient capital to cover the risk and that the 
businesses that subscribe the shares are trustworthy projects. They are 
particularly useful in the financing of business start-ups and ventures in high-
risk / high-potential sectors. In the event of default, the risk falls upon the fund 
and it is entitled to claim its credits from the failed business; the bank has no 
risk. The main recipients of these funds are small companies whose capital 
structure does not allow them to easy access to credit and lack the necessary 
counselling and advice in the drawing up of credible business plans and 
investment projects. 
The recent evolution has also witnessed the development of new forms 
of guarantees that stand halfway between equity and debt. Traditionally the 
classical forms of guarantees (personal or real) were seen as a pre-condition 
for the credit: the person that presented enough assets that could cover the 
sum in the event of default would be given the credit. The recent evolution that 
followed the Basilea II agreements on the guarantees that banks could demand 
from SMC modified this relationship from pre-condition of the credit to the 
integration within the credit. These new types of guarantees are manifold and 
only three examples will be mentioned – securities, debt covenants and step-
by-step  financing - to provide the reader with an idea of its functioning. 
Securities consist in financial instruments whereby a person is entitled to a 
fixed income in exchange for the provision of capital. They were initially 
developed for the large public corporations but the recent evolution of company 
law in Europe has allowed SMC to issue these types of financial instruments.441 
Securities are a very effective financial instrument on account of a number of 
reasons: although they do not provide the holder with a right to vote, they 
provide the holder with extensive information rights that allow them to control 
the management of the company; they are also freely tradable in the market; 
therefore, if the bank is not satisfied with the company or it needs credit it might 
recover its credit by selling the security in the market. Debt covenants consist in 
conventions celebrated between the bank and its debtors that oblige the 
company to be run in a certain manner and within certain limits. They also 
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specify financial indicators in order to control the running of the business.  In 
the event that the company fails to abide by the covenant the bank may  either 
claim the debt or, more often, renegotiate the agreement. This obliges the 
company to apply the capital in the best interest of the provider of credit and 
functions as a monitoring mechanism of the parties. Step-by-step  financing 
consists in the division of the required amount in parcels with the obligation to 
meet a number of requirements before receiving to the following parcel. These 
new forms of guarantee have the advantage of maintaining the separation 
between the personal and corporate assets and ensuring a more effective 
monitoring mechanism of the application of the money by the parties to the 
loan.442 
The final relevant financial instrument consists in the participation of 
banks in the capital of networks. This participation might consist in the 
conversion of the debt in shareholding in the firm. This ensures that the bank 
has a very effective monitoring mechanism of the behaviour of the remaining 
shareholders because the rights recognised to shareholders will be the same 
as those recognised to the creditor – the bank. This also ensures an alignment 
of the interests between the creditor and the company and reduces the scope 
for short-termism: since the bank as a participation in the capital of the 
company it ensures its credit in the form of a future distribution of results to the 
shareholders. 
Non-financial strategies refer to another plethora of processes in which 
the provider of finance considers it to be relevant to be involved in a network 
when deciding to provide the credit. This consists in the evaluation of credit 
worthiness and in the role of commercial credit.
The evaluation of credit worthiness refers to a situation in which the 
presence of a company within a network is seen as a positive factor when 
deciding to attribute the credit. Banks are increasingly recognising the 
relevance of these relations because the participation within a network ensures 
a stability of cash-flows and the commercial activity of the company and does 
not leave it so heavily dependent on the humours of the market. The 
participation of companies in network projects is even more relevant: projects 
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ensure a high degree of activity  and collaboration between companies that 
ensures their activity and the levels of cash-flows. That is the reason why 
banks are increasingly turning from the financing of subjects and individual 
start-ups to the financing of projects and network relations. This has several 
implications for the governance of companies because they are aware that they 
will need to be involved in networks and in projects in the event that they want 
to have access to credit in the future.
Commercial credit is also a very important financial instrument. 
Commercial credit refers to a situation in which a company agrees to sell first 
and receive at a latter stage. Commercial credit is of a great relevance in 
network relations because this reinforces the cooperation and the coordination 
of activities between companies. Each company knows that if it defaults to pay 
it will have an impact in the remaining productive chain and the consequences 
of its default will eventually be internalised on account of the “missing step” of 
the procedure. This also builds up  a form of “peer-pressure” that will serve as a 
deterrence mechanism: if it defaults the payment no other member of the 
network will grant it credit in the future. 
All of these developments had important implications in the governance 
of the networked SMC and in the behaviour of the providers of finance. As 
regards the governance of the SMC, as banks increasingly give relevance to 
the participation of SMC in investment projects and in networks, companies will 
need to abandon their atomistic attitude and progressively  develop 
collaborative relations with other companies if they wish to have access to 
finance. This will have a sharp-impact in the way that companies are managed 
because they will need to moderate their behaviour to avoid having negative 
externalities over the actions of other companies and will need to coordinate 
their strategies with those of other companies. Companies will also need to 
increasingly projectify their development strategies in the form of investment 
projects. This represents a sharp  modification to the long-term strategies of 
companies, which will have to be rendered more and more towards the short 
and medium term. As concerns the relationship with the providers of finance, 
one can perceive that they are evolving towards more collaborative relations. 
Instead of adversarial and default/execution schemes of finance, providers of 
finance are increasingly turning towards relational schemes of finance. These 
relational schemes consist in the provision of counselling services, support of 
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investment projects, greater involvement of the providers of credit in the 
management of the company and greater degree of supervision of the conduct 
of companies. The objective is not so much to ensure the recovery of the credit 
but to ensure that it is applied in the most proper way as to satisfy the interests 
of both parties. This implies a considerable modification of the governance 
strategies of SMC, who will increasingly have to integrate the concerns of 
stakeholders in their management strategies.           
The impact of these developments in the labour relations within the 
networked structure had also been profound. In general terms, one may say 
that the same principles that apply to the large firm have been implemented in 
the SMC: labour is seen as a competitive resource and as a means to bring 
value into the company; the main concern is not so much with ensuring job 
stability but with ensuring the know-how of the workforce (that might have an 
impact over the regulation of non-competition clauses, for instance). The 
management labour will have to readapt to the growth strategy of the company; 
labour will increasingly be managed in the sense of performing the projects that 
the company is involved in and will have to take into account the interests of 
the stakeholders of the company when claiming for wages and conditions of 
work. This will imply necessarily  a decentralisation of collective bargaining 
towards the level of the firm also in SMC  and the setting up  of new types of 
agreements destined to use labour in the interest of the projects of the firm.443  
(d) a sum-up of post-fordism – it is difficult to attempt to draw up  a conclusion 
over post-fordism given its fluid  and highly  flexible character. There are three 
main characteristics however that orient the plethora of processes and 
procedures that are grouped under the umbrella-concept of post-fordism: 
decentralisation, projectification and the rise of the networked structure. 
Decentralisation refers to the new role of labour within the firm. The rank 
and file is no longer seen merely as the performers of the commands of the 
management team but are seen as a strategic resource that is expected to 
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bring about a valuable contribution to the company. This implies several 
modifications to the traditional method of organisation of work that 
characterised fordist procedures: the workforce is now expected to work under 
sorter time frames, be participative, participate in projects and use their 
knowledge and know-how to improve the quality  of the product, under other 
aspects. This obliges companies to reorganise their incentive schemes in order 
to ensure the alignment of interests of the workers with the company: instead of 
long-job tenures and progression based on seniority the workforce is given 
progression based on valid contributions and the skills to be employed in other 
places once their positive contribution to the company comes to an end.
Projectification refers both to the strategy of the companies as well to the 
strategy of workforce. As regards the strategy of companies, companies had to 
reorganise their business-strategy towards shorter time frames and bet on 
innovation as a means to compete with other companies. This is particularly 
relevant as regards the relationship of SMC with the providers of finance. One 
of the consequences of the reorganisation of SMC was to projectify their 
business strategies in the form of investment projects if they wished to have 
access funds by  the providers of finance. The same thing is valid for the 
reorganisation of large companies in the form of SBU: these SBU are expected 
to perform a certain role and have clearly defined objectives in the form of 
investment projects; if they fail to bring about the expected return from those 
projects they will simply be shut down or sold to anyone who expects to rip 
from profit from them. This implied considerable changes to the strategy of 
companies, which were obliged to work in shorter time frames and present 
results in order to survive. This also implied several modifications to the 
strategy of the workforce. Post-fordism brought about the organisation of the 
workforce working around project-teams and in shorter time-frames; the basic 
idea was to re-align the application of the workforce with the objectives of the 
company: the workforce had to bring added value to the company, be 
imbedded in the same projects and time frames that the strategy of the 
company was involved in and comply with the constantly  flowing strategy of the 
company. 
Finally, post-fordism brought about the rise of the networked company. 
Networks of companies consist in a fluid mixture of models of coordination of 
the strategies of companies that stand between the integration in groups of 
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companies and the pure hand of the market. These networks consist in 
contractual and organisational models of coordination of the activities of 
companies that renders each company totally or partially dependent of the 
activity  of the other without putting in question their autonomy. These networks 
came to modify  significantly  the relationships that post-fordist companies had 
with the suppliers and the providers of finance. As regards the relationships 
with the suppliers, these contractual and organisational models of coordination 
ensured that each company would specialise in the production of a particular 
input; the integration of the company within networks ensured that each specific 
input would have constant demand and that the activities of each company 
would not be left to the simple play of market forces. Networks could also be 
used for the coordination of the activities of companies in R&D and the 
exploration of new markets. These networks had several mechanisms to 
reduce agency costs and prevent opportunistic behaviours on the part of the 
participants of the company. As regards the relationship  with the suppliers of 
finance, the impact of the networked company was felt more abruptly in the 
case of SMC. Since these companies are chronically  undercapitalised and lack 
a number of transparency mechanisms in order to evaluate their financial 
health, the providers of finance had to devise new mechanisms in order to 
reach the market of SMC. These mechanisms may be either financial or non-
financial; financial mechanisms consist in the use of the network as a means to 
get to finance by the means of common funds on the part of the network or the 
use of relational finance – that stands between debt and equity - as a means to 
get guarantees to the credit; non-financial means consist in the consideration of 
the pertinence to the network when evaluating credit worthiness and the role of 
commercial credit within the network itself. 
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4.3 Conclusion  
This short description of the evolution in the patterns of organisation of 
companies may allow us to conclude that management, capital and labour 
have had distinct forms of organisation of their relations throughout the times 
and that this has influenced the predominant patterns of Corporate 
Governance, Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining. 
 The times of “laissez-faire, laissez-passer” capitalist gave rise to craft 
production as the predominant form of organisation of work. A multitude of 
small and medium companies tailored specific markets emerged and the 
relations between capital, management and labour were close: the manager 
was usually also the main shareholder of the company and the relationships 
with labour were close. 
 The second stage of capitalism - coordinated capitalism - gave rise to 
the emergence of the large vertically  integrated unit. This demanded a 
considerable modification to the predominant patterns or organisation of work: 
in Continental Europe, managers had to rely  on large shareholdings that would 
tie the interests of the shareholders to the company and allow them to insist on 
incremental growth strategies; employees had to organise around mass unions 
in order to undermine cost competition and allow the determination of the 
professional careers within these companies. An exception must be made to 
the particular Anglo-Saxon example that achieved the same results by distinct 
means: the dispersion of shareholdings insulated management from the 
pressure of some groups of shareholders and allowed them to pursue 
incremental growth strategies (because no shareholder or syndicate of 
shareholders could coerce management boards); labour decided to 
decentralise at the level of the company in order to pursue direct dialogue with 
management. This did not prevent the emergence of some industries 
characterised by concentrated shareholdings and industry level bargaining in 
the UK albeit they were residual in relation to the general British industrial 
landscape.444
 The modifications in the macro-economic environment that have been 
taking place since the 1970s have had a large impact in the organisation of 
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companies. The financiarisation of the economy and the hybridisation of the 
patterns of Corporate Governance have obliged companies to reformulate their 
work procedures. The main characteristics of this movement - named as post-
fordism - consists in decentralisation, projectification and the rise of the 
networked company. The main features of each one of these characteristics 
were already outlined in the former paragraph. The most important thing to 
retain is that companies currently act at a global level, they require employees 
to be flexible, participative and innovative in their work procedures and they 
engage in a multitude of contractual relations with outsourcing companies that 
establish close relations with the “mother company”.  The main purpose of this 
scheme appears to be to allow the company to adapt easily to economic 
fluctuations and to the demands of shareholders. This poses great difficulties 
as regards the organisation of work, which obliged lawmakers and trade unions 
to rethink the patterns of Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining 
that had been implemented so far. That will be the object of the following 
chapter.           
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Chapter 5
The Evolution of the National Patterns of Employee 
Representation and Collective Bargaining
5.1. The Evolution of Collective Bargaining 
The final part of this thesis will be concerned with the evolution of employee 
representative structures and the new type of collective agreements. 
Considering that the firm is viewed as a nexus of contracts and that the specific 
configuration of each one of the interest groups that interacts with the company 
affects the configuration of the remaining interest groups, this chapter will be 
concerned with the impact of the modifications of Corporate Goverance and the 
Organisation of Companies in the structures of Employee Representation and 
the Collective Agreements reached. This chapter will defend that the evolutions 
occurred in the patterns of Corporate Governance and in the Organisation of 
Companies have led to a rearrangement of the structures for employee 
representation towards a more decentralised and participative bargaining. 
5.1.1 Macro-Economic Environment, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Organisation 
The first part of this thesis outlined the influence of the macro-economic 
environment in corporate governance and firm organisation. It was argued that, 
in contrast to the legal origin hypothesis laid down in LaPorta’s influential paper 
“Corporate Ownership  around the world”, the reason for the diversity in the 
patterns of corporate governance had to be sought in the macro-economic 
environment.445 The demand-side economic policies of the time and the efforts 
for post-war reconstruction demanded the development of fordist production 
units that could provide societies with the goods they needed. The institutional 
complementarities between the fordist model of production and the national 
447
445 La Porta, R., F. Lopes-de-Silanes, et al. (1999). "Corporate ownership  around the world." 
The Journal of Finance 54(2): 471-517.
patterns of corporate governance and firm organisation were outlined above 
and they will not be repeated here. 
 The macro-economic environment changed radically though after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1972 and the oil-schock of 1973. The 
previous regime led to a situation of “overaccumulation” in which the magic 
recipe of profit retention for reinvestment in expansion could no longer be 
sustained. The economic policies enforced after 1974 were heavily based upon 
Milton Friedman’s monetarist supply  side policies. These monetary policies 
focused on fighting inflation by three means: (a) restrictive monetary and tax 
policies, (b) cutting down on the role of the State and (c) deregulation of 
markets (in particular the financial sector and the labour market). The restrictive 
monetary and tax policies consisted in upholding the growth of credit behind 
the growth of inflation so that interest rates would be artificially  raised and 
therefore the wages and prices would decrease. The wages had to be 
squeezed harder than prices to boost profits and restore profitability  in the long 
run. The main beneficiaries were operators in the financial sector that benefited 
from the cheap sales of stocks. Tax policies were another area of government 
intervention: the system passed from a progressive towards a regressive 
system and corporate taxes were eased to foster investment. Consumption 
taxes also increased. The cutting down of the role of the State was achieved by 
means of the privatisation of several areas of public policy. This opened way for 
the entry  of new investors in certain sectors of the economy. Finally  the 
markets were heavily deregulated: the most important markets that were the 
object of deregulation were the financial markets and the labour markets. As 
regards financial markets, the economy was increasingly “financialised”: 
financialisation refers to a process whereby financial markets, financial 
institutions and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy  and 
outcomes. There are several manifestations of this phenomenon: the access to 
credit was relaxed, stock markets were heavily encouraged in order to foster 
investment and the creation of wealth in the economy; international capital 
flows were liberalised. Monetary policies would control the inflation. Labour 
markets were equally heavily deregulated with attacks to the power of trade 
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unions, facilitation of the dismissal procedures and the introduction of fixed 
term contracts and other forms of job precarity.446
 The impact of this modification of the macro-economic environment in 
the governance of companies was equally  demonstrated before. Ownership 
structures modified to a great extension becoming more dispersed in 
Continental Europe and more concentrated in the hands of a few institutional 
shareholders in the UK; in addition, institutional shareholders also entered the 
Continental European capital markets modifying to a certain extension the 
predominant styles of governance. This led to a reinforcement of the rights of 
shareholders in general and minority shareholders in particular in order to 
encourage the investment in capital markets. Management boards had to adapt 
to this new structure in order to become more responsive to the interests of 
shareholders: the roles of CEO and chairman were separated, independent 
directors were introduced, auditing was reinforced, several control procedures 
were enacted in order to control more actively the activity  of the management 
boards and there was an enunciation of the fiduciary duties of shareholders in 
accordance with the “enlightened shareholder value” view of corporate 
governance. The overall objective of these reforms in the governance of 
companies was to make management boards more responsive to the interests 
of shareholders and therefore curtail the managerial autonomy that gave rise to 
the agency problems outlined by Berle and Means. If we link the modifications 
in corporate governance to the modifications in the ownership structures of 
companies and the macro-economic environment it becomes easy to observe 
that the management of companies had to become more responsive to the 
interests of financial shareholders and to the economic fluctuations caused by 
the monetarist economic policies.447
 The organisation of companies had to adapt correspondingly to this new 
institutional endowment. The first and second chapters of this thesis enunciated 
the contractarian conception of the company and the links between this 
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conception of the company, Employee Representation, Collective Bargaining 
and Firm Organisation. The former paragraphs mentioned that the fordist 
model of production was a means of reducing the information and agency costs 
between managers and employees in the organisation of production demanded 
at the time. This new institutional endowment (in which management boards 
had to become more responsive to the financial interests of shareholders and 
had to manage their firms in fluctuating economic environments) demanded a 
new type of work organisation. The answer lay  in a system of organisation of 
work that became known and post-fordism or lean production: this system of 
organisation of work presented a sharp  contrast to the fordist model of 
production because it was underpinned in two main ideas: (a) decentralisation 
(operational and strategic) of decision-making structures and (b) projectification 
of labour.448  
 The main challenges that the progressive financialisation of the 
economy and its impact on the governance and the organisation of companies 
posed to labour law may be summoned in the following points:
(a) Labour Law needs to be able to accommodate the new agency costs - 
financialisation was described above as a movement initiated in the 1980s in 
which the  financial actors and instruments gained an increased influence in the 
governance of companies and the overall economic environment. The impact 
of financialisation was analised above: the pressure of financial actors (in the 
ownership structures of companies and in the financial circuits) placed a great 
degree of pressure upon the managers of companies that had to modify  their 
managerial strategies to meet the challenges placed by these actors. The 
impact of this new institutional endowment upon existing companies was 
exemplarily demonstrated by Charley Hannoun: 
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“La financiarisation (...) réalise un changement de l’objectif de 
l’investissement dont la rentabilité será recherchée moins en 
function des dividends générés par l’activité qu’à travers la 
valorisation de la société en vue de sa cession. C’est la plus-value 
espérée après une gestion plus cerrée de l’entreprise qui será 
l’élément essentiel de la rentabilité de l’investissement. Il en découle 
de nouveaux comportements. L’activité será orientée vers tout ce qui 
favorise une meilleure valorisation de l’entreprise à courte terme. 
Diminution des coûts, rationalisation de l’organisation, resserrement 
des niveaux hiérarchiques, informatisation, redécoupage des 
activités afin de rendre plus transparentes les sources de la création 
de valeur, bref, l’entreprise est entièrement repensée en vue de la 
cession de la société, et non pour améliorer de manière pérenne en 
tant que outil de production”.449              
Charles Hannoun attempted to outline the fact that, during the time of fordism, 
the objective of managers was to grow through expansion by means of the 
extraction of the profits from the investments in fixed capital. This demanded an 
organisation or work that could underpin this strategy of growth based upon 
sector level bargaining and rigid division of tasks. Financialisation brought with 
it a new managerial strategy in which managers had to concentrate on the 
financial valorisation of the company: this had the result of a transfer of risk 
from shareholders towards the employees because the success of the 
company was no longer measures by means of the conquer of market share 
but by means of the guarantee of profit levels. Redundancies are usually 
accompanied with highs in share prices. This new managerial logic also 
demanded a transformation of the organisation of companies and work in order 
to accommodate the demands of this new managerial strategy. 
 This new institutional endowment is capable of creating substantial new 
agency costs: managers wish to preserve their places in face of shareholder 
pressure; shareholder are increasingly impatient vis-à-vis managers and 
increasingly willing to exercise their control rights; employee increasingly share 
a greater part of the risk of the business without making any capital 
investments in it because the preservation of the place of the managers and 
the figures of the “financial theatre” is often made at the cost of their wages. 
One of the tasks required of labour law is to be able to accomodate these new 
managerial demands underpinned on the need to provide value to the financial 
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actors. This demands the creation of new instruments to ensure the alignment 
of interests of managers and employees vis-à-vis shareholders (insider/outsider 
conflict). and new instruments to ensure an effective representation of 
employees in the new forms of organisation of companies.450
(b) need to accomodate new organisational strategies at the national and 
international level - Labour law equally needs to accommodate the new forms 
of organisation of companies. The impact of financialisation on the transition 
from fordism to post-fordism was outlined above and the new forms of 
organisation of companies - based upon the internal and external 
decentralisation in strategic business units and in (international) networks of 
companies - placed great demands to the traditional forms of employee 
representation. The first part of this thesis attempted to outline the institutional 
complementarities between the national patterns of employee representation, 
the predominant national corporate governance pattern and the macro-
economic environment. The modifications in the macro-economic environment, 
the national corporate governance structures and forms of organisation of 
companies have to be accompanied by an adaptation of the national patterns 
of employee representation in order to attempt to ensure the continuation of the 
institutional complementarities between the elements of the productive system. 
The reorganisation of companies at the national and international level has to 
be accompanied with a transformation of the patterns of employee 
representation.451 
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(c) need to integrate and correct  financial pressures - the financialisation of 
the economy does not simply generate new agency costs between the 
manager and the employees: it may undeniably weaken the position of the 
workforce to an unprecedented level. The regulation of labour markets and the 
asymmetries of power between the employer and the employees were formally 
dealt with at the national level: the labour and product markets were national 
and there was the possibility of regulating these markets effectively at the 
national level. The internationalisation of production and capital markets 
brought with them a disturbance of this stable balance: the production chains 
exacerbated by the decentralisation of production became increasingly 
international in order to take advantage of the comparative advantages (often in 
terms of labour costs) of national export-oriented markets; the financial 
movements that influenced to a great extent the internal and external 
governance of companies became also international with international capital 
flows in the form of foreign direct investment, bank borrowing and entry  of 
institutional investors in capital markets. The only element of the system that 
remained national was the labour market: employees are not as mobile as 
capital and companies and the traditional systems of employee representation 
became inadequate to meet the new challanges. Let us imagine a company 
listed in the UK with a productive unit in Portugal: an american hedge fund 
enters the capital of the company and demands high quarterly results; the 
company is forced to dismiss part of its workforce in order to cut costs and 
decides to make several employees in its Portuguese production unit 
redundant.                 This is a situation that leaves employees heavily 
unprotected because the State and/or the trade unions are incapable of acting 
as a counterbalancing element in order to bring some social justice.452
 Labour law needs to integrate and correct these new realities. Labour 
law needs to take into account the internationalisation and financialisation of 
companies and needs to readapt its representative structures in order to 
accomodate these new forms of production. Labour law also needs to 
acknowledge that the pressure of financial actors upon the management 
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boards is currently a reality and needs to readapt its bargaining strategies in 
order to accommodate the demands of the financial actors because its 
traditionally  weak position vis-à-vis the management boards (who have the 
direction power in the company  and are able to terminate employment 
relationships) may become considerably weaker if it fails to recognise the 
unstable position of managers. There is a need to evolve from a distributive 
towards an integrative bargaining in order to collaborate in the pursuit of 
shareholder value. The integration of these new realities in its bargaining 
strategies - which are also suffering a considerable transformation in terms of 
actors and agreements - may be the only  means to be able to be able to 
correct these problems by means of employee representation. As Marie-Ange 
Moreau puts it: 
“....when management power is exercised at a global level, so that a 
single corporate decision can result in a multiplicity of territorial/
national consequences, the situation calls for the development of a 
countervailing reactive power equivalent in its scope and nature.”453   
The following lines will attempt to analyse how and to which extent the 
European and national regulations have been attempting to provide an answer 
to these challenges and how they have been able to integrate in their national 
systems of employee representation each one of the three points referred 
above: accommodation, integration and correction of new agency costs and 
organisational strategies of companies at the national and international level. 
5.2 The Evolution of National Employee Representation  
The final part of this thesis will attempt to analyse in a comparative perspective 
the evolution in the national models of employee representation. It will be 
argued in the following paragraphs that there seems to be a trend in all the 
European countries under analysis towards the development of a decentralised 
culture of employee representation and a new philosophy of collective 
agreements that seem to be evolving towards a more partnerial attitude to 
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453  Moreau, M.-A. (2007). The originality of transnational social norms as a response to 
globalisation. Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation. New challanges, new 
institutions. B. Bercusson and C. Estlund, Columbia. See also Perulli, A. (2007). "Diritto del 
lavoro e decentramento produtivo in una perspectiva comparata: probleme e prospettive." 
Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro(I): 29-65. 
bargaining in order to align the interests of managers and employees vis-à-vis 
shareholders (a so called insider-outsider conflict); but on the other hand 
employees may also be interested in these developments because they may 
syndicate with the shareholders in order to increase their monitoring of the 
management board (the so called accountability  conflicts). The following 
paragraphs will analyse each one of these developments in detail.454    
5.2.1. The original strategy of European Law  
The analysis of the evolution in the national systems of employee 
representation must begin with a description of the solutions offered by 
European Law. EU Law deserves to be studied as an independent paragraph in 
this chapter because it has been extremely active since the 1970s in the 
subject of employee representation - particularly but not limited to restructuring 
procedures - and the solutions offered by EU Law have created a delicate 
balance with the systems of employee representation in the member states. 
Although the primary concern of EU Law appears to have been to offset the 
consequences that the internationalisation of companies as a consequence of 
the completion of the internal market could have for employees, its 
development over the years appears to have created a “EU-model of employee 
representation” that might have had more far-reaching consequences in the 
member states. 
 The EU has been extremely active over the years in the subject of 
employee participation up  to the point that many consider it to be an integrating 
part of the EU Social Model.455 This expression – EU Social Model – deserves 
a further explanation: it must be understood as an object gifted with a certain 
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454 For an overview of these conflicts and possible coalitions between each one of the interest 
groups in the company see Kirr, B. Corporate Governance und Arbeitsbeziehungen in 
Deutschland, Groβbritannien und Polen, Gospel, H. and A. Pendleton, Eds. (2005). Corporate 
Governance and Labour Management - an international comparison, Oxford, Höpner, M. 
(2005). Corporate Governance in transition: ten empirical findings on shareholder value and 
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455  Fuchs, M. (2004). "The bottom line of European Labour Law." International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 20(2 and 3): 155-176 and 423-444, Laulom, 
S. (2005). Le cadre communautaire de la représentation des travailleurs dans l'entreprise. 
Recomposition des systèmes de représentation des salariès en Europe. S. Laulom, 
Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne. Marhold, F. and M. Fuchs (2001). Europäisches 
Arbeitsrecht. Wien, Springer, Seitz, K. (2004). Europäisches Rahmenrecht für eine Europäische 
Betriebsverfassung - stand und perspectiven. Tübingen, Köhler-Druck.
content that may be moulded in accordance with national laws and practices. 
The study of the EU Social Law concerning employee participation struggles 
with an initial difficulty however: the sources of law providing employees with 
participation rights are extremely scattered, they were enacted under distinct 
political circumstances and contain various levels of engagement; therefore it is 
difficult to present an harmonious study of the employee participation rights 
contained in the EU legal instruments and to draw up general conclusions that 
would present the EU Social Model. Despite these difficulties, a considerable 
array of legal literature has attempted to consolidate the lessons to be drawn 
from the EU legal instruments concerning employee participation and to 
substantiate the EU Social Model.456  The purpose of this section is to present 
the conclusions that this literature has reached and to introduce the 
developments in the national systems of employee representation.
 5.2.1.1 A scattered source of law  
One of the first difficulties in analysing the EU framework on employee 
participation consists in identifying and systematising the distinct sources of 
law. EU Law has been progressively  recognising several rights to employee 
representatives in distinct contexts. The debut took place in 1974, when the 
Social Action Program declared the progressive engagement of the employees 
in the life of companies and at the economical and social decisions of the 
Community  as one of the main objectives of the European policies. Its effective 
implementation initiated in 1974 and 1977 with two extremely  influential 
directives: the Directive on Collective Redundancies and the Directive on the 
Transfer of Undertakings. These two directives provided for an information and 
consultation procedure of the employees in situations of collective 
redundancies and transfer of undertakings. The success in the adoption of 
these Directives encouraged the proposal and negotiation in 1980 of the Vth 
Company Law Directive – the Vredeling Directive – that intended to harmonise 
the structure of public companies in Europe and impose a German style system 
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456 Brors, T. (2004). Das system der Arbeitnehmer-Beteiligungs-Richtlinien - grundlage für eine 
Europäische Betriebsverfassung? Baden-Baden, Köln, Laulom, S. (2005). Le cadre 
communautaire de la représentation des travailleurs dans l'entreprise. Recomposition des 
systèmes de représentation des salariès en Europe. S. Laulom, Publications de l'Université de 
Saint-Étienne. Moreau, M.-A. (2006). Normes sociales, droit du travail et 
mondialisation, Dalloz.
of co-determination in multinational companies. The negotiation was 
unsuccessful and the Directive was never adopted.457 The regulatory activity in 
the EU in the subject of employee participation suffered a halt until 1989 with 
the adoption of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers. Although the charter was deprived of a binding effect towards the 
member states and did not provide individuals with enforceable rights, it is said 
to have had an extremely  influential effect at the political level because it 
inspired most of the post-1989 Labour Law Directives. The rebirth took place 
with the institutional modifications brought about by the Maastricht protocol in 
1992 that allowed for the adoption in 1994 of the Directive on European Works 
Councils, which established a mandatory organ for the representation of 
employees in multinational companies.458 The success of this Directive inspired 
the adoption of the following extremely  influential directives: the Directives on 
Employee Participation of the Societas Europeae (Directive 2001/86) and the 
European Cooperative Society (Directive 2003/72) and the Information and 
Consultation Directive (Directive 2002/14).
This short description of the legal instruments concerning employee 
participation allows us to understand that the statutory framework is extremely 
spanned and fragmented because it uses distinct sources of law (fundamental 
rights charters - with a variable binding nature - and Directives) enacted in 
distinct periods in time and political endowments. This obliges us to make a 
small overview of the legal instruments at stake in order to grasp their concrete 
content.
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457  Hutchinson, E. A. S. and R. C. H. Thomas (1982). Company Law in Europe: the Vth 
Directive and the Harmonisation Programme, Institute of Directors, Vredeling, H. and R. 
Blainpain (1983). The Vredeling proposal : information and consultation of employees in 
multinational enterprises, Kluwer.
458  The Social Policy Protocol was the legal mechanism designed to resolve the impasse 
reached over the social policy provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht at the summit of December 
1991. Eleven of the 12 member states (the UK opted out) agreed to incorporate the Agreement 
on Social Policy reached by the Social Partners in October 1991 in the ECT. This Agreement on 
Social Policy provided the social partners with a constitutional law-making competence within 
the framework of the EU Institutions and extended the competences of the EU in the field of 
employment and social relations, allowing for qualified majority voting with respect to some new 
competences. See Falkner, G. (1996). "The Maastricht  protocol on social policy: theory and 
practice." Journal of European Social Policy 6(1): 1-16.
 5.2.1.2. The EU acquis concerning employee participation 
The analysis of the European Law on employee participation must necessarily 
begin with a review of the most important legal texts that provide employees 
with participation rights. This is where the first difficulty begins: there is a 
constellation of sources of law that provide employees with participation rights 
but with various scopes, procedures and extensions. The sources of law may 
be combined into two large groups however: the fundamental rights group and 
the secondary law group. This section will review each one of these groups in 
detail. 
(a)  the fundamental rights dimension - There are several international legal 
instruments providing employees with fundamental rights to participation in 
companies. The most relevant legal instruments consist in the European Social 
Charter, the Community  Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The European Social Charter 
consists in the counterpart of the European Convention of Human Rights in the 
field of Economic and Social Rights. Although it is legally binding on the states 
that choose to ratify it, it does not provide individuals with enforceable rights 
vis-à-vis the State: its enforcement mechanisms consist in the obligation to file 
a report on the implementation of the Charter that is to be revised by a 
committee and in a collective action procedure in accordance to which some 
organisations may file a complaint against a State for failure to implement the 
charter. The European Social Charter provides employees with rights to 
information and consultation in arts.21 and 29: These provisions consider that 
the parties to the agreement are obliged to adopt or encourage measures so as 
to enable workers and their representatives to be informed regularly or at the 
appropriate time and in a comprehensible way about the economic and 
financial health of the undertaking employing them and to be consulted in 
appropriate time on proposed decisions which could affect substantially the 
interests of the workers, in particular those that could have a large impact over 
the employment in the undertaking; this principle is further developed in the 
situations of collective redundancies, providing that the right to information and 
consultation should be exercised with a view to avoiding redundancies, limiting 
their occurrence or mitigating their consequences. 
458
 The Community  Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers was 
adopted in 1989 and was intended to fill the social gap  in Single European Act 
in 1986. Its importance is hard to estimate because it was purely a soft law 
instrument: it wasn’t binding for the member states and it did not provide 
employees with enforceable rights; in addition, it had a marginal impact on the 
case law of the EU.459 Some claim that it was very influential however because 
it inspired many of the post-1989 Labour Law Directives. The Community 
Charter also contains two provisions concerning the right to information and 
consultation of the workforce: arts.17 and 18 state that member states should 
promote the information and consultation of the workforce in accordance with 
national laws and practices and in particular in some situations.460 But the most 
important part is its preamble where it is stated that 
The completion of the internal market must lead to an improvement in 
the living and working conditions of workers in the European 
community. The improvement must cover, where necessary, the 
development of certain aspects of employment regulations such as 
procedures for collective redundancies and those regarding 
bankruptcies. Information, consultation and participation of workers 
must be developed along appropriate lines, taking account of the 
practice in force in the various member states. Such information, 
consultation and participation must be implemented in due time, 
particularly in connection to restructuring operations in undertakings or 
in cases of mergers having an impact on the employment of workers. 
This statement makes reference to three extremely important aspects of the 
EU: (a) the completion of the internal market, (b) the protection of workers and 
(c) the engagement of employees by means of information and consultation 
procedures. As it will be demonstrated further, the importance of this statement 
is paramount because it directly inspired the secondary law of the EU. 
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was thought to take one 
step further by means of the recognition of a catalogue of fundamental rights at 
the level of the EU. Unlike the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights for Workers, it was destined to be enforced: by overcoming the 
traditional distinction between self-executing rights and rights dependent of 
positive action, it drew a system of enforceability that in practice obliged the EU 
459
459 It was referred only in one case, UK vs Council (C-84/94) [1996] ECR I-5755.
460  The situations referred were (a) implementation of technological changes, (b) restructuring 
operations, (c) collective redundancies and (d) labour policies pursued by a company 
established in another state. 
institutions and member states to observe its provisions when implementing EU 
Law. This means that the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
circumscribe the margin of manoeuvre of the EU institutions and the member 
states. Its main impact is not to provide individuals with a margin of liberty from 
the State but to limit the deregulatory impact of EU Law on national policies and 
to formulate duties to act by the EU institutions. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights simply states in its art.27 that workers have a right to be informed in the 
cases and under the conditions laid down in EC Law and national practices.461 
462
 The former paragraph elucidates the extension to which employees enjoy  
a fundamental right to information and consultation within the sources of law 
governing the activities of the EU. The concrete legal regime of these 
international fundamental rights instruments may allow us to put forward two 
preliminary  conclusions: firstly, the recognition of the right was not 
accompanied with its direct enforceability. This does not mean that they are 
entirely  deprived of a practical effect: with the exception of the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers – with is merely a political 
statement deprived of any binding nature – the remaining charters overcame 
the traditional conception of a fundamental right as a right against the State 
(and, in some situations, private parties); the rights enshrined in these charters 
impose positive duties to act upon the EU and the member states that apply to 
its legislative, administrative and judicial activities; this means that not only the 
law-making bodies (both EU and nationals) have to take positive actions in 
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462 The absence of direct enforceability of those fundamental rights and their dependence of 
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actual implementation was analysed in a short but elucidative article by Frenz, W. and V. 
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overview of the right to information and consultation at the level of fundamental rights see 
Hassiotis, A. (2000). Die entwicklung des rechts der Arbeitnehmervertretung auf Information 
und Consultation in der Europäischen union - unter berücksichtigung des deutschen, 
französischen, britischen und schweizerischen rechts, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 
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order to implement these rights but also that the administrative and the judicial 
organs have to take into account these rights when applying the national laws. 
This is expected to provide the rights enshrined in these charters with a 
maximum expression because their enforcement is a positive duty of the State 
in all of its activity. These charters were accompanied with control mechanisms 
to guarantee the enforcement of these rights: the European Social Charter 
contains a duty to draw up a periodical implementation report to be revised by 
an independent committee and there are equally procedural mechanisms in 
accordance to which certain organisations are entitled to initiate a vexatory 
procedure to pressure the State to implement those rights. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights does not contain a similar procedure but it is expected that 
the action of the ECJ and the European administration will provide these rights 
with a practical content (and supervise the action of the member states in the 
observance of these rights when implementing EU Law – art.51). These 
enforcement mechanisms have important consequences: considering that 
these rights are not subjective rights but rather duties to act imposed upon EU 
and national authorities, its main impact will not be one of providing individuals 
with a margin of freedom from the State but rather limiting the deregulatory 
effect of European and national authorities.463  The public action of the 
European and public authorities will always have to respect the content of 
these rights and recognise them to their fullest extent in their legislative, 
administrative and judicial activities. This is an extremely  important effect 
whose practicality should not be underestimated: the practical effect is to 
condition the activity  of the pubic authorities without providing individuals with 
enforceable rights (and the consequential procedural onus to go to Courts and 
enforce these rights); the best analogy to understand the functioning of these 
rights may  be drawn from the Law of Obligations: they may be considered as 
legally protected interests, i.e: as duties to act imposed upon a certain entity 
but without providing the beneficiaries of these rules with subjective rights to 
their enforcement (as it occurs, for instance, with health and safety regulations). 
This means that they are applicable independently of the will of the 
beneficiaries, which provides the beneficiaries with a much stronger protection 
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463 Witte, B. d. (2005). The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union. 
Social Rights in Europe. G. De Búrca and B. d. Witte, Oxford.
as long as there are supervisory mechanisms to ensure their compliance.464 
 This brings us to the second conclusion to be drawn from these 
international legal instruments: considering that these international legal 
instruments merely  enunciate the existence of a right to information and 
consultation but refrain from defining its proper content; its practical expression 
must be sought in the legislative, administrative and judicial acts implementing 
them. As regards the national level, the powers of the employee 
representatives as regards participation at the level of the company were 
already outlined above on occasion of the description of the national 
regulations. There is a diversity of structures, procedures and levels of 
employee involvement and that the reasons underpinning those institutional 
configurations must be sought within a combination of the political economy of 
the time and the dominant corporate governance pattern in accordance with the 
theory of institutional complementarities.465 The following section will attempt to 
outline the EU acquis on employee participation contained in the Directives and 
judicial decisions implementing the fundamental rights contained in the charters 
mentioned in this paragraph.
(b) Instruments of Secondary EU Law - the EU has been extremely active in 
the subject of workforce participation since 1974, the year of the enactment of 
the collective redundancies directive. The EU has, over the years, emanated a 
number of legal instruments destined to implement the rights contained in the 
Charters mentioned in the former section that have already led to some 
decisions of the ECJ. These legal instruments compose the statutory body of 
the EU acquis on employee participation and they are the effective 
implementation of the rights contained in the charters. This body of law is not 
without difficulties however: the rights and regulatory techniques contained in 
them vary  to a great extent and their scope of application is distinct. This 
section will attempt to describe and contextualise the Directives in order to 
understand their reach, the solutions contained in them and extract some 
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465 Aoki, M. (2001). Towards a comparative institutional analysis, Stanford University Press, 
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general conclusions concerning the EU acquis on employee participation. 
 The EU exhibits already a body of statutes and case law that compose the 
EU Law on Employee Participation. The statutes consist in the following 
Directives: Directive 98/59, on collective redundancies; Directive 2001/23, on 
the transfer of undertakings; Directive 94/95, on the European Works Council; 
Directive 2001/86, on employee participation in the Societas Europeae; 
Directive 2003/72, on the participation of employees in the European 
Cooperative Society and Directive 2002/14, establishing a general framework 
for the information and consultation of employees.466 It is useful to make a short 
description of each one of these Directives. 
 Directives 98/59 and 2001/23 – the “restructuring Directives” – are 
applicable in situations of collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings. 
As a preliminary point, it is interesting the read the preambles of the Directives 
and observe their legal basis: although both of the Directives were enacted 
under the common market provisions (art.94 and 100ECT), meaning that they 
were primarily  intended to eliminate distortions in the functioning of the 
common market, they equally make reference to the Community  Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. This is a very strong indication that they 
were not only thought as a means of eliminating distortions in the common 
market (avoiding a race to the bottom in working conditions to attract 
investment), which served as the legal basis for their enactment in 1975 and 
1977, but also as an implementation of the guiding lines of the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (which inspired their revision 
in 1998 and 2001). The duties contained in the Directives are of an appalling 
simplicity  although they are far-ranging: whenever the employer wishes to 
undertake one of these decisions, he is obliged to undergo a procedure for the 
information and consultation of the employees: the collective redundancies 
Directive states that the employer must initiate an information and consultation 
procedure with a view to reaching an agreement whenever he is contemplating 
to undertake a collective redundancy (art.2(1)); the consultation will have the 
463
466  A word must be given on the collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings 
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objective, in particular, of (a) avoiding redundancies, (b) limiting their impact or 
(c) mitigating their consequences; art.2(3) then discriminates the information to 
be provided to employee representatives in order for them to make constructive 
proposals during the consultation procedure. The situation is slightly  distinct in 
the case of a transfer of an undertaking: the employer merely has to inform 
employee representatives (or the employee themselves in the absence of 
representatives for no fault of the employees) the date, reasons and 
implications of the transfer and measures envisaged in relation to the 
employees; in the event that the transferor is planning measures in relation to 
the employees then he must initiate a consultative procedure with a view to 
reaching an agreement.467 
 Directives 94/95, 2001/86 and 2003/72 – the “transnational Directives” – 
provide for a distinct regulation of employee representation. These Directives 
are applicable in the following situations: (a) in community-scale undertakings 
or groups of undertakings 468  and (b) in the setting up of a Societas Europeae 
or European Cooperative Society. In these situations the employer must 
promote or allow the setting up  of a special negotiating body of employee 
representatives (as defined by national law and/or practice) destined to bargain 
with the management board an information and consultation procedure within 
the undertaking. The idea underpinning the Directives consists in setting up  a 
works-council type body in these companies in order to engage employees in 
the life of companies by means of periodical information and consultation 
procedures. In contrast to the former Directives, there is no rigidly laid out 
procedure for the transmission of information between the management board 
and employee representatives: the priority  is given to an ad hoc procedure, 
directly bargained by the management and the employee representatives 
taking into account the specificities of the undertaking and the culture of the 
company. The intention is to provide the parties with the conditions to bargain 
an optimal agreement to both parties. This purpose is clearly  reminiscent of the 
objectives laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
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pasted above of promoting employee involvement in the life of companies; 
although only the preamble of the European Works Council Directive makes 
express reference to it (the remaining Directives only  make a nebulous 
reference to the promotion of the social objectives of the community by  means 
of the involvement of employees), the similarities of the regulation and 
procedures between the three Directives reveal that they were underpinned in 
the same ideal: to promote dialogue between management and labour and 
engage employees into the life of companies. The Directives provide for a 
parachute in order to safeguard the position of employees and create 
incentives to bargain: this “parachute” consists in the subsidiary requirements 
laid down in the European Works Council Directive and the subsidiary 
procedure laid down in the Societas Europeae and the European Cooperative 
Society: as regards the European Works Council, the annex to the Directive 
lays down the minimum content of the information and consultation agreement; 
as regards the Societae Europeae and the European Cooperative Society, in 
the event that no agreement is reached, there is a subsidiary  procedure for 
information and consultation. This subsidiary provisions are destined to ensure 
that the management does not merely provide lip-service to the employee 
representatives and thus avoid signing an agreement claiming that it was 
impossible to reach an agreement; the subsidiary provisions function as a 
safeguard for the employee representatives and an incentive for the 
management board to bargain an agreement. This further reinforces the priority 
of autonomous information and consultation agreements freely bargained by 
the management and the employee representatives.469
 It is important to stress that these Directives are applicable at the 
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transnational level. The transnational level poses great difficulties for labour 
lawyers because labour laws are eminently national and companies are active 
at the international level. The difficulties of coordination between employees 
and the competition between distinct countries to attract investments poses 
great difficulties to the setting up of transnational employee representative 
structures, which comes at the disadvantage of the workforce. These Directives 
are extremely important because they set up a new level: the European level. 
When a company is active at the European level, it is under a duty to set up a 
employee representative body that will allow it to engage into dialogue with the 
employees of the company in the several countries in which it is active. This will 
reinforce social dialogue at the European level and fill the “social void” that the 
integration of the common market and the territorialisation of national labour 
laws left open.470 
 The last legal instrument to be analysed is Directive 2002/14 – the 
Framework Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees. This 
Directive must be analysed separately because - in contrast to the former - it is 
neither applicable only in situations of restructuring or to transnational 
situations. The legal basis of this Directive is art.137(2)ECT and its preamble 
contains a reference to the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers; 
therefore, its objective is not the elimination of the distortions in the common 
market (as it occurred initially with the first groups of Directives) but the 
improvement of the living and working conditions of workers within the 
Community. The objective of the Directive and the principles underlying its 
provisions are clearly  laid down in the following ambitious paragraphs of the 
preamble: 
(7) There is a need to strengthen dialogue and promote mutual trust 
within undertakings in order to improve risk anticipation, make work 
organisation more flexible and facilitate employee access to training 
within the undertaking while maintaining security, make employees 
aware of adaptation needs, increase employees' availability to 
undertake measures and activities to increase their employability, 
promote employee involvement in the operation and future of the 
undertaking and increase its competitiveness. 
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(8) There is a need, in particular, to promote and enhance information 
and consultation and on the situation and likely development of 
employment within the undertaking and, where the employer suggests 
that employment within the undertaking may be under threat, the 
possible anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular in terms of 
employee training and skill development, with a view of offsetting the 
negative developments or their consequences and increasing the 
employability and adaptability of the employees likely to be affected. 
(9) Timely information and consultation is a prerequisite for the success 
of the restructuring and adaptation of undertakings to the new 
conditions created by the globalization of the economy, particularly 
through the development of new forms of organization of work.   
The principles laid out boldly in the former paragraphs allows us to understand 
that the information and consultation directive comes more in line of the former 
directives (destined to implement permanent information and consultation 
procedures in multinational companies) than in the first group of Directives 
(destined to provide an answer to a restructuring situation). Its objective is to 
promote a stable dialogue between managers and employee representatives in 
order to engage employees in the life of businesses. Despite this sequence, it 
did not provide priority to ad hoc procedures but it preferred to lay down a rigid 
information and consultation procedure. Arts.3 and 4 provide that in 
undertakings employing at least 50 employees or single establishments 
employing at least 20 employees the management is obliged to engage in an 
information and consultation procedure with employee representatives.471 The 
duties of the employer are the following: it has (a) to provide information on the 
recent and probable development of the activities of the undertaking, (b) to 
provide information and consultation on the situation, structure and probable 
development of employment within the company and any anticipatory 
measures envisaged and information and (c) consultation with a view to 
reaching an agreement in situations likely  to lead to substantial changes in 
work organisation. A simple reading of the provision reveals that there is a 
graduation of the duties of the employer in accordance with the subject, that go 
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from a duty to provide information, to provide consultation and to provide 
consultation with a view to reaching an agreement. In contrast to the former 
group of Directives, the procedure is rigid although member states are free to 
allow the social partners to conclude an ad hoc information and consultation 
agreement (similar to the former group) that respects the minimum 
requirements laid down in art.4 (art.5). If this provision is read at the light of the 
principles laid down in the preamble, its objective becomes crisp  clear: the 
purpose is to promote the engagement of employees in the management of the 
company by  promoting the alignment of interests between managers and 
employees.472 
 As we may see, the EU acquis in terms of secondary legal instruments 
concerning employee information and consultation is complex because it was 
designed to a concrete number of situations: whereas the first group  intends to 
provide employees with an effective answer to a crisis situation of restructuring, 
the second and the third intend to overcome the social gap  in transnational 
companies and engage employees in the life of companies: but there are 
several important differences between the second and the third group: the 
second group is applicable only to transnational companies and gives priority to 
autonomous procedures and the powers of employee representatives are 
limited to information and consultation; the third group contains a rigid 
procedure (the autonomous procedures are left to the option of the member 
states) and there is a graduation of participation rights that range from 
information, consultation and consultation with a view to reaching an 
agreement (making this third group closer to the first in which the consultation 
is made with a view to reaching an agreement). 
(c)  comparative perspectives -  the description laid out in the former 
paragraphs of the models of participation contained in the diverse Directives 
allows us to conclude that there are several gradual and structural differences 
between them. The first evidence is the following: there are two great distinct 
stages in the Directives: the Directives of the 1970s -  the Directives on 
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collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings - so-called restructuring 
Directives – were concerned with a thematically circumscribed theme: their 
legal basis was primarily the harmonisation of the common market and they 
laid out a rigid procedure to be observed in specific circumstances. Since they 
were designed to provide employees with a weapon to react to specific 
circumstances capable of having an impact over their employment situation, 
they will be named as reactive directives. The Directives of the 1990s and 
2000s have a widely  distinct approach and objective. Their legal basis is no 
longer the elimination of distortions to the functioning of the common market 
but rather the off-setting of the social gap  in the European transnational 
companies and the promotion of the social objectives of the community. Instead 
of being concerned with a single theme they elect a more global, trans-
disciplinary and socio-politically  integrated approach with the participation of 
the workforce at the European level. The objective is no longer to provide 
employees with a weapon to react to situations of crisis but rather to promote 
the exchange of views and dialogue within the undertaking in order to allow 
managers to take into consideration the position of the employees in 
transnational companies and therefore engage employees in the life of the 
company. They are no longer thematically circumscribed but rather intend to 
engage employees in issues of their interest and encourage the alignment of 
interests between employers and employees in the management of companies. 
This is the reason why they may be named as pro-active directives: they  are 
not limited to a single theme but have a potentially greater scope of application 
– the promotion of social dialogue at the level of the company and the 
involvement of employees.473
 The distinction between the reactive and the pro-active Directives should 
be stressed and be the object of a further explanation. Although both of the 
groups of Directives have the same scope – the promotion of the involvement 
of employees in the life of companies – the evolution of their internal regulation 
reveals an evolution in the EU’s approach to social issues and the practical 
content of the EU Social Model as regards worker participation. Whereas the 
reactive directives had primarily  harmonisation as their main goal (in order to 
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avoid a race to the bottom in terms of labour conditions) and only incorporated 
the provisions of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers in their revision, the pro-active directives were enacted in the fulfilment 
of the objectives of social economy and democracy laid out in the Charter and 
in the Maastricht protocol. The provisions of the Charter concerning employee 
participation replicated above reveal precisely  the intention of the community: 
the improvement of the situation of workers in the effort of the completion of the 
common market by means of information, consultation and participation in 
particular (but not only) connected to restructuring operations. The opening to 
employee participation outside restructuring operations opened the roads for 
the Directives on European Works Councils, Societas Europeae and European 
Cooperative Society  and the Information and Consultation Directive. Social 
dialogue between employers and employees and the engagement of the social 
partners in the economic life of the Community became a key element in the 
European Social Model. This is even more so if we consider that the 
mechanisms of employee participation go well beyond information and 
consultation at the level of the company. At the institutional level, the Maastricht 
Treaty  had the merit of institutionalising the participation of employers and 
employees in community law-making by means of the European Social 
Dialogue. In accordance with the redaction of arts.136 and ff of the ECT the 
European Social partners have not only a consultative role in social issues 
(because the Commission is obliged to consult them) but they equally have a 
legislative role: they  may take the legislative proposal in their own hands or 
autonomously  conclude collective agreements that may be implemented in 
accordance with their internal mechanisms or be subject to the approval of the 
Council – which will act as a declaration of general interest.474  Therefore the 
pro-active Directives must be understood in the line of the evolution of the 
European policies from the perspective that social integration would emanate 
autonomously  from economical integration towards the conceptualisation of a 
global political and legal concept of a European Social Policy that implicated 
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social dialogue and employee participation.475
 The cooperation model laid down in the Directives has certain 
communalities and differences. As a preliminary word, one must begin by 
commenting the interesting perspective of Sylvaine Laulom, who claims that 
the European Model laid out in the Directives is a model more based on rights 
and actions than actors or subjects.476  In accordance with the view of this 
author, the Directives did not harmonise employee participation structures but 
simply provided the national pre-existing actors with a common set of rights 
that would not bring a great degree of modifications to the national structures. 
The main concern of the Directives would be to provide employees with the 
possibility of enforcing the provisions contained in them and not to attempt to 
harmonise structures of employee representation. Although this argument is 
quite seductive because the Directives effectively did not bring about directly 
extensive modifications to the structures of employee participation in countries 
that have a strong tradition of social dialogue – such as Germany and France, 
despite their several differences – it seems to disregard two important points: 
firstly, as regards multinational companies, the European Works Council and 
the Societas Europeae/European Cooperative Society  Directives were in fact 
quite innovative because they created a new body applicable to multinational 
companies. Despite the possibility  of evading the setting up of a European 
Works Council created by arts. 6(3) and 13 of Directive 94/95 – which allowed 
multinational companies to set up  or maintain an ad hoc information and 
consultation procedure of the employees directly or their representatives 
instead of a European Works Council – the remaining Directives did not allow 
for this exception and employee representative bodies had to be established;477 
in addition, in multinational companies that chose to evade the setting up  of a 
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European Works Council by means of arts.6(3) and 13 of Directive 94/95, the 
employees will still benefit from an information an consultation procedure that 
either existed before or was set up intentionally to avoid the creation of a 
European Works Council but may nonetheless be capable of bringing 
modifications to the internal governance of those companies. Secondly, 
although the author claims that it is a model more concerned with rights than 
actors, in reality admits at the end of her paper that these rights seem to be 
having an indirect effect of modifying the traditional roles of the pre-existing 
structures of employee representation. That will be the subject of the next 
section, where it will be defended that the Directives seem to have had an 
indirect impact on national structures for employee representation by  modifying 
to a considerable extent their role. This section will be concerned with an 
analysis of the cooperation model embedded in the Directives. 
 The cooperation model embedded in the employee participation 
Directives seems to be underpinned in three great elements: actors, 
procedures and themes. As regards the actors, one must begin by stressing 
that all the Directives (both reactive and proactive) demand the existence at 
least of the possibility of employee representation at the level of the company 
with the consideration of the national model. In the reactive directives and the 
Directive 2002/14, the setting up of the employee representation body is left to 
national laws and practices but the employees must have at least to possibility 
to set up  an employee representative body mandatorily recognised by the 
employer. The effectiveness of these Directives and the need to have a 
representative body recognised by the employer has been the object of two 
decisions from the ECJ that stressed the importance of national laws providing 
for the possibility of setting up  an effective employee representation for the 
effective implementation of the Directive. In Commission vs UK478  the ECJ 
struck down the tradition of voluntarism in the British system of collective 
bargaining in accordance to which only recognised unions could enjoy the 
prerogative of collective bargaining (being that recognition was a purely 
voluntary  act of the employer). This led to a statutory change – to be analysed 
in the next section - in accordance to which trade unions could recur to a 
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statutory procedure for recognition to be mandatorily recognised by the 
employer and enforce the information and consultation procedures laid down in 
the collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings directives. In the case 
CGT & others vs Ministre de L’Emploi479 the ECJ struck down some provisions 
of the French contract premier emploi in accordance to which workers under a 
certain age would not be accounted for in the thresholds for the calculation of 
the number of employee for the application of the information and consultation 
provisions laid down in the collective redundancies and employee information 
and consultation Directives. These two cases reveal the importance that the 
ECJ attaches to the effective representation of employees at the level of the 
undertaking. Although the Directives leave the criteria for employee 
representation to national laws and practices, the reality is that these national 
systems have been subject to the scrutiny of the ECJ and that the ECJ has had 
no problems in striking down certain national provisions that would render the 
provisions contained in those directives meaningless by rendering void the 
possibility of setting up employee representative bodies. This is nothing but an 
effective implementation of the objectives of the promotion of social dialogue 
between management and labour laid down in the Charters and the Directives 
described above. This objective seems to have been also clearly pursued in the 
pro-active directives. These Directives demand the setting up  of a special 
negotiating body that will bargain an ad hoc information and consultation 
procedure and the practical arrangements for the setting up  of an employee 
representative body. This employee representative body is mandatory in both 
the Societas Europeae and the European Cooperative Society Directives; only 
the European Works Council Directive allows for a more flexible procedure: 
although it claims that it is in principle mandatory but in fact it allows for its 
evasion in the event that the multinational company already has a procedure 
for informing and consulting employees or decides to set up  another 
consultative procedure, the intention to promote company-level social dialogue 
remains and the duties to consult still seem to presuppose some kind of 
employee representation – to be defined by the employee representatives in a 
flexible ad hoc procedure. 
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 The pro-active directives deserve a more elaborate explanation.  These 
Directives were enacted as an attempt to provide an answer to the difficulties 
created by the internationalisation of companies arising from the completion of 
the common market and globalisation. These transnational companies 
operated in a “social vacuum” because there were no transnational social 
norms and, considering the principle of subsidiarity  to which the EU is bound to, 
the member states remained competent in many social issues. The challenge 
was to devise a means of avoiding that the economical integration would have 
adverse consequences for national social systems and to fill the social 
representation gap in transnational companies. The answer lay in a European 
Social space underpinned in minimum social norms in the framework of social 
harmonisation.480 
 These transnational social norms consisted in a legal framework 
recognising a transnational collective autonomy. This solution was designed in 
accordance with a principle that Marie-Ange Moreau calls the “principe de 
concordance”. This principle claims that the challenges raised by the 
internationalisation of companies in the framework of the completion of the 
common market must have an adequate and proportional answer by  the 
transnational social norms. This principle is subdivided in three main sub-
principles: concordance of scope, concordance of time and concordance of 
action.There is a concordance of scope when room of manoeuvre provided for 
the social norms is an adequate answer to the space of manoeuvre of the 
employer; if the power of the employer is exercised at the European level as a 
consequence of the internationalisation of the company in the margin of 
manoeuvre provided by the common market then the room of manoeuvre of the 
employee representatives must equally be exercised at the European level; 
there must be a cross-border representation of employees in order to fill the 
social gap caused by the national scope of employee representation. There is a 
concordance of time when the answer provided by  the employee 
representatives is able to act as a counterbalancing power to the actions of the 
employer: this demands a timely information of the employees and the 
recognition of time to act. There is finally a concordance of action when the 
social norms reflect and integrate the transnational dimension of the actors, 
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they have a transnational content and they  are enforceable at the transnational 
level.481          
 This framework may allow us to extract some conclusions as regards the 
actors of the Directives. The Directive’s constant reference to national laws and 
practices must be understood cum grano salis: although it is true that the 
Directives do not impose a uniform model of employee representation, it is 
nonetheless true that the existing national models must be configured in such a 
way as to allow for employees to set up  a representative body that may 
effectively engage in dialogue with the management. The rulings Commission 
vs UK and CGT vs Ministre de L’Emploi mentioned above illustrate the need for 
the national models to respect the provisions of the directives: in Commission 
vs UK, the ECJ was not afraid to strike down the secular system of voluntarism 
in the UK; in CGT vs Ministre de L’Emploi the ECJ limited member state’s 
competence to determine thresholds for an effective system of representation 
because the practical effect was to deprive the Directives of their effectiveness 
(even in the presence of labour market policy justifications). This pressure 
towards effective systems of company level dialogue is even more evident in 
the pro-active Directives: the Societas Europeae and the European 
Cooperative Society Directives do not allow for any deviation from the system 
of employee representation laid out in them: there must be a company-level 
organ for the representation of employees within these companies gifted with 
information and consultation rights that must obey a minimum threshold. Only 
the European Works Council allows for a deviation from the principle that there 
must be an employee representative body as long as employees are gifted with 
information and consultation rights. This set may allow us to conclude that the 
EU Social Model presupposes some kind of mandatory employee 
representation that is capable of engaging into dialogue with the employer; 
although the structure of this representation is left to national laws and 
practices, the reality is that it must be configured in such a way as to allow for 
the effective implementation of the provisions contained in the Directives; this 
means that employee must have at least the possibility to set up an organ 
representative of their interests mandatorily recognised by  the employer both in 
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national and multinational companies.482
 These directives represent an original answer of the EU in terms of filling 
the social vacuum created by the internationalisation of companies and 
implementing the principle of concordance to the possible extent.  The first 
relevant element consists in the mandatory employee representation. All pro-
active Directives483 require the setting up of an employee representative body 
as a special bargaining unit - to bargain the participation agreement  - and latter 
as a transnational works council. This body is to be set up in accordance with 
pre-determined very specific rules concerning the representation of all the 
employees of the company. These rules concern a division of the posts in 
accordance with a criterion of division of the rank and file by  country in 
accordance with pre-determined thresholds of representation. The purpose is 
to attempt to avoid the pre-dominance of a particular group over the remaining 
employees. The selection of the representatives is equally  to be made in 
accordance with national rules in order to ensure an adequate integration with 
national traditions. It is worth noting that this representation of employees is 
strictly mandatory: the Societas Europeae and European Cooperative Society 
cannot be incorporate without an agreement on employee representation and 
companies covered by the European Works Council Directive must at least 
initiate a procedure for the setting up of employee representative structures 
and, if they wish to avoid in-company representation, they must prove that the 
pre-existing agreements suffice to satisfy the requirements of representation. 
Therefore employee representation becomes mandatory in certain trasnational 
European companies and represents an adequate implementation of the 
principle of concordance: the social vacuum was filled with the requirement to 
have employee representation.
 The second relevant element of implementation of the principle of 
concordance was made by means of the information and consultation 
procedures. These procedures present two original elements: firstly, they are 
ad hoc procedures, meaning that they are set up by the parties themselves in 
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accordance with their specific needs of the company and sector. In order to 
overcome the chronic debility in employee representation, the Directives also 
provide for fall-back clauses containing subsidiary information and consultation 
procedures in case the bargaining fails. This is an extremely important element 
because it attempts to ensure that the representation is not only formal but 
substantial: the information and consultation rights of employee representatives 
(ad hoc or deriving from the subsidiary provisions) are thought as a means of 
implementing the principle of concordance of time and action: employees are 
timely informed about issues affecting their interest to a relevant extent and 
may discuss those issues with the management board. It is worth stressing the 
freedom granted to the parties in setting up  their own agreements because this 
attempts to ensure that the unregulated room of transnational companies is 
filled with regulation adequate to the interests of the parties. 
 These two paragraphs intend to demonstrate the originality of the 
approach followed by  the EU in these directives. Considering that the 
internationalisation of companies raises a number of complex issues that may 
have adverse consequences to the workforce due to the unregulated space in 
which they are active, the EU has attempted to design an original solution to 
these problems. This original solution is designed in accordance with what 
Marie-Ange Moreau calls the “principle of concordance” (of scope, time and 
action) which consists in the requirement of an effective answer to the 
internationalisation of companies. This approach consists in the requirement to 
set up  employee representative bodies in these transnational companies that 
ensure an adequate representation of the employees of all the countries in 
which the company is active and in the provision of room to set up adequate 
information and consultation procedures (underpinned in fallback clauses to 
fight the predominance of the employer). This set of mechanisms is fought to 
ensure the representation of one key stakeholder - employees - in transnational 
companies in an unregulated space and fight the adverse consequences of the 
internationalisation of companies. This amounts to an effective implementation 
of the principle of concordance because (1) they result from a transnational 
elaboration, to reflect and integrate the transnational dimension of the different 
actors, (2) they have a transnational content, so as to reflect the specificity of 
transnational labour regulations and (3) they are enforceable at the 
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transnational level in order to ensure an effective mode of control.484               
 The Directives also set out procedures for information and consultation 
although these procedures equally vary to a great extent. As a preliminary word 
one must state that the Directives provide employees with three distinct rights: 
(a) right to be informed, (b) right to be consulted and (c) right to be consulted 
with a view to reaching an agreement. There is a progression of the rights 
because each one of them presupposes the former; on the other hand, not all 
Directives provide for the same level of participation. The right to be informed 
simply consists in the employer’s duty to acquaint employees with certain facts. 
This duty is differently regulated across the Directives: in general terms, the 
reactive Directives are extremely precise on the type of information to be 
transmitted to the employees, laying out a concrete duty to provide the 
employees with specific facts.485  The pro-active Directives also provide 
employees with extensive information rights although they are defined in a 
much broader manner: for instance, the Societas Europeae Directive defines 
information as the transmission of elements to employee representatives of 
“questions which concern the SE itself or any of its subsidiaries or 
establishments situated in another member state or which exceed the powers 
of the decision-making organs in a single member state…”; although the 
subsidiary provisions concretise the duties to inform, they are still enunciated in 
such broad formulae that are capable of covering any element.486 The annex to 
the European Works Council Directive equally states that the right to 
information covers the duty to fill an annual report on the progress of the 
undertaking and its future prospects. Finally  the information and consultation 
Directive simply states that information means the transmission of data that will 
478
484 See the works of Marie-Ange Moreau: Moreau, M.-A. (2001). "L'implication des travailleurs 
dans la société européenne." Droit Social: 967-976, Moreau, M.-A. (2006). Normes sociales, 
droit du travail et mondialisation, Dalloz, Moreau, M.-A. (2006). "Restructurations et Comité 
d'Entreprise Européen." Droit Social(March ), Moreau, M.-A. (2007). The originality of 
transnational social norms as a response to globalisation. Regulating Labour in the Wake of 
Globalisation. New challanges, new institutions. B. Bercusson and C. Estlund, Columbia, 
Moreau, M.-A. (2008). Les échanges entre les droits, l'expérience communautaire - une lecture 
des phénomènes de régionalisation et de mondialisation du droit Collection Droit de L'Union 
Européenne. S. Robin-Olivier and D. Fasquelle.
485 See art.2(3) of Directive 98/59 and art.7(1) of Directive 2001/23. 
486 The annex to Directive 2001/86 claims that the management organ has to file an annual 
report to the employee representatives on the progress of the business of the undertaking and 
its future prospects and copies of the agendas of the meetings of the company and any 
documents submitted to the shareholders. 
allow the employee representatives to be acquainted with recent and probable 
development of the undertaking and its activities. 
 As we can observe, the extension of the right to information is differently  
regulated in the Directives. The reasons behind this diversity must be sought in 
the objectives underlying the Directives and their legal basis: whereas the 
reactive directives intend to provide and answer to a crisis situation (a collective 
redundancy or a transfer of an undertaking), the proactive Directives intend to 
engage employees into the life of companies; therefore the information to be 
provided in the latter situations must be much more extensive and less 
regulated because they are intended to encourage a more permanent dialogue. 
There seems to have been a fear that a very concrete regulation of the duties 
to inform would encourage employers to limit themselves strictly to those 
obligations; if they  are laid out in a much broader scope, it might encourage 
dialogue and the exchange of ideas. The intention is to encourage the parties 
to develop their own arrangements for information and transmit the information 
that are more appropriate to their purposes.487  This is nothing but Teubner’s 
idea of reflexive law in practice.488 This is strictly dependent of one particular 
factor however: the strength of the employee representatives.  The efficacy of 
the procedures for information and the development of social dialogue at the 
level of the company depend of the existence of solid employee representative 
structures that are capable of engaging in a collaborative relationship with the 
management. The Directives provide for the possible mechanisms to set up 
those structures but they do not guarantee their effectiveness. Solid employee 
representative bodies are a precondition for the development of social 
dialogue.   
 This brings us to the second right: consultation. The definition of 
consultation is much more difficult: the Directive on European Works Councils 
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firstly defined it as “an exchange of views and establishment of dialogue 
between employee representatives and the central management”. This 
definition was developed in the Directives on the Societas Europeae and the 
Information and Consultation of Employees stating that this exchange of views 
should be made “at a moment, way  and content that will allow the employee 
representatives to express their views over the measures to be undertaken by 
the competent authorities that should be taken into consideration in the 
decision-making framework” and “to be reunited with the employer and obtain a 
reasoned answer to any reasoned opinion that they may issue”. These 
elements allow us to conclude that the consultation simply implies a dialogue 
between the employee representatives and the management at the end of 
which the employee representatives should issue an opinion. It is of paramount 
importance to stress that the consultation does not need to be made with a 
view to reaching an agreement. It is limited to a simple dialogue and exchange 
of views between management and labour in order for the management board 
to be acquainted with the opinion of the workforce. The employer is not obliged 
to follow the opinion of the employee representatives nor to reach an 
agreement if he does not wish to do so: he simply has to provide a reasoned 
answer to the opinion of the employee representatives and take it into 
consideration in it decision-making procedure. It is interesting to observe that 
the duty to consult employee representatives is differently regulated in 
throughout the Directives: whereas the reactive directives provide for an 
information and consultation procedure with a view to reaching an agreement 
(to be analysed in the bellow), the proactive directives seldom reference to the 
need to reach an agreement: the only occasions in which the proactive 
directives point towards the need to reach an agreement are in the situations 
that affect the interests of the employees to a considerable extent such as 
substantial changes to work organisation or plant relocations. These are 
exceptional circumstances however and the determining element of the 
consultative procedure consists in the exchange of views between 
management and labour. The reasons for this difference in treatment have 
been analysed above and are easy to guess: whereas the reactive directives 
intend to provide an answer to situations of crisis, the proactive directives 
intend to establish social dialogue at the level of the company and encourage 
collaboration between management and labour. That is the reason why there is 
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not much emphasis on the reaching of an agreement (because that could 
undermine the need to collaborate on account of employers’ resistance to any 
loss to the managerial prerogative) unless there are exceptional circumstances 
affecting employee interests to a considerable extent (in which a reaction is 
advisable). There are two further points to be made as regards the regulation of 
consultation in the Directives: firstly, one must stress the subject-matters. 
Whereas the reactive directives (and their emphasis on the guiding of the 
consultative procedure towards the reaching of an agreement) are thematically 
circumscribed, the proactive directives have such a wide scope of application 
(expressed in terminologies such as the “situation of the undertaking” and 
“probable developments”) that they are capable of covering a wide array of 
subjects. That is also the reason why  the European legislator did not place 
much stress upon the reaching of an agreement: considering the opening of 
social dialogue to new subjects, the most important point was to foment social 
dialogue at the level of the undertaking and then expect that forthcoming 
agreements and the taking into consideration of employee interests in the 
decision-making procedures of the company would arise as a natural 
consequence of the establishment of social dialogue (by means of an 
exchange of views) in the company. The second relevant point worth 
mentioning for the consultation procedure concerns its regulation: whereas the 
reactive directives and the Directive on employee information and consultation 
imposed a rigid procedure, the proactive directives leave the regulation of the 
procedure to the autonomy of the social partners (managers and employee 
representatives); the only  exception consists in the subsidiary provisions 
applicable in the absence of an agreement. The reasons behind this diversity of 
regulatory techniques are easy to explain: the reactive directives and the 
information and consultation are applicable at the national level where there is 
a diversity of structures of employee representation. Member states simply had 
to modify to a slight extent these national structures in order to accommodate 
the demands of the Directives. The proactive directives are applicable at the 
international level where there was no regulatory framework. Considering the 
diversity of national practices in every  country in which those multinational 
companies where active, it would be a violation of national autonomy to impose 
one specific model of participation. That is the reason why the European 
legislator chose to leave to the autonomy of the social partners – by means of a 
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phenomenon known as reflexive law – the regulation of the concrete 
procedures as long as they were in accordance with a certain pre-established 
criteria of quality.489
 The last level of involvement consists in the consultation with a view to 
reaching an agreement. This is a further development of the duty to inform and 
consult that is used with extreme caution by the Employee Participation 
Directives. Consultation with a view to reaching an agreement consists in a 
further development of the duty to consult that implies that the consultation 
should be made with the purpose of the harmonisation of interests. This does 
not mean of course that there must be a harmonisation of interests in the sense 
of the Interessenausgleich laid out in the §§112 BVG in order for a certain 
managerial decision to be implemented; although member states are free to do 
so (because Directives only  establish minimum harmonisation) they are not 
obliged to do so. The Directives simply demand that the parties behave in such 
a way that reveals that they at least attempted to harmonise their interests in 
the concrete subject of the consultation.490  The duty to consult with a view to 
reaching an agreement is seldom used in the Directives: it is used in the 
reactive directives and in the Societas Europeae directive and Information and 
Consultation directive. In the collective redundancies directive, art.2(1) of 
Directive 98/59 clearly states that the consultation muse be made with a view to 
reaching an agreement. This is perfectly understandable because since the 
procedure is enacted in situations of termination of the employment relationship 
then the need to promote a conciliation of interests in this situation of maximum 
crisis is more acute. It is interesting to observe the type of agreement that the 
Directive intends to promote: art.2(2) states that the consultation procedure 
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should be made with a view to avoiding or mitigating the consequences of the 
redundancies (thus giving an indication that the redundancy is a solution of last 
resource that should be moderated). This duty to undertake a consultation with 
a view to reaching an agreement has been the object of a decision by  the ECJ 
in the case Junk vs Kühnel.491  This case concerned a situation in which an 
employer had initiated a collective redundancy procedure simply  by offering a 
monetary compensation to the employees. The ECJ struck down this 
procedure because it claimed that the consultation procedure laid down in the 
Directive was not simply a formality but a true obligation to negotiate the 
termination of the employment contracts (§43 of the ruling). This reasoning was 
further developed in the case G. Agorastoudinis vs Goodyear in which the ECJ 
stated that the employer could not simple terminate the activities of an 
undertaking without engaging into a collective redundancy procedure (a 
decision that touches upon the property rights of the employer).492  The 
combined effect of these cases illustrates the fact that the duty to reach an 
agreement in collective redundancy  procedures is to be taken seriously even if 
it leads to a certain limitation to the managerial prerogative by obliging the 
employer to bargain. This expression must be understood properly  however: 
the limitation to the managerial prerogative does not mean – of course – that 
the EU or the ECJ imposed any kind of co-determination in Europe. It simply 
means that it is not enough to have an information and consultation procedure 
(in the sense of allowing employees to express their opinion on the redundancy 
or the compensation offered); the redundancy itself must be subject to a true 
negotiation with the employees so as to mitigate the consequences of the 
dismissal. Although the employer’s decision is left untouched, he must at least 
enter into a true negotiation with the employees in order to avoid the 
redundancies or mitigate their consequences.493 This is a far-reaching duty that 
is capable of modifying the systems of industrial relations in some countries – 
such as France, Portugal and the UK – where the managerial prerogative was 
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unquestionable: although the decision to terminate the employment 
relationships is still of the competence of the employer, he must at least bargain 
the decision with the employee representatives. This leaves us with the 
question of knowing whether this duty to attempt to reach an agreement 
strongly supported by the ECJ is limited to the collective redundancies directive 
or is rather the enunciation of a more general principle that is applicable to all 
situations in which the formula “with a view to reaching an agreement is used”. 
This is a question that the ECJ will have to answer in future cases. 
 The emphasis on attempting to reach an agreement in the negotiations is 
also used in the Societas Europeae and Information and Consultation 
Directives. In the annex to the Societas Europeae Directive, part 2(c) claims 
that the employee representatives have the right to be informed and consulted 
on situations affecting their interests to a considerable extent such as – but not 
limited to – relocations, transfers and closures; if the management organ 
decides not to follow the opinion of the employees then the representatives will 
be entitled to a second meeting with a view to attempting to reach an 
agreement. The Information and Consultation Directive claims on the other 
hand that the consultation shall be made with a view to reaching an agreement 
when the management decides to implement measures leading to substantial 
changes in work organisation or contractual relations (art.4(4),e) Directive 
2002/14). It is interesting to observe that these proactive directives use the duty 
to reach an agreement only  in exceptional circumstances. This seems to 
provide an indication that the duty is exceptional (in the sense of being strictly 
interpreted, only in the situations expressly  provided for in the Directives) and 
that the European Model on Worker Participation rests more on the exchange 
of views and social dialogue than on a type of feeble European co-
determination (which is clearly refused at the EU level). This has, of course, its 
advantages and disadvantages: as regards the advantages, this exchange of 
views, the encouragement of dialogue and the flow of information might create 
incentives for the alignment of interests between employees and managers vis-
à-vis shareholders (the so-called insider/outsider conflict) and reduce the 
agency costs of employees vis-à-vis shareholders (who are in a stronger 
position to make pressure upon the management on account of the 
reinforcement of their rights and the use of voting power to replace the 
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management board).494 As regards the disadvantages, there is the danger that 
the flow of information might serve simply as a means of paying lip-service to 
the employees and avoiding stronger commitments. Only time will tell the 
advantages of each system.495 
 One transversal question that is currently pending before the ECJ consists 
in the timeliness (zeitpunkt, temps utile) of the intervention. The question is: 
should the employer initiate the information and consultation procedure 
(whether or not with a view to reaching an agreement) before any decision is 
taken or is the managerial prerogative untouchable and the employees will 
simply be entitled to state their views on the question or bargain the 
consequences of its implementation. The directives are silent on this question: 
it is logical that the information shall always precede the consultation but it is 
not obvious at which moment the employer is obliged to provide the information 
in order to hear the opinion of the employees or bargain. The ECJ provided an 
answer to this question in the case Akavan.496 The ECJ ruled that the employer 
is under a duty to engage into dialogue under the Collective Redundancies 
Directive whenever it adopts measures that might give rise to collective 
redundancies independently of the fact that it is able or not to provide the 
undertaking with all the information required by the Directive. The relevant 
elements consist in (1) the adoption of the measures and (2) the likeliness of 
those measures to contemplate collective redundancies. If the company is 
organised as a group  of companies with independent legal personality, the duty 
to initiate the consultations falls with the subsidiary  affected by the measure 
once that subsidiary has been identified. This is a very protective measure of 
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the employees that safeguards the autonomy of the employer to undertake the 
decisions while it obliges him to go through a number of procedures destined to 
safeguard the interests of the employees in order to implement them.      
(c)  European Law, the macro-economic environment and firm 
organisation – this section must be completed with a short reference to the 
context in which this European regulation was enacted. The reactive directives 
were implemented in the second half of the 1970s, a time in which the idea of 
coordinated capitalism had reached an end and the new monetarist policies 
initiated their first steps. It was equally a time of increasing shareholder 
activism as the movement of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers revealed and 
in which the fordist production structures initiated their dismantling and the new 
forms of work organisation debuted. This trend continued throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. This gave birth to a number of agency costs of managers vis-à-vis 
employees. Since the institutional equilibrium between managers and 
shareholders had been displaced in favour of stronger shareholders and a 
more financially oriented management, the work organisation structures had to 
adapt correspondingly to the new institutional endowment. As it was referred 
above, the purpose of the organisation of work is to reduce the agency costs 
that occur between managers and employees by means of information failure: 
since the objective was to organise production in such a way as to make firms 
more responsive to shareholder demands and a fluctuating macro-economic 
environment, the solution lay in improving the channels of communication 
between the management and the workforce, engaging the workforce into the 
life of the company and encourage them to adapt new work procedures to 
adopt new forms of work organisation to make companies more profitable. This 
is clearly stated in the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers and the Information and Consultation Directive. This provides us with 
a strong indication that the new institutional equilibrium between management, 
shareholders and employees lay not in a radical division of work characteristic 
of the fordist production unit but in an improvement of the channels of 
communication between managers and employees in order to accommodate 
the management of the company to a fluctuating macro-economic environment 
(with several ups and downturns) and to the increasing financial demands of 
the shareholders. This is particularly visible in the evolution from the reactive 
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directives (which were the only  employee participation directives from the 
1970s to the beginning of the 1990s) to the proactive directives (who knew a 
renewal of interest from 1994 onwards with the approval of the European 
Works Council). Therefore EC Law seems to bet on social dialogue at the level 
of the company and a partnership  approach of social dialogue between 
employees and managers in order to reduce the agency costs within the firm. 
This leads us to conclude that there is room for adaptability  and limitation of the 
unilateral power of the employer in terms of the compromise between the 
shareholders and the management.  
 5.2.1.3 Conclusion 
This explanation of the regime concerning the regulation of employee 
participation at the European level is capable of allowing us to extract some 
conclusions. Employee participation at the European level is made by three 
means: rights to information, consultation and consultation with a view to 
reaching an agreement. The analysis of these rights must begin at the 
fundamental rights level contained in the several charters of fundamental rights. 
The Charters recognise rights to information and consultation to the 
employees. Although they  are not directly enforceable because they do not 
provide employees with self-executing rights, this does not mean that they are 
deprived of practical application however: the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights for Workers – a purely soft law instrument – 
inspired the majority of the employee participation directives that were 
approved or revised in the 1990s and 2000s. The European Social Charter and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights have a practical application because they 
are binding at all times during the action of the public authorities. This provides 
them with an extremely  important double effect: (a) imposing a permanent duty 
to act and respect their provisions by the public authorities (in their legislative, 
administrative and judicial activities) and (b) limiting the deregulatory impact of 
national and European measures.497  The Employee Participation Directives 
made the practical implementation of these rights at the European level. These 
Directives may be classified into two great groups: reactive and proactive. The 
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reactive directives were designed to provide employees with a weapon to 
answer situations of entrepreneurial crisis (collective redundancies and transfer 
of undertakings). The proactive directives have a much broader scope of 
application: they intend to encourage social dialogue at the level of the 
company by means of an exchange of views over various subjects that concern 
the situation of the company. These Directives have several communalities and 
differences: as regards the communalities, these directives are underpinned in 
two basic elements: (a) mandatory company-level employee representation (b) 
information and consultation procedures. As regards the differences, these 
common elements are diversely regulated across the several directives. The 
actors in the proactive directives are essentially those that represent 
employees at the national level; although this might provide pre-existing 
structures of employee representation with new rights (and be a factor of 
evolution as Sylvaine Laulom cunningly observed),498  they did not modify 
structurally the national laws.499  That is not the same thing with the proactive 
directives: since the majority of them are applicable to multinational companies 
– an almost unregulated terrain in terms of labour rights – they set up new 
structures for the representation of employees; only the European Works 
Council Directive seems to allow the evasion of the duty  to set up an European 
Works Council by means of art.6(3) and 13 of Directive 94/95, although the 
duty  to consult seems to presuppose an alternative mechanism of 
representation. The ECJ has had the occasion to state its imperativeness for 
an effective system of representation of employees at the level of the company, 
as the case law referred above illustrates. The procedures equally exhibit a 
great degree of differentiation. The reactive directives (and Directive 2002/14) 
provide for rigid procedures laying out in detail the terms of the procedure. 
Since they are applicable at the national level, there was the concern to lay out 
in detail these procedures so that the transposition of the Directives could have 
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a practical effect at the national level (and avoid a repetition of Commission vs 
UK); that was the reason why Sylvaine Laulom claimed that it was a procedure 
more concerned with rights than actors, although the rights provided to those 
actors are capable of bringing an evolution at the national level.500  The 
proactive directives preferred a flexible system of information and consultation 
to be agreed in an ad hoc procedure by the employee representatives. The 
differences between the procedures are not exhausted in the regulatory 
technique however: the terminology and the duties contained in them also vary 
to a great extent. The duty to inform is rigidly  laid out in the reactive directives, 
whereas the proactive directives prefer broader formulas. The duty to consult is 
also differently regulated: this duty  in the reactive directives is accompanied 
with the expression “with a view to reaching an agreement”, an expression 
almost absent in the proactive directives. The reasons behind this regulatory 
difference are easy to guess: since the reactive directives are applicable only to 
situations of crisis, the stress in placed upon the agreement; the proactive 
directives prefer a more permanent dialogue and exchange of views and only 
mention the duty to reach an agreement in situations in which the interests of 
the employees are capable of being affected to a large extent (becoming in this 
sense almost reactive). The macro-economic and firm organisation context in 
which these directives were enacted are also interesting: they were enacted in 
times of modification of the economic model, shareholder activism and 
modifications to the structures of firms; the EU believed that the answer to 
those challenges lay upon social dialogue at the level of the company.
 A final word must be given to the positions of Marie-Ange Moreau: the 
author analysed the approach of the EU in the framework of the 
internationalisation of companies and concluded that this body  of statutes 
represents in innovative approach to the social  challenges raised by the 
internationalisation of companies in the common market. Considering that the 
companies are active internationally and the social regulation remains 
essentially national, there are considerable agency costs between managers, 
shareholders and employees because one decision is capable of having a 
variety of social impacts in several distinct jurisdictions. The solution lays in an 
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innovative  approach that was implemented in accordance with the principle of 
concordance of scope, time and action, which claims that the power of 
shareholders and managers in an unregulated space needs an appropriate 
counterbalancing answer. The answer is based upon the setting up of 
mandatory employee representation in international companies capable of 
representing the interests of all employees affected and in the setting up of 
appropriate information and consultation procedures; these procedures are to 
be bargained between the parties having in mind their specific circumstances 
although the employees are always underpinned in fallback provisions. This is 
an expression of reflexive regulation in order to fill-in the social vacuum of the 
transnational activity of companies.501    
 The conclusion to be drawn from this puzzle of legal sources can be the 
following: the EU believes that social dialogue at the level of the company and 
the engagement of employees into the life of companies is the best means to 
provide an answer to the challenges of the economic model that initiated after 
the 1970s and brought managers under an increasing pressure from the 
shareholders to restructure and provide financial results. This led to a 
realignment of interests between managers and employees in order to provide 
an answer to the demands of shareholders. This was achieved by  means of the 
recognition of rights to information and consultation at various legal sources. 
These rights may be summoned into two large groups: (a) rights of consultation 
with a view to reaching an agreement in situations of crisis or that affect the 
interests of employees to a considerable extent and (b) rights to information 
and consultation (merely  an exchange of views). These rights are recognised 
both at the national and multinational level. At the national level, the strategy 
bet more on rights than actors and simply provided pre-existing actors with a 
concrete and rigidly laid out set of rights in order to implement those directives; 
this recognition is expected to be a factor of evolution of the national 
regulations. At the international level the strategy was more flexible and simply 
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imposed – with some limits – employee representation and left to the autonomy 
of the social partners the definition of the concrete arrangements to information 
and consultation. The end result was the promotion of social dialogue at the 
level of the company.   
5.2.3 The Evolution of the Actors  
the traditional national systems of employee representation have been 
undergoing a considerable evolution over the last 20 years that led to a 
rearrangement of the functions attributed to each one of the actors and to the 
creation of new actors to meet the demands of companies. This evolution is 
intimately  connected to the evolution in collective agreements, which will be the 
object of analysis in the following section. This section will argue that, in a 
similar way that occurred at the level of European law, there has been a 
movement of decentralisation of collective bargaining towards the level of the 
company. This movement of decentralisation was achieved in Continental 
Europe by means of a new articulation between the actors at the level of the 
sector and those at the level of the company and in the UK by means of a 
movement of centralisation of bargaining from the level of the undertaking 
towards the level of the entire company. The causes of this trend of 
decentralisation that led to a rearrangement of the traditional function of the 
actors are multiple and overlapping: they must be seen within their due context 
and assume distinct dimensions within each distinct system. The causes of this 
evolution may be simplified – for reasons of exposition – in one simple 
sentence: the changes in the macro-economic environment (financialisation of 
the economy), the reinforcement of the rights of shareholders and the 
modifications occurred in management boards that has been taking place since 
the beginning of the 1980s have put a considerable degree of pressure upon 
managers for them to be more attentive to the interests of shareholders 
(including non-controlling shareholders, thus curtailing their managerial 
autonomy and the agreements with the dominant shareholders); this led to a 
rearrangement of the organisation of work in order to reduce the agency  costs 
of managers vis-à-vis employees and make the performance of the company 
more responsive to the demands of shareholders. This reorganisation of work 
obliged to a modification of the pre-existing structures of employee 
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representation in order to accommodate the new demands of lean production 
(betting on operational and strategic decentralisation and projectification of 
work). This led to a reinforcement of the powers of the actors at the level of the 
company in each country examined and to a rearrangement of competences of 
the trade unions, who have been increasingly loosing their exclusive monopoly 
in the representation of the interests of employees towards a more balanced 
role of determining the framework conditions at the level of the sector and 
supervising the agreements concluded at the level of the company in order to 
ensure that the institutionalisation of social dialogue at the level of the company 
will not result in a formalisation of the managerial predominance in collective 
bargaining to the detriment of employees. This comes to the interest of 
managers, shareholders and employees: the realignment of interest between 
managers and employees will allow them to agree on attempting to satisfy to 
the best extent the interests of the shareholders and thus preserve their 
position and avoid redundancies (the so-called insider/outsider conflict); but 
employees are equally  interested in this evolution because this will allow them 
to supervise to a greater extent the behaviour of the management board and 
attempt to bargain the solution that is the least detrimental to their interests 
when faced with the pressure of shareholders (the so-called accountability 
conflict).502 The impact of EU Law in this evolution is hard to evaluate; with the 
exception of the UK – a country in which the influence of EC Law and been so 
extensive that it has increasingly became a case-study of how EU Law can 
modify a national system – the influence of EU Law in the other regulations is 
harder to observe; the most correct observation seems to be Sylvaine Laulom’s 
observation that the rights-based approach of EU Law has been serving as the 
seed of change of a traditional system and that the forthcoming modifications 
will occur by means of a spill-over effect.503  As we can see, the sources of 
influence and transformation are multiple and hard to observe in an isolated 
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manner. The following lines will attempt to illustrate the evolution of each 
national system and demonstrate the evolution registered towards the creation 
of new spaces of manoeuvre for the actors at the level of the company. 
(a)  Germany – Germany has experienced since the beginning of the 1980s a 
remarkable evolution in the traditional functions of employee representation. 
This evolution was remarkable because – unlike the remaining countries – it did 
not consist in the creation of new actors (with the exception of the 
Arbeitsgruppen in the new §28aVBG) but simply  in the adaptation of the 
existing employee representative structures to the challenges of new realities. 
The former paragraphs mentioned that the German system of employee 
representation was underpinned in a sharp division of competences between 
the trade unions (who had the monopoly at the level of the sector and 
represented employees as a class, regulating the substantive working 
conditions at the level of the industry) and the works councils (who represented 
employees at the level of the company as stakeholders). This sharp division of 
competences became under attack since the beginning of the 1980s. The 
reasons behind the increasing critics to the traditional balance of the system lay 
in its inadequacy to the structural changes that occurred since the end of the 
1970s. The modifications in the macro-economic environment, the patterns of 
corporate governance and the organisation of companies (that placed an 
increasing demand upon managers to deliver shareholder value) demanded an 
increasing level of flexibility and differentiation in collective agreements. The 
current practice of collective bargaining was unable to present an answer to the 
challenges of the time and began to loose its capability to perform its functions. 
The employers criticised the rigid wages and the rigid standardisation of work 
laid down in industry level agreements because it did not fit to the particular 
demands of their companies. In addition, the current practice of collective 
agreements had the effect of benefiting the insiders (i.e: persons that already 
had a stable job  within companies) at the cost of outsiders (persons that had a 
flexible contract with the company or that worked in outsourced companies 
working exclusively for the central company) because they were able to raise 
their wages above the level of the market by putting pressure upon persons 
with unstable positions to accept lower wages and precarious working 
conditions under fear of loosing their employment. The answer lay in a 
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decentralisation of the employee representation towards the level of the 
company. The advocates 504  of this solution praised the fact that the 
decentralisation of employee representation towards a reinforcement of the 
powers of the actors at the level of the company brought with it numerous 
advantages: it could reduce the transaction costs of managers vis-à-vis 
employees in the channels of information within the company; it could assist in 
the implementation of lean production – with the consequential advantages in 
flexibility - while maintaining employee representation, it could create incentives 
for the investment in human capital that is characteristic of the German system 
of corporate governance and it could provide companies with instruments of 
flexibility (particularly in wages and working time) in order to be able to face the 
economic fluctuations of the time, the demands of shareholders and the 
capacity of companies.
This decentralisation of collective bargaining towards the level of the 
company was achieved by means of an adaptation of the actors and of the 
collective agreements.505  This emancipation was made by several distinct 
means that must be contextualised in order to understand the reasons behind 
their development and their importance. As it has been laid out several times 
throughout this thesis, the German system of employee representation has a 
core actor at the level of the company – the works council. The works council 
and the trade unions have a statutorily mandated strict division of tasks in order 
to safeguard the representative functions of each body and avoid overlapping 
functions. This separation was strongly supported by the employers who 
wanted to avoid bringing social conflicts into the company. The key provision 
here was §77(3)BVG; this provision barred the works council from determining 
the conditions of work when those conditions were previously laid out in a 
collective agreement applicable to the industry. The concern to avoid free-riding 
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505 This section will be concerned with the description of the emancipation of the actors; the 
agreements will be the object of the next section. Several references will be made to collective 
agreements however because one cannot truly understand its function in an isolated manner; 
the details of the evolution of the agreements will be laid out further on.    
and ensure the effective application of the industry level agreement to all the 
companies of the sector was so strong that the provision was applicable even if 
the company was not a part to the agreement in one of the few deviations 
allowed from the principle of double affiliation. This meant that as long as 
wages and working conditions were normally  (üblicherweise) regulated in a 
collective agreement applicable to the sector, the works council would be 
barred from determining it at the level of the company independently  of the 
affiliation of the employer. The key concern here was to ensure the monopoly of 
trade unions in the determination of the wages and working conditions.506 The 
challenges of the 1980s led employers to contest to an increasing extent this 
solution because they thought that collective agreements were no longer 
capable or providing for a solution to their problems and wished to determined 
the working conditions directly with the works council free from the coverage of 
collective agreements. The inadequacy of the limits laid down in §77(3)BVG 
and its progressive disregard in practice were more than evident in three widely 
debated cases: Viessman, Holzmann and Burda. The Viessman case dates 
back to 1996 and concerns an agreement with the works council (further 
approved by 96% of the employees in a plebiscite) in which the employer 
increased the working time of the employees without an increase in 
remuneration in exchange for not delocalising a company. The trade union 
opposed the agreement but undertook no effective actions. The Holzmann case 
concerns an insolvent company that bargained a recovery plan that contained 
the following clause: the employees would accept to work five extra-hours per 
week without an increase in remuneration in exchange for the preservation of 
their jobs; the employees could nonetheless set up  a working-time account in 
which the extra-hour would be accounted and compensated with 
supplementary rest when the situation of the company improved. Although the 
agreement met the opposition of the trade unions, it had no practical effect 
because the company was liquidated in the end. The last case was the widely 
discussed Burda decision: this case concerns a company that concluded an 
agreement with the employees in accordance to which the employees would 
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increase their working time to 39h per week without an increase in 
remuneration in exchange for giving up  redundancies and a delocalisation. 
Unlike the previous cases, the Burda case reached the courts and the BAG 
took a widely discussed decision: when the BAG was asked to discuss the 
interpretation of the principe de faveur (Günstigkeitprinzip) (§4(3)TVG) between 
the collective agreement and the labour contract, the BAG decided that the 
employees could not be placed in such a position because the choice between 
wages and job  security are not comparable (“one cannot compare apples and 
peaches”, in the ruling’s words). Nevertheless by deciding that that this rule 
would be applicable only  to affiliated employees, it deprived the ruling of most 
of its practical effect because it in fact legalised an escape to the collective 
agreement (and §77(3)BVG) by means of the un-affiliation of the employees.507 
This decision of the BAG opened the doors to a line of cases that in fact 
legalised the escape from the collective agreement by indirect means. The 
higher courts admitted that the employer concluded an informal agreement with 
all the employees concerning the matters subject to a collective agreement; as 
long as that agreement was not qualified as a company-level agreement 
(Betriebsvereinbarung) concluded with the works council and the employees 
were not affiliated to the trade union in question then the “informal agreement” 
could deviate from the industry agreement and therefore overcome the limit laid 
out in §77(3)BVG. This was an indirect means of empowering the works council 
by opening doors to the deviation from the industry level agreements and 
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bringing  social dialogue into the company so that the interests of managers 
and employees could be aligned in times of trouble.508 509
The lawmakers and the trade unions understood the potential reach of 
these decisions and decided to undertake measures to fight a potential 
voidness of the trade unions. One of the most relevant measures took place in 
2001 in the reform of the BVG and consisted in an enlargement of the cases in 
which the collective agreements could increase the powers of the works 
councils. The key provision here is the new version of §3BVG that is expected 
to create incentives for the decentralisation of social dialogue to the level of the 
company with the assistance of the trade unions. The new version of §3BVG, 
introduced in the reform of 2001, had the intention of creating incentives for the 
setting up of ad hoc employee representative structures. The trade unions had 
been demanding since the beginning of the 1980s a reinforcement of social 
dialogue at the level of the company; the trade unions understood that the 
structural changes that were occurring were favouring more company specific 
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measures and placed a great challenge to the traditional system of industry 
level bargaining that had been one of the pillars of the German economic 
success; company level social dialogue was seen as the most secure means of 
ensuring employee influence at the future.510  The problem lay in guaranteeing 
that the trade unions would not be left out of the picture and ensure them a 
significant role in this decentralised social dialogue. The new version of §3BVG 
is the result of those efforts and its solutions attempt to strike a balance 
between the need to increase social dialogue at company level and the 
guarantee of the power of the trade unions. The essence of the provision 
consists in providing a means for the employer and the employees to bargain 
more specific employee representative structures. In the event that the 
catalogue of structures offered by the law is inadequate to ensure an effective 
employee influence in the decision-making structures of the company, §3BVG 
allows trade unions and employers to bargain a company specific 
representative structure. Before analysing each one of the distinct possibilities 
of adaptation, there is a need to make two preliminary remarks: firstly, the 
statute uses throughout the provision the formula “as long as it is necessary to 
serve an objectively justified interest of the workforce”.511  This means that this 
possibility is always subsidiary to the statutory representative structures and 
that its enactment is dependent of a demonstration of the interest of the 
employees in setting up an ad hoc structure. Secondly, the new employee 
representative structures must be in principle set up  by means of a collective 
agreement concluded with a trade union. This agreement will normally  be a 
company-level collective agreement (i.e: concluded between a trade union and 
an employer) because the practical effects of the provisions are thought for 
specific companies. The only situation in which the employees may bargain the 
setting up  of a new representative structure directly with the employer occurs 
when the company is not under the influence of a collective agreement (§3(2)
BVG). The preference given to the trade unions is not strange and must be 
understood in its due context. The trade unions have a constitutionally 
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recognised role in Germany of regulating the labour market by  means of 
collective agreements and by  means of a delegation of the State to the social 
partners of the task of regulating the labour market. This role was recognised in 
§1TVG when the statute fit the task of regulating the “company constitution 
matters” within the competences of the trade unions. But it is equally interesting 
to observe that the attempt to decentralise collective bargaining in Germany by 
means of §3BVG did not result in a diminution of the power of trade unions: the 
unions still have the preference in bargaining the employee representative 
structures by means of (presumably) company-level agreements thus ensuring 
that the decentralisation of bargaining does not result in a diminution of the 
powers of the employees.512 
The new version of §3BVG provides that trade unions may set up 
complementary employee representative structures in several situations; the 
most important ones, for the purposes of this thesis, consist in (1) in companies 
with several undertakings, (2) in companies or groups of companies organised 
in specialised departments gifted with decision-making capacities (§3(1),nº.1 
and nº.2 BVG). As regards the first situation, when the company is divided into 
several undertakings, the law offers the possibility  for the employer and the 
trade union to agree to set up a structure representative of the employees of all 
the undertakings or to unite undertakings. The purpose of the regulation is 
more than evident: it intends to facilitate the possibility of representation of the 
employees in front of the employer. This possibility  seems awkward because 
the BVG provides in its §47 for the election of an enterprise works council 
(Gesamtbetriebsrat), which consists in a representative structure composed by 
representatives of the minor works councils; each undertaking would have to 
elect its own works council and then send to the enterprise works council a 
representative that would coordinate the activities of the minor works councils. 
This possibility  of deviation from the election of a Gesamtbetriebsrat must be 
understood at the light of the intention of facilitating social dialogue at the level 
of the company. The enterprise works council is an indirectly  elected organ 
whose competence is limited to affairs concerning the whole company. It 
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presupposes a previous election of works councils in the participating 
undertakings and therefore imposes a duplication of costs. The possibility to set 
up  a directly elected works council avoids this duplication of costs and provides 
the works council with the possibility to bargain any affairs that concern the 
employees of the company (and not just those that concern all the company); it 
is equally  a much stronger bargaining partner because it directly represents all 
the employees of the company even if the issue at stake only concerns one or 
some of the undertakings of the company. This possibility  was designed to 
strengthen social dialogue in small and medium companies with decentralised 
organisational structures where the setting up of both works councils and an 
enterprise works council would be too burdensome. On the other hand, the 
setting up of this structure projects the issues concerning the workforce at the 
level of the organisation (and not the undertaking) thus strengthening social 
dialogue at company level. Alternatively, the social partners may agree to 
consider the several undertakings in which the company is divided as only one 
undertaking for the purpose of the election of the works council and therefore 
avoid the dual-regime that the enterprise works council implies. That would be 
the case for example of one company with one decision-making structure and 
several geographically  dispersed units: since the meeting with the works 
councils of each one of these unions is unlikely or unfeasible then the trade 
unions may propose to consider them as one single undertaking for the 
purpose of the election of a works council that is nearer to the management.513
The second situation is quite distinct as it points towards the facilitation 
of social dialogue in companies in which lean production had been thoroughly 
implemented. §3(1),nº.2 BVG authorises the trade unions to bargain alternative 
representative structures in companies that are organised in specialised 
departments (Sparten) in accordance to the product or project with a certain 
degree of autonomy in decision-making. This provision allows either for the 
setting up of alternative representative structures in each one of the sparten in 
order to allow employees to enter into a direct dialogue with the management 
or the reunion of all the employees of the several sparten into one company for 
the purpose of the election of the works council. The founding stone of this 
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provision is the division of the company in sections (sparten). These sections 
must refer either to the product or to the project; other divisions that are 
unrelated to these elements (such as clients, market segments, distribution) are 
irrelevant when they have no indirect connection to those two elements. The 
functional division of companies in production, distribution and services are 
equally insufficient to allow a collective agreement to set up a separate 
representation. The reference to the very  expressive concept of sparten intends 
to make a direct appeal to the application of the principles of lean production to 
the activity of companies; the activity of the company is divided into products or 
projects with a substantial degree of autonomy within the company up to the 
point that they may be considered as independent units within an overall 
company. This brings us to the second requirement for the setting up  of an ad 
hoc employee representative structure: the management of the division must 
act as the functional employer of the division. The statute makes reference to 
the managerial decisions in situations subject to employee-influence 
procedures. This means that the division must have some kind of autonomous 
direction that will act as the functional employer. This does not mean however 
that the direction must be autonomous in the sense of having the responsibility 
and autonomy to undertake the decisions that it sees fit to the management of 
the company. This provision is also applicable when the management is under 
the direct influence and dependency  of higher layers of hierarchy and merely 
implements the decisions undertaken at those higher levels. The most relevant 
thing to retain is that the management of the product or project division must 
have some kind of directory  power that is capable of stimulating employee 
influence rights. One may make a distinction between the competence to run 
the division (Spartenleitung) and the competence to run the business 
(Betriebsleitung) in order to understand the level of autonomy required to 
implement this provision: it is enough that the management of the division 
exercises some kind of managerial prerogatives (even if to a limited extent) to 
be qualified as a manager for the purposes of the provision and allow for the 
setting up of this alternative representative structure. A final word concerning 
this possibility is imposed: similarly to what was described in the previous 
section, the setting up of a representative structure at the level of the product or 
project is destined to substitute the competent representative (the works 
council, global works council, (Gesamtbetriebsrat), group  works council 
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(Konzernbetriebsrat)) in its functions. The representative becomes an 
autonomous organ for the performance of the task of employee representation 
having regard to the particular organisation of the company. The law equally 
admits the possibility of setting up complementary  organs in the sense of 
ancillary employee representatives structures whose job  is not to replace the 
competent representative but simply to assist it in the performance of its job. §3
(1),nº.4 and nº.5 BVG make an express reference to them. Those contained in 
nº.4 are though to coordinate the actions of employee representatives in 
several companies; they are particularly useful in areas undergoing heavy 
restructuring procedures in which the coordinated action of the employees is 
useful; those contained in nº.5 are a simple reference to complementary 
structures that assist the works council in its relationship  with the employees. In 
similar terms to the structures that have been described here, they  must be 
agreed with the competent trade union by means of a collective agreement.514 
 The organisation of the company in accordance with the principles of 
lean production led the German lawmaker to introduce another provision in the 
BVG that is thought to adapt the structures of representation of employees to 
those procedures. That provision is §28aBVG, which concerns the delegation 
of tasks to groups of employees (Arbeitsgruppen). This provision authorises the 
works council of companies with more than 100 employees to delegate certain 
of its tasks to groups of employees (arbeitsgruppen) as long as the delegated 
tasks have some connection to the activity exercised by that group. This 
empowers the group  of employees to conclude agreements with the employer 
subject to the same requirements at the agreements concluded by the works 
council (§28aBVG). This provision – which was newly  introduced within the 
BVG – intended to strengthen the position of specific groups of employees 
within the company whose interests were not adequately safeguarded by the 
works council without undermining the position of the works council. Therefore 
its function is not to compete or to substitute the works council but to assist it in 
the function of employee representation by assuming some of its powers in 
areas gifted with sufficient autonomy; this explains the resource the concept 
imported from Administrative Law of übertragung (delegation), i.e: the transfer 
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of powers from one entity  to another because the interests at stake advise that 
the more specific entity should have the power to assume the decisions. This 
provision is an answer to the demands of the praxis that employees assume 
more direct forms of participation within companies. The concept of “group of 
employees” is to be interpreted as broadly as possible covering both team and 
project work as well as determined occupational activities. They may be 
defined as self-regulatory  organisational entities within the company that 
implement the planning, direction, implementation, coordination or control of 
their activity  (defined in occupational terms by reference to a task) with a 
variable degree of autonomy. The most relevant thing is the identification of a 
concrete group of employees that may be detached from the remaining 
company on account of their autonomy and discretionarity due to the activities 
exercised. The key provision here is §87(1),nº13 BVG, which defines groups of 
employees as “a group of employees that performs essentially in their own 
responsibility a task delegated to them in the context of the organisation of 
work within the company”. Therefore they  must have some kind of autonomy in 
the determination of their work (even if partial). The concept does not cover 
organisational units (even if perfectly  detached) that enjoy no autonomy in the 
determination of their work and merely  perform tasks commanded from 
above.515 The delegation must be made by means of a written agreement with 
the works council that will determine which groups will assume the tasks of the 
works council and which powers will be transferred to the group. The 
requirement of an agreement is made to avoid pressures from the employer 
and an undermining of the powers of the works council (divide et impera). In 
order to avoid pressures of the employer and to ensure that the transfer obeys 
genuine occupational requirements, the works council is free to revoke it at any 
time (§28aBVG). The tasks delegated to the arbeitsgrupp  must have some kind 
of intimate connection with the activities exercised by the group in order to 
facilitate the management of human resources in the company and make it 
more competitive. The group will be empowered to bargain a group  agreement 
(gruppenvereinbarung) with the employer in order to negotiate the more 
relevant questions. This agreement is able of covering any of the tasks of the 
works council delegated to the arbeitsgrupp  and issues of the specific interest 
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of the arbeitsgrupp, such as the improvement of communication channels 
between the employer and the group.
 This short description of §28aBVG allows us to understand how the 
representation of employees is being increasingly  adapted to the new realities 
of the organisation of work. The works council represents employees as a 
unitary group  in front of the employer; the reality  is that the employees are 
increasingly becoming a diversified group with distinct interests; the 
introduction of lean production and the consequential autonomy that the 
organisation of work in projects and teams entails demands a reconfiguration of 
the organisation of employee representation. In order to avoid that this re-
organisation would entail an undermining of the works council and a weakening 
of the representation of employees, the lawmaker surrounded the setting up of 
these structures with cautions: they only have the competences that the works 
council delegated to them (implying that the competence remains in principle 
with the works council and that the competence of the arbeitsgrupp  is merely 
subsidiary) and those competences may be revoked at any time. But within the 
framework of their competences, the arbeitsgruppen will be entitled to conclude 
all the agreements with the employer necessary for the performance of their 
tasks and therefore improve the communication channels within the 
company.516    
There is one last relevant aspect that considerably modifies the position 
of employees within companies and contributes directly to social dialogue at 
the level of the company, which consists in the increasing unionisation of works 
council members. The functional division of tasks between the works councils 
and the trade unions traditionally advised against the unionisation of the works 
council; there were fears that it would open doors for the internalisation of 
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social conflicts within the company  and that the function of the trade unions 
(which consists in defending employees as a class) could be undermined by 
the unionisation of the works council (who do not bargain as a class but as 
stakeholders of the company). The modifications in the structure of companies 
and the increasing demands for decentralisation of collective bargaining 
towards the level of the company obliged trade unions to rethink their 
strategies. The function of the collective agreement as a pacifier of the labour 
market was questioned and employers made increasing demands for flexibility 
at the level of the company. This raised a danger: there was the peril that the 
demands for flexibility by the employer could turn out in social inequalities 
within the company and by  an employer predominance in the running of the 
business of the undertaking, which would be extremely hazardous for the 
stakeholder orientation that German statutes intend to implement. One answer 
lay in overcoming the traditional distinction of roles and unionising the works 
council. There were several advantages to this trend: firstly, the works councils 
could benefit from the support and the advice of the trade unions when 
conducting their bargaining (which is extremely important in derogatory 
agreements, to be analysed in the next section) because the trade unions have 
more experience and information to be able to efficiently  bargain the best 
solution. Secondly, the statutory protection that German law affords not only for 
the performance of jobs in representative bodies but also on account of union 
membership helped employees to feel safer when performing their tasks; if we 
combine these two elements, employees tended to feel “safer” in their jobs 
when they had the backing of a union. Thirdly, the unionisation of works 
councils also provided trade unions with important and reliable information on 
the concrete financial situation of companies that could assist in designing their 
Tarifpolitik for the industry or company-level bargaining of collective 
agreements. 
This unionisation of the works council led to the development of a 
typology of the relationships between the works council and the trade unions in 
order to understand the various methods by means of which the two bodies 
influenced one another reciprocally. These relationships could be classified as 
an Entanglement (Verschränkung) or Dependency (Abhängigkeit). There is a 
situation of entanglement when the trade unions and the works councils have a 
close cooperation, which may be interpreted as a reciprocal benefice in the 
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context of a relatively autonomous company strategy. Although there is a formal 
distinction between the works council and the trade union in their position and 
jobs, the reality  is that there is a close relation between these bodies in the 
performance of their jobs that is cemented by  means of several communication 
channels. The communication channels between both bodies serve to assist 
the works council in the performance of its job  and, in that context, in the 
performance of the Tarifpolitik of the trade union. There is a substantive 
integration of the works council in the trade union in order to ensure an 
effective connection to the collective agreement. The works council informs the 
trade union of the situation of the company and requires its assistance in the 
performance of its job; the trade union assists the works council in the 
bargaining having simultaneously  into account the situation of the company and 
of the industry concerned; in this sense, the works council is not only a 
stakeholder of the company but equally an instrument of the Tarifpolitik of the 
trade union. The situation of dependency refers to a distinct case that implies a 
close reference of the works council to the trade union in compensation for the 
asymmetry  of powers within the trade union. The position of the works council 
within the company is relatively  weak; the works council then recurs to the 
trade union in order to compensate for this asymmetry  and regain its position 
as an interlocutor in front of the employer. Unlike the situation of entanglement 
however, the relationship  between the works council and the trade union is 
unilateral; the trade union assists the works council in the performance of its 
tasks but does not use it as a means of introducing its Tarifpolitik within the 
company; the trade union assists the setting up  of the works council but does 
not interfere in its functioning.517 
This typology of relations helps us in understanding the modifications 
that are occurring within the system. The trade unions and the works councils 
are increasingly  reinforcing their communication channels in order to assist the 
setting up of works councils within companies and therefore reinforcing the 
social dialogue at the level of the company. This might lead either to an 
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instrumentalisation of the works council within the company in the performance 
of the Tarifpolitik of the trade union or in, more feebly, in the simple assistance 
to the setting up  and performance of the normal tasks of the trade union. The 
end result is always the same however: the reinforcement of company  level 
social dialogue. 
This short analysis of the evolutions registered at the levels of the actors 
in the German system of employee representation allows us to extract a 
preliminary  conclusion: there appears to be a movement of modification of the 
powers and positions of the actors at the level of the company in Germany in 
order to facilitate direct dialogue between management and employees. The 
Burda decision struck a strong blow to the powers of trade unions by indirectly 
legitimising the agreements between employers and employees that were 
potentially detrimental to the provisions contained in industry level agreements. 
The trade unions understood this trend and have been partners in this process 
by requiring their agreement to the reinforcement of company level 
representatives and to the potential undermining of the industry level 
agreement: firstly, the creation of new actors demands the agreement of the 
trade unions in a collective agreement (presumably company-level). This 
means that the deviations from the provisions of the BVG (which are subject to 
the requirement of being in the interest of the employees) must be bargained 
with the trade unions. Secondly, the increasing unionisation of works council 
members provides trade unions with a possibility  of influencing the negotiations 
at the level of the company and with a rich source of information on the 
concrete situation of undertakings that may be extremely useful to the 
elaboration of the Tarifpolitik. Finally, it is unequivocal that the adaptation of 
employee representative structures was also thought having in mind the 
realities of the new forms of organisation of work: the delegation of tasks to the 
arbeitsgruppen and the setting up of ad hoc employee representative structures 
in companies organised in accordance with the principles of lean production 
(sparten) intends to adapt employee representation and social dialogue to the 
new demands of work. The end result is an expected reinforcement of 
company-level social dialogue.  
  
507
(b) France – the French system of employee representation also exhibited a 
considerable evolution over the last years that have appear to have led to a 
reinforcement of social dialogue at the level of the company. The 
transformations were deeper however as it implied a modification to the 
statutory regulation of employee representative structures and to the traditional 
balance between union and non-union representation in France. The 
transformation in the French system of employee representation was achieved 
by means of a complex procedure that mixed legislation and national collective 
agreements; it intended to achieve a compromise between the need to improve 
social dialogue at the level of the company and the trade union’s refusal to 
loose power in matters of representation of employees. The final result was a 
complex scheme that intends to achieve a balance between the engagement of 
employees in the life of the company and the safeguard of trade unions’ power 
to control the application of labour law at the level of the company. 
 The French system of employee representation at the level of the 
company exhibits two types of representation: (a) elected and (b) designated. 
The elected representation consists in the works councils (comité d’enteprise, 
which is a tripartite body) and in the staff-delegate (délégué du personnel); the 
designated representation consists in the shop-stewards (délégué syndical). 
The powers of employee representatives at the level of the company are limited 
to rights to information and consultation because the matters of collective 
bargaining are reserved to the trade unions. The first transformation to this pre-
established scheme came in the Auroux laws; these laws consisted in an 
extremely influential reform of French Labour Law that took place in the 
beginning of the 1980s, which set the bases for the development of social 
dialogue at the level of the company and influenced to a considerable extent 
the posterior evolution. The ambitious objective of the reform was clearly stated 
in a report elaborated by Jean Auroux himself in which he stated that the 
objective of the reform was to: (1) provide the employee with a greater and 
more responsible dimension within the company, (2) recognise to each one of 
the social partners its role and mission and (3) trust the organisation of 
employment relations to bargaining and contract. Each constituent element of 
the company (management, employees, shareholders) should be considered 
as a fully autonomous actor in its respective domain; the working collectivity 
should be reunited and the law should not regulate but rather provide room for 
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the social partners to adapt the management of the company to their specific 
needs by means of self-regulation, so that each one of the parties may exercise 
its own competences.518 These bold statements lay out in a clear fashion the 
guiding lines of the reform: the labour force should no longer be considered as 
an outside element of the company but rather internalised into the management 
of the company by providing the social partners with sufficient room of 
manoeuvre for the bargaining of the solutions best adapted to the situation of 
the company. This could well be translated in a contemporary contractarian 
conception of the company and the emphasis on company level social dialogue 
as a means of reducing the agency costs of managers vis-à-vis employees and 
providing companies with an instrument to face the demands of the time. 
 The reforms undertaken by the Auroux Laws were quite extensive. Since 
the laws placed a great deal of emphasis on company level social dialogue by 
setting up employee representatives that could bargain with the employer, the 
actors at the level of the company were one of the most important areas of 
intervention. One important modification that the law introduced consisted in 
the suppression the thresholds of 50 employees to set up trade union sections 
(section syndicale) within the company; although the trade union section is not 
itself gifted with information and consultation rights, it was nonetheless 
important because it encouraged the unionisation and the correspondent union 
presence within small and medium sized companies and facilitated the setting 
up  of a union partner within the company to initiate social dialogue. This 
encouragement of unionisation and union presence within the company had the 
merit of introducing us to the following innovation, which consisted in the 
replacement functions of the staff-delegate. The Auroux Laws allowed 
representative trade unions to designate in companies with less than 50 
employees the staff-delegate as its representative; this means that the staff-
delegate (délégué du personnel) would in reality combine both the functions of 
an elected representative of the personnel and of a shop-steward (délégué 
syndical). This was an extremely important innovation whose relevance should 
not be underestimated. The French legal thinking at the time made a distinction 
between the tasks of the shop-steward (which consisted in vindicating a 
change of rules, a task constitutionally reserved to the trade unions) and the 
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task of the staff-delegate (which was merely an interlocutor between the 
employer and the employees deprived on any bargaining functions; the most 
he could do was to protest against the inobservance of regulation within the 
company).519 This relevance had almost no impact outside large companies on 
account of the meagre unionisation in the private sector (in particular in small 
and medium companies). The lawmaker, by recognising the existence of a 
trade union section in all companies – independently of the thresholds of 
employees – and by providing representative trade unions with the possibility to 
designate a staff-delegate as a shop-steward in reality created incentives for 
company level social dialogue because that was a terrain unexplored 
previously by the trade unions on account of the lack of representation. This is 
even more important if we consider an essential obligation introduced by the 
Auroux Laws – the duty to bargain the organisation of work and working time. 
The laws imposed upon the employer the duty  to bargain with the 
representatives of the personnel (which would be the trade union 
representative) the organisation of work within the company and the 
arrangement of working time. If we make a connection to the previous sections 
of this thesis, it may be argued that this duty  is a direct implementation of the 
principles of lean production within the company, by attempting to engage 
employees into the life of the company through the facilitation the 
communication channels with the management board. The concrete extension 
of this duty will be analysed in the next section but it is important to remark for 
the time being that the reinforcement of the position of trade unions within the 
company was combined with a duty to bargain.520  The Auroux Laws had two 
other significant innovations: firstly, it created a new body – the comité de 
groupe, a works council to be set up  in groups of companies; secondly, it 
introduced a very important provision that laid out boldly the objectives 
underlying the reform of the employee representative structures; that provision 
is nowadays art.2323-1CTF, which states that the competence of the works 
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council is to “ensure a collective expression of the employees, allowing the 
permanent taking into account of their interests in the management of the 
company and the economical and financial evolution of the company”. Although 
this is essentially a declaration of principle, it has the merit of serving as the 
founding stone of a new philosophy of social dialogue within companies and as 
an interpretative canon of more technical provisions.521 
 The principles laid out in the Auroux Laws served as inspiration to latter 
regulatory reforms. An important reform took place in 1993 and consisted in the 
possibility of the employer factually uniting the staff-delegates and the works 
councils: the law of 20 December 1993 stated that in companies under the 
threshold of 200 employees, the employer could determine that the staff-
delegates could constitute the representatives of the employees to the works 
council; although this was in fact an unilateral act of the employer, the only 
requirement consisted in a non-binding previous consultation the staff-
delegates and the works council. This provision is of an illusory simplicity and 
must be understood at the light of the principles laid out in the Auroux laws: 
French law suffered from a diversity  of employee representative structures at 
the level of the firm that was  particularly  burdensome for small and medium 
companies, resulting in an absence of representation in those companies.522 
The Auroux Laws attempted to reverse this absence by promoting unionisation 
at the level of the company  (by abolishing the thresholds for the setting up of 
trade union sections and allowing unions to designate a staff-delegate as a 
shop-steward in the company); the law of 1993 contributed further to this trend 
by factually  uniting the works council and the staff-delegate. Although the staff-
delegate and the works council legally remained two distinct entities, the reality 
is that by allowing the employer to consider the staff-delegate as the 
representative of the employees to the works council, it in fact united these two 
511
521 Pélissier, J., A. Supiot, et al. (2008). Droit du Travail, Dalloz.
522  Jean-Emmanuel Ray observed that the traditional employee representative structures 
existent in French Law had been conceived having in mind the strongest French sectors at the 
time – mines and metallurgy. The previous texts dated from 1936, 1945 and 1968, a time in 
which France was primarily an industrial country. The modifications occurred since the 1970s 
progressively turned France into a services country, with thousands of small and medium 
companies. This demanded a reform of the structures for employee representation to meet the 
new economical reality. See Ray, J.-E. (1994). "Regard sur un lifting législatif nécessaire 
(articles 24 à 32, relatifs aux institutions représentatives du personnel)." Droit Social(2): 
142-146.
representative organs and promoted the setting up of works councils in 
companies. The employees simply had to elect a staff-delegate and that staff-
delegate could automatically be the representative of the employees to the 
works council. This allowed the employer to discuss the issues concerning the 
mandatory information and consultation procedures as well as the 
competences of the staff-delegate in one single meeting, thus simplifying the 
representative structures at the level of the company, reducing their costs and 
contributing to social dialogue. Some authors equally praised the positive 
effects that this union could have upon the employees: although works councils 
generally  enjoyed a good reputation among the employees, the staff-delegates 
were generally considered to be closer to the employees and to have a better 
knowledge of the internal activity of the company; the factual unification of the 
two bodies is also capable of boosting social dialogue at the level of the 
company by combining the advantages of both.523 
 The success of this provision opened the doors to an extremely  
important reform that took place in between 1995 and 1996 by means of the 
national agreement on contractual policy of 31 October 1995 and the law of 
12th November 1996. The national agreement on contractual policy of 1995 
was an extremely  important agreement signed at the national level by  the 
social partners that intended to develop  social bargaining at all levels of the 
economy. The underlying intention was to provide the social partners with the 
necessary tools to assume more responsibility in the determination of the 
conditions of work at each industry and company concerned and thus promote 
social dialogue. One of the main innovations introduced by the agreement 
consisted in an extremely strong push towards social dialogue at the level of 
the company. The agreement stated that the absence of representatives in the 
majority of small and medium companies and the absence of social dialogue in 
French companies was seen as detrimental to the performance of the 
economy. Therefore the agreement took upon its hands the task of developing 
an articulated contractual practice at all levels of bargaining, in particular at the 
level of the company, where it was virtually absent.  The collective agreement 
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then took two extremely innovative solutions: firstly, it expressly allowed the 
derogation of some provisions of an extended industry level agreement 
concluded by a representative trade union by a company-level agreement. This 
was an extremely  innovative implementation of the contractualisation of social 
policy  at the level of the company because it partially reversed the principe de 
faveur that was prevalent in French collective bargaining until 1996. The 
national agreement of 1996 provided that employee representatives at the level 
of the company could bargain an agreement on the reduction of working time 
subject to three conditions: (a) in principle, the competence to sign the 
agreement belonged to the shop-stewards; (b) in the event that there were no 
shop-stewards in the company, the agreement could be concluded by an 
employee expressly mandated by a representative  trade union for that 
purpose; (c) in the event that no express mandate existed, the derogatory 
agreement could be concluded by a staff-delegate;  the only  requirements were 
that the derogatory agreement be validated by  a paritary industry commission 
in order to gain efficacy. This model was so innovative for French law that it 
even motivated a decision from the French Constitutional Court in 1995, who 
considered that the model was in accordance with the French constitution 
because the trade unions did not have an absolute monopoly  of employee 
representation; alternative agents could be allowed as long as the natural 
tendency of the trade unions to defend the interests of the employees in 
collective bargaining was respected. As we can see, this is a model that comes 
in the line of the reinforcement of the powers of the actors at the level of the 
company undertaken by the Auroux laws in 1982 that respects a balance 
between the decentralisation of bargaining (by providing elected employee 
representatives with derogatory powers) with the respect of the autonomy and 
power of the trade unions (the trade unions can control the derogation by 
means of the mandate and the evaluation by the paritary  commission). This 
system was turned into a law by the Rouen laws of 1996.524 
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 The saga continued with the Aubry, Fillon and Bertrand laws. The Aubry  
laws of 1998 and 2000 consisted in a regulatory  package that reduced working 
time in France to 35 hours per week. The laws determined that working time 
should be reduced to an average of 35 hours per week by means of an 
agreement with an employee representative. The novelty brought about by the 
law consisted in allowing companies with less than 50 employees not covered 
by an extended collective agreement to bargain the reduction of working time 
directly with a staff-delegate (in the event that there was no shop-steward or 
mandated staff-delegate in the company) but subject to two additional 
requirements: (a) the agreement had to be approved by a referendum of the 
employees and (b) it also had to be approved by a paritary  industry 
commission. The Aubry laws had the merit of reintroducing the system of 
referendum into French labour law thus providing the agreements concluded by 
the employee representatives with a greater degree of legitimacy and further 
engaging employees into the life of companies by means of a direct 
participation in decision-making questions concerning the organisation of 
working time.525
The Fillon and Bertrand laws gave a further contribution to this scheme 
by reversing the hierarchy of norms. The Fillon and Bertrand laws consist in an 
implementation of the common position adopted by  the major French 
employers association MEDEF and four unions that required public authorities 
to adopt measures to reverse the principe de faveur that governed the 
relationship  between the various levels of bargaining; the demand was for a 
more decentralised culture of bargaining in accordance to which the lower level 
agreements could deviate detrimentally from the higher level agreements in 
order to adapt the working conditions to the situation of concrete companies (in 
particular in times of crisis). Until the Fillon Laws, collective agreements were 
subject to the principe de faveur, in accordance to which higher level 
agreements prevailed over lower level agreements. The previous lines of this 
text illustrated the progressive erosion of this principle in the subjects of 
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working time and wages by the Auroux, Rouen and Aubry  laws because they 
provided for the possibility of derogation under certain conditions. The Fillon 
laws opened the possibilities of derogation by providing the social partners with 
full flexibility in the determination of the subjects that could be derogated by 
lower level agreements; the only exceptions were the law (there are still 
imperative norms in the law that may not be derogated by collective 
agreements) and the collective agreement itself, which could determine the 
situations in which it did not allow deviations from the lower level.526  This 
means that, in practice, sector-agreements became subsidiary  and the centre 
of gravity of bargaining turned to the company level. The determination of the 
order public social (the limits to the derogation) lay within the freedom of the 
parties to the agreement. The Fillon Laws also introduced considerable 
modifications to the agents competent to conclude the derogatory agreements: 
the Auroux, Rouen and Aubry laws established a system of preference in 
relation to employees having a connection to a trade union (shop-stewards and 
staff-delegates holding a union mandate). The Fillon laws changed this scheme 
and established a system of preference in relation to elected representatives; in 
the event that no shop-steward was present in the company, the agreement 
could be signed by a staff-delegate (independently  of any connections to the 
union) or, in the absence of a staff-delegate, by a mandated employee. This 
possibility is subject to several requirements however: firstly, this possibility 
must be provided for in an industry level collective agreement; secondly, the 
agreement is subject to a referendum and validation by a paritary commission. 
This means that collective agreements still determined the conditions under 
which the derogatory agreement could be concluded (which provides trade 
unions with a certain degree of control over the derogation occurring at the 
level of the company) and that the focus is placed on an elected representation. 
In the event that a mandated employee concluded the derogatory agreement, it 
was subject to a further requirement – an approval in a referendum by the 
employees of the company. The Bertrand laws of 20th of August 2008 (which 
will only  be enforced from the 20th January 2009 onwards) provided the final 
push (for the time being) to this movement of decentralisation. The Bertrand 
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laws brought about a number of important modifications to the rules of 
bargaining of collective agreements in situations of the absence of a shop 
steward in the company. Firstly, the requirement of the provision of that 
possibility in an extended collective agreement was abolished; the derogatory 
bargaining became possible not by force of the collective agreement but by 
force of the law; secondly, the possibility of bargaining is not only  extended to 
the collective agreement but also to the law (where it allows derogation by a 
collective agreement). The following sections (concerning the new types of 
derogatory agreements) will analyse each one of these agreements in detail. It 
is sufficient to retain that the law admitted the conclusion of these derogatory 
agreements to a very large extent by (1) shop-stewards and, in the absence of 
shop-stewards, (2) staff-delegates and subject to the approval in a paritary 
commission or (3) specially elected representatives expressly  mandated by the 
trade unions and subject to the approval by  a referendum.527  This provides 
employees with a great margin of manoeuvre in the collective bargaining and 
clearly transfers the focus of bargaining towards the level of the company.528 
 This synthetic elaboration of the evolution of the French system of 
collective bargaining since the beginnings of the 1980s allows us to conclude 
that there seems to be a clear trend towards the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining in France. The trend seems to consist in the recognition of an 
increased relevance to the elective employee representatives at the level of the 
company (the staff-delegates) and the reservation of power to the trade unions 
to control the decentralisation by means of several mechanisms (such as the 
requirement of a permission in a collective agreement to deviate, the need for 
an approval in an industry paritary commission and the system of the trade 
union mandate). Although this trend is essentially  coupled with derogatory 
agreements, it is by  no means limited to these agreements; the following 
sections will analyse the new types of agreements that these empowered 
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employee representatives have been signing with the employers. For the time 
being it is sufficient to recognise the staff-delegate (délégué du personnel) is 
increasingly becoming an extremely  important actor in French collective labour 
law.529

(c)  UK – the UK is, at the eyes of a Continental lawyer, a fascinating system of 
industrial relations not only because the assumptions under which the 
continental system of industrial relations (in its various implementations) are 
reversed but also because it was one that exhibited a most remarkable 
evolution that brought it closer to the Continental model. The UK system was 
the one in which the impact of EU law was more evident and profound and 
consists in an interesting case-study to observe the model underpinning the EU 
system of employee representation and the potential transformations that 
Sylvaine Laulom’s “rights based approach” can bring to a system.530  The 
following lines will attempt to demonstrate the profound modifications that the 
British system has been undergoing in terms of the actors; the agreements will 
be left to the following section.
 The British system of industrial relations was traditionally underpinned in 
three fundamental characteristics: monism, voluntarism and decentralisation. 
Monism means that the representation of employees was made exclusively by 
trade unions; UK law did not recognise any type of works council type bodies or 
alternative representation mechanisms in relation to the trade unions. 
Voluntarism means that collective bargaining was made at a purely 
unconstrained basis; there was no obligation to bargain, the employer 
discretionally chose to engage into negotiations with a trade union by means of 
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a free-willed act of recognition and collective agreements were merely 
gentlemen’s agreements deprived of all binding nature; they did not create 
legal obligations whatsoever for any party. Finally, unlike what occurred in 
Continental Europe, most collective bargaining took place at a decentralised 
level at the level of the undertaking. Industry level agreements were rare and 
limited to a few industries.531 This system suffered a fatal blow in the 1990s by 
means of two extremely important rulings in the cases Commission vs UK.532 
The cases concern the compatibility of the British system of voluntarism with 
the Directives on Collective Redundancies and the Transfer of Undertaking (the 
reactive directives). As it was referred above, these Directives lay out a rigid 
mandatory information and consultation procedure with the employee 
representatives whenever one of those situations occurs. The British lawmaker 
had attributed those competences to the trade unions (in accordance with its 
monistic system), who could be unable to bargain collective redundancies if the 
employer failed to recognise them (in accordance with the principle of 
voluntarism). The ECJ was quite clear when it stated in §19 of case C-383/92 
that the Directive does not simple make a reference to the rules in force in the 
member states concerning the designation of employee representatives; it 
simply left to the member states a margin of manoeuvre to determine the 
arrangements for the designation of worker representatives who may or must 
intervene in the collective redundancy procedures. This meant that EC Law 
demands a mandatory employee representation at the level of the undertaking 
for the purposes of the Directives and that the reference to the laws and 
practices of the member states did not mean that those traditions could 
compromise the requirements of the Directives but rather that they had to be 
modified to accommodate the demands of the Directives. This does not mean 
however that the Directives will harmonise to the fullest extent the systems of 
employee representation in the Europe; member states retain the discretion to 
determine the models of employee representation, which simply have to abide 
by the minimum requirements laid out in those Directives. The principle of 
voluntarism prevalent in British law was ruled to be contrary to the demands of 
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532 Commission vs UK (C-382/93) and Commission vs UK (C-383/92). 
the Reactive Directives because it left to the discretion of the employer the 
possibility of negotiating the procedure with the employee representatives. Two 
other cases also provided a significant impulse to unionism in the UK. The 
cases became known as Wilson and Palmer and deal with the UK’s conviction 
in the European Court of Human Rights for failing to recognise the freedom of 
association.533  The cases concerned the narrow interpretation undertaken by 
the British House of Lords of the employee’s right not to have to suffer action 
short of dismissal taken against them for the purposes of preventing or 
deterring them from being members or taking part of the activities of a trade 
union. In these two cases the employers had de-recognised the union and 
wanted to move workers away from the unionised terms into individual 
contracts; for that purpose they offered certain inducements (namely pay rises) 
for workers who abandoned collective representation. The House of Lords 
decided that this action was lawful for two reasons: firstly, the action of the 
employer was not a proper action but rather an omission to offer the same 
benefits to unionised employees; secondly, collective bargaining was not 
regarded as an essential service of a union. These decisions led to a conviction 
of the UK in the European Court of Human Rights for violation of art.11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the freedom of 
association. This initiated a major change in British Law that created a 
somewhat hybrid dualist system of employee representation and greatly 
reinforced the powers of the actors at the level of the company.534
 The most important modification brought about by the ruling that is 
expected to provide a great push to company level social dialogue consisted in 
the introduction of the statutory procedure for recognition. This procedure was 
introduced by the Employment Relations Act of 1999 (subsequently modified in 
2004) and has a very clear purpose: in the event that an employer refused to 
recognise a trade union for the purposes of collective bargaining, the procedure 
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allowed the union to initiate seek a mandatory recognition from a public 
authority that will oblige the employer to engage into a collective bargaining 
procedure with it. The 1999 Act was not the first attempt to introduce a statutory 
procedure for recognition in the UK. The previous attempts dated to the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 (with its short-lived National Industrial Relations 
Court) and, in particular, to the Employment Protection Act 1975. It is worth 
reviewing these acts and the reasons for their failure in order to understand the 
Employment Relations Act 1999. The Industrial Relations Act 1971 allowed 
trade unions to apply to the National Industrial Relations Court for recognition 
as a sole bargaining agent in respect of a bargaining unit. The scheme was 
simple: if it was evident that there was a bargaining unit in which the majority of 
employees supported the union, the union would be recognised; if it were not 
so, the application would be referred to the Commission on Industrial Relations, 
which would organise a ballot in the workplace. The TUC organised campaigns 
for non-registration because the act also limited to a considerable extent the 
possibility of the use of strike in collective bargaining. This led the Act to be 
repealed in 1974. The Employment Protection Act 1975 attempted to revive the 
procedure by determining that statutory claims for recognition were to be 
handled by the ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service), which 
consisted in a tripartite body destined to handle recognition claims. The ACAS 
failed to fulfil its mission to provide for a Social Contract on account of a 
number of factors: the members of the tripartite body were unable to agree on 
key issues such as the level of employee support needed for recognition or the 
appropriateness of the claimed bargaining unit. There was considerable scope 
for inter-union competition (both between TUC affiliates and between TUC and 
non-TUC organisations) and disruptive litigation and refusal to deal by union-
resistant employers and competing unions. These difficulties led to lengthy 
delays in the processing of union recognition claims, during which their levels of 
membership and support proved difficult to maintain. The enforcement 
procedure of the 1975 Act proved ineffective in inducing hostile employers to 
bargain once a recognition procedure had been made because it depended of 
a union’s recourse to arbitration on a claim for improved conditions of 
employment. The Act was repealed in 1980 (under the regulatory  package of 
the anti-union Thatcher policy) and its impact is difficult to estimate: although 
the figures claim that it had a marginal impact on the workforce many claim that 
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it had an indirect effect of encouraging voluntary union recognition by 
employers in order to avoid the procedure.535 
 The statutory procedure for recognition was later reintroduced in the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 that was enacted in the fulfilment of the Labour 
Government Policies of Fairness at Work proclaimed in 1998. The background 
of this act is striking: a document issued by TUC in 1995 proposed rights for 
representation at work on account of the “growing job insecurity, excessive 
rewards for top executives and harsher management demands”; if we take into 
account that this appeal occurred in the sequence of the monetarist and 
strongly shareholder-value policies that had been implemented since the 1980s 
in the UK, it is interesting the observe that employee representation was seen 
as the most appropriate answer to tackle the agency problems that the 
excessive pressure that shareholders placed upon managers caused vis-à-vis 
employees; this is precisely what the Corporate Governance literature names 
as a class conflict (occurring between managers and shareholders vis-à-vis 
employees).536  This idea of representation as a means of reducing agency 
costs of employees vis-à-vis managers was evident in the Fairness at Work 
document referred above when it stated that representation is preferable to the 
absence of representation. There was a modification introduced to the 
character of representation however as (1) voluntary arrangements for 
representation should have priority and that (2) union representation should be 
mandatory only  if the majority  of the employees wanted it. These two elements 
explain the reasoning underpinning the statutory procedure for recognition – 
representation should be promoted and it should enjoy the support of the 
employees of the undertaking.
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 The procedure itself is complex and consists of several stages: the 
procedure is initiated by a union’s written request to an employer in respect of a 
certain group of employees (a bargaining unit). The union must possess a 
certificate of independence and the employer must have a minimum average 
threshold of 21 employees in the 13 weeks preceding the request.537  The 
employer’s response to that request is decisive: in the event that the employer 
and the union agree upon the bargaining unit within 10 days or demonstrates a 
willingness to negotiate and the parties reach an agreement within 20 days 
then the union will be considered as recognised in relation to that bargaining 
unit and no further steps are taken. This agreement has a significant quality: it 
is considered valid for a minimum period of three years, unless the parties 
agree otherwise. This means that the employer cannot in principle derecognise 
the union for minimum periods of three years and terminate the social dialogue 
with the union. In the event that the employer fails to recognise the union or no 
agreement is reached, then the union may apply to the CAC. The CAC will then 
determine (1) whether the bargaining unit is appropriate and (2) whether the 
union enjoys a majority support among the employees of the proposes 
bargaining unit. There are four substantive grounds under which the application 
will be deemed not receivable: (a) if there is already in force a collective 
agreement under which a union is recognised in respect of any  of the workers 
falling within the bargaining unit; this is valid only if the recognition covers the 
main topics of collective bargaining under which statutory  recognition may be 
afforded (pay, hours, holidays); (b) if the applicant union does not present 
evidence that it has a minimum threshold of 10% of affiliates in the bargaining 
unit and simultaneously enjoys the support of the majority  of the workers of the 
unit; (c) if two of more unions make the application unless they prove that they 
will cooperate and maintain stable bargaining arrangements; this means that 
there must be single-table bargaining either in respect of one single union or 
more cooperating unions; (d) if the CAC already accepted an application in 
relation to the same bargaining unit in the former three years. These fours 
grounds of rejection of the application provides us with a clear evidence of the 
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principles enunciated above. The fact that the application is liminarly  rejected in 
the event that the employer already recognised a union in relation to the same 
bargaining unit provides us with clear evidence that priority is effectively  given 
to voluntary arrangements. In this sense the tradition of voluntarism in British 
collective bargaining is not affected as the voluntary  recognition of a union bars 
the statutory recognition procedure. The appropriateness of this solution has 
raised some doubts in the British legal thinking because there is no mechanism 
to impede an employer’s choice of a minoritary union, which will in reality 
weaken employee representation.538 Secondly, it is also interesting to observe 
that the application is rejected if the union does not prove simultaneously 
majority support among the employees of the bargaining unit and a 10% 
threshold of affiliates. This means that there must be an intimate connection 
between the employees in the workplace and the applicant union. The same 
system is prevalent in France where the legislator has attempted to combine 
elected and union representation in the same person in order to allow 
derogatory agreements in the workplace, which is seen to provide greater 
legitimacy. Finally, the requirement of a single-table bargaining ensures a 
majority support of the trade union(s) among the employees and reinforces 
their legitimacy by avoiding trade union fragmentation or frivolous applications 
by unions that do not enjoy sufficient representation among the workforce. 
 The determination of the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining 
unit deserves a special reference. The bargaining unit is seen as appropriate 
when there is a need to be compatible with effective management. This means 
that only  units that engage into direct dialogue with the management in 
accordance with their characteristics are deemed worthy of representation by a 
trade union. This is particularly interesting if we compare with the German 
example of the Sparten or the Arbeitsgruppen, in which the bargaining powers 
of the works council were transferred to those units on account of their 
specificity in the company and their need to engage in a particular dialogue with 
the management. Here too we may observe an implementation of the principles 
of lean production in work; considering that the determining characteristics of 
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lean production consisted in the decentralisation and projectification of work in 
strategic bargaining units, the identification of the appropriateness of the 
bargaining unit to engage in matters of collective bargaining is sufficient to 
observe an introduction of this philosophy of organisation of work within 
companies. 
 The final part is the procedure for recognition itself: if the CAC is 
convinced on the basis of the evidence presented by the union that the union 
enjoys a majority support in the bargaining unit (by means of a minimum 10% 
threshold of affiliates and a majority support) then it will declare the union as 
recognised; if not, then it must hold a secret ballot that is valid only  if a 
minimum of 40% of the employees of the unit exercise the right to vote. The 
CAC is happy with a simple majority  as long as the minimum threshold for 
participation is respected. This ensures the legitimacy of the trade union to 
conduct bargaining in the name of the employees concerned. 
 In the event that the CAC declares the union as recognised, several 
consequences follow. The foremost consequence consists in the provision to 
the parties of a 30 day period for them to agree on the method by  which they 
will conduct bargaining; if no agreement is reached, the CAC will then act as a 
conciliator to encourage them to reach an agreement; finally, if the conciliation 
is unsuccessful, the CAC will issue a method that will function as a binding 
contract between the parties. This is of extreme relevance and deserves further 
explanation: the declaration of recognition does not impose a rigid bargaining 
procedure, it leaves to the parties the freedom to bargain the most appropriate 
arrangement; this emphasis on conventional freedom is so extensive that the 
subsidiary procedure to be issued by  the CAC – if the conciliation fails - is not 
more than a private law contract that may be reversed at any time by the 
parties to the contract. This subsidiary procedure provides for a works council 
type of body – a Joint Negotiating Body – that is composed by union members. 
Secondly, the recognition is afforded only for certain subjects – pay, hours and 
holidays. Although the parties are free to discuss any other matters, they are 
not obliged to do so because the unions are recognised only for those matters 
in relation to a particular appropriate bargaining unit where they enjoy the 
majority support. Thirdly, the obligation to discuss does not mean an obligation 
to reach (or attempt to reach) an agreement. It is merely a duty of means and 
not a duty of result. Finally, the statutory recognition has the effect that the 
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employer cannot derecognise the union for a period of three years. The parties 
are free to agree on a longer or lesser period but the statutory period is three 
years. This means that the employer is obliged to discuss issues concerning 
pay, hours and holidays in relation to the employees of a particular bargaining 
unit where the union unequivocally  enjoys majority  support by a minimum 
period of three years.539
 As overall evaluation of the statutory procedure for recognition seems 
difficult. One can praise the statutory procedure for betting upon three distinct 
dimensions: (1) the fact that it factually created incentives for employers to 
engage in collective bargaining because the outcome of the procedure consists 
in a duty  to bargain for three years subjects of pay, hours and holidays; (2) the 
fact that it placed a great emphasis on reaching voluntary arrangements 
between trade unions and employers and avoiding explicit statutory 
procedures, which are not only a exception in the traditional British system of 
industrial relations but also in contrast to the approach followed by  the EU in 
betting in ad hoc information and consultation procedures in order to ensure 
employee engagement by means of the proactive directives; (3) it discouraged 
frivolous applications by demanding that the union enjoyed a majority support 
(both in terms of affiliations and support of non-affiliated employees) thus 
approaching the interests of the union and those of the bargaining unit (which 
must have some kind of autonomy to bargain with the employers) and creating 
incentives for a bargaining closer to the concrete needs of the company and of 
the bargaining unit. These are the reasons why  the opinions in relation to the 
statutory procedure are generally favourable because it created a climate more 
favourable to collective bargaining and stimulated unions to put more resources 
into organisation and employers to have more attention to union claims. The 
greatest success of the procedure did not consist in the outcome of the 
procedures but in the general trend of voluntary recognition of unions that is 
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currently spreading to avoid the statutory procedure.540  The procedure is not 
absent from criticisms however. The major criticisms that are generally pointed 
out consist in the possibility of the employer recognising a minoritary union in 
the bargaining unit in order to block a statutory  recognition procedure. This 
would demand the existence of criteria of representativity similar to the ones 
enforced in France that the UK lawmaker has been unwilling to implement. On 
the other hand, the absence of the duty  to attempt to reach an agreement and 
the limitation of the recognition to three subject-matters seems to open the way 
for the employer to recognise the union merely to avoid further procedures and 
then pay lip-service to the employees in order to avoid industrial action. This 
does not create incentives for concrete company-level bargaining. 
Nevertheless the simple existence of a mandatory representative of the 
employees that must be recognised by the employer in relation to the subjects 
of pay, hours and holidays (that affect the employees to the first extent) is 
already a considerable victory  and a great impulse for bargaining at the level of 
the company.
 Another significant innovation consisted in the introduction into the UK 
system of industrial relations of elected employee representative structures in 
the workplace that appear to be works council type bodies. The traditional 
monist structure of employee representation that existed in the UK meant that 
there were traditionally no directly elected employee representative bodies. The 
situation modified considerably in the last few years as a direct consequence of 
EC Law. The inadequacy of the traditional monist system of employee 
representation to the modifications occurring in companies and in the 
competitive environment in which they were active had been previously noticed 
and there were previous attempts to introduce directly elected employee 
representative in the UK. In a book dated from 1973, McCarthy and Ellis 
criticised the attempt to establish a statutory procedure for trade union 
recognition by the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and stressed the need for a 
direct employee representation in-company; the purpose was to open room for 
these bodies to engage into dialogue with the management force and render 
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companies more adaptable to the volatile circumstances of the time.541  The 
failure of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and of the Employment Protection 
Act 1975 and the subsequent anti-union Thatcher policy that dominated the 
1980s postponed the wish to have more employee representation. The 
conviction of the UK in the two rulings Commission vs UK and the election of 
the Labour Government in 1997 opened the way for the introduction of more 
employee representation in-company. Curiously, this also opened the way for 
the introduction of a body unknown to British Industrial Relations, which were 
directly elected employee representatives. 
 The first reference to directly elected employee representatives came in 
the form of workforce agreements in the UK. These are agreements (to be 
analysed below) that provide for the possibility of the employer deviating from 
the statutory requirements in certain subjects and within certain limits by means 
of an agreement with the workforce. When the employer does not recognise a 
trade union in relation to a certain bargaining unit and wishes to deviate from 
the provisions laid down in the law, he may do so by means of a workforce 
agreement. This workforce agreement consists in an agreement between an 
employer and its workers or their representatives that deviate from the 
standards laid down in the law. In order for this agreement to be signed, no 
union must be recognised in relation to the bargaining unit in question and the 
terms of the contract of employment of the workers affected must not be 
regulated by an incorporated collective agreement. In these situations (in which 
unions are completely absent from the process) the employer may bargain the 
agreement with directly elected employee representatives. These 
representatives consist in employees that are elected by means of a secret 
ballot by the employees of the undertaking and that have the task of bargaining 
the adaptation agreement with the employer. In the event that the company has 
less than 20 employees, there is no need to conduct an election and the 
agreement may be approved by means of proposal addressed directly to the 
employees and approved by the majority  of them. These workforce agreements 
will be analysed in more detail in the next section; for the time being it is 
sufficient to acknowledge that the employer may bargain directly  with the 
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elected employee representatives an agreement covering the entire workforce 
in deviation or adaptation of the legal standards as a long as no trade union is 
recognised in relation to that bargaining unit, no collective agreements have 
been incorporated into employment contracts and the requirements for an 
appropriate representation of the employees have been fulfilled.542 
 The statutes equally  make reference to elected employee 
representatives in information and consultation procedures. This is where the 
influence of EU Law was most visible because the majority of the information 
and consultation procedures statutorily provided for in British Law result directly 
from the transposition of Labour Law Directives. The relevant Directives here 
are the Collective Redundancies, Transfer of Undertakings and the Information 
and Consultation Directive. This paragraph will deal with the first two Directives 
because the letter Directive has some specificities that deserve a paragraph of 
its own. As it was mentioned above, the Collective Redundancies and the 
Transfer of Undertakings Directives (the reactive directives) set out a rigid 
information and consultation procedure that demands mandatory employee 
representation. The UK reacted in 1999 to its conviction in the ruling 
Commission vs UK by introducing some amendments to the TULRA that 
modified the traditional scheme of the appropriate representatives and 
introduced elected representatives. Currently, in the event that an employer is 
contemplating a collective redundancy or a transfer of an undertaking he must 
consult previously the appropriate representatives. These representatives obey 
the following hierarchical scheme: if the workers being made redundant or 
transferred belong to a bargaining unit in respect of which one or more trade 
unions are recognised, the employer must mandatorily  consult those unions, 
even if the union members consulted are not going to be affected by the 
proposed measure; if no union is recognised in relation to that bargaining unit, 
the employer is obliged to consult specifically elected representatives; this also 
happens when the employees being made redundant belong to a bargaining 
unit in respect to which no union is recognised; the employer is obliged to 
engage in a single-table bargaining with union and specifically elected 
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representatives; these representatives must be employed by the employer at 
the time of the election therefore excluding that external advisors stand as 
appropriate representatives; the candidates for the election must be employees 
affected by  the measure and no employee affected by the measure may be 
excluded from standing for election; in the event that the employees fail to 
conduct the election, the employer must inform each employee individually but 
is not obliged to consult each employee individually; both the Directives and the 
national statute presuppose that all consultation is made by means of 
representatives and that the employees must at least have the possibility to 
elect representatives; the absence of a duty to consult each employee 
individually  may be understood as a means of creating incentives for the 
employees to set up a union or elected representative body.543 
 The Information and Consultation Directive (which should be analysed 
individually) is currently the last innovation in British Industrial Relations that 
provides us with a hint that the British system is currently evolving into a hybrid 
dualist system closer to Continental patterns. As it was referred above, the 
Information and Consultation Directive provides for mandatory information, 
consultation and consultation with a view to reaching an agreement (depending 
on the subject-matter) with mandatorily recognised employee representatives in 
the company as long as the company employs at least 50 employees or the 
undertaking employs at least 20. The transposition of the Directive into British 
law  was made in 2004 with the “Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations”. These statutes presented the Government with major issues to 
resolve in the area of the choice of representatives; this was even more so if 
we consider that the Directive, whilst laying down the principle of consultation, 
left member states with a great margin of manoeuvre in relation to the 
implementation of that agreement. The UK Government was determined from 
the beginning to avoid a “one size fits all” approach to information and 
consultation rather creating room for a wide variety  of practices that could 
combine several company-specific forms of employee representation. The 
objective was to attempt to generate a high level of consensus between the 
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employer and the employee representatives while transposing the principle of 
consultation into British law. This section will be concerned with the choice of 
representatives because the following section will attempt to analyse the 
collective agreements reached at the level of the company. 
 As regards the choice of employee representatives, the UK undertook 
the revolutionary choice of providing for a strong preference for representatives 
elected by the whole workforce to the detriment of unions; in this sense, by 
postponing union priority, it gave a strong blow to the monist system in the UK. 
The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations (transposing 
Directive 2002/14) determined that, in the event that no previous information 
and consultation agreements were already in force in the company, the 
employer had to make arrangements for the employees to elect or appoint 
negotiating representatives either at the initiative of the employer or at the 
request of a minimum threshold of 10% of the employees (subject to a 
maximum of 2500). The Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations are extremely sparse in the details of the process, merely stating 
that each individual employee had the statutory right to participate in it and that, 
in the default of an agreement, the employer must organise a secret ballot to 
elect representatives (who must be employees of the undertaking) normally on 
the ratio of 1 representative for each 25 employees. These regulations 
produced a complete divorce in relation to the practices of collective 
bargaining. The recognition of a union and the existence of an agreement 
providing for collective terms and conditions of employment applicable to the 
whole workforce of the undertaking will not prevent the existence of a 
consultation agreement (either bargained or applicable by  force of the fallback 
provisions) operating alongside a collective agreement with directly elected 
non-union employee representatives. This will be the case even if the collective 
agreement had been imposed by the CAC as the result of a statutory 
procedure for recognition; conversely, the existence of a consultation 
mechanism covering the entire workforce will not prevent a union from applying 
to the CAC in order to gain recognition in relation to a concrete bargaining unit 
in matters of pay, hours and holidays (provided that the union enjoyed sufficient 
support among the employees of the proposed bargaining unit). Therefore, the 
statutory recognition machinery and the ICE regulations seem to run on parallel 
tracks; the only potentiality  for overlapping between union and non-union forms 
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of employee representation seems to occur in consultation relating to 
redundancies and transfers when there is a recognised union; in order to 
preserve harmony with the TULRA the conflict was resolved by providing 
priority to the unions upon notification to the standard employee 
representatives. This exception to the general preference for elected 
representation is understandable in order to preserve harmony with the 
competences of recognised unions prescribed in the TULRA and because 
unions are normally in a better position to bargain these matters because they 
have a stronger background. The unions may attempt to counterbalance this 
scheme by putting forward unionised employees for election as representatives 
or by incorporating into collective agreements the duties to inform, consult and 
consult with a view to reaching an agreement provided for in the ICE 
Regulations and Directive 2002/14. The practical effect of the latter hypothesis 
would be to classify  these collective agreements as pre-existing arrangements 
for information and consultation and therefore prevent the election of employee 
representatives, guaranteeing their monopoly in collective bargaining.544 This is 
not worrisome as long as the requirements of Directive 2002/14 are respected 
and the concrete arrangements lead to a progressive engagement between the 
employer and the recognised union strengthen social dialogue at the level of 
the company – which is the ultimate objective of Directive 2002/14.545 
 This description of the evolution of the actors in British labour law may 
allow us to conclude that – in parallel to the other countries - there seems to be 
a movement of diversification of the powers of the actors at the level of the 
company and a progressive attempt to introduce more partnerial forms of 
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representation. The assessment is harder to make because – in contrast to 
continental Europe – the UK never exhibited a dual form of employee 
representation or sector level bargaining. The reinforcement may be seen in 
the following elements: the foremost element consisted in the introduction of 
the statutory procedure for recognition; this procedure – which had precedents 
in the UK – factually  obliges the employer to recognise a union and to bargain 
with it matters relating to pay, hours and holidays; although this catalogue is 
small it is nonetheless significant because those are the matters that concern 
employees most directly and that may serve as the seed to engage in further 
dialogue. The introduction of the procedure is not without criticisms however: 
the intention to preserve voluntarism had the consequence of providing 
prevalence to voluntary recognition; whereas this might have advantageous 
consequences (because the threat of the statutory  recognition might encourage 
voluntary  recognition) it might equally have adverse consequences because 
there is no mechanism to prevent the employers’ choice of a minoritary  union to 
engage in bargaining; this led several authors to propose the introduction of 
criteria of representativity  (similar to France) in order to ensure proper 
representation.546 In addition to the introduction of the statutory procedure for 
recognition, the UK equally introduced directly elected forms of employee 
representation inside the company, which may open the road to the 
development of works council type bodies. These bodies are – for the time 
being - merely ad hoc and their relation to the trade unions is not altogether 
clear. The first reference to these types of bodies came in the form of workforce 
agreements, which consisted in the possibility to deviate (subject to certain 
preconditions and limits) from the standards laid down in the law by means of 
an agreement with specifically  elected representatives. The second reference 
came in the form of elected representatives in situations of transfer of 
undertakings and collective redundancies, which had the task of representing 
the employees in the information and consultation procedures. These bodies 
had one thing in common: they could be set up  only  in the absence of 
recognised unions (both voluntarily or statutorily). This last requirement was put 
aside in the transposition of the Information and Consultation Directive, which 
532
546 Davies, P. L. and C. Kilpatrick (2005). La représantation des travailleurs au Royaume-Uni 
après le canal unique. Recomposition des systèmes de représentation des salariés en Europe. 
S. Laulom, Publications de L'Université de Saint-Étienne.
led to several criticisms from the trade unions and legal thinking. The 
articulation between both levels of bargaining was one point: although this 
seems to open the road for the setting up of a true dualist system of bargaining 
in the UK, the articulation of the level with the traditional voluntarist system is 
still a challenge; another point consists in putting aside trade unions in 
mechanisms for information and consultation, which is one of the natural tasks 
of unions in a decentralised system as the one in the UK. One solution lay in 
putting unionised employees as candidates to the election to these bodies; this 
is a solution similar to the one encountered in Germany to coordinate the 
actions of the Betriebsrat with the trade unions and in France, where unions 
have monopoly representation in the works council; another solution lay in 
incorporating information and consultation procedures in the collective 
agreements concluded with recognised unions. Whatever the solution may be, 
the reality is that the combination of these elements (statutory procedure and 
elected bodies at the level of the workplace) may have a considerable impact in 
promoting social dialogue at the level of the company even in a traditionally 
decentralised system such as the one in the UK because social dialogue 
becomes mandatory and covers a wider range of topics.
(d) Portugal – Portugal has also taken some feeble steps towards the 
reinforcement of the powers of the actors at the level of the company, although 
the extension of the reforms do not match the ones found in France or 
Germany. Portugal is also a country  where the influence of EU Law is most 
visible, in parallel with the UK. The modifications introduced are expected to 
bring a substantial transformation of the Portuguese system of industrial 
relations. 
 The Portuguese system of employee representation may be classified 
as a dualist system that stands halfway between the German and the French 
system. The Portuguese system takes from the German system the rigid 
division of competences between the trade unions and the works councils and 
the principle of double-affiliation (meaning that collective agreements are 
binding only upon the affiliates to the trade union); from the French system, 
Portugal takes an extreme reading of the freedom of association (trade unions 
may be freely set up  and claim participation in collective bargaining, 
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independently  of criteria of representativity),547  the absence of any co-
determination structures (works councils merely  have constitutional rights to 
information and consultation) and the extensive use of administrative 
procedures for extension in order to apply collective agreements to non-
affiliated employees. The task of employee representation is constitutionally 
reserved to the works council (comissão de trabalhadores – art.54 CRP), which 
is in principle competent to all the information and consultation procedures 
occurring within the company.548 The feeble implementation of works councils 
led to the search for alternative means of employee representation that are 
expected to bring about some modifications to the Portuguese panorama of 
industrial relations. This section will attempt to describe these new actors.
 One of the most important innovations that the Labour Code of 2003 and 
the reform of 2009 brought about consisted in the transposition of Directive 
2002/14. The Information and Consultation Directive could perfectly have been 
transposed by  attributing to the works council the competence to exercise the 
duties contained in it; the enumeration of the competences of the works council 
contained in art.54CRP sufficed to transpose the requirements of the Directive. 
This solution found some practical implementation in the text of the Labour 
Code because the densification of the constitutional competences of the works 
council contained in arts.423-429 CTP represents a good transposition of the 
requirements of Directive 2002/14. This laudable transposition in terms of 
regulatory technique was destined to become dead letter however on account 
of the feeble implementation of works councils in the Portuguese industrial 
relations landscape. The number of works councils is absolutely residual and 
the Portuguese workers do not have a great tradition of association and 
participation in the life of companies, mostly due to the strongly personal and 
proprietary conception of the company prevalent in Portuguese law; the 
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company is regarded as the ownership  of the manager whose management is 
unaccountable to anyone except himself. Having into account these difficulties, 
the Portuguese lawmaker took the innovative approach of attributing the same 
competences to the shop-steward. Portuguese Law states that the shop-
steward is to be elected by the workers of one company affiliated to one 
particular trade union (art.462CTP); the shop-stewards must be affiliated to a 
particular union, it must be elected by the workforce and the trade union must 
accept to have that particular person as its representative within the company; 
this means that shop-stewards have a double legitimacy – both elected and 
designated. The traditional tasks of the shop-stewards were absolutely 
residual: normally, they were limited to informing the trade union of the situation 
in the company and to the supervision of the compliance with the law and the 
collective agreements; they had no bargaining power whatsoever.549  Art.
466CTP changed this state of the world and attempted to provide the shop-
steward with a new role by  stating that the shop-steward is entitled to exercise 
the information and consultation competences contained in Directive 2002/14 in 
the same way as the works council. This means that, in practice, the shop-
steward will be entitled to exercise the competences of the works council in the 
performance of the duties contained in Directive 2002/14 (which are already 
quite extensive). Although art.466(3)CTP considerably limits the reach of this 
provision by stating that it is applicable only to companies with more than 50 
employees (which account for only 3 % of the Portuguese company fauna) it is 
nonetheless important because it is expected to introduce the tradition of social 
dialogue in Portuguese largest companies. The feeble implementation of works 
councils in Portuguese companies was mostly due to a fear from the employer; 
the trade unions – whose action is mostly limited to the determination of wages 
and conditions of work at the level of the sector – have long wished to extend 
their action into the company and attempt to have an influence in company-
level social dialogue. The transposition of Directive 2002/14 and the attribution 
of the role of social dialogue to the shop-stewards provided trade unions with a 
strong instrument to accomplish that means:  employees tend to feel safer 
when belonging to a trade union and the strong protection afforded by  the law 
to the shop-stewards helped trade unions to feel more courageous and 
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innovative in attempting to introduce social dialogue at the level of the 
company. On the other hand, the particularly demanding regime of election of 
the shop-stewards (who must be affiliated to a trade union, be elected by the 
employees of the company affiliated to a trade union and be designated by that 
trade union to stand as its representative in the company) not only provides it 
with a reinforced legitimacy (because they are both employees of the company 
and members of the union) but it also approximates the Portuguese industrial 
relations regime to the French regime, in which in-company representation 
must have both elected and union representation, most notably  by means of 
the delegation unique, in which one elected employee performs all the roles of 
the union and staff representation.550
 Another significant innovation consisted in the introduction of new 
employee representative bodies. These bodied were thought to address the 
failure to implement works councils in the Portuguese company life and provide 
employees with instruments to answer situations of crisis; this was equally were 
the influence of EC  Law was most visible, in a situation comparable to the UK. 
There are numerous examples throughout the Labour Code of these new ad 
hoc bodies: for instance, art.360(3) CTP states that if the employer intends to 
promote a collective redundancy and the employees are not represented by  a 
works council or a trade union section, they may elect an ad hoc representation 
composed by the workers affected that is going to bargain the procedure; this is 
a solution much similar to the one found in the UK in which the workers 
affected by a redundancy have the possibility of electing a specific 
representation in the absence of recognition of a trade union. Another 
innovation consists in the introduction of the idea of referendum in Portuguese 
law: in accordance with art.206(2)CTP, the employer will be able to define the 
working time in average terms for a certain economic unit as long as 75% of 
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the workforce of the economical unit affected agree to it.551  This solution 
reminds us of the organisation of specific employee representative structures in 
companies that are divided in independent units (Sparten) as referred above in 
the analysis of German law.
 These two examples reveal that Portuguese law is timidly attempting to 
overcome the absence of employee representation within companies and 
promote more participative schemes and company-level social dialogue. 
Considering the failure to implement works councils, the legislator attempted to 
introduce alternative solutions. The most relevant solution consisted in the 
attribution to the shop-steward of the competence to perform the information 
and consultation duties contained in the transposition of Directive 2002/14. 
Considering the potentially  far-reaching scope of this Directive, the provision 
might have a considerable impact because the protection afforded by the trade 
unions and the demanding requirements of legitimacy (both elected and 
designated) to become a shop steward provide the shop-steward with a new 
role within companies capable of representing employees both as a class (on 
account of the union affiliation) and as stakeholders of the company (on 
account of being employees of the company and elected by their colleagues 
affiliated to the same union). The Portuguese legislator also attempted to 
overcome the absence of representation by introducing new bodies into 
Portuguese law; these bodies are directly  elected or concern direct participation 
of the employees and they are designed to overcome the absence of 
representation in particular situations, such as collective redundancies and the 
bargaining of the working time. This solution is clearly  reminiscent of the British 
approach of providing for directly elected bodies in specific situations to 
overcome the absence of recognised trade unions. Although the impact of 
these measures is still to be evaluated, it nonetheless reveals an effort to 
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decentralise industrial relations and introduce social dialogue at the level of the 
company.      
 5.2.2.1 Comparative perspectives  
This short description of the evolutions registered at the level of the actors in 
each jurisdiction under study  may allow us to sustain the conclusion that they 
are currently suffering a process of evolution that seems to be providing an 
increasing relevance to the powers of the actors at the level of the company. 
The modifications are not identical in each jurisdiction because each country 
exhibited a distinct pattern of employee representation, although they seem to 
be converging in the same direction. The most appropriate analysis appears to 
be a functional analysis that would allow us to understand the extent to which 
each distinct system is providing more and more relevance to the company-
level actors.552 This leads us to question the place of unions in this movement 
of decentralisation: the comparative analysis seems to suggest that the unions 
are not completely out of the picture in this new trend and that their role should 
be reserved to the control of the process of decentralisation in order to ensure 
that these new actors do not fall prey to the predominance of the employers but 
correspond to a genuine interest of the company: in this sense, one can speak 
of a phenomenon of controlled decentralisation. The following lines will attempt 
to illustrate how each country evolved in accordance with this idea.
 The case of Germany is paradigmatic of this approach. The co-
determination powers of the Betriebsrat and the strict division of tasks between 
the Betriebsrat and the trade unions (Gewerkschaften) underpinned in §77(3) 
BVG seems to have provided the company-level employee representatives with 
a maximum power and that there would be no room for decentralisation. The 
realities proved otherwise: the increasing protests against industry level 
agreements (Rahmentarifverträge), which were deemed to be inflexible and 
inadequate to the realities of the life of companies (particularly in situations of 
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crises) led to the search of alternative solutions.553 The Viessmann, Holzmann 
and Burda cases illustrated the tensions against industry level agreements and 
the desperate need for a more decentralised culture of bargaining: in the first 
two cases, the unions refrained from undertaking any actions against the 
employers, which provides us with a hint that they recognised the moral 
legitimacy of the agreements; in the Burda case, the courts provided these new 
agreements with a protective shield from the nullifying force of §77(3)BVG by 
means of a legal manoeuvre that legitimised these agreements considering that 
they were concluded individually with each employee (thus avoiding their 
qualification as a company-agreement) and that §77(3)BVG was applicable 
only to affiliated employees; since both trade unions and employees are fearful 
of making public their affiliations, the reality was that the case law in practice 
legitimised company-level agreements in deviation from industry-level 
agreements.554  The new version of §3BVG introduced in 2001 also provided a 
great contribution to the development of company-level actors. The practical 
effect of the modification was (1) to reinforce the representation of the works 
council when the company  was divided in several undertakings and (2) to adapt 
the structures of representation to the new forms of organisation of work, when 
the autonomy of the departments of the company (in the implementation of the 
principles of lean production) justified an autonomous representation of the 
workforce. The requirement that these new structures of representation be 
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contained in a collective agreement and correspond to a genuine interest of the 
workforce ensures the participation of the unions in this process of 
decentralisation and therefore the safeguard of the interests of the workforce 
(because there is the danger of dividing the representation in order to ensure 
the predominance of the employer – divide et impera). This is a form of control 
of the process of decentralisation and guarantee of participation of the trade 
unions. Finally, the increasing unionisation of the members of the works council 
and the changing interconnections between works councils and trade unions 
reveals that the division of functions is not so sharp  and that there seems to be 
initiating a process of collaboration between trade unions and works councils. 
This is extremely  important if we consider the increasingly relevant role that the 
works council (and alternative representative structures) seem to be having in 
the German panorama of industrial relations and the powers that they have in 
relation to industry agreements. This evolution seems to be an exemplification 
of how a system is currently  undergoing a process of controlled 
decentralisation.555 
 The case of France is equally paradigmatic. France seems to have been 
experiencing a long but constant process of decentralisation of collective 
bargaining by providing an increasing relevance to the powers of the actors at 
the level of the company. The mechanism of “controlled decentralisation” 
seems to be more visible here because the trade unions have been 
collaborating and participating in the process of decentralisation. The seed of 
the process was planted by the Auroux Laws of 1982, which created several 
incentives for unionisation in companies deprived of union representation. The 
most important innovations were the recognition of the possibility to the 
representative unions to designate a staff-delegate as a shop-steward, which 
would be entitled to bargain the statutory procedure of bargaining the 
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organisation of work and working time. In addition, the laws equally  created the 
comité de groupe, abolished thresholds for the setting up of trade union 
sections and redefined the functions of the works council as a means of 
collaborating with the employer. These innovations should not be 
underestimated: they  introduced mandatory bargaining within companies, 
engaged employees in the life of companies (by  bargaining the organisation of 
work and working time) and encouraged unionisation; the unions were not left 
out of this process because only employees affiliated or mandated by 
representative unions could bargain these procedures. This provided trade 
unions with a means of controlling the bargaining procedure.556  This trend 
continues in several steps; the law of 1993 created the single delegation, which 
encouraged the setting up of works councils and guaranteed union presence in 
them; the national agreement of 1995 partially reversed the principe de faveur 
that was prevalent in French law by admitting that lower level agreements could 
deviate (in certain subjects and conditions) from higher level agreements as 
long as the agent bargaining the agreement was a shop-steward or had a 
mandate from the union or was approved by an industry level paritary 
commission; the Aubry (1998 and 2000), Fillon (2004) and Bertrand (2008) 
laws continued this trend by allowing a controlled deviation from the standards 
laid out in higher level agreements; the Aubry laws allowed that the agreements 
for the reduction of working time be concluded by  a shop-steward or an 
employee as long as they were both mandated by a majoritary  union; if they 
were not mandated by a majoritary union (but a minoritary union), they were 
valid as long as they were approved in a referendum; the law of 2004 reversed 
the principle of favour by stating that the company level agreement could 
deviate from the industry  level agreement unless the industry level agreement 
expressly  stated otherwise; finally, the law of 2008 provided a greater margin of 
manoeuvre to derogatory  agreements by allowing company-level employee 
representatives to deviate in the same conditions as a union subject however to 
the control of a union (by means of a paritary  committee or by requiring that the 
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agreement be concluded by a shop-steward or a mandated employee).557 This 
trend of decentralisation initiated in 1982 reveals that the focus of collective 
bargaining in France has clearly turned towards the level of the company  as the 
company-level agents have an increasing power and increasing possibilities of 
deviation from higher level agreements. The trade unions were not left out of 
the process however since they have several forms of controlling the 
bargaining undertaken at the level of the company; as a rule, the agreements 
must be concluded by a shop-steward or a expressly mandated staff-delegate 
or subject to the approval of a paritary branch commission. This ensures a wide 
degree of union control over company-level bargaining.558 
 The case of the UK is equally  representative of this trend. The monist 
system is suffering severe transformations and the trade unions have an 
increasing role in the British panorama of industrial relations. The foremost 
example is the statutory procedure for recognition, which in reality struck a 
strong blow to the voluntarist system that prevailed in the UK and created a 
duty  to bargain with a (statutorily) recognised union for a period of three years. 
Although the scope of the duty to bargain is small (it merely covers pay, hours 
and holidays) it is expected nevertheless to have a strong impact; the threat of 
the procedure has encouraged the voluntary recognition of unions and the duty 
to bargain has had the reflexive effect of encouraging dialogue in other more 
substantial and delicate questions.559 The other great innovation in British law 
consisted in the introduction of elected representative structures. These 
structures were initially set up only for the bargaining of adaptation agreements 
(an euphemism for agreements deviating from the statutory standards) but 
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quickly  spread to the information and consultation procedures in situations of 
transfer of undertakings and collective redundancies and in the transposition of 
Directive 2002/14. This raises the question of the relationship  between elected 
and union representation, which was never posed before in the UK. The 
legislator gave a dubious answer; as regards the transfer of undertakings and 
collective redundancies, there is unequivocally a union priority as these 
structures may be set up  only when no union is recognised in respect of a 
particular bargaining unit; as regards the transposition of Directive 2002/14, the 
existence of a union does not impede the setting up  of these structures (even 
at the request of the employer). This raises the spectre of employer 
predominance because collective agreements are not mandatory in the UK. 
The unions have given a cautions answer to this problem: they either 
incorporate in collective agreements the information and consultation 
procedures demanded by Directive 2002/14 or they attempt to unionise the 
elected members in order to control the bargaining that takes place within the 
company.560 The combination of these elements reveals that the British system 
is slowly evolving towards more continental standards and that there is at least 
the attempt to introduce mandatory social dialogue at the level of the company; 
the priority still remains in the trade unions as they enjoy several prerogatives 
in relation to elected structures and they are attempting to control the 
procedures occurring within the company. 
 The Portuguese case is equally a feeble implementation of these 
principles. The innovation brought about by art.466CTP, which attributed to the 
shop-steward the competences of the works council in the implementation of 
the duties contained in Directive 2002/14, is significant because it attempted to 
introduce social dialogue in companies by means of the protection and activism 
of the trade unions. The evolution is similar to the one registered in France as 
the shop-steward (which must be elected by the employees of the undertaking 
and be designated by a trade union) enjoys a double-legitimacy and may 
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exercise the competences of the works council while maintaining a connection 
with a trade union. In addition, there are new specifically elected bodies for 
particular procedures (such as collective redundancies), which ensure 
representation of employees when it is most needed.561 
 This description of the evolution of the actors at the level of the company 
in each system is able to demonstrate the extent to which each system is 
evolving towards a controlled decentralisation of its structures of collective 
bargaining; the actors at the level of the company are clearly having a more 
relevant role while the trade unions are controlling the actions of these actors in 
order to ensure that they correspond to the genuine interest of the employees 
and of the needs of the company and not to the interest of the employer to 
undermine social dialogue and union power. 
 The evolution of the actors cannot be disconnected from the evolution 
registered in the subject of collective agreements however: the representation 
of employees exists to function as an interlocutor with the employer and the 
strength of the actors can be seen in the agreements concluded with the 
employer. That will be the object of the next section. 
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5.2.3. The Evolution of Collective Agreements 
The understanding of the reach of the process of decentralisation of collective 
bargaining that is currently occurring cannot be limited to the analysis of the 
actors; the diversification of the role of the actors at the level of the company 
was accompanied with the emergence of new types of company-level 
agreements concluded by these same actors that seem to be in the process of 
changing the traditional nature of industrial relations and posing considerable 
challenges to the former types of collective agreements. The purpose of this 
section is to analyse the new types of agreements that are being developed 
within companies. This section will begin by describing briefly the traditional 
function of collective agreements in order to best understand its evolution. The 
evolution of collective bargaining in the jurisdictions covered appears to exhibit 
three new types of agreements, which were coined as (a) flexibilisation 
agreements, (b) procedural agreements and (c) anticipatory agreements. The 
following sections will attempt to analyse each one of these agreements in 
detail and explain their significance within the system before ending with a 
comparative conclusion on the main common characteristics of these 
agreements and their function. It will be defended that these agreements 
appear to exhibit the characteristics of a contractarian and stakeholder 
inclusive view of the firm since they appear to be designed to reduce the 
agency costs that occur between the management and the workforce in face of 
stronger shareholder and product market pressure (the so-called insider-
outsider conflict).    
5.2.3.1.The traditional function of collective agreements  
The description of the evolution of collective agreements must begin with a 
description of the traditional function of collective agreements. Although this 
was previously made in the analysis of the institutional complementarities 
between the traditional patterns of corporate governance and collective 
bargaining, it is nonetheless useful to make a short recapitulation in order to 
better contextualise and understand the evolution. Collective agreements 
consist in a regulatory agreement bargained between a trade union and an 
individual employer or employers’ association with the purpose of regulating 
collectively the terms and conditions of work. The rationale underlying collective 
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bargaining has been an intensely  debated topic: whereas some see it merely 
as a labour cartel, others emphasize its nature as a human right and as a 
means of reducing the asymmetry of bargaining powers that exists between 
employees and individual employers.562  One recent ruling analysing the 
rationale of collective bargaining came from Canada, whose Supreme Court 
ruled in 2007 in the case Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 
Columbia that:
(1) The right to bargain collectively with an employer enhances the 
human dignity, liberty and autonomy of workers by giving them the 
opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and 
thereby gain some control over a major aspect of their lives, namely 
their work.
(2) Collective bargaining is not simply an instrument for pursuing 
external ends…rather [it] is intrinsically valuable as an experience in 
self-government.
(3) Collective bargaining permits workers to achieve a form of 
workplace democracy and to ensure the rule of law in the workplace. 
Workers gain a voice to influence the establishment of rules that 
control a major aspect of their lives.  
This enunciation of the finalities underlying collective bargaining allows us to 
understand that collective bargaining is not simply a labour cartel but a form of 
self-government to enforce an ideal of industrial democracy. As a general point, 
one may observe that collective bargaining performs the following functions. 
Firstly, it performs an important role in the reduction of transaction costs 
associated with bargaining because it provides for a standard level of working 
conditions applicable to a large group of workers. Secondly, it allows 
companies to adapt the working conditions to their own specific needs or to the 
needs of the industry instead of claiming specific rules from the central 
government. Finally, it may be equally institutionally complementary to the 
predominant corporate governance structure that predominates in each 
country. The former paragraphs attempted to enunciate the institutional 
complementarities between the predominant corporate governance and 
collective bargaining patterns and it was defended that insider and 
governmental patterns of corporate governance privileged bargaining at 
industry level and market forms of corporate governance privileged more 
decentralised forms of collective bargaining. The organisation of work equally 
had a strong influence in this pattern because some insider patterns of 
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corporate governance and industry level bargaining are ideal to the 
development of fordist structures and more decentralised patterns are ideal to 
the development of alternative forms of organisation of work. The combination 
of these elements (corporate governance, firm organisation and the functions of 
collective bargaining) assists in explaining the developments of particular 
patterns of collective bargaining.
 The institutional endowment in which these traditional patterns 
developed underwent strong transformations over the last 30 years. The overall 
economic environment transitioned from corporatist capitalism towards financial 
capitalism, the international competitive pressure increased to a great extent, 
the governance patterns of companies have been undergoing strong 
modifications and the patterns of organisation of work are underpinned today in 
the idea of lean production, which privileges decentralisation of company 
structures. This has to have a repercussion in the traditional patterns of 
collective agreements. The former paragraphs enunciated the transformations 
occurred in the actors; it was defended that each country is increasingly 
empowering the actors at the level of the company in a phenomenon coined as 
controlled decentralisation in order to achieve a more company-friendly 
bargaining. The purpose of this section is to analyse the transformations 
occurred at the level of the agreements. It will be attempted to demonstrate the 
extent to which the organisation of collective agreements is adapting in order to 
be able to perform the functions demanded from it, namely: (a) the reduction of 
transaction costs, (b) the establishment of industrial democracy, (c) the 
adaptation to the new corporate governance patterns.        
5.2.3.2. New types of agreements 
The panorama of collective bargaining has been undergoing considerable 
developments in each country under study as new types of agreements have 
emerged. The new agreements are bringing about some considerable 
modifications to the previous structure of collective bargaining both in terms of 
structure and content. In terms of structure, these agreements are increasingly 
being decentralised towards the level of the company; in this ambit, the 
prevalent level of bargaining is steadily  becoming the company-level. This 
raises serious questions of the modes of articulation with the sector level and 
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its future; each country has provided a distinct answer to this problem that must 
be seen within its due context. As a preliminary word it may be said that the 
decentralisation of collective agreements does not imply the end of the industry 
agreements but merely a redefinition of their roles and relationships; the 
industry level will maintain its function of regulating the labour market and will 
set a limit to the creativity  of company-level collective agreements; this is 
nothing but the idea of controlled decentralisation enunciated above at the level 
of the actors. As regards the contents, it is noticeable that the substance of 
collective agreements is undergoing severe transformations. It is apparent that 
collective agreements are increasingly concerned with the needs of specific 
companies and with the provision of instruments for company-specific 
implementation. This is particularly  evident in times of crisis and the recognised 
possibilities of deviation. The German legal literature has coined this new policy 
as a company-friendly collective agreement (Betriebsnäher Tarifpolitik).563 The 
evolution described above of the actors provided us with a hint of the new 
culture of collective bargaining that is being developed as the increasingly 
stronger role that the actors at the level of the company are gaining is coupled 
with the development of the new types of agreements. The purpose of this 
section is to describe the new types of agreements that are being developed. 
These agreements may be classified in three distinct types: (a) flexibilisation 
agreements, which provide for possibilities of deviation from the level of the 
sector under certain conditions, (b) procedural agreements, which intend to 
enhance the communication channels between the employer and the employee 
representatives at the level of the firm and reduce the agency  costs within the 
company and (c) partnership agreements, which consist in a pact between 
employer and employees intended to engage employees more actively in the 
life of the company. The following sections will analyse each one of these 
agreements in detail.       
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 5.2.3.2.1 Flexibilisation agreements 
Flexibilisation agreements consist in a type of agreements that allow for the 
deviation from the standards laid out in industry agreements. These 
agreements allow companies – under certain conditions – to agree with 
employee representatives some company-specific provisions that deviate 
considerably from the standards laid out in industry level agreements in order 
to safeguard the interests of the workforce within the company. These 
agreements are normally  connected to situations or crisis in which a temporary 
reduction of the standards laid out in industry level agreements is seen as the 
only means of preserving the employment levels at the undertaking. They are 
not reduced to situations of crisis though; other types of flexibilisation 
agreements consist in the power to determine the management of the working-
time at the company-level (in deviation from the standards laid out at the 
industry level) in order to allow the company to adapt more easily  to the 
economical fluctuations or to the requirements of specific clients; this is 
particularly important for small and medium companies that work as 
outsourcers for a reduced number of major companies and that are highly 
dependent on the demands of these major companies in order to survive on the 
market. These types of flexibilisation agreements (crisis agreements and 
adjustment agreements) are destined to attract social dialogue to the level of 
the company and make it more flexible in the task of providing an answer to the 
demands of competitors, major clients and shareholders. They should not be 
understood merely  as an instrument of downgrading labour standards by 
means of the justification of competition or crisis but truly as a means of making 
the company more competitive, able to respond rapidly to fluctuations and to 
the demands of the major shareholders and stakeholders of the company. In 
this sense, they encourage the alignment of interests between the 
management and employees vis-à-vis shareholders and stakeholders (the so-
called insider/outsider conflict) and provide employees with a means of 
safeguarding their interests.564 This possibility of derogation from the industry 
level agreements was not made without limits however as all the countries 
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under study placed several limits to the possibility of deviation from the industry 
level standards in order to avoid the abuse of these instruments of flexibility. 
The trade unions have an extremely important role to play in this matter, as 
they were the ones who were trusted with some power to control the possibility 
of deviation from the collectively agreed standards. These flexibilisation 
agreements may be considered as the utmost example of the idea of controlled 
decentralisation enunciated above. The following lines will attempt to explain to 
which extent each one of the jurisdictions under study implemented these 
flexibilisation agreements into their own legal system. 
(a)  Germany – the almighty power of the Flächentariffvertrag and the barrier 
posed by §77(3)BVG currently  correspond more to a myth than to the proper 
reality. This sentence deserves a more elaborate explanation. The industry 
level agreement (Flächentariffvertrag) is - together with the statutory law - 
arguably still the most important source of regulation of labour relations in 
Germany. The use of incorporation clauses (Verweisungsklauseln) and the 
pressure to join employers’ associations still ensure a wide coverage of 
collective agreements (64%).565 The increasing criticisms that have been made 
since the beginning of the 1980s to the rigid nature of collective agreements led 
the social partners to devise alternative strategies to flexibilise the application 
of collective agreements and make them more company-friendly in order to 
avoid an escape from collective bargaining (expressively  coined as Flucht aus 
dem Tarifvertrag). The reasons behind this increased criticism to collective 
agreements are manifold and they must be understood in their entire set: the 
internationalisation and globalisation of the markets exposed German 
companies to a stronger and more aggressive international competition with 
companies with diverse governance structures that demanded an adaptation of 
the behaviour of companies to these new realities; the modifications occurred 
in the structure of companies (progressive end of fordism and introduction of 
lean production) greatly  modified the internal and external borders of 
companies rendering the existing collective agreements (which were thought 
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for the fordist production structure) inadequate; the medications occurred in the 
governance of companies altered the stable equilibrium between managers, 
workers and major shareholders and exposed companies to the pressures of 
institutional shareholders and the stock markets. The existing collective 
agreements were increasingly criticised for not being sufficiently flexible in 
order to cope with these new realities and a more decentralised culture of 
bargaining, underpinned in an understanding between the managers and the 
employees, began to develop  in the 1980s. The trade unions and the 
employers’ associations understood the direction of this current and began to 
develop more flexible forms of collective agreements in order to be able to 
adapt the existing structures of collective bargaining to these new realities.566 
 One type of agreement – or better, a clause within the agreement – that 
flexibilised the application of collective agreements consisted in the absence of 
the duty to be bound by a collective agreement even when the employer is a 
member of the employers’ association. These clauses are named as OT-
Mitgliedshaft (Ohne Tarifbindung-Mitgliedschaft), which may be roughly 
translated as “membership  without collective agreement”. These clauses are 
destined to encourage the affiliation of employers to employers’ associations 
and to benefit in full from their services without being bound to the provisions of 
the collective agreement signed with the competent trade union. The first 
clause of this nature was inserted in a collective agreement concluded by the 
Verband des Holz- und kunststoffverarbeitenden Industrie Rheinland-Pfalz567 
as a response to declining membership and consequential escape from 
collective agreements and quickly  spread to other sectors of activity. The 
purpose with remaining a member of an association not bound to a collective 
agreement must be seen within the praxis of collective bargaining. If companies 
exit employers’ associations they will become an easy target for the strike 
power of the unions as they are not bound by the duty of industrial peace. The 
membership of the organisation shields them against strikes. Within the 
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employers’ association, although the member is in principle not bound to a 
collective agreement, the pressure of the other regularly  bound employers at 
least obliges the member to justify its option not to abide by  the collective 
agreement. This helps the employers’ association to understand the specific 
needs of these companies and to assist them at a latter stage in the conclusion 
of a single employer agreement with the industry  union in order to adequate the 
collectively agreed provisions to the specific needs of its company. Therefore 
this OT-Mitgliedshaft clauses are not a means of escaping collective 
agreements but a means of maintaining employers within the employers’ 
associations, insert their specific needs into the Tarifpolitik and attempt at a 
later stage to bargain specific agreements with them in order to arrange a more 
company-friendly industrial policy.568
 The extensive use of single-employer agreements as an alternative to 
association level agreements consists in another means of flexibilising the 
application of industry agreements and achieving a more decentralised culture 
of collective bargaining. German law recognises to individual employers the 
right to conclude collective agreements (§2BVG). In contrast to France, were 
the principe de faveur prevented the eviction of the higher level by the lower 
level agreements, the competition between collective agreements is regulated 
by the principle of speciality (Spezialitätsgrundsatz): in case of conflict, the 
collective agreement that contains provisions closest to the situation of a 
concrete undertaking applies because only one collective agreement can be 
applied in a given undertaking (the so-called principle of the single collective 
agreement (Tarifeinheit)). When the employer is a member of an employers’ 
organisation, the question of knowing whether the organisation allows him to 
conclude a concurrent collective agreement is to be decided in accordance with 
the internal by-charters of the association. Employers’ associations have been 
progressively  favouring the conclusion of such agreements by individual 
employers when the employer reveals the concrete reasons why the industry 
level agreement is not appropriate to him. If the employer provides the 
association with reasonable arguments for the conclusion of a company-level 
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agreement in deviation from the industry level agreement then the employers’ 
association may approve or refrain from undertaking disciplinary actions 
against individual employers who choose this form of bargaining. Although 
trade unions generally  do not favour the conclusion of these agreements 
because they prefer to focus their action at the level of the industry and are 
reluctant to allow for the deviation from the compromises, they have been 
progressively  accepting the conclusion of these agreements in order to achieve 
a more company-friendly Tarifpolitik. This is so by a number of reasons: the fact 
that trade unions enjoy a monopoly at the level of the sector guarantees that 
the same trade union that concluded the industry level agreement is going to 
conclude the (deviating) company-level agreement; this provides the trade 
union with the possibility  to verify  the reasons behind the requirement to 
deviate and ensure a collective representation of employee interests at the 
level of the company. On the other hand, the double control exercised by the 
employers’ association on the requirement of the member to escape from the 
provisions of the company-level agreement (and the general social pressure 
exercised by the other employers who make efforts to abide by the provisions 
of the agreement) ensures the legitimacy of the reasons provided. This allows 
us to have a controlled decentralisation of collective bargaining because the 
deviation from the provisions of the industry agreement by the single employer 
is controlled both by the employers’ association and by the trade union. The 
reality is that this use of single-employer agreements as an instrument of 
controlled decentralisation as been so successful that the number of single-
employer agreements almost parallels the number of industry-level 
agreements. In accordance with data from 2003, 59.636 collective agreements 
were in force in Germany (in more than 300 branches), which may be broken 
down into 33.100 industry  level agreements and 26.500 single-employer 
agreements (44,4% of the total number of agreements).569  Finally, even the 
case law of the German Labour Courts provided an impetus to the conclusion 
of these single-employer agreements as a means of decentralising industrial 
relations and achieving a more company-friendly collective bargaining. In a 
widely commented decision, the BAG decided that a trade union could undergo 
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strike action against an individual employer that was a member of an 
employers’ association and bound by an industry  agreement in order to force 
him to conclude a single-employer agreement. The strike would become illicit 
only when it was envisaged to force the employer to leave the employers’ 
association or when the question was covered by the industry agreement.570 
These examples provide us with an illustrative example of the current trend of 
decentralisation of collective bargaining that is occurring in Germany by means 
of the use of single-employer agreements (amid other instruments).571  The 
advantages are a double control exercised by both the trade union and the 
employers’ association and the fact that the same party  that concluded the 
industry level agreement – the trade union - collectively regulates the process 
of decentralisation. 
This use of single-employer agreements as an instrument of 
decentralisation does not come without criticisms however as some see in it a 
dangerous mean of undermining the purposes of collective bargaining. There 
have been several criticisms pointed out to this policy:  firstly, there is a 
disparity  of power between the union (who is organised at the industry level) 
and the individual employer because unions are much more capable of 
financially  supporting strike actions that are potentially  much more damaging 
for an individual employer than the ones undertaken at the industry level; this 
disparity  of power would compromise potentially the results of the individual 
agreement. Secondly, an expansion of single-employer agreements may have 
dreadful consequences for the industry  level agreements; the remaining 
employers will not be so willing to make sacrifices to abide to the conditions 
imposed in the industry level agreement and claims for deviation may increase. 
Thirdly, this single-employer policy is concerned essentially with protecting the 
jobs of the insiders, leaving no room for consideration of the interests of the 
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outsiders in collective bargaining. The economical situation of the industry and 
the need to increase occupational levels should be discussed at the industry 
level. Finally, the transfer of the wage bargaining to the company level is 
capable of disturbing the company-peace and creates conflicts between the 
employer and the rank and file that the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz intended to 
avoid. The critics of these single-employer agreements propose that the 
strength of the industry agreement should be maintained with the possibilities 
of a controlled decentralisation at the company level.572     
This serves as an introduction to the last form of decentralisation in the 
form of flexibilisation agreements that may be found in German Law - the 
opening clauses (öffnungsklauseln). Opening clauses consist in conventions 
inserted into industry agreements that allow individual companies to deviate 
under certain conditions and within certain limits from the provisions contained 
in them. It is a form of controlled decentralisation because it is the industry 
agreement itself (and therefore the parties to the agreement) that lay out the 
limits for its deviation. Opening clauses first appeared in 1984 in the Leber case 
in the context of a strike in the metallurgical sector (Leber was the name of the 
mediator) and they have been multiplying throughout the industries 
progressively  originating a revolution in collective bargaining. The origin of the 
opening clauses may be sought in the need for differentiation of individual 
companies in the industry  concerned. This need for differentiation and the 
multiplication of opening clauses reached such an extent that the German 
Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB – Deutscher Gewerkschaft Bund) laid out 
in its program in 1996 that there was a need to rethink the relationship between 
the collective agreement and its implementation in companies in terms that (1) 
the collective agreement took into consideration the distinct needs of 
companies and effectively conform (Gestalt) the unique conditions of each 
branch and companies and (2) the regulation of wages and minimum working 
conditions in collective agreements should remain the central element in order 
to guarantee the mandatory  establishment of minimum conditions. This means, 
in essence, that the predominance of the collective agreement should not be 
questioned but it should nevertheless allow for a certain degree of 
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differentiation in its application.573  The introduction of opening clauses in 
collective agreements led to the development of new types of collective 
agreements. These collective agreements, which were applicable previously 
like statutory  law throughout the industry, now contained a set of clauses that 
allowed for a certain deviation from its provisions by  means of an agreement 
with the works council. There were several variations of these clauses. They 
may consist in (a) a framework regulation (Rahmenregelung), (b) an optional 
regulation (Optionen; Kafeteriaklause) or (c) an opening clause properly said. 
A framework regulation consists in a set of principles to be implemented at the 
company level by means of an agreement with the works council; it consists in 
a regulatory technique in which instead of laying out a detailed regulation, the 
collective agreement would contain merely principles, mechanisms and 
indications (Grundsätze, Spannen und Richtwerte) to be implemented at the 
level of the individual company by means of an agreement with the works 
council; an optional regulation consists in a set of concrete regulations from 
which the company may choose from by means of an agreement with the 
works council; the parties to the collective agreement would take into account 
the needs of the industry  and of the individual companies and design a set of 
alternatives which contained several trade-offs between them; the individual 
company would then be free to choose between these different options by 
means of an agreement with the works council, i.e: the company would choose 
the regulation that is more appropriate to their individual situation from a set of 
pre-determined options contained in the collective agreement. Finally, the 
opening clause properly said consists in an express permission contained in 
the collective agreement of the works council to complete, modify or replace 
the provisions of the collective agreement by means of an agreement with the 
employer. The collective agreement itself would allow the parties at the level of 
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the company to deviate from its provisions by means of a company agreement 
that would complete, modify or replace the collectively agreed provisions.574
The industrial relations literature has been studying these clauses and 
they have been able to present us with a typology of the types of agreements 
reached. The more common clauses deal with the subjects of wages and 
working time and they may be classified as (a) opening clauses for working-
time arrangements, (b) working-time reduction without compensation in pay 
and (c) hardship and exemption clauses. Opening clauses for working time 
arrangements are normally framework or optional clauses that lay out the 
maximum limits of working time for each week and for a reference period and 
allow individual companies to determine the concrete arrangements for their 
implementation; an agreement with the works council will implement these 
provisions in accordance with the needs of the company; if the clause is merely 
a reference clause, it merely contains the limits and leaves their implementation 
to the individual company, which is subject merely to the maximum weekly 
working time and the maximum average working time for a reference period; if 
it is an optional clause, it will merely contain a set of working time schemes to 
be implemented by agreement (e.g: in times of need the maximum daily 
working time is increased by two hours but the working week has only four 
days or the increased in one week period compensated by a reduction in the 
following period). A working time reduction without compensation in pay 
consists in a modality  of lay-off in which the employer is entitled to reduce the 
working time of all or some of its employees during a reference period in order 
to cut costs and avoid redundancies. It is normally an option clause because 
there is a set of possible reductions to choose from. The reduction of working 
time and pay must be made by means of an agreement with the works council. 
The use of this option was widespread and very successful; a survey ordered 
by Gesamtmetall in 1994 concluded that a 10% reduction in working time in the 
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former 4 years had saved 50.000 jobs in the industry.575  Hardship  and 
exemption clauses consist in opening clauses properly said because they allow 
for a true deviation from the standards laid out in the collective agreement as 
long as it is necessary to pursue a legitimate aim. They are normally 
surrounded by precautions in order to avoid an escape from the collective 
agreement. For instance, some collective agreements contained a clause that 
stated that if a company was close to bankruptcy, they could require exemption 
from the collective agreement. In doing so, they  had to demonstrate that they 
were effectively close to bankruptcy  but that they had a convincing strategy for 
economic viability. If the social partners agreed with the seriousness of the 
conditions in the company and the viability of the plan proposed then they  could 
authorise the exemption from the collective agreement; the conditions of 
exemption were then bargaining with the works council. Other types of 
exemption clauses pursued social aims: for instance, there were clauses that 
provided that, in case of small and medium-sized companies that created 
employment in the industry concerned, they could be exempted from paying 
holiday and Christmas bonus to their employees in order to create more jobs; 
other clauses stated that if a company agreed to hire certain groups of 
disadvantaged employees (long-term unemployed or workers looking for a first 
job) they could be exempted from some of the duties contained in the 
agreement. The examples reveal that the social partners have been attempting 
to decentralise collective bargaining by  allowing for some differentiation but at 
the same time carefully avoiding delegating excessively  decision-making rights 
to the plant level; the decentralisation has been a controlled decentralisation 
within the limits laid out by the industry agreement, whose predominance and 
central role remained unquestioned.576
The legitimacy  and limits of these clauses at the light of the German 
Constitution and the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz have been raising a 
considerable degree of discussion because they modify to a certain extent the 
traditional balance of powers between the social partners that underpinned the 
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German economy for more than 30 years. The main idea underpinning the 
division of powers between the trade unions and the works councils and the 
prohibition of works council intervention in matters covered by collective 
agreements served as a means of ensuring the equality  of competition between 
undertakings in the industry (because it bypassed the possibility of competition 
in term of labour costs) and avoided the transfer of social conflicts into the 
undertaking that could endanger the “company peace”. This is so fundamental 
in the German industrial policy that it even enjoyed a constitutional recognition 
of this corporatist structure of the economy by means of §9(3) of the German 
Constitution.577 The introduction of opening clauses raised several questions of 
a constitutional and statutory nature because they are capable of bringing 
about a considerable degree of transformations to the self-regulatory tradition 
embedded in the German Constitution. The main discussion concerning these 
clauses may be subsumed to three great questions: (a) does the 
constitutionally  protected collective autonomy allow the possibility of the social 
partners renouncing their competence to regulate certain issues; (b) in the 
affirmative case, what are the limits to that possibility of deviation; (c) what 
about non-affiliated employees? The following paragraphs will analyse the main 
points surrounding these questions in detail. 
 The first question addresses the legitimacy of these clauses at the light 
of the constitutional recognition of the freedom of association. §9(3) of the 
German Constitution allows the setting up of associations for the guarantee 
and promotion of the conditions of work and of the economy. The constitutional 
interpretation of this provision led to the development of a system of trade 
union monopoly at the level of the industry in order to guarantee a certain 
corporatist structure of the economy: the main current of interpretation saw in 
§9(3) of the German Constitution a delegation of the State to the social 
partners in the task of determining the conditions of work in the industry by 
means of social dialogue.578  The insertion of opening clauses in collective 
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agreements is capable of disturbing this traditional structure because its 
practical effect is to allow for a differentiation in the conditions of work 
applicable in the industry (which may undermine competition between the 
undertakings) and endanger the regulatory function of collective agreements. 
This led many to question their constitutionality  in the first line. The main 
arguments of the legal thinking tend to favour the conclusion of these clauses, 
although the justifications vary to a great extent. Manfred Löwisch, in an 
extremely interesting article, considered that these clauses are not only 
admissible but equally imposed at the light of the German Constitution. In the 
view of this author, the social partners are not only free to renounce their 
constitutional competence to regulate the working conditions at the level of the 
industry and allow for individual deviations in collective agreements; they are 
equally mandated to do so by the German Constitution. Since the mandatory 
effects of collective agreements (§9(3)GG and §4TVG) interfere with the 
constitutionally  protected fundamental freedoms of contract (Vertragsfreiheit) 
and to choose an occupation (Berufsfreiheit) (§2 and 12GG), the constitutional 
principle of proportionality mandates that §9(3)GG be put aside when the social 
partners are unable to perform their functions – the protection of the employees 
in times of entrepreneurial crisis. One means to achieve this is by the notice of 
withdrawal (Kündigung) of the collective agreement on the basis of an 
important reason (the preservation of employment). Since that would lead to an 
escape from collective bargaining, the most appropriate solution seems to be 
an interpretation of §77(3) BVG in accordance with the German Constitution 
according to which the works council would not be prevented from deviating 
from collective agreements in times of crisis that threatened the existence of 
the company and of the labour posts.579  This position of Löwisch is a bit 
extreme and raises several constitutional and statutory  doubts that could only 
be answered by a ruling from the German Constitutional Court.580 The merit of 
the opinion of Löwisch consists in laying out that the reach of §9(3)GG is not 
absolute but it must be balanced with other considerations. This led the legal 
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thinking to propose other less drastic interpretations of opening clauses at the 
light of §9(3)GG. The opinions of Patrick Remy and Völker Rieble are 
exemplary in this aspect because they synthesise the discussion surrounding 
the legitimacy  of opening clauses. In accordance with the view of these 
authors, the constitutionally recognised freedom of association and the 
particular content that it enjoys in the German Constitution entails in it the 
power to refrain from regulating a certain subject. The power recognised to the 
social partners to regulate a certain subject (wages and working conditions at 
the industry  level) necessarily entails within it the power to refrain from 
regulating these subjects. The opening clause should not be understood as a 
delegation of regulatory competence to the company-level but simply an 
abstention to regulate a certain subject in certain occasions (normally situations 
of crisis). This means that since the subject is not regulated in a collective 
agreement, the barrier effect (Sperrwirkung) of §77(3)BVG would not apply and 
the company-level actors would be free to regulate the issue by means of a 
company-agreement. The competence to regulate the issue belongs to the 
works council in its entirety  because there is no barrier posed by a collective 
agreement at the light of §77(3)BVG. This is not an empowerment of the works 
council by means of a collective agreement but merely  a refusal to regulate a 
certain issue, which fits within their constitutionally recognised regulatory 
powers, thus opening roads to the original competence of the works council.581 
Independently of the justifications, one conclusion seems to impose: the 
particular role attributed to the social partners in the German Constitution (§9(3)
GG) is no obstacle to the insertion of clauses in collective agreements that 
allow for a deviation of the collectively agreed standards at the company-level. 
This opens room for a decentralisation of collective bargaining towards the 
level of the company by means of derogatory agreements.582 
 This raises the question of the limits (if any) to the possibilities of 
deviation. The position of the legal thinking was once again harmonious at to 
the result but not as to the reasons. As a preliminary word, one may say  that all 
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the authors seem to recognise the legitimacy of the possibility of deviation as 
long as it is subject to certain limits; the deviation from the collectively agreed 
standards should serve to preserve occupational levels and avoid bankruptcy 
and not to empty the collectively agreed standards, which would not only 
undermine industry agreements but equally the competition between 
undertakings in the sector. It is worth seeing each one of the arguments in 
detail. Zachert 583 began by pointing out that the freedom guaranteed to the 
social partners to regulate the economy and working conditions in a particular 
industry does not imply a duty  to regulate it to its fullest extent so as to pre-
empt the autonomy of the company-level actors. The regulatory freedom 
contained in §9(3)GG implied the admissibility of a partial waiving of the 
regulatory power as long as (a) the question could be dealt autonomously by 
the company-level actors, i.e: it fell within their powers and (b) there were limits 
to the possibility of deviation so that the hard-core of the collective autonomy 
would be preserved.584  The idea underpinning the reasoning of Zachert 
seemed to be the setting of limits to the possibilities of deviation so that the 
adaptation to difficulties would not result in a general escape to collective 
agreements; the industry  agreement should be preserved as the main source 
of law in the sector and the possibilities of deviation should be exceptional and 
respect the constitutionally guaranteed collective autonomy. This serves as an 
introduction to a very interesting thesis developed by  Baumann that was coined 
as the theory of essentiality (Wesentlichkeitslehre). Drawing upon the 
delegation laws contained in §80GG (i.e: laws authorising other bodies to enact 
laws and regulations, functioning as an administrative act of delegation) and 
the duties to which those laws are subject (legal security (Rechtssicherheit) and 
legal certainty (Rechtsvorsehbarkeit)), the author concluded that opening 
clauses should be admitted as long as they fulfilled these two preconditions: 
the employees subject to the collective agreements should be perfectly 
informed beforehand of the possibilities of deviation from those same 
agreements. This opinion of the author brings attention to an important 
limitation of the reach of opening clauses: they are admissible as long as they 
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do not empty the collective autonomy and the best means to do so consists in 
laying out in clear terms in the collective agreement itself the extension of the 
possibilities of deviation; this thesis has two advantages: it ensures that the 
possibilities of deviation are collectively agreed (thus ensuring a wide degree of 
consensus in the industry) and prevents the use of the notice of termination 
(Kündigung) of collective agreements in situations of need proposed by 
Löwisch as a means of deviation because it would be uncontrollable.585  The 
combination of these theories assists us in understanding the proposals made 
by Henssler and Däubler as regards the limits of collective agreements. In 
accordance with the view of these two authors, opening clauses are admissible 
as long as they  contain the limits to the possibilities of deviation; a free card to 
deviate is inadmissible because that would undermine the constitutionally 
protected collective autonomy but a certain margin of freedom in the 
determination of the working conditions at the level of the company (even if it 
leads to a deviation from the collectively agreed standards) is admissible as 
long as (a) it is expressly provided for in a collective agreement, (b) it contains 
limits to the possibilities of deviation and (c) it expressly lays down the 
preconditions under which it may be used. The combination of these three 
preconditions is extremely important because it ensures that they are 
collectively agreed, they correspond to a genuine interest of the companies of 
the sector and they are not used as a means of undermining the competition in 
the industry or the collective autonomy of the social partners.586 A last limitation 
to these clauses was proposed by Rieble 587 and consists in the application of 
the principle of equality  (Gleichheitssatz) to these clauses. The legitimacy of 
these clauses must obey a genuine interest of the sector and not be the source 
of competitive advantages of some undertakings that could use them in order 
to cut labour costs. This obliges the social partners to be very cautions as to 
the conditions in which these clauses may be used and companies to justify  the 
use of these clauses. The social partners may lay out the possibilities of use 
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and companies must present evidence that they fulfil those conditions in order 
to be able to deviate from the collectively agreed standards. The combination of 
these elements ensures a wide degree of transparency and control in the 
application of those clauses.
 The last question concerns the application of these clauses to non-
affiliated employees. German collective bargaining is underpinned in the 
principle of double-affiliation, according to which the provisions of collective 
agreements are applicable only  to affiliated employees in the absence of an 
administrative procedure of extension or an incorporation agreement contained 
in the employment contract (§3 and 5TVG). The problem lies in the following: 
the non-affiliated employees will be subject to a provision of the collective 
agreement (e.g: an increase in working time without an increase in pay) without 
being affiliated to the trade union. This problem may be overcome by means of 
the legitimacy of the works council. The application of the opening clauses 
contained in collective agreements must be made by means of an agreement 
with the works council. The trade unions and works councils have distinct 
sources of legitimacy to regulate the conditions of work; whereas the legitimacy 
of the unions arises from the affiliation of the employees, the legitimacy of the 
works councils arises from an election. Since all employees have the possibility 
of participating and influencing the results of the election of the works council 
and the works council represents all the employees of the undertaking, the 
decisions of the works council will equally  bind the employees that are not 
affiliated to the union. This is a means to overcome the problem of the lack of 
legitimacy.588
 This analysis of the use of flexibilisation agreements in Germany may 
allow us to extract some preliminary conclusions. The former predominance of 
the industry level agreement (Flächentarifvertrag) in Germany as a mandatory 
regulation of the industry by  means of irrevocable minimum standards does not 
correspond to the current reality as the social partners have devised a number 
of techniques to develop a more company-friendly Tarifpolitik. This does not 
mean however that the industry agreement lost its predominance in the 
German industrial landscape; the Flächentarifvertrag remains the main source 
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of law in the industrial level but with several possibilities of deviation that allow 
for the consideration of the interests of individual companies that face unique 
difficulties. These possibilities of deviation were surrounded by precautions so 
that they would not be used as a means of escape from industry  agreements 
but as an answer to genuine problems. The main instruments of deviation are 
the OT-Mitgliedschaft clauses, the single-employer agreements and the 
opening clauses. The OT-Mitgliedschaft clauses are an ingenious device 
designed to encourage the affiliation of employers and avoid an escape from 
collective agreements. Since employers are affiliated to their correspondent 
associations and enjoy all the rights and duties except the duty to be bound by 
the collective agreement, the employers’ organisation can hear them and take 
into account their interests in the Tarifpolitik and convince the trade union to 
sign single-employer agreements with them take correspond to their needs. 
These single-employer agreements (themselves an instrument of 
decentralisation) are equally  subject to a double-control: they are subject to the 
control of the trade union (because unions are organised at the industry-level in 
Germany, therefore there is no free-riding on the sacrifices of other competing 
unions) and to the control of the employers’ association, who supervises if its 
member has a genuine interest in a single-employer agreement and is not 
simply paying unfairly in the industry. The final instrument of decentralisation 
are the opening clauses. There are several types of opening clauses589 that 
correspond to several interests. The use of these opening clauses is subject to 
several controls: they must have limits to the possibility  of deviation, so that the 
constitutionally  protected collective autonomy is not endangered, they must be 
express (which ensures a consensus at the industry-level as to the possibilities 
of deviation), they must lay out the preconditions under which they may be 
used (in order to control their use and ensure that it corresponds to the genuine 
interest) and some say that they must abide by the principle of equality  (so that 
the competition between the undertakings in the industry is not injured). Finally, 
the requirement that they be implemented by means of a decision of the works 
council ensures a wide degree of legitimacy to the decisions that is capable of 
overcoming the principle of double-affiliation. These possibilities of 
565
589  Kittner, M. (1998). Öffnung des Flächentarifvertrags. Tarifautonomie für ein neues 
Jahrhundert - festschrift für Günther Schaub  zum 65 Geburtstag. M. Schlachter, R. Ascheid and 
H.-W. Friedrich. München, C.H Beck: 389-420.
decentralisation are particularly important for the new competitive requirements 
that companies are subject to. They are extremely important in times of 
economic fluctuations and in companies that are heavily  dependent of the 
orders of other companies (outsourcing companies) because they provide 
companies with a means of overcoming the economic hardships and avoiding 
redundancies and they flexibilise the organisation of work within companies in 
order to make them more responsive to the demands of their clients (who are 
their main stakeholders), thus ensuring the alignment of interests between 
employers and employees. The several controls that each one of these 
possibilities are subject to ensure that they correspond to genuine competitive 
and occupational interests and they are not merely a means of avoiding 
collective agreements. In this sense, they are an important instrument of 
flexibility and social dialogue.         
(b) France – the French system of collective bargaining has equally  had an 
extraordinary experience of decentralisation of collective bargaining by means 
of derogatory agreements up  to the point that they completely inverted the 
system of collective bargaining and turned the focus towards the level of the 
company. The reforms implemented in France completely  reversed the 
traditional system of collective bargaining by transforming company level 
agreements into the main source of regulation of labour relations and making 
the industry-level agreements subsidiary. Likewise in Germany however, this 
deep transformation of the system was surrounded with precautions so that the 
benefits of decentralization would not turn into a generalized escape from 
collective agreements and into a further weakening of the power of trade 
unions that could have severe consequences in a country  where the trade 
union panorama is already considerably dispersed.
 In order to understand the reforms implemented in 2004, which 
transformed company agreements into the main source of regulation of labour 
relations, one has to contextualise it into the evolution of the French system in 
general. The French system of collective bargaining was traditionally 
underpinned in the so-called ordre publique sociale or principe de faveur. This 
principle claimed that the higher sources of law prevailed upon the lower 
sources, which could only improve upon the conditions laid upon the higher 
sources. Therefore, the relationship between the sources was the following: the 
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law laid the minimum standards applicable to all the workers; this could 
improved upon by national collective agreements; national collective 
agreements (or the law in their absence) could be improved by industry level 
agreements and, finally, company-level agreements could only improve upon 
the remaining sources.590  This gradual increase in the level of protection 
afforded by  this particular articulation between the distinct levels of collective 
bargaining was a pillar of the French system of industrial relations that had 
been built upon several reforms that took place in 1950, 1971 and 1982. The 
main idea was to ensure a wide level of representativity in the modifications 
introduced and to guarantee that the same minimum standards applied to all 
workers; in the event that the branch or the particular company were able and 
willing to afford higher standards, they were free to do so; if not, the minimum 
standards provided for in the higher level source prevailed and could not be 
derogated.
 The first blow to this regime came in the Auroux Laws of 1982, which 
first put in question in a limited extent the relationships between the law and the 
industry agreement. While maintaining the basic rule that the higher level 
agreement (in particular the industry agreement, which shares the responsibility 
of being the main source of regulation of labour relations in France together 
with statutory  law) should retain its natural tendency to regulate the industry 
agreement, the Auroux Laws opened a timid possibility of deviation in the 
subject of wages and in the management of working time as long as the 
derogation was made in accordance with the preconditions expressly laid out in 
the law. The Law of 13 November 1982 introduced the mandatory duty to 
bargain within companies and authorized the conclusion of company-level 
agreements derogating from higher-level agreements. In the subject of wages, 
the Auroux law authorized the company-agreement to provide for a particular 
modality  of increase of the salaries in the company, more adequate to the 
concrete situation of the company, provided that the total increase is reached 
and the minimum salaries be respected (L132-24CTF); in addition, 
L212-10CTF authorized the company-agreement to determine a particular 
management of the working time in the company in deviation from the 
agreement within certain limits.  The derogation was subject to an important 
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limit however: the right of opposition of non-signatary  trade unions. In the event 
that the shop-steward who signed the agreement was not a member of a 
representative trade union that opposed the agreement, this later trade union 
could exercise the right of opposition and contest the agreement in an industrial 
tribunal.591 
This important reform lay the seed for another important reform that took 
place in 1995. The national agreement of 1995 contained an appeal from the 
social partners to the Government to rethink the articulation between the 
distinct levels of bargaining; in the view of the social partners, whereas the 
industry agreement should maintain its traditional regulatory function, the focus 
of collective bargaining should clearly evolve towards the level of the company, 
which should become the main terrain of social dialogue. The industry level 
agreements should not only open room to collective bargaining at the company 
level, reserving to itself a regulatory role of the bargaining that took place at the 
lower levels, and to make provisions for companies where social dialogue did 
not reach without overburdening those where social dialogue is established. 
This call of the social partners did not find its way into the legislative reform of 
the labour market that took place in 1996 however and the traditional 
relationship between the levels remained.592 
The adaptation agreements introduced by the Aubry laws of 1998 and 
2000 introduced a further push to company-level bargaining as the adaptation 
to the shorter working week was made by means of an agreement with the 
employee representatives. This led the MEDEF to make a joint statement in 
2001 calling for a dynamical articulation of the levels of bargaining that would 
provide more room to company-level bargaining. This provided the final push to 
the reform of collective bargaining that took place inn 2004 that has completely 
boulevarsé the panorama of collective bargaining and turned the focus towards 
the level of the company. 
The reform of 2004 introduced two alinea to L.132/33 CTF that 
transformed the whole system. In accordance with the new version of the law, 
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which migrated towards the new Code du Travail Français, the company level 
agreement is capable of derogating the industry level agreement (if necessary 
in a less advantageous direction) unless the industry  level agreement expressly 
forbids it from doing so. This is an important transformation whose impact 
should not be underestimated! The principe de faveur that governed French 
labour law for more than 40 years was completely  inverted and the focus of 
bargaining turned completely from the level of the industry towards the level of 
the company. Currently, the exception became the rule and almost all the 
provisions of collective agreements may be derogated unless the collective 
agreement itself does not allow it!593 This is even more important if we consider 
the meaning of the word “derogation”, which does not mean only deviation in a 
less favourable way but equally  adaptation and innovation. A third extremely 
important innovation consisted in the assimilation of company agreements to 
collective agreements in the adaptation of the standards laid down in the law. 
The law has long allowed industry agreements to make an implementation of 
the provisions contained in it in order to allow the social partners to conform 
better the statutory solutions to the particular conditions of the industry. The 
reform of 2004 empowered company agreements to undertake that same 
adaptation, which is bound to have very important consequences as regards 
the use of flexible work contracts and the management of working time 
because the law made some very  important concessions to the social partners 
in this respect. As regards the use of flexible work contracts, the law allows the 
social partners some margin of manoeuvre in the determination of the 
conditions in which they may be concluded and their duration; since the law 
may now be implemented by means of a company agreement unless the 
industry agreement expressly forbids any deviation, this provides companies 
with a considerable margin of manoeuvre in their human resources. The same 
thing goes for the management of working time, which is increasingly lowering 
from the industry level – which merely lays down the general guidelines 
supplementary applicable – towards the level of the company, providing 
companies with an extremely  important instrument of competitiveness and 
adaptation to the requirements of clients, who are their main stakeholders. 
569
593 The exceptions are minimum wages, professional classifications, mutual insurance funds 
and professional training funds (L.2252-1 CTF). 
Finally, as regards wages, the Code du Travail maintained the previous rule 
introduced by the Auroux laws that provided that the company-level actors 
could agree on the increase in wages as long as the global increase was 
respected.594 
This profound transformation of the principe de faveur that prevailed for 
so long in French labour relations was subject to the scrutiny of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel; the French constitutional watchdog boldly stated that the 
principe de faveur should be considered as a fundamental principle of labour 
law at the light of the French Constitution; nevertheless, its precise content and 
reach should be determined by the lawmaker. This in fact meant that the 
principe de faveur had a statutory and not constitutional value and that the 
lawmaker was simply obliged to determine the conditions and the extent to 
which the statutory law could be derogated. As regards the possibility of 
deviation of the law by company level agreements, the Conseil was satisfied 
with the introduction of the majoritarian principle in French companies, which 
would ensure to a sufficient extent the safeguard of the interests of the 
employees in collective bargaining.595
As we may observe, the reform of French labour laws in 2004 was deep 
as the centre of collective bargaining was in fact displaced from the industry 
level towards the level of the company, with the industry level becoming 
subsidiary in relation to the level of the company. This was surrounded with 
several precautions however so that the bargaining at the level of the company 
would correspond to a genuine need of the companies and not become a 
means of evading collective agreements. The control was made by means of 
the introduction of the majoritarian principle (principe majoritaire) that was 
already briefly analysed above on occasion of the analysis of the evolution of 
the actors. The majoritarian principle concerned the competence to sign these 
agreements. The scheme goes as follows: the competence to sign the 
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agreements belongs, as a matter of principle to shop stewards; here one has to 
make a distinction: if the shop-stewards belong to a representative union, then 
there are no further requirements; if the shop-steward belongs to a non-
representative union, then the agreement is subject to the right of opposition of 
the majoritarian unions. In the event that no shop-steward exists in the 
company, the agreement may be concluded by a staff-delegate but is subject to 
a further validation by a paritary commission at the level of the industry. If no 
shop-steward exists, the agreement may be concluded by an employee 
enjoying a mandate from a representative trade union but under the condition 
that the agreement be subject to the approval of the employees of the company 
by means of a referendum. This complex legal network has a number of 
important advantages: firstly, it ensures the participation of representative trade 
unions by means of their priority in the signature of the agreements or their 
control by means of the right of opposition of the need of approval in the 
commission. Secondly, the control is equally  exercised by the employees of the 
company because the competence to sign the agreements in the absence of a 
shop-steward belongs to a staff-delegate (thus ensuring the representativity of 
the employees) or to a mandated employee and subject to a referendum; this 
guarantees the control and participation of the employees and prevents the use 
of the company-level agreements as a means of undermining the industry 
agreements, which maintain their role as the main source of law at the industry 
level.596
This use of flexibilisation agreements in France must be connected to 
the reform of representativity  of the trade unions implemented in 2008. Before 
the reform undertaken by the law of 20th August 2008, French law 
distinguished between presumed representativity  and proven representativity: 
certain organisations declared as representative in an administrative act dated 
from 1966 were presumed de jure to be representative; the other organisations 
enjoyed a so-called self-representation and had the burden of proof of its 
representativity in the event that they were contested. The law of 2008 modified 
this state of affairs to a great extent:  the reform eliminated the distinction 
between presumed and proven representativity and subjected all trade unions 
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to the proof of representativity  in accordance with some (stringent) criteria in 
the level in which they wished to act. This is expected to reduce trade union 
dispersion in France. The impact of these reforms may be  the following: the 
use of these agreements at the level of the company will be subject to stringer 
new criteria of representativity, which is expected to reinforce social dialogue at 
the level of the company by increasing the legitimacy of the actors.597      
 This short description of the evolution of French collective bargaining 
demonstrates that the French system appears to be evolving towards a more 
decentralised level of bargaining with the company-level bargaining 
increasingly taking the central place in social dialogue and leaving industry 
level bargaining with a subsidiary role. The main determinants of the reforms 
were the same as the ones laid out in Germany: industry  level agreements and 
statutory law were deemed to be too inflexible as regards the competitive 
demands of companies and company-level bargaining was seen as the most 
appropriate means of adaptation of companies to the demands of shareholders 
and stakeholders. The national agreement of 1995 and the joint position of the 
MEDEF in 2001 suffice to prove that the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining is nor merely a requirement of the employers, who could use it as a 
means of escape from social dialogue, but equally  of the social partners, who 
understood that the distinct pressures to which companies are subject 
nowadays demand distinct solutions in terms that the main focus of social 
dialogue should become the company-level. The prevention of the undermining 
of collective agreements led the social partners to be extremely cautions as 
regards the conditions under which these deviations could be implemented. 
These precautions took two concrete measures: firstly, the social partners 
reserved themselves the right to conventionally reduce the possibility of 
deviation by considering the industry level agreement of such a paramount 
important that no derogation is justifiable; secondly, the actors at the level of 
the company who were deemed competent to sign those agreements were 
subject to the control of the trade unions. The rules concerning the competence 
to sign those agreements were already laid out above and will not be repeated 
here; it is sufficient to say that the law subjects the conclusion of those 
572
597 Dockés, E. (2008). Doit du Travail Dalloz, Pélissier, J., A. Supiot, et al. (2008). Droit du 
Travail, Dalloz, Favennec-Héry, F. (2009). "La représentativité syndicale." Droit Social(6): 
630-640.
agreements to a number of controls by the trade unions in order to ensure that 
the deviation corresponds to the genuine interests of the company.598  One last 
word may be said as regards the subject-matters of these agreements; the 
majority of these agreements concern the issues that are of paramount 
important to the companies – wages and working time. The provision of 
companies with a possibility  of controlled management and flexibility in these 
subjects is extremely important in a world in which companies must be 
increasingly flexible in order to cope effectively with economic fluctuations, the 
unstable demands of shareholders and stakeholders and harsh competition 
from countries in which the labour standards are considerably  lower. The 
possibilities of controlled decentralisation by means of flexible agreements 
should not be seen as a measure of downgrading workers’ rights in the name 
of competitiveness but as a means of maintaining the occupational levels in the 
company and ensuring the alignment of interests between managers and 
employees (who are interested in the survival of the company because their 
jobs simply  depends on it). This procedure for alignment is surrounded with 
precautions to avoid unfair competition. The final result appears to be an 
extremely balanced solution that conciliates the need for flexibility and the 
protection of the workforce by means of company-level social dialogue.599      
(c)  UK – the UK has also exhibited some experience with flexibilisation 
agreements destined to conform the labour standards to the concrete situation 
of the undertaking. Unlike in the other countries however, the use of 
flexibilisation agreements was not inserted into collective agreements but within 
the law. The reason for this particularity  in relation to the continental experience 
was due to the rule of voluntarism that prevails in the UK, which reduces 
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collective agreements to the status of gentleman’s agreements. Since collective 
agreements were not binding, the employer was free to deviate from them 
(although he could suffer industrial action by the recognised union) or to 
renegotiate the terms and conditions of employment contained in collective 
agreements unconstrained by the rule pacta sunt servanda. The influence of 
EU Law was equally overwhelming in this particular subject because the 
statutes that allowed for derogation by means of an agreement with the 
workforce were the ones used to implement EC  Directives on several labour 
standards. The UK decided that the margin of manoeuvre contained in those 
directives should not be used by the trade unions but by means of an 
agreement with the workforce. This created a revolution in UK Law – the 
workforce agreements – and opened the doors to a particular dual channel 
system. The purpose of this section is to analyse the statutory bargained 
adjustments – the agreements directly concluded with the workforce designed 
to deviate from the statutory standards. 
 The use of flexibilisation agreements in the UK must be contextualised in 
the use of workforce agreements. The analysis of the evolution of the actors in 
collective bargaining laid out above attempted to demonstrate that the British 
system seems to be currently  evolving into a dual-channel system due to the 
introduction of directly elected representative works-council type bodies within 
companies that have a number of competences namely in information and 
consultation procedures in situations of collective redundancies and transfer of 
undertakings and the adaptation of certain labour standards to the concrete 
situation of the undertaking. The statutory  bargained adjustments consist in a 
modality  of these workforce agreements. They allow directly  elected employee 
representatives or, in certain circumstances, a majority  of the employees to 
agree with the employer to deviate from the standards laid down in the law 
applicable by default to all the companies and adapt them to the concrete 
situation of the undertaking. They were designed to overcome the absence of 
recognition of trade unions within the undertaking and provide the employees 
directly concerned with a voice in the workplace. There were two generations of 
these agreements: the first generation was provided for in British legislation 
and the derogation was subject to the ministerial approval because the statute 
required that the adaptation agreement provided for a measure of protection at 
least equivalent to the legal regime that it intended to substitute; the second 
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generation of these agreements arose from the implementation of EC Law in 
the UK – the Working Time Directive of 1993, the Parental Leave Directive of 
1996 and the Fixed Term Work Directive of 1999. Unlike the first generation 
agreements however, these second generation agreements are not subject to a 
ministerial approval. In order to understand the function and reach of these 
agreements, it is worth analysing each one of them in detail.600 
 The subject of working time is one possible application of these 
workforce agreements. The transposition of the Working Time Directive into the 
UK marked a turning point in the regulation of the basic terms and conditions of 
employment in the UK because it was the first time in which working time 
controls were put in place to cover the entire population in general (whereas 
previously each sector and occupation had its own statute). The most important 
innovation brought about by the Working Time Regulations of 1998 however 
consisted in the possibility of deviation by means of a workforce agreement. 
Considering that the Working Time Directive allowed considerable scope for 
derogation by means of lawmakers or the social partners601 and much of the 
responsibility for arriving at more precise standards was delegated to the lower 
level, which included both collective agreements and individual agreements. 
The devolution is unusual in UK law and in particular its implementation. The 
central concept of the directive is one of “relevant agreement”, which means 
both a collective agreement applicable to the worker by means of an 
incorporation clause or a workforce agreement concluded between employee 
representatives and the employer or any other agreement in writing that is 
applicable between the employer and the employee. The workforce agreement 
is concluded with specified representatives of the workforce concerned or the 
majority of the workforce itself as long as the workers concerned are not 
covered by the terms and conditions laid out in a collective agreement 
concluded with a recognised union. The agreement may also be concluded 
with a “particular group” of workers, meaning “a group  of the relevant members 
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of the workforce who undertake a particular function, work at a particular 
workplace or belong to a particular department or unit within the company”.602
 The parental leave is another area in which the British statute allows 
derogations by means of workforce agreements. The implementation into the 
UK of the Parental Leave Directive was made by means of the specific sections 
of the Employment Relations Act 1999. The regulations provide that the 
operation of the parental leave schemes are to be worked out by an agreement 
between employers and employees; in the event that no agreement is made, a 
default scheme operates. This appears to provide room for the leave to be 
taken in blocks or in multiples of one week, depending of the result of the 
bargaining. The displacement of the provisions of the default scheme is to be 
implemented by means of a collective agreement or a workforce agreement 
governing the operation of the parental leave; in addition, the terms of the 
collective agreement or the workforce agreement must be incorporated into the 
employment contracts of the employee, thus ensuring that the conventional 
scheme is truly  mandatory for the employer. The conclusion of the collective 
agreement is subject to additional preconditions: it may be concluded only in 
the absence of a collective agreement concluded with a recognised 
independent trade union; it may cover the whole workforce or only a part of it 
but it must be concluded with their representatives or the majority of the 
employees of the workforce or the part of the workforce concerned.603 
 The Law finally allows employers to conclude with the employees 
workforce agreements governing the use of successive fixed-term work 
contracts. The Framework Directive on fixed term work allowed the social 
partners to choose between a number of possibilities to avoid the abuse of 
fixed term work contracts. The Directive was transposed by the Fixed-Term 
Employees Regulations 2002, which provided the individual companies with a 
wide margin of manoeuvre in the implementation of the requirements of the 
Directive. The Regulations provide that the employer may agree with the 
employee representatives or with the majority of the workforce concerned 
(which may be the entire rank and file or merely  an autonomous section) 
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limitations in the use of fixed-term contracts. The employer may only  sign the 
agreement if the matter is not dealt with previously with a recognised 
independent union in relation to the concrete bargaining unit.604 
 This short analysis of the use of flexibilisation agreements in the UK may 
allow us to extract some preliminary conclusions. The first conclusion consists 
in the recognition of the fact that the British system of industrial relations seems 
to be undergoing a process of evolution towards the creation of a hybrid dualist 
system of industrial relations with social dialogue at the level of the company  by 
means of directly  elected employee representatives or directly with the 
employees themselves. This is particularly important in small and medium 
sized companies where trade union implementation by means of shop-
stewards is insufficient and there was a great lack of social dialogue. This 
raises the issue analysed above of the relationship  between these bodies and 
the monistic system of industrial relations; the conclusion seems to be that they 
may only  take place in the absence of union presence; when the issue is dealt 
with in a collective agreement, then the collective agreement will take 
precedence. A second conclusion concerns the impact of EC Law; it is curious 
that the British legislator implemented these provisions precisely in the 
transposition of EC Law, which adds up  to the conclusion presented above that 
EC Law seems to lie on a dualistic system of representation that goes beyond 
the Directives on Employee Representation; this is another example of the 
influence of EC Law in an individual jurisdiction. The final conclusion concerns 
the modifications implemented: it is interesting to observe that the British 
legislator chose the technique of workforce agreements to implement these 
Directives. These workforce agreements provide the company with a 
considerable margin of manoeuvre of its human resources, in issues such as 
working time, parental leave and the use of flexible employment contracts. 
These instruments of flexibility in human resource management and the 
instrument of social dialogue as a means to implement it provides companies 
with sufficient flexibility in its organisation and reinforces its competitiveness in 
the market without undermining employee rights. The safeguard of employee 
interests lies in the fallback provisions and in the priority recognised to 
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collective bargaining: in the event that the agreements do not sufficiently 
guarantee employee interests, the employees or their representatives may 
simply refuse the agreement and the statutory  rights will apply correspondingly; 
if the statute does not correspond to the interests of the company and the 
employer is in need of flexibility, he may agree to recognise a union and 
bargain with the unit directly. The combination of these provisions provides 
companies with sufficient flexibility in the application of labour standards while 
safeguarding the interests of the workforce by means of the requirement of 
social dialogue (either with the employees or with the trade unions) to 
implement those provisions.
(d) Portugal – Portugal has equally exhibited some trends towards the 
flexibilisation of collective agreements, particularly after the enactment of the 
Labour Code in 2003, which undertook a deep  reform of the Portuguese labour 
market. The purpose of the instruments of flexibilisation are the same as 
occurred in the previous jurisdictions; to render companies more flexible and 
adaptive to the fluctuating demands of the market and shareholders and to 
align interests between managers and employees. The transformation was not 
so profound as the ones that are currently occurring in Germany and France; 
despite this, they are unequivocal and they  may be the seed of a new 
decentralised culture of collective bargaining in Portugal. 
 The first transformation consisted in the end of the principe de faveur in 
Portuguese labour law. As a preliminary word, one must say that the principe 
de faveur never had such an extensive reach in Portugal as it had in France, 
since it was only applicable in the relationships between the law and collective 
agreement. The previous statute that was enforced in Portugal from 1969 to 
2003 determined that the law laid minima that could only be improved upon by 
collective agreements unless the law stated otherwise; in this latter situation, 
the law could either determine that it allowed no derogation whatsoever (the so-
called absolutely imperative norms) or, more seldom, that it allowed less 
favourable derogations. As regards the conflict between collective agreements, 
the law determined that the collective agreement that was closer to the 
concrete situation of the individual company prevailed. This meant that single-
employer agreements would always take precedence over industry  and 
national agreements even if they laid down less favourable principles. The 
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bottom line limit was the law that laid the minima under which no derogations 
were allowed.605 This in reality curtailed the margin of manoeuvre for collective 
bargaining in Portugal because the statutory  regulation of the labour market 
was so extensive by means of a diffusion of statutes that attempted to regulate 
to its fullest extent each specificity of the labour relation that collective 
autonomy was left without any room for bargaining. This led to a paralysis of 
collective bargaining: collective agreements merely performed an informative 
function of the statutory regulation, replicating the statute and making it public 
in the company in an accessible way, and refrained to determining wages and 
professional careers for the sector. One exception was the extremely large 
public companies or private companies that enjoyed a legal monopoly; these 
companies usually  concluded single-employer agreements but the content of 
the agreements were the same.
 The first great stroke to this scheme came in 2003 with the approval of 
the Labour Code. The Portuguese Labour Code (in its version of 2003) 
determined in its art.4 that the collective agreements could freely derogate the 
law unless the law stated otherwise. This innovation opened room to collective 
bargaining because it partially freed the social partners from the constraints of 
the law and allowed them more room for manoeuvre. This movement led to a 
doctrinal division of the labour rules in three types of rules: (a) absolutely 
imperative norms (that could not be derogated either way); (b) relatively 
imperative norms (that could be derogated in a more favourable direction) and 
(c) suppletive norms (that could be derogated either in a more favourable or 
unfavourable direction). The Labour Code provided in its art.3CTP that, as a 
rule of thumb, legal rules were presumed suppletive and that it was a task of 
the legislator and the courts to determine which norms escaped from this 
presumption of derogability and could not be changed anyway or only in a more 
favourable way. This meant that, in reality, the principe de faveur ended and 
that legal rules and collective agreements became interchangeable. This 
reform of the relationship between law and collective agreements was coupled 
with some reforms on the conditions of validity of collective agreements that 
were extremely  detrimental for the collective agreements that were in force and 
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in reality  obliged the parties to the collective agreement to engage in bargaining 
so that the collective bargaining panorama in Portugal was renovated.606  The 
objective of the reform was clear: the statutory  regulation of the Labour market 
had been suffering increasing attacks on account of criticisms of inflexibility, 
overregulation and disregard of the specificities of each sector. The social 
partners claimed that their hands were tied on account of the short margin of 
manoeuvre opened by the law and the escape from the labour regulation was 
overwhelming, particularly in some sectors characterised by a multitude of 
small companies in which the labour inspection is extremely difficult. The 
adoption of art.4CTP intended to overcome these difficulties by  means of the 
introduction of concession bargaining in Portugal: the purpose of the regulation 
was to provide the social partners with a margin of manoeuvre in the 
determination of the working conditions, even in a less favourable way  if 
necessary, in exchange for job  security or other safeguards of employment. 
The understanding of the reach of the provision must be coupled with the rules 
governing the conflict between collective agreements: it is perfectly possible 
that an individual employer agree on a single-employer agreement with the 
competent trade union in deviation from the rules laid down in the higher level 
agreement or the law as long as the trade union recognises the legitimacy of 
the request of the employer and it finds such derogation necessary for the 
interest of the employees. This provision was reformed in the revision of the 
Labour Code that took place in 2008, although its reach was not modified. The 
provision (which now became art.3CTP) simply had a supplementary alinea 
that determined the norms that could only be derogated in a more favourable 
direction. This is simply a more accurate precision however to lay aside any 
580
606  The provisions in cause were destined to lead to the expiry of the existing collective 
agreements (which had been enforced for more than 30 years, limiting the revisions to annual 
wage bargaining) and force the social partners to engage in new bargaining procedures and 
make use of the possibility offered by art.4CTP, so that the trade unions would not lay back on 
the existing collective agreements. This policy option was heavily criticized because one thing 
is to open room for bargaining and another is to force the partners to bargain in conditions of 
economical crisis, which left the unions in a delicate situation. See Gomes, J. V. (2004). 
National Report Portugal. The evolving structure of collective bargaining in Europe 1990-2004. 
S. Sciarra. Florence, European Commission, University of Florence, Gonçalves da Silva, L. 
(2004). Princípios gerais da contratação colectiva no Código do Trabalho. Estudos de Direito 
do Trabalho, Almedina. I: 167 ff.
doubts that arose in the legal thinking and case law; the main principle of the 
introduction of concession bargaining remained.607 
 The introduction of this rule of concession bargaining gave rise to one 
particular doubt of a constitutional nature that will be briefly laid out here. The 
question concerns the compatibility  of this solution with the widespread use of 
administrative procedures for extension of collective agreements. Portugal 
follows the principle of double-affiliation in collective bargaining meaning that 
collective agreements are applicable only to the employees affiliated to the 
trade unions that signed the agreement. Although the rates of affiliation are low 
(circa 25% including the public sector) the coverage of collective bargaining 
reaches 80% thanks to the widespread use of the administrative procedures for 
extension.608  During the time in which the collective agreements could only 
improve upon the minima laid down in the law, there was no problem with this 
as it always benefited employees. Currently, the combination of the possibility 
of deviation in pejus with the use of the administrative procedure for extension 
raises the issue of the extension of derogatory norms to non-affiliated 
employees. The reality is that non-affiliated employees, who voluntarily chose 
not to join a union, will be subject by administrative means to the result of the 
bargaining. The legal thinking has been questioning the constitutionality  of this 
possibility at the light of the constitutionally  protected freedom of association in 
its negative dimension (art.55CRP). The Constitutional Court has not issued a 
decision and the doubt remains.609 
 The Labour Code also provides for other modalities of flexibilisation 
agreements. The reform of the Labour Code that took place in 2008 was 
extremely innovative in this aspect as it introduced a number of possibilities of 
flexibilisation of working time within the company by means of an agreement 
with the employees. The main modifications introduced consisted in the regime 
of group adaptability (adaptabilidade grupal – art.206CTP), working time 
accounts (bancos de horas – art.208CTP) and concentrated working time 
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(horário concentrado – art.209CTP).  As a preliminary word, one must say that 
these situations of flexibisation of working time consist in distinct modalities of 
application of the general regime of adaptability  of working time. Art.204CTP 
provides that, in deviation to the standard regime of 8 hours per day  and 40h 
per week of working time, the social partners may agree to organise working 
time in average terms by means of a collective agreement. The modalities of 
application of this flexible working time are the following. The social partners 
may agree to determine a regime of group adaptability (art.206CTP); the 
regime of group adaptability consists in a modality of flexible working time 
applicable to a certain economic unit in which the employees voluntarily choose 
to be subject to the average working time by means of an agreement with the 
employer; the agreement is valid only if: (a) at least 60% of the employees of 
the economic unit affected by the collective agreement are affiliated to the 
union that signed it and they choose to have their employment contract 
governed by that collective agreement or (b) if at least 75% of the employees 
affected by the agree to have their employment contracts subject to that 
regime. It is worth noting that Portuguese Law allows in art.205CTP that the 
employer and the employee agree individually to determine their normal 
working time in average terms; if 75% of the employees in an economic unit 
individually  agree to have their normal working time determined in such terms 
then the regime will be applicable to the remaining 25% of the employees of the 
unit independently of agreement. This is an important innovation whose impact 
should not be underestimated. This is a regime that allows for the application of 
a standard regime of working time to all the workers of a certain economic unit 
based upon sufficient support of the measure. It is a kind of referendum 
provided for in French law for the approval of the derogatory  agreements 
concluded by  mandated employees. A distinct modality of flexibilisation 
agreement consists in the working time accounts (art.208CTP). These working 
time accounts consist in a specific modality of organisation of working time in 
which the social partners are given a choice as to the type of compensation for 
the deviation of the normal working time. Art.208CTP states that the social 
partners may agree on increasing the normal working time for a maximum of 4 
hours per day, 60h per week and 200h per year; the social partners may then 
agree on determining the type of compensation for the deviation from the 
normal working time, which may consist in (1) monetary  compensation, (2) 
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correspondent reduction of normal working time or (3) both! The final modality 
of flexibilisation of working time consists in the concentrated working time (art.
209CTP). This may be implemented either by a collective agreement or by an 
individual agreement between the employer and the employee; in this case, the 
normal working time may be increased in a maximum of 4 hours per day so 
that the worker performs work for a maximum of 4 days per week and three 
days off or a maximum of three consecutive days.
 These types of agreements are of paramount importance in the 
Portuguese entrepreneurial landscape. The majority of Portuguese companies 
are small companies that work as outsourcing companies to major contractors 
located abroad; since the majority  of these contractors have irregular orders 
and are exposed to a number of uncertainties caused by the economic cycles 
and shareholder pressure, among other elements, the Portuguese outsourcing 
companies have to be extremely flexible and responsive in order to maintain 
their customers. The previous regulation of working time was very ineffective 
because, despite the attempts of flexibilisation by means of collective 
agreements, they were deemed inadequate to the unique pressures placed 
upon each company and therefore created incentives to escape labour 
regulation; the “black labour market”, i.e: undeclared work and falsified working 
time documents, were a social stigma because the fear to loose employment 
left employees without any kind of protection. This solution attempts to strike a 
balance between the need for flexibility and the need of social protection; the 
need for flexibility is evident in the enlargement of the possibilities of deviation 
by means of an individual and group agreement of the employer with its own 
employees; the social protection dimension is patent in the need for 
authorisation in collective agreements (unless the law allows room for the 
individual agreement) and in the attempt to control the use of this possibilities 
of flexibilisation by discouraging the escape from the labour regulation. Even 
the few large Portuguese companies have an interest in this type of 
flexibilisation because the international competitive pressures that they  are 
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exposed to for them to be more adaptable in their business operations. This is 
particularly the case in construction companies.610
 This short description of the use of flexibilisation agreements in 
Portuguese law reveals that the Portuguese legislator has taken some limited 
but courageous steps towards the decentralisation of collective bargaining in 
Portugal and the use of instruments of flexibility in order to make companies 
more competitive. The end of the principe de faveur in the relationship between 
law and collective agreements in Portugal and the liberation of the social 
partners from the limits placed by a heavy statutory regulation of the labour 
market opened the doors to the introduction of concession bargaining in 
Portugal. The idea underpinning the reform of the relationship  between laws 
and collective agreements was to encourage social dialogue between 
employers and trade unions and engage the social partners in assuming more 
responsibility for the regulation of the labour market both at the industry and at 
the single-employer levels (because single-employer agreements may also 
deviate from the law and prevail over industry agreements in case of conflict). 
The requirement that this deviation be contained in a collective agreement 
(because unions have the monopoly of collective bargaining in Portugal) 
ensured the participation of the social partners (in particular the trade unions) in 
the process and guaranteed that this flexibility would correspond to a genuine 
interest of the workforce and would not end in an escape from labour 
regulation. Another extremely important innovation consisted in the possibilities 
for an ad hoc determination of working time by means of an agreement with the 
employees. The types of flexibilisation agreements and the conditions for their 
implementation were already laid out above and will not be repeated here. It 
suffices to say that those possibilities depend of the agreement of the 
employees concerned (in one situation by  means of a referendum) and often by 
means of a provision in a collective agreement that authorises the employer to 
implement those measures. This ensures the protection of the employees in 
the implementation of those measures and provides companies with an 
extremely important instrument of flexibilisation of working time that will allow 
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them to become more competitive by becoming more responsive to the 
requirements of shareholders, stakeholders and economic fluctuations.          
(e)  conclusion - this analysis of the development of flexibilisation agreements 
in each one of the jurisdictions under study  presents the following conclusions. 
The first relevant conclusion appears to be the fact that each one of the 
jurisdictions under study exhibits attempts to flexibilise the collectively agreed 
terms and conditions of employment in their internal systems of industrial 
relations. This flexibilisation focuses mainly (but not exclusively) in the subjects 
of wages and working time and are concluded essentially between the 
managers of the company and the employees directly concerned. The trade 
unions have understood the need for these agreements but they fear that they 
may pose a threat to their traditional function of defending the interests of 
employees because flexibilisation agreements are capable of undermining their 
power; therefore the conclusion of these agreements is usually  surrounded with 
precautions in order to attempt to ensure that they are not used as an 
instrument of predominance of the employer and as a means of undermining 
the protection afforded by collective agreements and statutes.  These are the 
main characteristics of these agreements: (a) flexibilisation, (b) essentially in 
the subjects of wages and working time and (c) subjection to control 
mechanisms. Since these agreements assume a variety  of forms even within 
the same system, they must be analysed within their due context.
 Germany has been experiencing in the last 30 years a considerable 
growth of these flexibilisation agreements. These agreements came in the form 
of (a) “naked membership” agreements, (b) single-employer agreements and 
(c) opening clauses. “Naked membership” agreements consist in agreements 
that attempt to encourage the affiliation of employers by  exempting them from 
the duty to abide by the collective agreement concluded by the employers‘ 
association. These agreements are seen as an optimal alternative to the 
general escape from affiliation to employers‘ associations because the 
exemption from the duty  to abide by the agreements allows the association to 
understand the reasons why the existing collective agreements are inadequate 
to the situation of the concrete employers and attempt to design a Tarifpolitik 
that also takes into account the needs of those employers in future collective 
agreements or to encourage the conclusion of a single-employer agreement 
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that will be more adequate to the concrete situation of the employer. This is a 
good solution because it brings employers into collective bargaining, ensures 
that the reasons underpinning their refusal to sign collective agreements are 
justified and adapts the collective bargaining to the concrete situation of the 
employer. Single employer agreements are equally used as an instrument of 
decentralisation because it allows employers to adapt the collectively agreed 
terms and conditions of employment to the situation of their company. The 
control mechanisms consist in the requirement of the agreement of a trade 
union; in the event that the trade union believes that the reasons invoked by  the 
employer are not justified, then it may refuse to sign the single employer 
agreement and undertake industrial action to force the adhesion to the industry 
agreement. The final instrument of decentralisation are opening clauses: these 
consist in clauses inserted in collective agreements that allow for the deviation 
at the level of the company from the standards laid down at the level of the 
industry by means of an agreement with the employees concerned. There are 
several types of these clauses (framework regulations, optional regulations and 
opening clauses properly said) and they focus mainly on working time and pay. 
They are subject to a number of requirements of legitimacy in order to function 
as a control mechanism in their application (the most commonly accepted are 
legal security, legal certainty and equality) and their application to non-affiliated 
employees in based in the democractic legitimacy of the works council.
 France has equally been experiencing a considerable use of 
flexibilisation agreements in its internal system of industrial relations. The 
cardinal points of the introduction of these agreements consists in (a) the 
Auroux Laws, (b) the Aubry Laws and (c) the reform of 2004. The Auroux Laws 
were an extremely influential reform of Labour Law in France that introduced 
the duty to bargain with employee representatives within the company. The 
Auroux laws introduced in this duty to bargain the subjects of wages and the 
adaptation of the standards of working time laid down at the level of the 
industry to the concrete situation of the company. This was the first concrete 
experience with company level bargaining in France in the subjects that 
concern the interests of the employees to the foremost extent: wages and 
working time. The success of the reform was continued with the Aubry laws of 
1998 and 2000 that introduced the 35 hour working week in France. The 
legislator opted for a bargained solution for the problem as the implementation 
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of the 35h week should be made by means of an agreement with the employee 
representatives. The reform of 2004 was the final point in this movement of 
decentralisation as the lawmaker intended to displace the focus of collective 
bargaining towards the level of the company. The industry agreements became 
subsidiary except where the law or the collective agreement expressly forbid 
the possibility of derogation. There were considerable limits however to prevent 
that this possibility of derogation would be used as a means of undermining the 
collectively agreed terms and conditions of employment laid down in the 
industry agreements. The limit consisted fundamentally  in the persons 
competent to bargain the derogatory agreements: the law admitted the 
conclusion of these derogatory agreements to a very large extent by  (1) shop-
stewards and, in the absence of shop-stewards, (2) staff-delegates and subject 
to the approval in a paritary commission or (3) specially elected representatives 
expressly  mandated by the trade unions and subject to the approval by  a 
referendum. This ensures the participation of trade unions in the process of 
decentralisation as a control mechanism in order to ensure that the use of the 
derogatory agreements corresponds to a genuine interest of the company and 
is not used as a means of undermining the collectively agreed terms and 
conditions of employment. 
 The UK has equally experienced the use of flexibilisation agreements. 
There is one striking distinction in relation to the former types of agreements 
however: since collective agreements are not mandatory in the UK, these 
agreements refer to the statutorily provided terms and conditions of 
employment. Some statutes allow for the adaptation of their terms and 
conditions of employment at the level of the company by means of an 
undetermined concept in British law named as “workforce agreements”. The 
legal thinking has tended to name them as “statutorily bargained adjustments”. 
British law recognises statutorily bargained adjustments in the subjects of 
working time, parental leave and the use of fixed term work contracts. These 
statutes and agreements result from the transposition of EU Directive into 
British law and the possibilities of deviation are thought to be able to adapt 
them to the particularities of British companies. These agreements were 
subject to considerable control mechanisms however: in the event that the 
agreement does not sufficiently safeguard the interests of the employees, then 
the employees may refuse the agreement and the statutory provisions apply; if 
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the employer is in need of flexibility  and no agreement is reached with the rank 
and file, he may attempt to reach an agreement with the trade unions in order 
to adapt the conditions by means of a collective agreement. This ensures an 
effective control to the possibilities of deviation. 
 The final jurisdiction that has been implementing these agreements 
consists in Portugal. Likewise in France, flexibilisation agreements in Portugal 
were introduced by statutory  reform and consist in the possibility  of flexibilising 
the adaptation of the statutory  standards to the concrete situation of the 
industry or company. The first extremely important reform consisted in the end 
of the principe de faveur in Portuguese law: currently, statutory law is 
subsidiary to collective agreements except were the law expressly  forbids the 
possibilities of deviation. This provides the trade unions with considerable 
instruments to adapt the statutory standards to the concrete situation of the 
industry or company by means of collective agreements. The second type of 
reform consisted in the possibility  to flexibilise working time in Portuguese 
companies by  means of group adaptability, working time accounts and 
concentrated working time. The implementation of these provisions is 
surrounded with precautions that ensures the participation of trade unions 
(such as the requirement of a collective agreement in order to implement them 
in the company) and the agreement of the employees concerned. This attempts 
to ensure that flexibilisation is not synonymous with precarity or the 
undermining of terms and conditions of employment and correspond to genuine 
occupational requirements. 
 Therefore, flexibilisation agreements correspond to a new modality of 
adaptation of the collectively agreed terms and conditions of employment to the 
situation of individual companies. These agreements have been progressively 
developed since the 1980s and are intended to ensure the capacity  of 
companies to adapt to unstable circumstances. They allow the management 
and the workforce to readapt their labour costs and productive organisation to 
the demands of customers, economic fluctuations and pressure from the 
shareholders. Since the main concern of companies consists in labour costs 
and the organisation of production, these agreements focus mainly  - but not 
exclusively - in the subjects of wages and working time. These agreements 
may pose a threat to the collectively  agreed terms and conditions of 
employment because they may be an escape route from the collective 
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agreements. That is the reason why the conclusion of these agreements was 
surrounded by precautions that usually  involve the trade unions in order to 
ensure that the deviation corresponds to a genuine concern of the company 
and is made also in the interest of the workforce - normally in order to avoid 
redundancies but also to involve employees in the management’s strategy to 
ensure the satisfaction of shareholders and stakeholders - and is not used as a 
means of undermining collective agreements.      
 5.2.3.2.2 Procedural agreements  
The evolution of collective bargaining was not limited to flexibilisation 
agreements. The lawmakers and the social partners have equally been 
developing new types of agreements destined to overcome the agency costs 
that incur between employers and employees and to improve the 
communication channels between them. These types of agreements attempt to 
reduce the information gap between the management and the workforce by 
laying out a detailed procedure concerning the sharing of information between 
both parties. The purposes underpinning these agreements are manifold and 
cannot be reduced to a single rationale. The best source to understand the 
intentions of these agreements consists in the European Law on the 
Participation of the Workforce, in particular of Directive 2002/14. The analysis 
made above of these legal instruments stressed that the evolution of EU Law 
seems to be moving towards a more flexible and partnerial approach to social 
dialogue; this was clearly evident in the preamble of Directive 2002/14 in which 
the European legislator boldly stated that the purpose of the Directive was to 
(1) improve the communication channels between management and 
employees, (2) make the work organisation more flexible and make employees 
aware of change and (3) engage employees in the success of the undertaking. 
The procedural agreements correspond to a possible implementation of these 
purposes as their objective consists exactly in reducing the information gap 
between management and the workforce in order to fulfil the Directive’s 
objective of flexibilising the organisation of work and engaging employees in 
the restructuring of the business, at least to offset the negative consequences 
that restructuring may have to them. The management seems to have clearly 
understood that these objectives could not be reached unilaterally but only by 
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means of a participation of the workforce and the employee representatives 
seem to have equally understood that change is inevitable in companies and 
that the best means to cope with it and ensure that it will not bring about 
negative consequences to the workforce consists in the reinforcement of the 
communication channels between the management and the workforce in order 
for the employees to devise the necessary  anticipatory measures to be able to 
cope with change. It should be stressed that this seems to amount to a 
considerable evolution in the purposes of collective bargaining: the previous 
implementation of the principles of workplace democracy and self-government 
immanent in collective bargaining that the Canadian Supreme Court stressed in 
the ruling Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia have 
evolved in Europe (where sector level bargaining prevailed, with the exception 
of the UK, and the approach to collective bargaining was mainly vindictive) 
towards a more human resources management approach: the objective now 
seems to be to be able to make the necessary arrangements in the workplace 
in order to create room for the necessary restructuring and enact instruments 
that will provide employees with a tool to manage those restructuring 
operations. This is particularly  important as regards the transformation of the 
rules of organisation of work since the principles of lean production that have 
increasingly been taking account of companies demand the active involvement 
of the workforce in work procedures. The means to achieve these ends consist 
in a new type of agreements that will be coined as procedural agreements. 
These agreements consist in conventions setting out a detailed procedure for 
the sharing of information between the manager and the employees and 
improve the communication channels between them. They may be limited to 
this function in order to make employees aware of the state of the undertaking 
and prepare any anticipatory  or they may rather serve as a means of coping 
with change and attempting to deal in the best possible means with it or at least 
to offset the possible negative consequences to the employees.  The following 
section will attempt to analyse each one of these agreements in particular.    
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(a)  procedural agreements – in addition to the flexibilisation agreements each 
jurisdiction under study seems to have been developing a new type of 
collective agreements whose purpose is not the determination of wages and 
conditions of work but to regulate the procedure to be followed in the 
information and consultation of employee representatives. These agreements 
are applied in a variety  of circumstances; although their main focus of 
application are collective redundancies, they may equally be used in provisional 
information and consultation, anticipation of change, negotiation of productive 
procedures, among other circumstances. The common point of these 
agreements is that they set out a conventional detailed procedure for the 
information and consultation of employee representatives. The purpose of the 
procedure is to agree on the calendar and stages to be observed in a certain 
subject-matter (such as collective redundancies) and attempt to reach a 
negotiated solution with the employee representatives concerning that same 
subject-matter. The main advantage of these procedures in relation to the 
workforce consists in allowing the parties to specify the points that are of 
greatest interest to them and adapt them to their specific needs and interests. 
Procedural agreements therefore consist in a negotiated procedure for the 
information and consultation of employee representatives, set out with the 
purpose of reaching an optimal harmonisation of the interests of both parties by 
means of an autonomous agreement focusing on the subjects that are of 
greatest interest to the parties to the agreement. Statutory  regulation is seen as 
undesirable by both parties because the “one size fits all approach” followed by 
the regulation is regarded as not adequate to the specific needs and interests 
of the parties.  These agreements equally  accept implicitly that autonomous 
company-level social dialogue is the best means to solve conflicts of interest 
and allow for the readaptation of companies to changed circumstances. The 
following lines will attempt to determine to which extent each jurisdiction under 
study has been developing this type of agreements. 
(a.1)  France – the comparative analysis of the procedural agreements should 
initiate with the French case because it contains by far the most illustrative 
example of a procedural agreement. France has recently implemented in its 
extensive regulatory reform of its system of industrial relations a measure 
destined to encourage information sharing between the employer and the 
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employee representatives within the company and regulate autonomously 
these procedures. The reform consisted in the introduction of came to be 
known as method agreements (accords de méthode) in French Law; they were 
introduced experimentally in 2003 by means of the Lois Fillon and became a 
part of the Labour Code definitely in 2005 by means of the Loi de Cohésion 
Sociale; it is currently integrated in the French Labour Code by means of article 
L1233-21 CTF. The purpose of these agreements consists in encouraging an 
autonomous regulation of the collective redundancy procedures. The CTF lays 
out in its arts.L1233-8 to L1233-10CTF the procedure to be followed in the 
event of a collective redundancy as a transposition of the Collective 
Redundancies Directive.611 The chapter is followed by another entitled “specific 
modalities resulting from an agreement”; this latter chapter contains several 
provisions allowing for the social partners to derogate from the statutory 
provisions and agree on a conventional procedure for the information and 
consultation of employees in the event of a collective redundancy 
(art.L1233-21CTF); the law further states that the agreement should regulate, 
in particular (1) the conditions in which the works council is informed of the 
economical and financial situation of the company, (2) the procedure to be 
followed in the proposal of alternative measures to the employer and the 
employer’s duty to provide for a reasoned answer and (3) the content of the 
plan for safeguard of employment and measures of professional and 
geographical mobility (L1233-22CTF). A simple reading of the provisions of the 
law enables us to understand that the social partners were granted with far-
reaching powers as regards the regulation of collective redundancies and that 
the main purpose of the law is to encourage a conventional regulation of the 
procedure and the sharing of information between the manager and the 
employees. 
 This institutionalisation of the method agreements does not arise from 
the unitary action of the lawmaker because it has its origins in the practice of 
collective bargaining. Procedural agreements first appeared at the request of 
large French industrial groups, which underwent deep  restructuring operations 
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during the 1990s that led in many cases to collective redundancies. Since 
these industrial groups intended to avoid extensive and costly litigations and 
the externalisation of social conflict to the courts, they took the option of 
proposing to the trade unions an autonomous regulation of the steps to be 
observed during a collective redundancy procedure in order to avoid social 
conflicts. The trade unions accepted to sign these agreements because they 
provided them with an added advantage in relation to the law; whereas the 
statutory regulation was essentially reactive and simply intended to provide 
employee representatives with a procedure to deal with the collective 
redundancy procedure after the managerial decision was taken, the trade 
unions saw in these agreements an alert sign of planned redundancies, which 
allowed them to be prepared for the forthcoming social measures and prepare 
beforehand the necessary  bargaining procedure. In this sense, it was equally a 
movement from a reactive towards a proactive approach to collective 
redundancies that was outline above on occasion of the analysis of EU Law. 
The success of these agreements led to their institutionalisation in 2003 and 
2005.612 
 The analysis of the legal framework of these agreements reveals that 
they provide the social partners with a considerable degree of flexibility. The 
intention that seems to be underlying the provision is to suspend the procedure 
in order to create incentives to bargain. Considering that the collective 
redundancies procedure laid out in the statute is considerably  burdensome and 
capable of provoking social conflict, the law maker decided to provide the social 
partners with a means of offsetting these potentially hazardous consequences 
for the procedure at stake and provide the social partners with a margin of 
manoeuvre for them to agree on a conventional procedure. The margin of 
manoeuvre provided to the social partners was extremely large because these 
method agreements may  be concluded at the company, group  or industry 
levels (L1233-21CTF). If we connect this possibility with the evolution of 
derogatory agreements outlined above in which it became evident that the 
focus of collective bargaining is currently the company level, it becomes clear 
that the objective of the provision is to encourage the bargaining of these 
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agreements at the level of the company in order to encourage social dialogue 
at that level; in the event that the employer is not satisfied with the statutory 
procedure or the procedure laid out in the industry  agreement, it may initiate 
negotiations with union representatives at the level of the company in order to 
bargain its own method agreement and accelerate restructuring operations in 
the event that it intends to implement one. In addition, the social partners are 
bound to very few limitations: the only limits to the possibilities of derogation of 
the conventional agreement are laid out in art.L1233-23CTF and consists in the 
duties of training, adaptation and classification incumbent upon the employer 
and the rules for information and consultation of the works council and staff-
representatives, whose minimum statutory  framework must be guaranteed and 
the conventional rules may only improve upon. Therefore, the social partners 
may, having regard to the minimum content of the rules on information and 
consultation of the works council and staff-representatives and the employer’s 
duties of training, freely bargain a conventional information and consultation 
agreement concerning collective redundancies at the company, group or 
industry levels (being that the lower level prevails). This preference for the most 
decentralised level comes in the line of the process of decentralisation of 
collective bargaining that has been analysed in its several dimensions. The 
company level is preferred to the industry  level because there is the perception 
that the industry level is not sufficiently adequate to the needs of specific 
companies, in particular as regards the plan of safeguard of employment. 
There is an incentive for the bargaining of company-specific solutions.613
The social partners equally enjoy a wide margin of manoeuvre in the 
determination of the content of these agreements because there are few 
limitations to the possibilities of derogation of the law. Considering that the 
natural tendency of the agreement is to regulate the modalities of information 
and consultation of the works council as soon as the employer intends to 
implement a collective redundancy, it is no wonder that the content of the 
agreements is fundamentally procedural and that the main purpose of the 
procedure is to provide the works council with sufficient instruments to be able 
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to formulate alternatives to the planned redundancies or to mitigate its 
consequences; if we couple this with the employer’s duty  to provide a reasoned 
answer to the questions of the employee representatives, then there is strong 
evidence that the purpose of the procedure is to stimulate the social dialogue at 
the level of the company and engage employees in the planned restructuring 
procedures without ever questioning the employer’s managerial prerogative.614 
The industrial relations scholarship  has undertaken several studies 
concerning the content of these agreements and they have devised four main 
types of agreements. These agreements may be (a) at the benefit of the 
employer, (b) of reciprocal guarantee, (c) of procedural legitimation and (d) 
preliminary  agreements. An agreement is said to be at the benefit of the 
employer if they refrain from laying out more detailed procedures concerning 
the proposal of alternatives or the information of the works council and simply 
set out the stages for information, the bargaining of the compensation and the 
dates from which the redundancies may be pronounced. An agreement is said 
to be of reciprocal guarantee if it contains an engagement on the deadline of 
the procedures in consideration for particular measures provided for in the 
agreement, most often of a pecuniary or social nature (such as compensation 
for redundancy or early  retirement). An agreement is of procedural legitimation 
if they lay  out not only the single steps of the procedure but equally the 
conditions for the passage from one step  to the other in such a way as to 
ensure a complete exploitation of the restructuring project; for instance, the 
consultation may begin only after the employee representatives consider 
themselves sufficiently informed as concerns the restructuring project and the 
conditions in which it will be implemented. Finally, the preliminary agreements 
consist in engagements to bargain a method agreement when the employer 
plans to implement a restructuring project. They are destined to make 
employees aware of the existence of such a project and to take the necessary 
anticipatory measures already in the bargaining of the agreement. These 
agreements are normally coupled with several substantial guarantees for both 
parties. The most important substantial guarantees consist in the content of the 
information and the indication of the measures envisaged. As regards the 
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content of the information, it is common that these agreements determine 
exhaustively the information to be provided to the representatives of the 
employees in order for them to be acquainted with the concrete situation of the 
undertaking. This information is of extreme importance because it is based 
upon it that the employees will not only be able to exercise control over the 
veracity of the reasons put forward by the employer for the restructuring but 
equally of the most adequate anticipatory  measures to be proposed. For 
example, if the company is in serious economical trouble then the employee 
representatives should focus on bargaining redundancies; if the company on 
the other hand is simply  restructuring its business then the works council may 
propose alternative measures such as professional and geographical mobility 
in order to avoid redundancies and allow the company to implement its 
restructuring operation. This leads us to the second type of substantial 
guarantee contained in these agreements: the reform measures envisaged. 
The employee representatives need to be able to know which type of measures 
are envisaged in the restructuring project in order to be able to propose viable 
alternatives. The diversity of the types of agreements and the substantial 
guarantees usually contained in them are sufficient to understand their 
advantages and their role in promoting self-regulation of restructuring projects. 
615 
The conclusion of these agreements brings several advantages both for 
the employer and for the employees. As regards the employer, the agreement 
brings with it the advantage of guaranteeing the procedure. The employer is 
able to know with certainty which steps it is going to have to undertake in order 
to implement the decision and its reasonable duration. Considering that the 
procedure is usually bargained with the employer (or may be bargained with 
the employer), the employer will be able to propose and agree on a procedure 
more adequate to its organisational needs. A final mechanism of extreme 
importance consists in the fact that the agreements may and effectively have 
designed conflict-solving mechanisms in order to overcome impasses and 
delays in the procedure. Since these mechanisms are agreed with the trade 
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unions, then one can expect a greater degree of adhesion to them then if it is 
merely statutorily  imposed and there is uncertainty and unwillingness to follow 
the details of the procedure. The employees equally  have several benefits in 
the conclusion of these agreements. They may agree to have resource to 
additional guarantees to assist them in the bargaining (such as the assistance 
of experts, complementary  logistics and ad hoc dialogue structures) in order to 
ensure the best communication channels between the employer and the 
employee representatives and to effectively provide them with an active voice 
in restructuring operations.616 
This description of the functioning of the method agreements allows us 
to understand the reasons underpinning their introduction in 2003. The 
lawmaker had a double purpose: to diffuse by statutory  means a promising 
innovation with the purpose of promoting company-level social dialogue and to 
create incentives for a dynamic that fed a national bargaining and allowed for 
the modernisation of the rules currently  enforced that were increasingly away 
from the rapidly  changing economical and social realities. The following 
benefits are generally pointed out to these agreements: firstly, they reduce the 
information asymmetries that occur between the management and the 
workforce within the company; the employee representatives have an 
instrument to be able to demand more information concerning the concrete 
situation of the company and bargain more effectively in the defending their 
interests. This encourages social dialogue within the company and make 
employees aware of the probable evolution of the situation of the undertaking 
and the fate of their jobs therefore reducing the information asymmetries 
between the management and the workforce and allowing employees to 
propose the necessary anticipatory measures. Secondly, these agreements 
equally improve the quality of the information and the adequacy of the 
deadlines, allowing for a reduction of the distance between the regulation of the 
concrete procedures and the concrete needs of the actors. It is often the case 
that the statutory regulation of the information and consultation procedures is 
inefficient because it doesn’t take into account the concrete needs of the 
actors. The bargaining of ad hoc procedures allows for the social partners to 
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overcome these inadequacies and bargain an agreement more adequate to 
their concrete needs and therefore increase the chances of a successful 
outcome. This is generally  made by means of the reinforcement of the quality 
of the information to be provided by the management board and the 
autonomous regulation of the procedures. Thirdly, the interaction between the 
actors creates several incentives for further bargaining. The parties not only 
have to bargain to reach an agreement, as they also have to bargain during the 
performance of the agreement. This allows the parties to acquaint themselves 
and to understand their dynamics therefore creating indirect incentives to open 
up  the bargaining table and discuss other issues of mutual interest that will end 
up  reinforcing company-level social dialogue. Finally, the procedure requires 
the parties to bargain before the measure is implemented. This is an added 
advantage because the pressure to bargain before the restructuring measure is 
implemented is capable of influencing the outcome; if the parties sit without any 
pressure of a restructuring measure then they may bargain at equal arms and 
propose a mutually advantageous solution that safeguards the interests of both 
parties. This serves as a safeguard to the latter bargaining that will be made “à 
chaud”.617 
This short description of the functioning of the method agreements in 
French law is capable of providing us with an insight as regards it function. 
Method agreements are, for this moment, limited to collective redundancies 
procedures but its importance should not be underestimated. The 
implementation of method agreements in French law comes in the line of 
decentralisation of collective bargaining and the reinforcement of social 
dialogue at the level of the company that this chapter has been attempting to 
describe and they consist in an implementation of those principles in the 
subject of collective redundancies. The introduction of method agreements 
presupposes three great principles: firstly, that regulation is inadequate and 
should only be implemented in the event that the parties fail to reach an 
agreement; this emphasis on self-regulation is extremely  important because it 
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implies that a greater responsibility of the parties in finding a solution to 
situations of crisis in the company. Secondly, the procedure implies that 
employees accept redundancies and restructuring as necessary and that they 
attempt to safeguard their interests by means of a constructive approach that 
passes by dialogue with the management, the reduction of information gaps as 
regards the concrete situation of the company, employee involvement in the 
success of the undertaking and the proposal of alternative measures to attempt 
to avoid redundancies. Finally, the introduction of method agreements also 
presupposes that the parties are able conciliate their interests and agree on a 
procedure that best safeguards their interests and is able of leading to a 
mutually  advantageous solution. The implementation of these three principles 
is reminiscent of the principles enunciated in the evolution of the European Law 
on the Participation of the Workforce with the evolution from reactive towards 
the proactive Directives and their emphasis on voluntary regulation by the 
parties concerned and a more active approach by the employees in the 
company.  In this sense they  are pure procedural agreements because they lay 
out a detailed voluntarily agreed procedure to be followed in one specific event 
(a collective redundancy). Its impact is capable of being much wider however 
because the rules concerning the sharing of information between the parties of 
the agreement that presupposes more employee involvement in the company 
and the efficient preparation of anticipatory measures may serve as a means of 
encouraging a more active involvement of the employees in the life of the 
company. In this sense, they  may not be understood merely  as a voluntary 
procedure regulating collective redundancies: they may be understood as a 
more active involvement of the management and employees in the life of the 
company that presupposes the acceptance by both parties that change in 
inevitable but that it may be bargained in order to reach a mutually 
advantageous solution. In this sense, company level social dialogue helps to 
contribute to the competitiveness of companies while offsetting the negative 
consequences for the workforce.     
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(a.2)  Germany – the German panorama of collective bargaining has equally 
exhibited some experience with procedural agreements. These agreements in 
Germany are named as “agreements for the protection against 
rationalisation” (Rationalisierungs-schutzabkommen) and their main purpose is 
to regulate the restructuring procedures in companies in such a way as to 
minimise their social consequences. They function in a very similar way to the 
accords de méthode described above: they accept that restructuring is 
necessary and then they attempt to improve the communication channels 
between the manager and the employee representatives by means of the 
regulation of the deadlines of the restructuring procedure and the alternative 
measures proposed in order to mitigate their consequences. The following lines 
will attempt to provide an overview of the structure of these agreements in such 
a way as to provide a picture of their functioning. 
 The origins of these agreements must be traced back to the employment 
crisis of the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. During this period, 
several companies undertook severe restructuring measures that led to mass 
redundancies and social conflicts. The trade unions assumed the role of 
attempting to intervene and defend employee interests during those times due 
to the inability  of works councils to deal with the problem and the fact that these 
measures were not limited to single companies but to entire sectors of activity. 
This was, perhaps, the first blow to the traditional division of competences 
between trade unions and works councils that had underpinned the German 
system of industrial relations because the trade unions did not look only to the 
industry level but they also took into account the interests of the employees in 
the industry  concerned. The reasons underpinning these restructurings 
consisted not only in the international economic crisis that began to give its 
signs during that era but in particular in the introduction of new methods of 
organisation of work, technologies and organisation of companies. This led to 
several harsh consequences for the employee that took the form of 
redundancies, wage losses, waste of qualifications, intensification of work 
among other issues. The works councils proved ineffective in the regulation of 
these issues by  means of their codetermination powers because they did not 
possess the necessary knowledge and bargaining strength to be an effective 
social opponent to the employer. That was the reason why the trade unions 
decided to take the issue into their hands and enlarge their activity  from the 
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regulation of wages and working conditions towards a more company-focused 
Tarifpolitik that could provide an effective answer to these rationalisation 
measures at the benefit of the employees.618 
 The study  concerning the conventions on rationalisation must initiate 
with the definition of rationalisation. This is were we can find the first difference 
concerning the “accords de méthode” analysed in the previous paragraph; 
whereas in France the method agreement is defined by its result (it is to be 
implemented when the employer is contemplating redundancies), in Germany 
the procedural agreement is defined by its cause. The legal scholarship 
analysed several agreements and concluded that rationalisation, at the eyes of 
the Tarifpolitik, consists in the modifications in the structure and organisation of 
companies that is capable of having an impact on the personnel. This means 
that the agreement is not reduced to redundancies (although most often 
“restructuring” is an euphemism for redundancy) but is designed to implement 
restructuring operations in companies. Company restructuring 
(Betriebsänderungen) and particular company operations can be the object of 
collective agreements without infringement to §111BVG. Although these 
collective agreements are primarily concerned with the regulation of the 
consequences of the restructuring measures, the may equally cover the 
modalities of performance of work and the introduction of new techniques.  The 
purpose of these agreements consists in regulating the introduction of these 
new work procedures and the restructuring operations that companies were 
undergoing at the time. They set out either industry or company-specific 
minimum procedures for the introduction of these modifications in companies 
that favour the position of the employees in these restructuring operations.619
 The measures contained in these legal instruments consisted 
fundamentally  in (a) the guarantee of the labour post and (b) the protection of 
wages. As regards the guarantee of the labour post, this is usually achieved by 
means of the conventional regulation of the procedures for dismissals. These 
agreements usually  introduced indirect protections against dismissals by 
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means of the regulation of the deadlines for dismissal and the duty to search 
for alternatives. These measures did not prohibit or directly limit the possibilities 
of redundancy but simply contained provisions on a qualitative and quantitative 
staffing of labour positions (Arbeitsplatzbesetzung) that had a general effect in 
the labour force (as opposed to a particular effect on individual employees). An 
example of qualitative guarantee of labour positions consisted in some 
measures contained in collective agreements that reserved the occupation of 
some labour posts to particular categories of qualified employees even if those 
qualifications were not strictly necessary  for the performance of that particular 
task. A quantitative guarantee consists in the compromise to employ a certain 
number of persons within a certain activity in order to ensure the maintenance 
of the labour posts within that activity.  A measure that also indirectly protects 
large groups of employees against redundancy consists in the duty of 
professional and geographical mobility; the implementation of the restructuring 
measure must be not be accompanied with a dismissal if the mobility towards 
the new department of the company or towards new geographical units is 
possible; the employer is obliged to propose that mobility before engaging in 
the redundancy. Another protective measure that is usually found in these 
collective agreements consists in the duty to promote professional training; in 
the event that the employer wishes to introduce new working techniques, it 
assumes the compromise to allow workers to undergo professional training in 
order to avoid redundancies and allow the implementation of the necessary 
work procedures. These measures of professional training may assume a 
number of modalities such as (a) time off, (b) payment of the training courses, 
etc. In the event that the redundancies are considered unavoidable, the 
rationalisation agreements attempt to fight them by  means of the regulation of 
the redundancy deadlines and the severance payments. The regulation of the 
deadlines for redundancies had a clear purpose: it intends on the one side to 
avoid social conflicts and allow the parties to agree on a procedure to 
implement a measure; it intends on the other hand to provide the employees 
and their representatives with a means of fighting for the labour post and 
ensuring that the redundancy is really the ultima ratio of the procedure; in this 
sense it consists in a procedural guarantee. The regulation of the severance 
payments also pursues several interests: on the one hand, it is in the interest of 
both parties to have clear rules for the determination of severance payments 
602
that have the agreement of both parties in order to avoid costly  social conflicts 
in the form of strikes and court action; on the other hand, the determination of 
the severance payments may equally serve as a means of deterrence from the 
redundancies in order to oblige the employer to weight the pros and cons of the 
redundancy and the expected benefits from the restructuring or if alternative 
measures could prove less costly.
 These provisions equally  have detailed provisions concerning the 
protection of wages. The protection of wages is destined to ensure that the 
implementation of the restructuring measure does not entail negative 
consequences for the remuneration of the employees. There is a number of 
means to achieve this: for instance, some clauses provide for the guarantee of 
the previous wage in the reorganisation of work; in the event that the internal 
working procedure within the company  is reorganised and the worker is 
assigned to new tasks or groups, these clauses ensure that the employee will 
retain its previous remuneration at least for a certain duration (e.g: one year). 
This serves as a compensation for the unilateral modification of tasks and a 
subvention to allow the worker to adapt its lifestyle to the prospects of a 
reduced remuneration in the future. The same thing applies to subventions 
when the worker faces unexpected costs as a consequence of a modification in 
the geographical location of its labour post.620 
 The analysis of these clauses allows us to understand the classification 
of these agreements as procedural agreements. They are intended to regulate 
the procedure and social consequences of the restructuring measures but not 
the measures themselves. The decision to undertake a restructuring belongs 
solely  to the employer who is limited only by the co-determination powers of the 
works council contained in the BVG. In a similar way to the method 
agreements, they  imply that restructuring is necessary and that it is in the 
interest of both parties to regulate the restructuring procedure then to engage in 
costly  strikes and litigations that bring no additional benefit to no one. The 
scope of these agreements is apparently quite large since they are applicable 
not only in situations of redundancies but in all situations of restructuring that 
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imply the implementation of new work procedures, as the definition of 
“rationalisation” demonstrated. Despite this apparent wide scope of application, 
a closer look reveals that the parties are fundamentally concerned with the 
regulation of the social consequences (i.e: redundancies). This regulation 
focuses on three aspects: firstly, it is concerned with avoiding redundancies 
and ensuring alternative measures that will stabilise the labour post; secondly, 
in the event that redundancies may be avoided, they are concerned with 
ensuring a smooth transition to the new occupation; finally, in the event that 
redundancies cannot be avoided, they are concerned with determining the 
severance payments; this previous determination performs two fundamental 
functions: it attempts to deter redundancies and oblige the employer to 
calculate the costs and benefits of the redundancy and, in the event that the 
redundancy cannot be avoided, it attempts to avoid social conflicts by 
determining beforehand with clear criteria the compensation that the employee 
will receive. These agreements are of great utility  to companies because they 
allow them to undergo a quick and effective restructuring without social 
conflicts while safeguarding the interests of the employees. 
(a.3)  UK – the UK seems to have equally  exhibited some experience with 
procedural agreements although – as the following lines will attempt to 
demonstrate – the types of agreements developed in the UK differ to a 
substantial degree from the ones that we have been analysing. The procedural 
agreements in France and in the UK were born in systems dominated by 
industry level bargaining and were designed to allow companies to implement 
restructuring procedures with a minimum degree of social conflict. The British 
panorama of collective bargaining – underpinned in a heavily decentralised 
system in which collective agreements are deprived of a binding effect (at the 
request of the trade unions, who have fiercely opposed all attempts to classify 
the agreements as binding) – was inapt to the development of similar 
agreements because the institutional endowment is completely diverse. There 
is evidence however that EU Law has had further influence in the development 
of new types of agreements in the subjects of collective redundancies and the 
information and consultation of employees regulations that managed to 
influence to some extent the restructuring procedures the companies wished to 
implement without undermining the absence of a binding nature of collective 
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agreements. These agreements must be contextualised within the British 
system of industrial relations in order to understand their role and impact.
 The first relevant innovation came in the form of “new style agreements” 
that were developed in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s. These new style 
agreements were the trade unions’ response to the developments in corporate 
governance and firm organisation; they placed an emphasis on new 
cooperative approaches of fundamental and long-run import. These new style 
agreements were developed in a number of industries (most notably, but not 
reduced to, microelectronics) and consist in a number of related elements in 
collective bargaining agreements that attempt to overcome the former 
adversarial approach that characterised British collective bargaining and 
achieve a more cooperative approach with the management and engage 
employees in the success of the firm; they were prominently  use in 
restructuring procedures (which did not necessary lead to redundancies) and 
attempted to gain employee adhesion to the success of the company and the 
need of change to remain competitive. The elements that were usually inserted 
in those agreements consisted in the following clauses: (a) union recognition 
clauses, (b) no-strike clauses, (c) agreement on arbitration procedures to 
overcome impasses, (d) improvement of communication channels between the 
management and the unions, (e) substantial information sharing by the 
management board, (f) participative institutions and (g) substantial flexibility 
underpinned in training.621  Before advancing any further, it is useful to review 
the content of these clauses in order to understand the innovations that they 
brought about to British industrial relations.
Union recognition clauses consist in the voluntary recognition of one or 
more unions that enjoy  sufficient support among the rank and file; in the event 
that there are several unions in the company, the recognition is conditioned to 
the setting up of a single bargaining table. The objective of the recognition and 
the imposition of a single bargaining table were to achieve a single employee 
representative that would serve as an interlocutor in front of the management 
board. This ensured that the management board would have someone to 
address and develop  a working relationship  with. The recognition of the unions 
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must be complemented with the agreement on a non-strike clause. The unions 
agreed not to go on strike in exchange for recognition and setting up  of more 
permanent social dialogue. The purpose of the no-strike clause consisted in a 
joint commitment by  the management and the unions to solve their disputes 
without engaging in industrial action. This is extremely relevant if we take into 
consideration that the use of industrial action was the main instrument of the 
trade unions to force employers into collective agreements and oblige them to 
engage in a more permanent social dialogue in the absence of the duty to 
recognise trade unions; the forgoing of the “right” to industrial action is a 
significant issue because – although it is not legally enforceable – it stands as 
the ultimate compromise of the trade unions to overcome the traditionally 
adversarial approach to collective bargaining and engage in a more 
cooperative attitude.622 The forgoing of the “right to strike” was completed with 
the agreement on alternative conflict solving mechanisms; these mechanisms 
usually consist in a forum for advice, consultation and relevant company 
information. In the event that an autonomous solution is not possible, the 
parties usually agree on a voluntary  arbitration procedure, which consists in the 
resource to a third party that will attempt to conciliate their interests; if no 
conciliation is possible, then this third party will issue a decision that the 
conflicting parties promise to abide with and perform. The remaining clauses – 
equally complementary  between themselves – are easily found in new style 
collective agreements. The agreements provide for the improvement of the 
communication channels between the management and the rank and file. This 
improvement may assume various forms such as a more precise definition of 
the information to be transmitted, the definition of the periodicity of the 
information, the setting up  of employee consultation mechanisms to hear their 
remarks concerning the organisation of work, among other issues that are 
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to bargain. See Deakin, S., William S. Morris (2005). Labour Law. Oxford, Hart Publisher. 
completely open to the willingness of the parties. This improvement in 
communication channels is of utmost importance in the introduction of a new 
method of organisation of work that consists in lean production; these 
agreements normally contained provisions relating to the introduction of team-
work and labour flexibility (in the form of pay connected to productivity and job 
security dependent on progression by professional training efforts), which 
consists in nothing else rather than lean production; it is worth noting that these 
methods of production also depend heavily  on a good channel of 
communication with the management board and the existence of peaceful 
conflict solving mechanisms – hence the emphasis on union recognition, 
single-table bargaining and no-strike clauses.623
This short description of the new-style agreements reveals that they may 
be considered as procedural agreements although they have a distinct reach 
from the ones analysed before. The purpose of these agreements is to set out 
a procedure to be followed in the engagement of the employees into the life of 
the company by means of the improvement of the communication channels and 
the introduction of new work procedures. This last aspect of the new work 
procedures is of utmost importance because the emphasis that they place on 
social dialogue and teamwork depends of a cooperative system of industrial 
relations. The transition of the adversarial towards the cooperative system was 
achieved by two means: firstly, by the voluntary recognition of trade unions and 
the setting out of a single bargaining table; this is of utmost importance 
because it provides the employees with one independent and reliable 
representative and the management board with a viable interlocutor. Secondly, 
the transition was equally achieved by means of the forgoing of the right to 
strike and the setting up of voluntary conciliation and conflict-solving 
mechanisms that will attempt to avoid social conflict and achieve mutually 
beneficial outcomes. This allows companies to introduce new forms of working 
procedures, restructure both internally and externally and adapt more easily  to 
a fluctuating environment without social conflict and attempting to capture 
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employee adhesion to the furthest extent by guaranteeing that they have a 
means of safeguarding their interests by means of their representatives. This is 
a voluntarily agreed procedural means of restructuring companies more easily 
and quickly and avoiding social conflict. 
Another significant innovation in the British panorama of collective 
bargaining consisted in the implementation of Directive 2002/14. The British 
lawmaker took an innovative approach to social dialogue that attempts to 
encourage the parties to reach voluntary agreements on information and 
consultation of the workforce by reflexive means.624  The details of the 
procedure had been analysed above, on occasion of the analysis of the 
evolution of the actors in British law, and they will only be briefly recalled here. 
The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, transposing 
Directive 2002/14, created a works council type body within companies to the 
detriment of trade unions. This body may be set up in the company either at the 
request of at least 10% of the employees or at the request of the employer. The 
setting up  of this body is necessarily accompanied with the enactment of a 
procedure to bargain an ad hoc information and consultation agreement. This 
agreement must abide by the requirements of Directive 2002/14, which 
requires employers to inform and, in some situations, consult or consult with a 
view to reaching an agreement employee representatives on a wide range of 
issues, namely (a) recent and probable development of the activities of the 
undertaking and its economic situation, (b) situation, structure and probable 
development of employment within the company and the anticipatory measures 
envisaged when employment is threatened and (c) decisions likely to lead to 
substantial modifications in work organisation and contractual relations. The 
British lawmaker took the innovative approach of refusing to implement an 
upside-down information and consultation procedure and preferred to use the 
technique of reflexive law to encourage companies to bargain their own 
agreements that abided by the requirements of the Directive. In a similar way to 
what occurred with the European Works Council Directive, the lawmaker 
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exempted companies from implementing this bargaining as long as they had in 
force a pre-existing information and consultation agreement that abided by the 
requirements of Directive 2002/14. This means that all companies within the 
thresholds defined by the Directive will at least have the possibility of having 
substantial information and consultation procedures within them. 
 The maximum flexibility provided to the management and employee 
representatives in the bargaining of the information and consultation 
arrangements is simultaneously  an advantage and a danger that must be used 
with precaution. The maximum degree of flexibility  provided by the Information 
and Consultation of Employees Regulations is particularly adequate to the 
voluntarist system of industrial relations in Britain in which both employers and 
trade unions traditionally  strongly  opposed the enforceability of collective 
agreements and a rigid regulatory  framework so that they could conform social 
dialogue in accordance with their own needs. The fact that the bargaining is to 
be made at the company basis is also of extreme importance because it allows 
the management and the employee representatives to bargain the agreement 
that best fits the requirements and internal organisation of the particular 
company unconstrained by the general regulations that would be applicable 
regardless of the types of companies. There is anecdotic evidence of the 
flexibility of firms in the bargaining of these particular arrangements, which 
include examples such as: German style companies councils, French style joint 
consultative committees, several levels of representation along the internal 
structure of the company and its articulation, union based arrangements, 
different information and consultation arrangements for distinct parts of the 
workforce (similar to the organisation of employee representation in Sparten 
and Arbeitsgruppen in German Law) and direct forms of participation among 
other elements.625  The various arrangements described and the flexibility 
provided to the employer and employee in their agreement allows them to 
devise the form of representation that best fits the internal organisation, culture 
and needs of the company. This must be coupled with another important 
provision in the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations that 
mimics the solution found in the European Works Council. In the event that the 
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employer previously had within its company a voluntary agreement that sufficed 
to fulfil the requirements of the Directive then it will be able to leap the duty to 
bargain and simply enforce this previous arrangement. This equally  ensures a 
maximum degree of flexibility within the company because if the employee 
representatives were satisfied with the previously  bargained arrangements 
(independently  of any statutory  imposition) then the regulations will respect 
these arrangements (as long as they conform with the requirements of the 
Directive) and not impose any other solutions that could unbalance the 
equilibrium voluntarily found within the company. 
This internal flexibility equally  carries a danger with it: there is the danger 
that this flexibility and the natural predominance of the employer within the 
company (in a system characterised by low levels of protection against 
redundancies) will lead to the agreement on very feeble forms of participation 
that will compromise the intention of the Directive. The employer might be 
tempted force the employees into an agreement that could be used to escape 
the statutory or union regulations and merely  provide “lip service” to the 
employees therefore compromising the intention of the Directive. That is the 
reason why the public authorities devised measures to protect employee 
representatives and provide a minimum content to the agreements. The British 
Department of Trade and Industry issued a guide to the Information and 
Consultation of Employees Regulations that provided guidelines to interpret the 
content of each one of the information to be provided and the scope of the duty 
to inform, consult and consult with a view to reaching an agreement. An 
important element is the scope of the duty  to consult with a view to reaching an 
agreement: the DTI was extremely clear in stating that the duty to reach an 
agreement did not place in question the managerial prerogative (which 
remained untouched) and it did not mean negotiation, bargaining or co-decision 
but simply  an exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between the 
management and the employee representatives in good faith and making the 
best efforts to reach a mutually advantageous solution. This is a very clear 
statement of the purpose of the Directives: it is not to set up  a German style co-
determination structure (although the parties are free to do so if they (unlikely) 
agree to it) but simply to improve the communication channels within the 
company and create a culture of dialogue between the management and 
employee representatives; more active forms of involvement are expected to 
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arise reflexively from this new culture of dialogue and exchange of views 
between the management and the employee representatives.626  Another 
procedural safeguard consists in the fallback provisions provided for in the 
Regulations. In the event that the employer and the employee representatives 
fail to reach an agreement and there is no previous agreement on information 
and consultation in force within the company then the employer will be obliged 
to follow the standard information and consultation provisions provide for in the 
regulations. This is a situation similar to the one provided for in the European 
Works Council and serves not only as a procedural safeguard to the employees 
but equally as a means of creating incentives to the bargaining of an 
autonomous agreement.627
 The analysis of these two types of agreements allows us to understand 
that the UK has equally developed some form of procedural agreements, in the 
sense of agreements destined to facilitate the restructuring of companies, albeit 
the scope and techniques were slightly distinct from the ones found previously 
in France and in Germany. Whereas the cases of the accords de méthode and 
the rationalisierungsschutzabkommen were fundamentally  concerned with the 
procedure for collective redundancies and the forms of avoiding social conflicts, 
the new-style agreements and the information and consultation agreements 
had a distinct scope: they were destined to improve the communication 
channels within the company in order to gain employee adhesion, make them 
acquainted with the needs and possibility  of restructuring and attempt to 
bargain the most appropriate restructuring measures and avoid social conflicts. 
The new style agreements consist in an implementation of this principle: the 
combination of clauses of union recognition, no-strike clauses, peaceful conflict 
solving mechanisms and the improvement of communication channels within 
the company seemed to have the clear purpose of evolving from an adversarial 
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towards a cooperative approach in industrial relations and implement the 
necessary restructuring measures by procedural means: the employees would 
be permanently  informed of the situation of the undertaking and the measures 
envisaged, the management would attempt to reach a voluntary agreement and 
the impasses would be overcome by means of a resource to voluntary 
arbitration; this is a procedural means of overcoming differences of interest, 
gaining employee adhesion and making companies more flexible and 
competitive. The fact that they go beyond the limited scope of collective 
redundancies provides them with wider possibilities of impact. The voluntary 
information and consultation agreements that arose from the transposition of 
Directive 2002/14 may equally be inserted in this classification. The innovative 
approach of the British legislator to allow the parties maximum freedom to 
bargain their own arrangements and the reflexive technique used in lawmaking 
encouraged the parties to determine the procedures for information and 
consultation of employees that best fit the needs of their companies. This is a 
procedural form of implementing the duties of information, consultation and 
consultation with a view to reaching an agreement; the improvement of the 
communication channels within the company and the introduction of the duty to 
promote a fair exchange of views and the establishment of dialogue between 
the management board and the employee representatives by allowing them the 
maximum freedom to bargain their own arrangements to achieve this purpose 
is a means of facilitating restructuring of companies and a more active 
involvement of the workforce.       
(a.4)  Portugal – Portugal was the only country  that failed to provide evidence 
of the use of procedural agreements in its industrial relations panorama. The 
reasons underpinning this reality are not due to an absence of interest of the 
trade unions or the employee representatives to regulate the issue but the 
regulatory burdens. The law exempts collective redundancies from the action of 
the trade unions (arts. 339CTP only allows trade unions to determine the 
deadlines of the procedure and the compensations to be paid but since both of 
these elements are already provided for in the law in a very generous form the 
trade unions do not see a point in modifying the statutory regime) and the 
procedures to be used in the remaining company restructurings (such as lay-
offs or temporary closures) are also laid out in the law in a very detailed and 
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generous form. This does not mean that the lawmaker is not interested in 
employee involvement in company-restructurings; it simply means that the 
procedures are not the result of the action of the trade unions but of the will of 
the legislator. There are two procedures worth noting in this aspect: the 
procedures for the temporary closure of activity and the procedure for collective 
redundancies and extinction of labour posts. It is worth viewing them in some 
detail.    
 The Portuguese Labour Code allows the employer to suspend the 
performance of the labour contracts in some situations. In these situations, the 
employee will not have a duty to perform work and will be entitled to receive 
remuneration from the Social Security besides the possibility of performing 
salaried work elsewhere; the employment relationship  is maintained but simply 
“frozen” as regards the rights and duties of the parties (art.295 CTP). The 
employer may suspend the performance of the labour contract in three 
situations: (1) in situations of entrepreneurial crisis in order to avoid collective 
redundancies, (2) in situations of impossibility  due to an Act of God and (3) in 
situations due to the employer’s own interest (e.g: because he wants to 
reorganise the company internally). Although the law is extremely clear in 
leaving the managerial prerogative of the employer untouched in these 
situations, the employer nonetheless must undergo a procedure to implement 
them. 
 If the employer wants to suspend the labour contracts for reasons 
connected to an entrepreneurial crisis that is capable of leading to 
redundancies, the employer is obliged to communicate in a written form its 
intention, the detailed reasons and the workers affected to the works council or 
the trade union section or the employees affected; in the absence of any of 
these bodies, the employees affected will be entitled to elect a representative to 
initiate the consultation procedure (art.299). The consultation procedure has a 
particular characteristic: the employer is not only  obliged to inform and consult 
the employee representative; the law clearly states that he is obliged to bargain 
the consequences of the suspension of the labour contract with the employee 
representatives; these consequences may be a total or partial suspension of 
the employment contract or modalities of flexible working. Although the last 
word belongs to the employer, the procedure must be contained in a written 
document stating the proposals of each part and the reasons why the parties 
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were unable to reach an agreement. This document is to be sent to the Social 
Security who takes the charge of paying the total or partial remuneration of the 
employee laid off and controls the good faith in the bargaining procedures (art.
300 CTP). The Labour Inspectorate will accompany the procedure and re-
examine the reasons underpinning it every three months (art.307CTP). 
 In the event that the contract is suspended by an Act of God, there are 
no consultation procedures to be followed. 
 In the event that the contract is suspended in the interest of the 
employer, he must simply inform the employee representatives or the 
employees directly, who may issue an opinion concerning the subject. There 
are no consultation or bargaining procedures envisaged (art.311CTP). Despite 
this, the employer is subject to a number of constraints during the suspension 
such as the prohibition to distribute profits or to remunerate the managers (art.
313CTP). The objective is to discourage at the maximum the use of this 
procedure. 
 There is also an important procedure in situations of collective 
redundancies. If the employer wishes to undertake a collective redundancy he 
must send a document stating the reasons and the workers affected to the 
works council, trade union sections or the workers themselves (who may elect 
a representative) (art.360CTP). This stage is followed by a consultative 
procedure that the law classifies as a bargaining procedure; the employer must 
bargain the redundancies with the employee representatives, in particular the 
reasons for the impossibility of alternative measures, which must all be 
contained in a written document (art.361CTP). The Labour Inspectorate 
intervenes in the conditions laid down in the Collective Redundancies 
Directive.628 
 There is equally anecdotic evidence of a certain diffusion of the 
improvement of the information and communication channels within 
Portuguese companies outside statutory procedures. In a survey conducted by 
the Ministry of Labour in 2006, circa 78% of employees stated that they  had 
regular talks with the management and that they were inquired on the reasons 
capable of increasing their productivity  albeit only  48% said that they felt that 
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they had an actual impact. The reasons behind these numbers are connected 
with the Portuguese reality. The majority  of companies are small companies 
with a small number of employees and therefore there are informal 
communication channels with the workforce based upon personal relationships; 
a daily walk through the company and an inquiry  to the employees as a 
monitoring mechanism of their performance may serve as an indirect means of 
implementing an information and consultation procedure outside rigid statutory 
frameworks. The absence of a real pressure is connected with the strong 
managerialist conception of the company in Southern European countries 
where the company is regarded as the personal property of the manager who is 
unaccountable to anyone but himself. There are equally figures stating an 
increase in direct forms of employee participation such as lean production and 
other anthropomorphic forms of labour organisation (which already account for 
54% of Portuguese companies) that is capable is increasing levels of employee 
participation and social dialogue but always outside a statutory framework. 
These are flexible forms of social dialogue and labour organisation that are 
capable of facilitating restructuring within companies.629
 These two examples reveal that there is equally evidence in Portugal of 
an increase in the proceduralisation of restructuring, albeit made essentially by 
the law and indirect forms of participation, leaving the social partners aside. 
The requirement of the participation of the workforce in situations of suspension 
of the labour contract seems to be intended to make employees aware of the 
situation of the undertaking and encourage them to assume a more direct form 
of participation to fight the entrepreneurial crisis and avoid the redundancies. 
This is a proactive means of dealing with a crisis that encourages employee 
involvement and the sharing of information between both parties. In addition, 
there are several informal procedures for the exchange of information between 
the management and the rank and file therefore encouraging social dialogue at 
the level of the company. These procedures are purely informal and made 
outside any binding duty. Although these procedures exist, the general 
perception is that employees have little or no impact in the conformation of the 
workplace and that the managerial prerogative is left untouched. A wishful 
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thinking would hope to replicate the British example in Portugal and hope that 
these informal channels of communication between employers and employees 
would have the reflexive effect of encouraging more active forms of 
participation. Only the future will tell but for the time being it is already a great 
conquest that employers are increasingly  entering into dialogue with the 
employees and showing receptivity to more active forms of participation.    
(a.5) Conclusion 
this analysis of the implementation of procedural agreements in each one of the 
jurisdictions under study may allow us to put forward some conclusions. The 
purpose and objective of the procedural agreements is to lay  down the 
formalities to be observed in certain restructuring procedures in order to avoid 
the externalisation of social conflicts into the courts or industrial action and 
allow the implementation of restructuring in a quick and efficient manner. These 
agreements presuppose two things: they presuppose an employee adhesion to 
the need of restructuring and a willingness of the management to engage into 
dialogue in order to find the best solution or to minimize its consequences. The 
best means to achieve this is by means of the improvement of the 
communication channels within the company; this will make employees aware 
of the forthcoming restructuring, reduce the agency costs that information gaps 
would provoke between managers and employees and allow employees to 
collaborate with the management in order to design the necessary anticipatory 
measures. 
 Procedural agreements in France are fundamentally  connected to 
collective redundancies: the law encourages the parties to bargain their own 
agreements on the procedures to be observed in those cases and applies the 
statutory regulation only  subsidiarily. This focus on self-regulaton has a very 
precise scope: the self-regulation and the necessary anticipatory  measures 
provided for in the law depend of the improvement of the communication 
channels between the employer and the employees; this improvement and the 
employees’ willingness to collaborate in order to avoid redundancies is perhaps 
capable of giving birth reflexively  to a new system of industrial relations based 
upon a more collaborative approach with the management; employees may 
use the information at their disposal in order to act more preventively and avoid 
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restructurings or at least minimise their consequences to the greatest extent 
possible. 
 This seems to be the situation in Germany. The conventions for the 
protection against rationalisation are not only used in situations of 
redundancies (although it is in those situations that they have their greatest 
expression) but in all situations capable of affecting the interests of the 
employees to a great extent such as the introduction of new work procedures 
or modifications in the organisation of companies. Although many  of these 
measures fit within the co-determination powers of the works councils, the 
Betriebsräte decided to require union assistance in the performance of their 
role. Although the potential scope of application is larger than the one found in 
the method agreements, the formula is the same: rationalisation agreements 
are underpinned in the improvement of the channels of communication 
between employers and employees and in the search for anticipatory  measures 
in collective agreements in order to avoid or minimise redundancies and their 
consequences. This leads to a more pro-active role by the employee 
representatives with a greater focus on the involvement at the company and 
cooperating actively in restructuring procedures in order to boost the 
competitiveness of the company. 
 The experience with procedural agreements in the UK was remarkable. 
The new-style agreements and the implementation of Directive 2002/14 in the 
UK seem to be clear indications of a new style and experience with collective 
bargaining which focus on a company-specific cooperative approach based 
upon employee representation within the company. The setting of employee 
representative bodies adapted to the specific needs of the company, the 
introduction of no-strike clauses and voluntary interest conciliation 
mechanisms, the improvement of communication channels by voluntary means 
and the particular duties of information and consultation imposed by Directive 
2002/14 seem to be clear indications of the development of a new culture of 
collective bargaining underpinned in company-level social dialogue, a 
cooperative approach to restructurings and anticipation of change in order to 
contribute more actively to the competitiveness of companies. 
 Portugal also presented some evidence of the development of these 
agreements. The procedural regulation of conflicts of interest was seen as 
positive by the legislator;the lawmaker decided to assume into its own hands 
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the role of providing unilaterally  for the procedure. The most prominent 
example is the procedure for lay-offs (that might be used in a variety  of 
situations) in which the legislator intended to create incentives for a voluntary 
conciliation of interests in times of entrepreneurial crisis. If the company 
entered into an entrepreneurial crisis and the employer anticipated that 
collective redundancies could be necessary, it could use a preliminary 
procedure for layoffs that had to be bargaining with employee representatives. 
This ensured the improvement of communication channels between the 
management and the workforce and the engagement of employees in the 
management of the crisis within companies. Anecdotical evidence suggests 
that communication channels seem to be improving in Portugal albeit at the 
margin of the law and with weak results concerning the concrete possibilities of 
influencing the workplace.
 The conclusion that may be drawn from these procedural agreements 
may be summoned in three principles: (a) the acceptance by managers and 
employees of the need to bargain in order to achieve the necessary 
restructurings (whether or not leading to redundancies), (b) the improvement of 
communication channels within the company in order to conquer employee 
adhesion and prepare the necessary anticipatory measures and (c) a 
cooperative and company-based approach to industrial relations.  
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 5.2.3.2.3 Anticipatory agreements  
The last type of innovative agreements that each country seems to have been 
developing consists in a new type of agreements that go beyond the traditional 
function of regulating wages and professional careers and the management of 
crisis situations towards an active involvement of the employees in the 
competitiveness of the company. These agreements may be named as 
“anticipatory agreements” because they are underpinned in a common 
commitment to ensure the prosperity  of the company. They may be used both 
in prosperous and ailing companies because their function is to engage the 
employees more actively in the promotion of the competitiveness of the 
company. The legal and industrial relations literature has been studying these 
agreements and they have been naming them under the umbrella term 
“partnership agreements”. The various definitions that have been proposed for 
these agreements may assist us in understanding their precise reach. One 
definition was proposed by Frege - who coined them as “partnership 
agreements” and goes as follows:
[Partnership agreements are] a participatory  process leading to high-
trust, cooperation and compromise between management and labour 
leading to the engagement of employees in the success of the company 
– instead of simply demanding more pay and better working conditions – 
and to their active evolvement as stakeholders in the policy of the 
company.630 
 Another definition that may be found at the Eurofound website, which 
conducted a comparative study of this type of agreements and defined 
partnership agreements as:
Partnership is an active relationship  based on the recognition of a 
common interest to secure the competitiveness, viability  and prosperity 
of the enterprise. It involves a continuing commitment by employees to 
improvements in quality  and efficiency; and the acceptance by employers 
of employees as stakeholders with rights and interests to be considered in 
the context of major decisions affecting their employment. 
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Partnership  involves a common ownership of the resolution of challenges, 
involving the direct  participation of employees/representatives and an 
investment in their training, development and working environment. 631
These definitions may allows us to extract some preliminary conclusions 
concerning the key characteristics of these agreements. Partnership 
agreements consist in a shared responsibility for business efficiency 
underpinned in employment security  and flexible working. Their advocates 
claim that they represent a modernisation of industrial relations that goes 
beyond the adversarialism of the period that covered 1950-1970 and the 
managerialism and fight against unionism that characterised most of the 
1980-1990. The majority  of these partnership  agreements have the 
improvement of business performance in a viable and sustainable form as their 
main goal; they  are underpinned in sound relationships with the representatives 
of the employees (whether union or elective) and seek organisational 
arrangements and the improvement of the sharing of information between 
management and employee representatives as the main form of boosting the 
performance of the company. The organisational arrangements that partnership 
agreements normally regard as the most appropriate for the fulfilment of their 
goals consist in (a) teamworking and the reduction of hierarchies, (b) flexible 
working methods and pay dependent of results and productivity, (c) 
employment security in consideration for the flexibility  and commitment to the 
success of the company and (d) conflict solving mechanisms bases on 
consensus and an avoidance of the courts. These are, as we may  observe, all 
elements of the philosophy of lean production that mandates a decentralisation 
of decision-making towards the lower levels of the hierarchy, teamworking and 
the elimination of the division of tasks and employment security  in exchange for 
flexibility. Partnership  agreements consist in the involvement of the social 
partners in the implementation of this working philosophy. 632 
 Each country  reveals some experience with partnership  agreements 
because there is evidence of agreements containing all these elements, 
although their precise implementation varies in accordance with the legal 
620
631 Sheehan, B. (2000). "Partnership  Agreements may Point the Way Forward." from http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/01/feature/ie0001204f.htm.
632  Terry, M. (1999). "Assessing the significance of partnership  agreements." from http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1999/07/feature/uk9907214f.htm.
system; whereas in some countries partnership agreements are clearly pro-
active in the sense of making a forward planning in others there is a more 
reactive dimension without forgetting the future reorganisation of the company. 
The following lines will attempt to demonstrate to which extent each country 
has been developing this kind of agreements and their precise content.      
(a)  Germany – Germany has been experiencing over the last few years a 
considerable expansion of a new type of agreements that became known as 
“pacts for employment and competitiveness” (Betrieblische Bündnisse für Arbeit 
und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit). These agreements come in the line of the process 
of decentralisation of collective bargaining that this chapter has been 
attempting to describe. Collective agreements seem to be increasingly moving 
towards the level of the company in the sense of achieving a more company-
friendly  (Betriebsnäher) Tarifpolitik. Pacts for employment and competitiveness 
differ from the previous types of agreements analysed because their purpose is 
not restricted to dealing with a crisis situation or to agree on a procedure for 
restructuring (although they may be used in these cases). These pacts have a 
much wider agenda that is focused on overcoming the common problems 
facing both the management and the workforce. The most complete definition 
came in the words of Seifert and Massa-Wirth, who defined these agreements 
as: 
Mutual accords between management and workforce 
representatives that resolve company-specific problems related 
to employment and competition. Works councils cooperate in 
order to cut costs and boost productivity. In return, the 
employers generally  promise to forgo planned dismissals, 
protect threatened jobs or even to create additional ones and to 
preserve or even expand the production site affected.633   
These agreements knew a considerable expansion during the 1990s, a period 
in which they established themselves as a common practice in German 
companies. The particular characteristic of these agreements lays in the fact 
that the parties to the agreement made reciprocal concessions (with or without 
the approval of the trade union) in order to safeguard the jobs and boost the 
competitiveness of the company. The proof that these agreements were 
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underpinned not only on the willingness of the employee representatives but in 
particular of the unions to overcome common problems lay in the fact that the 
majority of the themes dealt in them did not fit within the co-determination 
powers of the works council but on the Direktionsrecht of the employer or the 
regulatory powers of the parties to the collective agreements. The 
competences bargained – in particular those from the employer’s side – were 
not enforceable but both parties assumed a compromise to act as if they were. 
This flexibility outside the boundaries of the law and the mutual compromise of 
both parties to solve common problems turned these agreements into one of 
the most important regulatory means of employment relations during the 1990s 
and reflected the structural transformations that companies were subject to. 
These agreements deepened the bargaining agenda, reflected the 
acknowledgement of the fact that intensifying competition required the 
management and the workforce to minimise costs and promote workforce 
cooperation for continuous improvement and presented numerous advantages 
to both parties: for the management board, it presented the advantage of 
offering it an opportunity to reduce costs, improve flexibility  and change the 
culture of the organisation in the face of increasing competitive pressures; for 
employee representatives, it offered them the opportunity to minimise job 
losses and strengthen their role in company decision-making; for both parties, it 
encourage the participation of both in the decision making procedures within 
the company in order to enforce a serious partnership approach.634 
 The investigation on the German Pacts for Employment and 
Competitiveness has devised a classification into two main types that may be 
subdivided into four subtypes. The main types are adaptation pacts and 
prevention pacts; adaptation pacts may be divided in (a) conventions for the 
guarantee of labour posts with a reduction in wages and (b) conventions for 
work redistribution; investment pacts may be classified as (c) conventions for 
investment with a reduction in wages and (d) conventions for productivity 
boosting investments.
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(a) adaptation pacts
(a.1) conventions for the guarantee of labour posts with a reduction in 
wages
(a-2) conventions for the work redistribution
(b) investment pacts
 (b.1) conventions for investment with a reduction in wages
(b.2) conventions for productivity boosting investment
It is worth viewing each one of these conventions in detail. Adaptation pacts 
consist in pacts bargained in situations in which the company faces serious 
economic problems (such as insufficient product demand or capital shortages). 
Companies react by proposing measures to reduce labour costs and make the 
necessary investments to overcome the situation of crisis and prevent its re-
appearance in the future. They may consist in two modalities: (a) conventions 
for the guarantee of labour posts with a reduction in wages (Lohnsenkende 
Beschäftigungsvereinbarung) or (b) conventions for work redistribution 
(Arbeitsumverteilende Beschäftigungsvereinbarung). The former type consists 
in agreements providing for a waiving of wages in exchange for the guarantee 
of the maintenance of the labour posts. It consists in a form of worker solidarity 
in which the employees forgo temporarily a part of their salary in exchange for 
the maintenance of the labour posts in order to ensure the survival of the 
company. The latter type was made popular by  means of the “Volkswagen 
agreement” in 1993 and consists in the avoidance of a collective redundancy or 
other types of rationalisation by means of the division of the shrinking volume of 
work by all the employees. The employee concessions consist mostly in a 
reduction of working time (shorter working days or working weeks) often 
combined with complementary measures of flexibilisation. The redistribution of 
work may equally be performed by means of a geographical and/or functional 
flexibilisation of the operation of work.635
Investment pacts consist in a distinct type of agreement. They consist in 
worker concessions not with the purpose of maintaining their labour posts but 
with the purpose of boosting the productivity of the company. They  correspond 
more precisely to the partnership  agreements mentioned above because the 
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concessions by the employees are not made with the direct purpose of 
maintaining their labour posts and avoiding redundancies but with the purpose 
of boosting the competitiveness of the company. There are two types of these 
agreements: (a) conventions for investment with a reduction in wages 
(Lohsenkende Investitionsvereinbarung) and (b) conventions for productivity 
boosting investments (Produktivitätsfordernde Investitionsvereinbarung). The 
former type consists in a modality of agreements that developed in Europe in 
the last part of the 1980s and early 1990s. This type is agreements is 
characterised by wage concessions by the employees in exchange for 
investments in the company that are destined to maintain production lines or to 
improve the productivity or the totality or of part of the company. They reveal a 
more active commitment of the employees into the success of the company as 
well as a compromise by managers to apply the sacrifices of the employees in 
the development of the company as a whole that will bring about benefits to the 
company as a whole – managers, shareholders and employees. The latter type 
consists in a modality of agreements that is not connected to the concessions 
of the employees but with the improvement of their productivity. The objective 
of the agreement is not to reduce the costs of labour to remain competitive but 
to increase the productivity of the company. These agreements normally 
consist in measures to flexibilise the working time, connect wages to 
productivity, adopt forms of organisation of work that are bringing an added 
value to the productivity of the company (in particular the introduction of lean 
production with employee assistance), among other measures. The purpose of 
the agreements is clearly pro-active in the sense of engaging employees in 
making the company more competitive and not simply requiring sacrifices in 
order to ensure its survival.636 
 A simple and synthetic reading of these kinds of agreements may allow 
us to extract some preliminary conclusions regarding the pacts for employment 
and competitiveness in Germany. Firstly, all but one of these pacts depend on 
waiving of benefits by the employees, often provided for in collective 
agreements, in exchange for other benefits. This is precisely what occurred in 
624
636  Seifert, H. and H. Massa-Wirth (2005). "Pacts for employment and competitiveness in 
Germany." Industrial Relations Journal 36(3): 217-240. Berthold, N., B. M., et al. (2003). 
"Betrieblische bündnisse für arbeit. Eine empirische untersuchung fur den deutschen 
maschinen- und anlagenbau." Wissenschaftliche Beiträge des Lehrstulls für 
Volkswirtschaftslehre,  Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik 68.
the Burda-Viessman-Holzmann cases commented above; the former pages 
have equally described the means by which the courts and the trade unions 
have been providing these agreements with a binding effect or – at least – 
exempting them from the barrier effect of §77(3)BVG. This is extremely 
important because this reveals that partnership agreements correspond to the 
reinforcement of the powers of the company level actors that we referred in the 
former pages and because they are often coupled with other kinds of 
agreements – flexibilisation agreements – in order to become effective and in 
conformity with the law. This coordination between partnership agreements and 
flexibilisation agreements (in particular single-employer agreements and 
opening clauses) also has an added advantage – it ensures that the use of the 
possibilities of deviation is made within the limits laid out in the collective 
agreements and the monitoring mechanisms guarantee the truthfulness of the 
reasons laid out for the use of the agreements and the possibilities of deviation. 
Secondly, the use of these agreements also reveals that the deviation from the 
standards laid down in collective agreements in not always a “least harmful 
solution” and that the deviation may correspond to a genuine interest of the 
workforce in the sense that today’s sacrifices may be tomorrows gains. That is 
the reason why some legal thinking claims that these agreements do not 
undermine but correct the standards laid down in collective agreements. 
Thirdly, these agreements may equally  justify  the insertion of some clauses in 
collective agreements; for instance, conventions for investments with a 
reduction in wages may  justify increases in the wages laid down in collective 
agreements because part of them will serve the purposes of the 
competitiveness of the company; opening clauses in the subjects of working 
time and professional careers (delegating them towards the level of the 
company as far as possible) may serve the purposes of adaptation agreements 
(in particular those that aim at work redistribution, which often presupposes the 
violation of the professional careers laid down in the collective agreement).637 
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The most important thing to retain about these agreements is that they 
seem to be the example of a new decentralised culture of industrial relations 
betting upon a shared compromise of the employers and the employees in the 
success of the company. They rely on the management and the employee 
representatives within the company to assume jointly the responsibility for the 
success of the company and provide them with the necessary freedom to make 
the necessary arrangements. This shared compromise may demand some 
sacrifices – either monetary  or in terms of flexibility - from the employee 
representatives; this must have some kind of control in order to avoid 
managerial abuses and downgrading of the standards of work. The best means 
to control these agreements are the so-called flexibilisation agreements 
mentioned above; these agreements are capable of providing both the 
necessary margin of freedom of the parties to bargain the best arrangements to 
boost the competitiveness of the company and the necessary limits and 
monitoring mechanisms to avoid abuses. This is the best means for the trade 
unions to have some kind of control over the activities occurring in this new 
decentralised culture of collective bargaining.       
(b) France – France has equally had some experiences with anticipatory 
agreements. Following the traditional French regulatory tradition, these 
agreements were introduced by law and came in the form of the employer’s 
duty  to bargain the manpower management in the undertaking. This duty was 
introduced in the Borloo Laws of 2005 and took the name of provisional 
management of employment and competences (GPEC – Gestion Prévisionelle 
des Emplois et des Compétences) currently provided for in art.L2242-15CTF. 
This provision is of an illusory simplicity because its potential impact is far-
reaching. Art.L2242-15 CTF simply states that in companies with more than 
300 employees or companies and groups of companies of communitarian 
dimension employing at least 150 employees in France, the employer is 
obliged to engage every three years in a bargaining procedure concerning (a) 
the modalities of information and consultation of the works council on the 
strategy of the company and its foreseeable impact on employment and wages 
and (b) the enforcement of a procedure for the provisional management of 
manpower, which must contain the modalities of information of the works 
council and the assistance measures associated with them – in particular 
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training, validation of experience, evaluation of the competences and measures 
of professional and geographical mobility. 
 Before engaging into the content of the duty one must understand its 
evolution. The GPEC comes in the line of a series of measures that have been 
progressively  adapted throughout the times by the French legislator in order to 
avoid brutal restructurings and attempt to manage the human resources of the 
company in a socially responsible form. The first reference came in the Law of 
18th June 1966 concerning the information and consultation of the works 
council on measures having an impact in the generality  of the workforce. This 
statute determined that the works councils should be informed and consulted 
before the employer undertook any measures having an impact on the volume 
and structure of the rank and file. This was followed by the national agreement 
of 10th February  1969 concerning security in employment, which declared that 
companies should take an active role in the policy of security  in employment by 
making the best efforts to forecast the probable evolution of employment in the 
undertaking in order to set the basis of an employment policy to be contained in 
industry agreements; this was particularly  important in restructuring operations 
in order to reduce unemployment and search for viable alternatives. The period 
that covered from 1970 to 1978 was particularly  fruitful in the determination of a 
provisional management of employment; the social partners signed in 1974, in 
the aftermath of the oil shock, an annex to the national agreement of 1969 
creating the concept of a social plan (that would become a law in 1986 and be 
the origin of the Plan de Saufeguarde de L’emploi) and the Chirac Government 
of 1975 introduced the duty to inform and consult the works council in cases of 
collective redundancies, implementing the first Collective Redundancies 
Directive. One should mention that although Chirac’s regulation of collective 
redundancies also implied an administrative control of the procedure 
(mandating the consent of the Labour Inspectorate), few than 10% of the 
requirements to the Labour Inspectorate were refused; this meant that the 
focus was clearly on the information and consultation procedures of the works 
councils. The Auroux Laws of 1982 continued this trend by planting the seed of 
what became a major revolution in the French system of industrial relations and 
gave the definitive impetus to the current prevalence of company-level 
collective bargaining in France. The evolution of the French system since the 
Auroux Laws had been outlined above and will be not repeated here. The most 
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important thing to retain is that there is a long tradition of social management of 
restructuring operations in France in order to minimise the social impact of the 
procedures.638
 The GPEC is not easy to define. The greatest difficulty with it consists in 
the fact that the GPEC is not originally  an object of the law; it is more 
concerned with Human Resource Management than with a concrete statutory 
duty. The most complete definition of GPEC  might have been provided by 
Tierry and Sauret who defined it as 
“the conception, enforcement and follow-up  of coherent policies and 
action plans destined to reduce in an anticipated manner the differences 
between the needs of the company and its human resources (in terms 
of effectives and competences) in function of its strategic plan (or at 
least in function of medium term objectives) and implicating the 
employee in the framework of a project of professional evolution”.639 
This definition evidences the dynamic character of the duty: it consists in a 
procedure, a duty to engage in a bargaining in order to take advantage of the 
margin of manoeuvre opened by the law in managing the human resources of 
the company, planifying the evolution of employment in the undertaking and 
presenting mutually  agreed solutions after having identified the problems of 
common concern to the employer and the employees. The best definition of the 
procedure might not be made by its origin but by its objective: to undertake an 
efficient management of the employment in the undertaking taking into account 
the competences held by the employees and the demands of the company; it 
consists in assisting today’s employees to occupy tomorrow’s jobs by providing 
them with precise analyses concerning the evolution of the activities, the 
consequences in terms of employment and the needs of human resources. The 
concepts underpinning this management are anticipation, competences and 
employees; the employers needs to communicate to the employees the 
foreseeable needs in terms of human resources, to acquaint them with its 
needs in terms of competences and collaborate with the employees in the 
management of the human resourced that best fits its needs. This procedure is 
the connecting element between the human resources, the needs of the 
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639 Tierry, D. and C. Sauret (1990). La gestion prévisionelle des emplois et des compétences, 
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company and the transition from an individual towards a collective 
management of human resources. This is a true proceduralisation of the 
management of human resources in the sense that it contains a set of tools, 
models and a procedure. It is destined to enforce a set of practices intending to 
conceive and implement preventive actions destined to overcome the problems 
of adjustment in terms of human resources when faced with the internal and 
external constraints of the organisation.640 
 The GPEC  has two dimensions: a substantive and a procedural. The 
substantial dimension appeals to the concrete object of the procedure. The 
procedure has three mandatory objects and an optional one. The mandatory 
objects consist in (a) the modalities of information and consultation of the works 
council on the strategy of the company and its likely impact on employment and 
wages, (b) the bargaining of the setting up of a device for the provisional 
management of jobs and competences and (c) the conditions for access and 
maintenance in employment and access to professional training by aged 
employees; the optional object consists in the agreement on a conventional 
procedure for the plan de saufeguard de l’emploi. It is worth viewing each one 
of these objects in detail. 
The negotiation on the modalities of information of the works council is 
an original choice of the legislator. The works council enjoys several statutory 
rights to information and consultation on economic issues, the situation of 
employment in the undertaking among other issues (art.L2323-1CTF and ff.). 
The legislator decided to adopt the original solution of placing these statutory 
duties of the parties at the disposal of the employer and the employee 
representatives who will be entitled to bargain the most appropriate 
arrangements to fulfil those objectives. This is a very important issue because 
this not only means that the rights to information and consultation on issues 
directly concerning the workforce are to be directly negotiated between the 
parties concerned but also that the parties have a right to proceduralise the 
decision-making in the company  and agree on a solution that best defends their 
interests; the parties assume responsibility for their own information and 
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consultation arrangements in a process somewhat similar to the Information 
and Consultation of Employees Regulations in the UK. This presupposes an 
assumption of responsibility by the parties of the best means to achieve the 
optimal outcome in terms of information and consultation.
The second mandatory object of the procedure (the plan for the GPEC) 
is the core of the regulations. The parties are asked to bargain a procedure 
within the company that will in reality amount to an agreed procedure for 
human resource management for a period of three years. This plan has three 
very  important dimensions: firstly, it must be provisional in the sense of 
avoiding making the plan a reactive one and attempting to manage the 
competences within the company in a pro-active way; the procedure is 
provisional in the sense of being turned towards the future, of being an 
agreement on the management of human resources for a given future period 
(three years in principle); secondly, it must deal with the competences of the 
employees; the purpose is not to agree on the volume of the employment but in 
particular of the competences mobilised and developed within a working 
context, which competences the employees will need to acquire (if possible) to 
remain in the company or how should they manage to make the professional 
transition; the literature concerning the GPEC is almost unanimous regarding 
the content of this agreement: it should state the status-quo of the company, 
make an evaluation of the impact of the strategy of the company in terms of 
human resources and define the necessary measures to be implemented;641 
the geographical and professional mobility  should equally  be the object of a 
GPEC since it becomes the best means of ensuring mobility  within the 
company and the necessary anticipatory  or adaptation measures by the 
employees in order to safeguard that levels of employment within the company 
and provide the employee with a foreseeable development of its career; the 
final issue that is of considerable importance for the agreement consists in the 
measures for hiring and dismissing persons, in particular aged employees; the 
determinations of the conditions of hiring of persons helps the employees to 
understand the future development of the rank and file of the company and 
adopt the necessary anticipatory measures to cope with it; the determination of 
the conditions of dismissal helps to determine beforehand the conditions for 
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voluntary  departures, makes employees aware of their destiny  in the company 
and avoids social conflicts; the situation of the older workers is of particular 
importance because they are a particularly  disadvantaged group; the plan 
should combine the social treatment of these workers with measures for 
professional training in order to facilitate their transitition towards new jobs. This 
part of the most important element of the procedure because in reality  it will 
amount to an agreed management of human resources in the company for a 
period of three years having into account the needs of the company and the 
capabilities of the employees; the employees will not be caught by surprise, will 
be acquainted with the evolution of the rank and file for the next three years 
and will have an opportunity to influence it by  means of the duty to engage in a 
negotiation procedure with the management board.   
The optional part of the plan consists in the possibility  of agreeing on a 
PSE (Plan for the Safeguard of Employment) in the GPEC. This possibility 
raised severe discussions concerning the compatibility between the GPEC and 
the PSE; the main question was to know whether the GPEC was a preliminary 
state if the PSE; the doubt is more academic than real: as Rouilleault puts it in 
a very straightforward way both the GPEC and the PSE are mandatory for all 
companies (with more than 300 employees); the difference is that the GPEC is 
proactive (in the sense laid down in the European Law on the Participation of 
the Workforce, of looking towards the future and attempting to foresee the 
contingencies affecting the company) and the PSE is reactive (in the sense of 
attempting to provide an answer to a situation of crisis). They are not to be 
confused and the possibility of inserting a PSE in a GPEC is simply a natural 
consequence of the proactive character of this latter type of procedure; the 
parties would consider in their best interest to agree previously, outside the 
pressure of the redundancy, on the conditions for the collective redundancy to 
occur.642 
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 The procedural dimension of the GPEC lays in the fact that – similarly to 
the method agreements – it consists in a voluntary procedure. The 
management of the human resources within the company became a duty of the 
employer and the employee representatives who had to bargain an agreement 
that safeguarded to the best possible extent their mutual interests. In a 
procedure similar to the one provided for in the Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations, the parties became free to determine the content and 
steps of the procedure to be followed in accordance with their needs and being 
bound only by the minimum content laid down in the law. This proceduralisation 
of the GPEC remembers the content of the proactive directives in the European 
Law of the Participation of the Workforce in which the parties were strongly 
encouraged to bargain their own voluntary agreements for information and 
consultation given the relative indeterminacy  of the content of information and 
consultation and the underlying intention of encouraging a cooperative 
relationship between the parties.         
 This synthetic description of the content and procedure of the GPEC 
allows us to extract some preliminary conclusions regarding this legal 
instrument. The main characteristics of the partnership  agreements outlined 
above consisted in an attempt to progressively  engage employees as 
stakeholders and in their involvement in the decision-making procedures of the 
company by means of procedures for information and consultation that would 
align their interests with the management board and attempt to engage them in 
the promotion of the success of the company. The GPEC reveals all the 
characteristics of a partnership agreement: it is a procedural duty meaning that 
it does not lay down substantive solutions but rather attempts to encourage the 
parties to reach their own solutions by procedural means; it relies on 
information and consultation and attempts to promote the exchange of 
information between the management board and the rank and file of the 
company by providing them with the possibilities to develop  their own 
arrangements in deviation of the law if necessary; the objective of the 
procedure consists in the progressive engagement of employees in the 
management of human resources in the company by making them acquainted 
with the needs of the company, providing them with an instrument to be able to 
influence that management and contribute more actively to the competitiveness 
of the company and engaging them more actively in the restructuring of the 
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business. The objective of the procedure seems to be to overcome the 
adversarial approach characteristic of French collective bargaining and evolve 
towards a more cooperative approach attempting to involve the employees as 
true stakeholders in the company. This is extremely important if we take into 
account two distinct dimensions: the progressive move towards a philosophy of 
“enlightened shareholder value” in French corporate governance and the 
increasing shareholder pressures demand a more cooperative relationship  with 
the employees (the so-called insider/outsider conflict); it is equally an optimal 
means to introduce the philosophy of lean management in French companies 
because this working procedures rely fundamentally on the exchange of 
information between the management and the employees and the assumption 
of responsibilities by the employees in the promotion of the success of the 
company. The GPEC  has all the possibilities of becoming in the future an 
important restructuring instrument for the competitiveness of French 
companies.643   
 
(c)  UK – the UK has equally exhibited some experience with anticipatory 
agreements within companies although the particular characteristics of the 
British model of industrial relations dictated the development of a distinct form 
of agreements and their relationship with the law. In addition, the evolution of 
partnerial forms of work organisation cannot be unbound from the objectives 
pursued recently  by the New Labour Government elected in 1997, which 
attempted to set the basis for a new culture of industrial relations without 
putting in cause what was left of the principles of monism and voluntarism that 
underpinned the British system of collective bargaining. 
 The analysis of the institutional complementarities between the systems 
of corporate governance, firm organisation and collective bargaining made 
above outlined the fact that the monistic and adversarial characteristics of trade 
unions were complementary to a system in which managers were under a 
pressure to deliver results to the shareholders and in which the tayloristic 
system of work organisation emphasised the managerial prerogative by 
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providing managers with the undisputed right to manage the best in the best 
interest of the shareholders. The fierce attacks to trade unionism undertaken 
during the 1980s by the Thatcher Government allowed for an extraordinary 
development of capital markets at the international level but failed to provide 
British companies with the necessary boost in competitiveness to become 
world players once again. The success of more cooperative forms of firm 
organisation by German and Japanese competitors led more and more British 
companies to search for viable alternatives to the traditional adversarial 
approach that characterised British industrial relations and attempt to promote 
more cooperative forms of firm organisation; the answer lay in human resource 
management strategies that have progressively  been attempting to introduce 
more cooperative approaches within companies without questioning the 
managerial prerogative.644
 The New Labour Government that took power in 1997 endorsed labour-
management cooperation or partnership  as an effective approach for improving 
economic performance. The Labour Government’s primary industrial relations 
objective became to change the culture of work relations in and at work based 
on the assumption that efficiency and fairness are wholly  compatible. The new 
culture needed to be based upon understanding and cooperation because it 
was recognised that the prosperity of each employer and employee was 
strongly dependent on the prosperity  of all. This new model of human resource 
management focuses on the achievement of a particular role orientation on the 
part of the employees so that they are flexible, expansive in their perceptions 
and willing contributors to innovation. The best and most often quoted definition 
of this new role for the management and human resource management came 
in the words of Stephen Wood, who coined it as:
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Partnership  is a matter of employers having the right to ask 
employees to develop  themselves in order to accept fresh 
responsibilities whilst they themselves must take responsibility 
for providing the context in which this can happen. In the 
terminology of the principal-agent theory, it is about employers 
having a concern for the employability of the employees and in 
so doing acting as an agent for their development and 
security.645     
This sentence deserves further explanation. Wood did not put in question the 
traditional supremacy of managerialism and the right of managers to decide 
what is best for the firm. Wood rather emphasises the need for workers to 
make commitments and adapt to the needs of their employer and its business 
by adopting a unitarian corporate culture: in the nomenclature of the 
contractarian conception of the firm, workers are to be considered as key 
stakeholders in the company whose collaboration is needed to promote more 
efficiently the success of the business. Their participation is to be achieved by 
means of integrative institutions (a proxy for employee participation 
mechanisms) which will enter into dialogue with the management, understand 
the needs of the business, propose and make arrangements on their possible 
contribution to promote it and then adopt the work procedure (the human 
resources management) towards the promotion of those specific goals. The 
bargaining should evolve from a distributive towards an integrative bargaining. 
 This new philosophy was welcomed by the Trade Union Congress, who 
committed itself to partnership as a new form of bargaining in a document 
issued in 1999 named Partners for Progress: new unionism at the workplace. 
This document identified the six principles underlying company-level industrial 
partnership, which consisted in: (a) a shared commitment to the success of the 
organisation; (b) a commitment by the employer to employment security in 
return for which the union agrees to a higher level of functional flexibility  in the 
work place; (c) a renewed focus on the quality of working life, giving workers 
access to opportunities to improve their skills, focusing attention on improving 
job content and enriching the quality  of work; (d) openness and a willingness to 
share information; (e) adding value – unions, workers and employers must see 
that partnership is delivering measurable improvements; and (f) a recognition 
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by both the union and employer that they each have different and legitimate 
interests.646 
 This approach raises a distinct question, which consists in the 
relationship  between the law and this new philosophy of partnership. To which 
extent should law impose or encourage partnership. The question is hard to 
answer because the traditional British distrust of statutory regulation - 
completely opposed to the French tradition - in particular in the subject of 
industrial relations opposed from the first instance a direct imposition of 
partnership by statutory means. This does not mean however that the law does 
not influence partnership; the approach that has been followed by  the British 
legislator seems to have been one of using the law as an encourager of 
partnership agreements without ever imposing their conclusions and much less 
their content. The main instruments that the British legislator has been using to 
create incentives to company-level social dialogue have been outlined in detail 
above and will only be mentioned briefly here. The first main important 
instrument comes in the statutory  procedure for recognition; considering that 
the unions may achieve mandatory  recognition for a period of three years and 
the employer had a duty to bargain wages, working time and holidays with the 
unions, there is the hope that this procedure will have the reflexive effect of 
encouraging a more proactive dialogue between the parties. Secondly, the 
creation of the workforce agreements and the ad hoc employee representation 
in situations of collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings have 
created an hybrid works council-type body in companies deprived of union 
recognition that is capable of bargaining directly with the employer some of the 
issues that concern them to the furthest extent. Finally, the particular technique 
of transposition of Directive 2002/14 in the Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations, which is strongly underpinned in the technique of 
reflexive law as a means of encouraging the parties to bargain the employee 
representation institutions and the information and consultation mechanisms 
that best fit their own specific needs, provided the parties with the necessary 
instruments to conciliate voluntarism with the requirements of the Directive. The 
combination of these instruments is particularly apt to the development of a 
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partnerial approach to social dialogue at the level of the company. They 
reinforce the powers of the actors at the level of the company (with the 
possibility of union, non-union, joint and other forms of representation) and the 
information and consultation requirements provide them with sufficient flexibility 
to develop their own arrangements free from any statutory coercion and agree 
on the best mutually acceptable outcomes. This is a strong encouragement to 
industrial democracy and partnership because the main purpose of the law is to 
encourage the conclusion of agreements between the parties and a more 
permanent level of social dialogue within the company. This is the functioning of 
reflexive law at its best.647
 The preliminary conclusion that one may extract from the approach to 
partnership agreements in the UK is that partnership  cannot be imposed by the 
law (in particular in a system that still preserves voluntarism to some extent) but 
it may be encouraged by it. The main actors here are the human resource 
management departments that have been tailoring some innovative solutions to 
the competitive needs of companies. There is anecdotic evidence of concrete 
partnership arrangements that have been developed by the employer and 
employee representatives. These agreements have some common 
characteristics that consist in the following traits: (a) greater fluidity  in job 
classifications and hierarchies, (b) indirect forms of supervision, (c) double-
direction communication channels, (d) profit and performance related pay and 
(e) flexible employment/employability as job security.648 It is worth viewing each 
one of these elements in detail.
 The greater fluidity in job classifications essentially  appeals to the 
progressive elimination of hierarchies and the strict job  classifications that 
characterised the fordist production regime. The classifications of jobs are 
becoming more and more open ended and employees are increasingly 
expected not to perform a predefined task but an indeterminate number of 
tasks that fits within its capabilities. This led to the regrouping of workers in 
groups of workers that exhibit names such as quality  circles, just-in-time 
production, etc. These groups of workers are characterised by a lack of 
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hierarchies and they are expected to contribute more actively  in the 
performance of the task attributed to them. This amounts to a direct 
implementation of the philosophy of lean production. 
 The rearrangement of workers in working groups has also modified the 
monitoring mechanisms. The vertical direct monitoring mechanism that was 
characteristic of the fordist production regime is being increasingly substituted 
by indirect monitoring mechanisms with techniques such as peer-pressure 
(since the work of the group  is evaluated as a whole, the remaining members of 
the group  will monitor themselves in order to prevent shirking by any  individual 
member), performance targets, appraisals of performance and financial 
measures of performance. The incentive to work hard and to prevent shirking 
does not come from penalties but from incentives. 
 The improvement of communication channels is an element of central 
importance. The extraction and exploitation of knowledge from the workforce 
requires new types of procedures and organisational arrangements. The firm 
has to create processes and systems through which the knowledge is shares 
and used productively. This implies the transmission of information from the 
management to the workforce, in order to allow them to adapt their work 
capabilities to the requirements of the company, but also from the workforce to 
the management, in order for the management to make the necessary 
arrangements to extract the most from the possibilities of the workforce. It is 
imperative to strengthen the free flows of information that bind the firm together. 
 The remuneration system is another element of central importance. The 
remuneration systems during fordism had been based upon fixed sums varying 
in accordance with professional category and seniority  and there was an 
absolute protection of the wage. This system was typical of a rigid organisation 
in which the employee had no margin of manoeuvre based upon a conflicting 
hierarchy with the management hesitant to pay  the labour cost. The 
cooperative approach to labour management depends of another type of 
remuneration system; since employees have greater autonomy in their work, it 
is normal and understandable that part of their remuneration is performance 
based because it intends to create incentives to increase the productivity  of the 
workforce; on the other hand, profit-sharing schemes are equally common as it 
intends to make employees aware that they are equally part of the business, 
increasing their remunerations in times of gains and reducing it in times of 
638
economic troubles. This is an integrative approach that intends to create 
incentives for value-creation and a more collaborative approach with the 
company. 
 The question of security  in employment is another important issue. 
Security in employment during fordism was achieved by protecting the status of 
the worker. In a cooperative form of industrial relations, employment security 
can be achieved by two means: firstly, by means of flexibility in the workplace; 
secondly by means of employability. These two measures are destined to 
encourage the adaptation of the worker within the company and to flexibilise its 
performance of work while the second is destined to encourage employee 
adhesion to the company by providing it with the necessary knowledge to the 
employed elsewhere and ensure a successful professional transition.                  
 The distinguishing feature of these agreements is that they are made 
voluntarily, independently of any legal coercion of command. The regulatory 
scheme for industrial relations simply intends to provide for a procedural 
framework to encourage the parties to bargain their own arrangements and 
reach the best optimal solutions. This is consistent with the philosophy of 
voluntarism that still prevails in British industrial relations according to which the 
parties are strongly  encouraged to make their own arrangements for 
participation. On the other hand, anecdotic evidence from the study of the 
concrete agreements reveals that there is a strong connection between the use 
of these agreements and the implementation of the philosophy of lean 
production within companies. These are the conclusions that may be drawn 
from the study of partnership agreements in British law.   
(d) Portugal – Portugal has equally  exhibited some experiences with 
partnership agreements although the situation is Portugal is singular in some 
aspects. The Portuguese experience with partnership  agreements has largely 
been made outside the law – although it has been often publicly  praised by the 
Government – since it consists in a form of bargaining made outside the 
boundaries of the law and based upon purely voluntary agreements. The legal 
value of these agreements is extremely doubtful although they have been 
spreading. It consists in a form of social bargaining made outside the statutory 
procedures largely based upon a gentleman’s agreement between the 
employer and the employee representatives. 
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 Trade unions enjoy a monopoly of collective bargaining in Portugal 
because they are the only  parties recognised by  the law as legitimate to 
conclude collective agreements regulating collectively the conditions of work 
(art.2CTP). This means that works councils and the collectiveness of the 
employees of the company do not enjoy any collective bargaining capacity; 
there is no such thing as a “workforce agreement”, “Betriebsvereinbarung” or 
“accord d’entreprise” in Portuguese Law. Although works councils and 
employers have been making pressures throughout the years to introduce 
these kind of agreements in Portugal (named as “acordos gerais de empresa”), 
they have always met the most fierce opposition by  the trade unions. Since the 
unionisation levels are low in the private sector and the majority of collective 
bargaining takes place at the industry level (and covering circa 80% of the 
workforce by means of the administrative procedures for extension), the trade 
unions oppose any kind of measure that might disturb  their predominance at 
the industry  level and never allowed for the introduction of these agreements 
into Portuguese law.649    
 The reality  has proven distinct from the statutes. The Portuguese 
landscape of industrial relations has witnessed the expansion of a number of 
agreements made outside the law that came to be known as “atypical 
agreements” (a proxy for illegal agreements) concluded directly between the 
management and the workforce without the opposition of the unions, who 
refused to go to courts and challenge directly these agreements. These 
agreements first appeared in the period that covered from 1974-1990 in which 
there was a massive wave of nationalisations of the major companies in 
Portugal (until the mid-1980s) that was followed by another wave of 
privatisations and growth of stock markets (from the mid-1980s onwards). In 
addition to this wave of nationalisations and privatisations, there was equally an 
extensive industry-level restructuring of all companies (independently  of the 
size) in order to adapt the productive units of the country  to the accession to 
the European communities and the common market. Since the majority of the 
trade unions were politically compromised and were unable to provide an 
effective answer to these successive waves of massive restructurings, the 
employers and the employees took upon their own hands the duty to bargain 
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the best means of coping with these challenges and bargained a number of 
agreements that were the functional equivalent of workforce agreements 
(Betriebsvereinbarungen) with the works councils or the employees directly. 
These workforce agreements proved successful and currently they are 
extremely widespread across the industries taking the form of informal 
agreements with the workforce.650 
 European Law also had considerable influence in the spreading of these 
agreements. The Labour Code provides for information and consultation 
procedures in situations of collective redundancies, transfer of undertakings 
and lay-offs. The details of these procedures were outlined above and will not 
be repeated here. The most important thing to retain is that these in-company 
information and consultation procedures are destined to result in an agreement 
(although the agreement is not mandatory; there is a duty of means and not a 
duty  of result) that has a very dubious legal value in Portuguese law because 
the labour code does not recognise it among its sources of labour law. The 
transposition of the EU Directives and the action of the lawmaker attempt to 
promote an agreement that has no place in the sources of labour law in 
Portugal. That is the reason why these agreements came to be known an 
atypical agreements.651
 The legal value of these atypical agreements is extremely dubious. 
There are three positions concerning the value of these agreements. One 
position considers them as a pre-constitutional form of collective bargaining 
that the Portuguese Constitution failed to recognise; since collective bargaining 
would be – like the family – a pre-constitutional phenomenon that the 
Constitution simply recognised, they had to fit within the constitutionally 
recognised freedom of coalition and right to collective bargaining and an 
interpretation of the law in accordance with the constitution had to recognise 
them legal value. They  were socially typical but legally atypical. Another 
position recognise them validity and applied the old principle tu paeter legem 
(you suffer the consequences of your own law) considering that they were 
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unilateral engagements by the employer or the employee representatives and 
had to be recognised as valid by the law. A third position simply  considered 
them invalid because they did not fit within the statutorily recognised sources of 
labour law.652       
 There are several examples of these agreements and only some of them 
are documented. An analysis is extremely  difficult because these negotiations 
take place fundamentally at an informal basis and they are difficult to control. 
The most prominent example is the one of AutoEuropa, the Volkswagen 
production unit located in Palmela, Portugal. As a preliminary word, one must 
say that AutoEuropa alone represents 8% of Portuguese exports and 2% of 
Portuguese GDP. The German management at AutoEuropa has implemented 
since the beginning of the production unit a German style system of industrial 
relations largely based upon direct dialogue and consensus with the workforce. 
One example was the agreement signed in 2003; the works council agreed to 
forgo a pay rise in order to cope with the crisis that was threatening the 
existence of the plant and the maintenance of the employment levels and 
exchange the reduced remuneration for non-working days or a complete halt of 
the production of the factory during some periods in time in order to maintain its 
existence.653  The management and the works council also signed in 2006 
another agreement in order to cut labour costs and increase flexibility; the 
terms of the agreement stated that there would be a phased wage increase in a 
period of two years that would amount to a total increase of 5%; in exchange 
for this increase in normal working time, the remuneration for extraordinary 
working hours would be decreased from 200% to 100%. In addition, the 
workers also agreed to undergo training measures in order to increase their 
efficiency levels and flexibility in performing several tasks. This agreement 
ensured the maintenance of the factory in Palmela for another period of 10 
years and the creation of an additional 3000 jobs (direct and indirect).654 
 These agreements had been widely praised by the successive 
Portuguese Governments – Left and Right – as an example of the path to 
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follow in industrial relations and the possibility  of an agreement between the 
management and the workforce and the overcoming of the adversarial 
approach that characterised Portuguese industrial relations. Despite the 
success of the agreements, the social partners have persistently refused to 
accept their expansion into other companies (although they have refrained from 
challenging AutoEuropa in the courts) and the introduction of workforce 
agreements in Portugal. This does not mean that they do not exist however but 
merely that they exist at the margin of the law; in the words of Nunes de 
Carvalho, it is a socially typical but legally atypical phenomenon.                  
5.2.3 Conclusion
This short overview of the content of anticipatory agreements may allow us to 
extract some comparative conclusions. These agreements seem to be 
underpinned in five common characteristics that determine their content. Firstly, 
these agreements are mainly  procedural in the sense of not laying out the 
content of the partnership  agreement but mainly providing the parties with the 
necessary legal framework to reach that agreement; this is particularly  evident 
in France (with the GPEC) and the UK (in which the statutory procedures 
refrain to the fullest extent from dictating substantive solutions) where these 
agreements are essentially procedural and relying on a technique of reflexive 
law. Secondly, these procedures are heavily  linked to human resource 
management; they seem to the intended to manage the human resources in 
the company in a proactive and efficient form and evolve from a distributive 
towards an integrative bargaining; the only  exception here seem to be 
Germany, where the agreements appear to be linked more to flexibility 
agreements than to human resource management; this may be explained by 
the strong co-determination powers of the Betriebsrat in the management of 
human resources in the workplace, which makes this dimension of the 
agreements appear less important. Thirdly, these agreements are equally 
strongly underpinned in the philosophy of lean management with an emphasis 
on decentralisation of decision-making procedures, progressive elimination of 
hierarchies, flexibility  in the workplace and the reinforcement of the dual-
channels of information in the workplace in order to reduce information 
asymmetries. Finally, these agreements equally appear to exhibit a philosophy 
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of concession bargaining (particularly in Germany, where they are linked to 
flexibilisation agreements) in which the employees make concessions to the 
firm in exchange for other types of benefits that the improvement of the 
competitiveness of the firm may bring them in the future. These five 
characteristics may allow us to understand the reach of the definition of 
“partnership agreements” made at the beginning of this session: they  consist in 
the most complete form of recognition of employees as true stakeholders of the 
company (within a contractarian conception of the firm) and the mechanisms 
devised in them appear to be designed to reduce the agency costs that occur 
between the management and the workforce in the face of increasing 
shareholder and market pressure (the so-called insider/outsider conflict) and 
are designed to integrate employees more fully  into the firm and align their 
interests with the competitive interests of the firm; the five characteristics 
assigned to them above are the means the best achieve these objectives.  
5.2.4 Comparative perspectives
One may attempt to put forward at this point some conclusions concerning the 
evolution of collective bargaining. The former chapters of this thesis attempted 
to outline the institutional complementarities that appear to exist between the 
regulation of employee representation (including collective bargaining) in each 
jurisdiction, the prevailing pattern of corporate governance and the overall 
economic conditions.  Collective bargaining developed in Continental Europe 
the context of a system characterised by a macro-economic environment 
underpinned in keynesianist ideals, fordist production structures and 
concentrated relational governance structures. The function of collective 
bargaining was to pacify the labour market, avoid competition in terms of labour 
costs between companies and allow the retention of profits to finance the 
expansion of the company. The only exception was the UK, a country where 
the dispersed ownership  patterns provided managers with a considerable 
degree of autonomy to run the business and decentralised collective bargaining 
was a complementary part of this system of insulation from shareholder 
pressure. The situation modified considerably from the 1980s onwards: the 
expiry of the previous model of growth led governments to rearrange their 
macro-economic environments towards monetarist policies. This had a 
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considerable impact in the governance of companies. The economic cycle 
became increasingly unstable, the market capitalisation of companies 
expanded considerably, institutional investors (a proxy for investment funds) 
entered the stock markets with the purpose of influencing the governance of 
listed companies, the preferred growth technique transitioned from growth 
through expansion to growth through innovation, companies became 
increasingly governed in terms of their capacity to generate profits and a 
widespread movement of decentralisation of companies began to took place 
under the  ideals of lean management. This placed a considerable degree of 
pressure upon managers in all jurisdictions to deliver shareholder value as a 
standard of performance. This had to have an impact on the existing models of 
collective bargaining, which had to adapt to the new demands. 
 The new types of agreements may be considered as an evolution of the 
structures of collective bargaining in order to deal with this new macro-
economic environment, governance of companies and organisation of 
production. The significance of the agreements must be seen within their due 
context - because the structures of collective bargaining vary widely  - but they 
may be boldly  subsumed to three distinct types of agreements: flexibilisation 
agreements, procedural agreements and anticipatory agreements. 
 Flexibilisation agreements consist in a modality of agreements destined 
to flexibilise the working conditions at the level of the company. They focus 
mainly  in the subjects of wages and working time and are prominently used as 
a means of adapting the working time to the demands of the customers and the 
wages to the economic fluctuations in order to avoid redundancies or 
bankruptcies.They have a direct connection to the post-1970 macro-economic 
environment - characterised by an unstable economy, fierce international 
competition, shareholder pressure to deliver financial results and widespread 
restructuring of production - and attempt to align the interests of managers and 
employees in order to ensure the competitiveness and/or survival of the 
company. These agreements pose a considerable danger because they may 
be used as a means of undermining the collectively agreed conditions of work. 
That is the reason why their application was surrounded by precautions mainly 
in the form of a requirement of approval of the trade unions in their existence 
and application. They represent nonetheless an important instrument of 
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flexibility while attempting to safeguard the interests of employees in a new 
unstable world. 
 Procedural agreements perform a distinct function. They intend to 
improve the communication channels between the management and workforce 
within the company. The purpose and objective of the procedural agreements is 
to lay down the formalities to be observed in certain restructuring procedures in 
order to avoid the externalisation of social conflicts into the courts or industrial 
action and allow the implementation of restructuring in a quick and efficient 
manner. These agreements presuppose two things: they presuppose an 
employee adhesion to the need of restructuring and a willingness of the 
management to engage into dialogue in order to find the best solution or to 
minimise its consequences. They allow for a constant adaptation of companies 
to the demands of stakeholders or to the instability of the  macro-economic 
environment and promote the competitiveness of companies while minimising 
the social consequences. 
 Anticipatory agreements consist in the final stage of development of the 
new types of collective agreements. These are procedural agreements, heavily 
linked to human resource management, that bet upon lean management, 
decentralisation and concession bargaining as a means of reducing the agency 
costs of managers/shareholders vis-à-vis employees in the firm and attempt to 
engage them into the success of the firm by means of flexible work procedures, 
in-company social dialogue and constantly readapting compromises. They may 
consist in the most complete form of recognition of employees as true 
stakeholders of the company.
 These diverse types of agreements may be considered as a 
development and readaptation of the traditional structures of collective 
bargaining to the new macro-economic environment and corporate governance 
structures. They appear to recognise employees as stakeholders of the 
company and attempt to engage them in the success of the company by means 
of flexibilising their wages and working time in order to allow the company to 
adapt to economic fluctuations and the demands of stakeholders, improve the 
communication channels in order to allow the company to engage in a 
successful restructuring with a minimum of social consequences and engage 
employees in the success of the company by  means of the improvement of the 
communication channels between management and employees, a human 
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resource management underpinned in lean management and decentralisation 
and concession bargaining in order to make the company more competitive.    
5.3. Evolution of Employee Representation and SMC: short 
comparative remarks 
This overview of the evolution of employee representation and collective 
bargaining cannot forget an overview – necessarily short – concerning the 
evolution of employee representation in small and medium companies. Several 
of the measures that were described above are of particular importance to 
small and medium companies and their role should be righteously stressed. 
 The European definition of a small and medium enterprise considers it 
as an entreprise bellow the thresholds of 50 (small) or 250 (medium) 
employees.655  These companies are not simply large companies in a small 
scale. Social dialogue in these types of companies is greatly facilitated because 
the (relatively) small thresholds of employees and the direct dialogue between 
the management layers and the rank and file – often by means of a simple 
routine walk along the production unit - facilitates direct flows of information 
between the employees and the management independently of institutional 
forms of representation. This is particularly  important for companies whose 
main activity  is to work as contractors for major companies in accordance with 
the philosophy of lean management. These companies are under an increasing 
pressure and preponderance from an external contractor that in reality  acts as 
a major shareholder of the company (because the financial survival of the 
company is dependent of a relatively small number of clients) and they are 
under an increasing demand for flexibility  – particularly in the subject of working 
time – in order to accommodate the demands of its major overwhelming 
stakeholder. This places a great deal of pressure upon these small companies 
because they need to flexibilise their production to maintain their main client. 
Since union implementation in these companies is generally feeble there is a 
great deal of illegal activities in these companies to the detriment of employees. 
That was the reason why nearly  all the jurisdictions in this study have 
attempted to introduce measures to facilitate the functioning of small and 
medium companies and allow them to remain competitive. 
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 The measures that the majority  of the jurisdictions adopted were 
fundamentally  in the form of derogatory  agreements in the subject of working 
time. The objective of these agreements was to provide these companies with 
sufficient flexibility in working time to accommodate their productive procedures 
to the demands of their major stakeholders without endangering their 
competitive position and safeguarding the position of the employees. The 
foremost example is the UK with the introduction of the derogatory  agreements 
in the subject of working time. These workforce agreements, analysed above, 
were specifically  designed for small companies that needed to adapt constantly 
to fluctuations in the demands. Since union implementation in those companies 
was usually feeble, the legislator provided for the setting up of “works council” 
type bodies that would bargain the derogations to the procedure (which were 
latter subject to an administrative approval). Portugal exhibited the same 
tendency. The recent reform in working time with the creation of working time 
accounts (bancos de horas) that allows companies to deviate from the 
standards laid down in collective agreements under certain conditions was 
designed precisely to allow small companies to adapt within an easily 
controlled procedure to the fluctuations in demand and the requirements of 
their major clients. This was particularly welcomed in Portugal as a large 
proportion of Portuguese small companies work as subcontractors to 
companies located abroad. The same thing goes for Germany: the opening 
clauses contained in German collective agreements were particularly 
welcomed by small companies because this provided them once again with 
sufficient flexibility  in order to remain competitive in international markets while 
preventing a general movement of escape from collective agreements. 
 The French case deserves a special paragraph. The evolution of French 
Labour Law outlined above attempted to describe how the progressive 
reinforcement of the powers of the actors at the level of the company was 
accompanied with the progressive development of derogatory agreements up 
to the point that the company-level is increasingly becoming the main focus of 
bargaining in France and the industry level is becoming wholly subsidiary. The 
evolution of the powers of the actors intended to create incentives for employee 
representation that had both an elective and a designate legitimacy: the priority 
given to the actors in the signing of derogatory agreements is the following: (1) 
shop stewards (who are primarily elected by the trade union among the 
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candidates to the elections), (2) staff-delegates holding a union mandate or (3) 
staff-delegates but subject to the approval of the employees by means of a 
referendum and a subsequent approval by a paritary commission. These actors 
have an extraordinary power at the level of the company because the 
sequence of possibilities of derogation initiated by the Auroux Laws turned the 
company level into the main level of bargaining.
 This small explanation of the evolution of the regulations may assist us 
in understanding that several of those provisions were specifically thought for 
small and medium companies or may be of an extreme advantage to them. 
This is particularly important because the large majority of the population works 
in these companies and this is where the greatest attacks to labour law occur 
within countries. These possibilities of controlled decentralisation and limited 
flexibilisation are extremely important in a terrain characterised by  low levels of 
institutional social dialogue and where the needs for flexibility are felt more 
acutely.   
  
5.4. Corporate Governance, Firm Organisation and Collective 
Bargaining – new institutional complementarities? 
The final chapter of this thesis will attempt to outline the new institutional 
complementarities that may have arisen from the modifications in corporate 
governance, firm organisation and collective bargaining. Before analysing each 
one of the new institutional complementarities that appear to be emerging, it is 
useful to recall briefly the modifications that have occurred.
 The modifications that have occurred in corporate governance 
fundamentally  consist in the reinforcement of the position of shareholders 
across each European jurisdiction. This reinforcement comes in the form of (a) 
increased supervision of the management board, thus reducing the agency 
costs vis-à-vis shareholders that an excessive managerial autonomy could 
cause, (b) changed ownership patterns (that consisted in the entry of 
institutional shareholders in Continental European stock markets and in the 
evolutional towards a more relational shareholding in the UK initiated by  the 
Companies Act 2006), which placed a greater degree of pressure upon the 
management in Continental Europe to provide results and to engage in 
relational management in the UK and (c) a reinforcement of the rights of 
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shareholders across Europe. European Law as equally had an impact in this 
evolution because it accompanied these trends. The reinforcement of the rights 
of shareholders does not amount to a general evolution towards the Anglo-
American model of shareholder value as Hansmann argued.656  The 
unequivocal reinforcement of the position of shareholders was counterbalanced 
with some important counterweights that limit their preponderance. The 
introduction of the institution of fiduciary  duties across each jurisdiction was 
made in accordance with the idea of enlightened shareholder value; this 
provides the management board with a considerable margin of manoeuvre in 
managing the company in the long-term interest of the shareholders and 
making the necessary  alliances with the stakeholders in order to promote long-
term sustainable shareholder value. The entry of institutional investors in 
Europe was not so overwhelming to the point of transforming European stock 
markets; although the levels of ownership concentration are considerable lower 
in Continental Europe, they still suffice to produce stable blockholdings; on the 
other hand, the concentration of ownership in the UK did not produce a 
Continental style relational form of governance but rather limited the influence 
of some aggressive institutional investors. Finally, the reinforcement of the 
shareholder rights was mainly  coupled with the rights to be exercised at the 
general meeting, which presuppose a relatively  large shareholding that creates 
incentives for relational investment; the case of the UK was once again singular 
because the reinforcement of the rights of shareholders was implemented in 
order to overcome the exit strategy that characterised British corporate 
governance and implement a voice strategy. The reinforcement of the 
possibility of enacting shareholder suits was counterbalanced with mechanisms 
to ensure that they  were made in the interest of the company as a whole and 
not in the interest of the shareholders. The combined effect of these 
modifications consists in the creation of a hybrid type of corporate governance 
in which the relational systems will be maintained as such although with 
important modifications derived from the reinforcement of the rights of non-
controlling shareholders (who will have a more active voice) and the British 
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system seems to be evolving towards a market system tempered with more 
relational elements.657
 The evolution in the organisation of firms cannot be forgotten. The 
extremely influential model of fordism, characterised by a strict division of work 
in large vertically  integrated units, is increasingly being replaced by a model of 
organisation of work that came to be known as lean production that bets on the 
vertical desintegration of companies in networks of companies, the 
decentralisation of decision-making towards the lower levels of the firm, the 
reorganisation of the hierarchies and the functional divisions into working units 
and the security  of employment based upon professional and geographical 
flexibility in the workplace (which includes wage flexibility) and the innovative 
concept of employability. In addition, employees are expected to adhere to the 
progress of the company and contribute to it in a proactive form. This 
modification of the organisation of work arose from the pressures in the capital 
and product markets to deliver better and cheaper goods. This had an impact in 
the organisation of companies that evolved from the large vertically integrated 
unit towards the mother company bound to a network of subcontractors by 
contractual means.658
These modifications necessarily had to have an impact in the 
organisation of employee representation. The beginning of this chapter 
attempted to illustrate the diversity  of the patterns of employee representation 
in each jurisdiction under study and the institutional complementarities that 
those patterns of employee representation had in relation to the prevailing 
system of corporate governance in that country in accordance with a 
contractarian conception of the firm. The second part of this chapter attempted 
to demonstrate the evolutions in the forms of employee representation with the 
emergence of new types of actors and agreements in each one of the 
jurisdictions under study that appear to obey to some common principles. An 
element of extreme importance, because it modelled the evolution of the 
national models, consisted in the evolution of the system of European 
employee representation. The description of the European Law on the 
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participation of the workforce stressed that the evolution of the Directives 
tended towards the progressive involvement of the workers in the life of 
companies; this involvement was made by means of the enactment of 
information and consultation procedures in specific circumstances (the so-
called reactive directives) towards a more indeterminate and permanent level of 
social dialogue in transnational companies (the proactive directives). The 
evolution from the reactive towards the proactive directives was accomplished 
by two means: the diversification of the powers of the actors at the level of the 
company and the reinforcement of the procedures for information and 
consultation of the workforce, which evolved from subject-specific towards a 
dynamic open-ended procedure. The national models of employee 
representation seem to have equally  exhibited a similar evolution: each 
jurisdiction under study seems to have undertaken measures to reinforce the 
powers of the actors at the company-level and devised new types of 
agreements. These new types of agreements are of a paramount importance 
because they appear to be the sign of a new type of industrial relations based 
upon cooperation between the management and the workforce. These 
agreements may be flexibilisation agreements, procedural agreements or 
partnership agreements. The flexibilisation agreements allow the management 
and the employee representatives (whether union or elected) to deviate from 
the standards laid down in the law or collective agreements in certain 
circumstances and in accordance to certain limits. The objective is to deal with 
crisis situations and avoid redundancies or the insolvency of the company. 
Procedural agreements are a distinct type of agreements that attempt to 
bargain a restructuring before it occurs. The objective is to avoid social conflict 
and agree on the stages that the restructuring procedure will follow. Their main 
application is collective redundancies procedures although they are not limited 
to them. Finally, partnership agreements consist in procedures destined to 
engage the workforce more actively  in the promotion of the success of the 
company and encouraging them to undertake a more participative role. They 
often involve stages of concession bargaining by the employee representatives 
in exchange for other types of benefits by the employer. 
The question remains: are the evolutions in the models of employee 
representation (underpinned in a diverse role for the actors at the level of the 
company and new types of agreements) linked to the developments in 
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corporate governance? Can they  be considered as institutionally 
complementary? There seems to be a link between them that the following 
matrix will attempt to demonstrate:
S t r o n g e r 
Sharehold.
Protection
Fiduciary duties Lean management
Diverse Actors 1 2 3
New Agreements 4 5 6
(1)  diverse company-level actors + stronger shareholder protection – 
there seems to be a link between the development of the actors at the level of 
the company and the reinforcement of the position of shareholders achieved by 
the reforms in the structures of the management board, their statutory rights 
and ownership structures. The reinforcement of the protection of the 
shareholders (in particular non-controlling shareholders) reduced their agency 
cost vis-à-vis managers who saw themselves under an increased pressure to 
deliver results. This might have given rise to a class-conflict (characterised by 
the alignment of interests of managers and shareholders against employees) 
that the employees had to fight somehow.659 The solution seems to have laid in 
the development of employee representation within the company. The 
diversification of the powers of the actors at the level of the company had the 
capacity of providing the management board with sufficient margin of 
manoeuvre to adapt the management of the company to the pressure of the 
shareholders and at the same time attempt to safeguard the interests of the 
employees within the company.
(2)  diverse actors + fiduciary duties – the reinforcement of the power of the 
actors at the level of the company and the widespread introduction of the 
philosophy of enlightened shareholder value by means of the legal transplant of 
fiduciary  duties also seems to be connected. The purpose of the fiduciary 
duties and the enlightened shareholder value theory was to provide 
management with a margin of manoeuvre within the company in order to 
pursue long-term strategies free from impatient shareholders pressure. The 
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reinforcement of the powers of the company-level actors seems to have been 
complementary to this development because the employee representatives 
could use this margin of manoeuvre in order to attempt to safeguard their 
interests in the pursuit of shareholder value. Since managers had to abide by 
the pressure of shareholders, employees had to devise a way to cope with that 
pressure. 
(3)  diverse actors + lean management  – the reinforcement of the powers of 
the actors also seems to be connected to the philosophy of lean management. 
Since the philosophy of lean management is strongly dependent on the 
organisation of workers in working units gifted with a considerable degree of 
autonomy, the reinforcement of the powers of the actors at the level of the 
company appears to be a natural development of this technique of work 
organisation. 
(4)  new agreements and stronger shareholder protection -  the new type of 
agreements equally seem to be connected to the stronger protection afforded 
to shareholders. Since managers had to abide by increasing pressures by 
shareholders, these new types of agreements allowed them to cope with 
situations of crisis and economic downturn, engage in quick and peaceful 
restructurings or to devise the best internal organisation that would boost the 
competitiveness of the company.
(5)  new agreements + fiduciary duties – the link between the new types of 
agreements and the fiduciary duties appears evident. The margin of 
manoeuvre provided to the management board by the fiduciary duties may be 
used to bargain these new types of agreements  and adapt the company to 
changed conditionalisms. 
(6)  new agreements + lean management  – the link also appears to be 
evident. These agreements appear to be a means of restructuring and 
implementation of this new philosophy of work organisation, in particular the 
procedural and the partnership agreements.
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Conclusion 
The developments in the national forms of employee representation and 
collective bargaining seem to have been able to provide an adaptation to the 
challenges raised by a more shareholder-oriented form of governance and the 
defies of regulation, product markets and the attitude of investors identified by 
Deakin et allii.660 The key provisions here are the fiduciary duties of managers 
and the new types of agreements. The fiduciary duties of managers – in 
particular the implementation of the business judgement rule – have provided 
managers with a relevant margin of manoeuvre from the pressures of 
shareholders. Although they are still ultimately accountable to shareholders, 
their position allows them to develop  a number of alliances. The diversification 
of the powers of the actors at the level of the company seems to be of 
paramount importance to deal with these challenges. The new types of 
agreements provide managers with sufficient margin of manoeuvre to 
overcome unexpected downturns in economic activity without having to engage 
in redundancies, achieve quicker and peaceful restructurings and align their 
interests with those of the employees by means of partnership  agreements. 
This appears as a good implementation in each country – to the extent possible 
– of the idea of democratie économique put forward by Aglietta/Rebérioux as 
the future model of governance of companies that is capable of fostering 
economic and competitive growth as well as social protection.661  If we place 
this in the language of the contractarian conception of the company, it appears 
as the best possible means of reducing the agency costs of managers vis-à-vis 
shareholders and stakeholders (employees) that the governance of the 
company in this new competitive world demands. One question remains 
however: there in an undeniable reinforcement of the powers of the 
shareholders in this new economy that places a considerable degree of 
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661 Aglietta, M. and A. Rebérioux (2004). Dérives du capitalisme financier, Bibliothèque Albin 
Michel.
pressure upon the managers in addition to the fierce international competition. 
The philosophy of enlightened shareholder value that underpins the fiduciary 
duties in the corporate governance reforms that are currently taking place may 
place a defence mechanism but never a barrier to the overwhelming pressure 
of shareholders. The adaptation of the structures of employee representation 
and collective agreements may provide an answer but never a counterweight to 
the pressure to deliver results. It is still considerably  easier to make employees 
redundant in order to cut costs and maintain the results than to convince 
shareholders of the benefits of a longer-term investment culture and the need 
to invest in human capital. Despite the merits of these transformations, 
employees are still in a considerably  weak position and these new mechanisms 
appear to be more of an adaptation due to the strength of the circumstances 
than a proper counterbalance to the pressure of the shareholders.           
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Thesis  
Corporate Governance and Labour Law were - until recently - regarded  as 
radically separate fields of study. With the only  exception of the German 
“Unternehmensrecht”, which deals with the particularities of the German 
system of co-determination, the majority  of the company an labour lawyers 
never investigated the possible relationships between Corporate Governance 
and Labour Law. This thesis attempted to challenge this view using a 
contractarian conception of the company and the theory of institutional 
complementarities and present in a European and comparative evolutionary 
perspective how the national systems of Corporate Governance, Employee 
Representation and Collective Bargaining may be regarded as complementary 
and how the systems are currently  in a state of change that follows two 
common paths: the hybridisation of the structures of Corporate Governance 
and the decentralisation of the structures of Employee Representation and 
Collective Bargaining.  
 The advances in the theory  of the firm have increasingly challenged the 
division between Corporate Governance and Labour Law. The widespread 
conceptualisation of the firm as a nexus of contracts and the classification of 
employees as stakeholders of the firm led some leading scholarship  to 
interrogate the position of employees in the governance of the firm and the 
impact of the distinct systems of Corporate Governance upon the employment 
relations.662  This soon proved to be a daunting task: there is a diversity  of 
systems of Corporate Governance and Labour Law across countries and the 
fact that these systems did not emerge merely by means of market forces but 
by means of a plethora of processes that combined the prevalent political 
economy of a country, tradition, interest groups, cultural factors, the products 
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markets, among other elements, complicated all attempts to undertake an 
analysis.663      
 This thesis proposed to use the concept of institutional 
complementarities developed by Aoki in order to understand the possible 
complementarities between each national system of Corporate Governance 
and Employee Representation (including collective bargaining). The author 
proposed that each one of the elements of the national system could be 
considered as complementary to the remaining elements of the system in such 
a form as to create a joint result that is greater than the individual parts 
composing it. It is worthwhile remembering that each one of the elements of the 
system must be seen within its due context in the set of attempts to explain the 
development of the distinct patterns of corporate governance and employee 
representation: these elements are the macro-economic environment, the 
prevalent system of organisation of production, the political economy of the 
country, among others. This thesis defended that the national systems of 
corporate governance and employee representation developed in the context of 
a macro-economic environment characterised by keynesianism, fordist 
production structures and growth by vertical expansion. The institutional 
complementarities between corporate governance and employee 
representation assist in understanding the reasons why the national systems 
developed within that institutional endowment with certain specific 
configurations. 
 This analysis faced another difficulty however. The national systems of 
Corporate Governance, Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining 
under analysis are not immutable but have been in a stage of change over the 
last years. The institutional endowment in which companies operated modified 
considerably from the 1970s onwards. The successive crises that hit the 
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Western world and the exhaustion of the former models of production 
demanded a deep reform of the system. The macro-economic system modified 
from keynesianism towards monetarism; the preferred model of growth 
changed from expansion towards innovation; companies had to deal with a 
considerably new economically unstable world; the preferred model of growth 
modified from fordism towards lean production; the crisis of the early 2000s 
with the corporate scandals raised the awareness of the need for a new system 
of production. 
 This demanded some considerable transformations to the systems. This 
thesis then proceeded to analyse the developments in the national systems of 
Corporate Governance, Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining in 
order to attempt to understand the scope of evolution.
 The national systems of Corporate Governance are currently in a state 
of change. The legal thinking has tended to reduce the debate on the changes 
to three distinct trends: some claim that the national systems of Corporate 
Governance are currently  converging towards one single best model of 
Corporate Governance, which is generally  coincident with the anglo-saxon 
model; others claim that the scope for convergence is more apparent than real 
and that in reality  systems are diverging for a number of reasons, such as path-
dependencies, the pressure of interest groups, political economies, among 
others; finally  some claim that there appears to be in reality a phenomenon of 
hybridisation of the patterns of Corporate Governance by means of which each 
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system will borrow elements from the other system and develop its own system 
of Corporate Governance.664 
 This thesis attempted to analyse these theories against the background 
of the developments registered in each one of the countries under study. Using 
a comparative methodology, this thesis attempted to analyse the developments 
registered in management boards, ownership structures, shareholder rights 
and in the governance of SMC. We found that the national patterns of 
Corporate Governance appear to be in a state of hybridisation: whereas it is 
undeniable that relational and governmental systems are increasingly 
becoming more marketised and exposed to the pressure of shareholders, it is 
nonetheless undeniable that the market systems are also currently in a state of 
change that is introducing relational systems in them. We conclude that the 
final result appears to be one of hybridisation: the main features of the national 
systems of Corporate Governance will be maintained but not in its purest form 
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because they will borrow elements from the other system. EU Law has equally 
contributed to this trend.        
 The transformations in the national systems of Corporate Governance 
raises the question of their impact in national systems of Employee 
Representation and Collective Bargaining. If systems are to be seen as 
complementary, then the transformations in some elements of the system will 
necessarily have an impact in the other elements. We also collected data from 
the evolution in the national systems that appears to reveal that national 
systems are also undergoing a process of hybridisation of their national 
structures.
 The analysis of the developments of the national systems of employee 
representation should initiate with the transformations in the organisations of 
companies. The means by which a company is organised is the form of 
allocation of the inputs in the form of capital and labour in the nexus of 
contracts that composes the firm. The industrial relations literature has outlined 
that systems of organisation of production have gone through three distinct 
stages over the last 50 years: craft production, fordism and lean production. 
The most relevant ones for this thesis are fordism and lean production. Fordism 
is a means of organisation of production that is designed for the production of 
mass commodities. The prevalent systems of Corporate Governance, 
Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining emerged in Europe during 
the times of the Imperium of fordism. Since Europe needed an industrialised 
economy capable of producing cheap and mass goods, then the existing 
systems of Corporate Governance and Employee Representation had to adapt 
in accordance with the needs of this system of production. That is the reason 
why we witnessed the emergence of concentrated shareholdings and mass 
labour unions in Continental Europe and unaccountable managers and 
decentralised company-level unions in the UK. The modifications that occurred 
in the economic circumstances from the 1970s onwards implied a great degree 
of changes to the structures of Corporate Governance and the organisation of 
firms. The  economic fluctuations, the pressure of the shareholders and the 
general view that the company should be restructured for “shareholder value” - 
the new standard for business performance - implied a new organisation of 
firms in what became known as lean management. In short, this managerial 
philosophy encouraged the concentration of companies to its core-business - 
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outsourcing all ancillary activities - the division of companies in strategic 
business units, the projectification of labour and the promotion of participative 
management schemes. The idea was to promote the engagement of 
employees in their companies in order to allow them to become more 
adaptable to the economic fluctuations and to the pressure of shareholders.       
 The analysis of the modifications occurred in the national systems 
should initiate with a review of the modifications introduced by EU Law. EU Law 
has accepted change and restructuring as a necessary element in the life of 
companies and has attempted to devise mechanisms to engage employees 
into the life of companies. The regulatory activity of the EU in this aspect may 
be divided into three large groups: (a) the reactive directives and (b) the 
proactive directives. The reactive directives are designed to provide employees 
with instruments to defend their interests in situations of crisis. The proactive 
directives are essentially used in multi-national companies and attempt set up 
employee representative bodies in a supra-national context in order to reduce 
the information gap of management vis-à-vis employees and engage 
employees into the life of companies.  The joint result of these legal 
instruments consists in the development of company-level social dialogue. 
 National systems of employee representation had to adapt to the new 
forms of corporate governance and organisation of work. This thesis defended 
that this adaptation consisted fundamentally in the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining towards the level of the company achieved by means of the 
diversification of the powers of the actors at the level of the company and in the 
emergence of new types of collective agreements.
 The description of the evolution of the actors at the level of the company 
in each system attempted to demonstrate the extent to which each system is 
evolving towards a controlled decentralisation of its structures of collective 
bargaining; the actors at the level of the company are clearly having a more 
relevant role while the trade unions are controlling the actions of these actors in 
order to ensure that they correspond to the genuine interest of the employees 
and of the needs of the company and not to the interest of the employer to 
undermine social dialogue and union power. 
 The description of the role of the actors must be completed with the 
description of the evolution of collective agreements. The new types of 
agreements that each system appears to have been developing may be 
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subsumed to three types: (a) flexibilisation agreements, (b) procedural 
agreements and (c) anticipatory agreements. These diverse types of 
agreements may be considered as a development and adaptation of the 
traditional structures of collective bargaining to the new macro-economic 
environment and corporate governance structures. They appear to recognise 
employees as stakeholders of the company and attempt to engage them in the 
success of the company by means of  the flexibilisation of their wages and 
working time in order to allow the company to adapt to economic fluctuations 
and the demands of stakeholders, improve the communication channels in 
order to allow the company to engage in a successful restructuring with a 
minimum of social consequences and engage employees in the success of the 
company by  means of the improvement of the communication channels 
between management and employees, a human resource management 
underpinned in lean management and decentralisation and concession 
bargaining in order to make the company more competitive
 This description of the evolution of Corporate Governance and 
Employee Representation (including Collective Bargaining) may allow us to 
propose a new type of institutional complementarity between the new elements 
of the system: a more marketised system (relational in the case of the UK) will 
have as a complementary part the development of a decentralised culture of 
collective bargaining that will attempt to engage employees into the life of 
companies by  means of new types of actors and agreements in order to 
recognise them as true stakeholders of the company. Relational systems of 
Corporate Governance (Germany, France and Portugal in this case) were 
underpinned in a strong industry level social dialogue in order to reduce the 
scope for competition in wages and conditions of work: the only exception was 
Germany, which had co-determination in addition to industry level social 
dialogue; company-level social dialogue in France and Portugal could be better 
described as communication but not participation. The new pressures placed 
upon the management boards on account of the unstable economic conditions, 
the pressure of the shareholders and the new types of organisation of work 
demanded an adaptation of the structures of Employee Representation and 
Collective Bargaining. The same thing occurred in the UK, a country that has 
been attempting to introduce relational elements into its system in order to 
promote a longer term investment culture. The answer lay in a more 
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decentralised culture of Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining 
because the pressures were displaced towards the level of the company. 
Management boards needed mechanisms to engage into dialogue with the 
employees: the answer lay in the diversification of the powers of the actors at 
the level of the company and in the development of new types of collective 
agreements thought to address the difficulties faced by  firms while attempting 
top safeguard the interests of labour. 
 The only question that remains concerns the efficacy of these 
developments as a counterbalancing mechanism to the pressure of 
shareholders in companies. It appears that they are merely an adaptation to the 
increased powers of shareholders within companies and that they are unable to 
function as a counterbalancing mechanism against shareholder pressure. The 
efficacy of these new types of agreements and the development of a sound 
culture of social dialogue at the level of the company depends upon the 
existence of strong actors that are able to function as a counterbalancing 
mechanism to the interests of shareholders. The current state of affairs 
indicates that that is unlikely to occur without the good will of management 
664
665
Bibliography
). "Les accords de méthode." Droit Social(9/10): 915-923.
, Center for European Studies: Program for the Study of Germany and 
Europe Working Paper Series.
, Center for European Studies: Program for the Study of Germany and 
Europe Working Paper Series.
, IDHE CNRS.
." Economy and Society 29(1): 36-53.
." International Journal of Auditing 6(155-182).
." International Journal of Auditing 6(155-182).
Adams, M. (1999). "Cross holdings in Germany." Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 155(1): 80-109.
Adams, M. (1999). "Cross holdings in Germany." Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 155(1): 80-109.
Addison, J. T. and W. S. Siebert (2002). Changes in collective bargaining 
in the UK. Bonn, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit.
Administrateurs, I.-I. F. d. (2007). La gouvernance des sociétés cotées. 
Synthése des recommendations sur le role et les modes d'action 
des conseils.
Aglietta, M. and A. Rebérioux (2004). Dérives du capitalisme financier, 
Bibliothèque Albin Michel.
Aguiló Piña, J. F. (2002). "La sociedad anónima europea: constitución, 
órganos y otros aspectos." Revista de Derecho Mercantil(246): 
1795-1892.
Ahlering, B. and S. Deakin (2005). Labour regulation, corporate 
governance and legal origin: a case of institutional 
complementarity European Corporate Governance Institute.
Ahlering, B. and S. Deakin (2005). Labour regulation, corporate 
governance and legal origin: a case of institutional 
complementarity European Corporate Governance Institute.
Ahlering, B. and S. Deakin (2005). Labour regulation, corporate 
governance and legal origin: a case of institutional 
complementarity European Corporate Governance Institute.
Allertz, W. (2007). Cross-border organisation development and its 
consequences for industrial relations. Agire research papers.
Antonmattei, P.-H. (2003). "Licencements économiques et négotiation 
collective: un nouvel accord collectif de travail est né."
Antonmattei, P.-H. (2005). "Accord de méthode, génération 2005: la 
"positive attitude"." Droit Social(4): 399-402.
Antonmattei, P.-H. (2007). "La gestion prévisonnelle des emplois et des 
compétences: un défi social, économique et juridique." Droit 
Social: 1-3.
Antonmattei, P.-H. (2009). "Quelques propos sur la promotion de 
l'accord d'entreprise." Droit Social(9/10): 883-885.
Aoki, M. (2001). Towards a comparative institutional analysis, Stanford 
University Press.
Aoki, M. (2001). Towards a comparative institutional analysis, Stanford 
University Press.
Aoki, M. (2001). Towards a comparative institutional analysis, Stanford 
University Press.
666
Armbrüster, C. (2006). Recent Developments in German Corporate Law. 
Centro di Ricerca per il Diritto de l'impresa, Libera Università 
Internationali degli Studi Sociali.
Armbrüster, C. (2006). Recent Developments in German Corporate Law. 
Centro di Ricerca per il Diritto de l'impresa, Libera Università 
Internationali degli Studi Sociali.
Armour, J. (2005). Who should make corporate law? EC legislation vs 
regulatory competition, European Corporate Governance 
Institute.
Armour, J. (2006). Legal capital: an outdated concept. Cambridge, 
Centre for Business Research.
Armour, J. and M. J. Whincop (2004). An economic analysis of shared 
property in partnership and close corporation law. The 
governance of close corporations and partnerships. US and 
European perspectives. J. A. McCahery, T. Raaijmakers and E. P. 
M. Vermeulen, Oxford.
Armour, J. and M. J. Whincop (2004). An economic analysis of shared 
property in partnership and close corporation law. The 
governance of close corporations and partnerships. US and 
European perspectives. J. A. McCahery, T. Raaijmakers and E. P. 
M. Vermeulen, Oxford.
Armour, J., S. Deakin, et al. (2003). "Shareholder primacy and the 
trajectory of UK Corporate Governance." British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 41(3): 531-555.
Armour, J., S. Deakin, et al. (2007). Shareholder protection and stock 
market development: an empirical test of the legal origins 
hypothesis, Centre for Business Research - University of 
Cambridge.
Armstrong, P., A. Glyn, et al. (1991). Capitalism since 1945, Blackwell.
Armstrong, P., A. Glyn, et al. (1991). Capitalism since 1945, Blackwell.
Artus, I. (2001). Krise des deutschen tarifsystems - die erosion des 
flächentarifvertrags in Ost und West, Westdeutscher Verlag.
Artus, I. (2003). "Die kooperation zwischen betriebsraten und 
gewerkschaften als neuralgischer punkt des tarifsystems. Eine 
exemplarische analyse am beispiel Deutschlands." Industrielle 
Beziehungen 10(2): 250-271.
Arvidsson, N. (2006). Global strategies of multinational corporations. 
Agire research papers.
Ashford, R. (2002). "The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law 
and Corporate Social Responsibility." Tulane Law Review 76: 
1187-1205.
Assman, H.-D. and R. A. Schütze (2007). Handbuch des 
Kapitalanlagerechts, C.H. Beck.
Auroux, J. (1983). "Un nouveau droit du travail?" Droit Social(1): 2-4.
Bachmann, G. (1999). "Die Geschäftsordnung der Hauptversammlung." 
Die Aktiengesellschaft 44(5): 210-215.
Backhaus, J. G. (1999). Company Board Representation. The Elgar 
Companion to Law and Economics. J. G. Backhaus, Cheltanham.
Backhaus, J. G. (1999). Company Board Representation. The Elgar 
Companion to Law and Economics. J. G. Backhaus, Cheltanham.
Backhaus, J. G. (1999). Company Board Representation. The Elgar 
Companion to Law and Economics. J. G. Backhaus, Cheltanham.
667
Bainbridge, S. M. (1996). "Participatory Management within a Theory of 
the Firm." The Journal of Corporation Law 21(4): 658-730.
Barbiera, L. (2000). Il Corporate Governance in Europa - 
amministrazione e controlli nelle società per azioni in Italia, 
Francia, Germania e Regno Unito. Milano, Giuffrè.
Barbiera, L. (2000). Il Corporate Governance in Europa - 
amministrazione e controlli nelle società per azioni in Italia, 
Francia, Germania e Regno Unito. Milano, Giuffrè.
Barnard, C. (2007). Worker Representation in the UK. Decentralizing 
Industrial Relations and the Role of Labour Unions and Employee 
Representatives R. Blainpain, Kluwer: 83-103.
Barnard, C. and S. Deakin (2002). "Reinventing the European 
corporation? Corporate Governance, social policy and the single 
market " Industrial Relations Journal 33(5): 484-499.
Barry, P. (2005). Company Law Reform White Paper, Department for 
Trade and Industry.
Barry, P. (2005). Company Law Reform White Paper, Department for 
Trade and Industry.
Barthélemy, J. (2009). "Vers de nouvelles évolutions du droit de la 
négotiation collective? ." Droit Social(8/10): 907-910.
Basset, P. (1987). Strike free: new industrial relations in Britain, 
Papermac.
Baumann, T. (1992). Die delegation tariflicher rechtsetzungsbefügnisse, 
Dunker & Humblot.
Baums, T. (1999). "Il sistema di "corporate governance" in Germania ed i 
suoi recenti sviluppi " Rivista delle società: 1-19.
Baums, T. (1999). "Il sistema di "corporate governance" in Germania ed i 
suoi recenti sviluppi " Rivista delle società: 1-19.
Baums, T. (1999). "Il sistema di "corporate governance" in Germania ed i 
suoi recenti sviluppi " Rivista delle società: 1-19.
Baums, T. (2007). "Aktuelle entwicklungen im Europäischen 
Gesellschaftsrecht." Der Aktiengesellschaft 52(3): 57-65.
Baums, T. (2007). "Aktuelle entwicklungen im Europäischen 
Gesellschaftsrecht." Der Aktiengesellschaft 52(3): 57-65.
Baums, T. and K. Scott (2003). Taking shareholder protection seriously? 
Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 
Stanford Law School.
Bayer, W. (2002). Aktionärsrechte und Anlegerschutz - kritische 
Betrachtung der lex lata und Überlegungen de elge ferenda von 
der Hintergrund des Berichts der Regierungskomission Corporate 
Governance und des Entwurfs eines 4. 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes Corporate Governance. P. 
Hommelhoff, M. Lutter, K. Schmidt, W. Schön and P. Ulmer, Recht 
und Wirtschaft Verlag.
Bebchuck, L. (2005). "The case for increasing shareholder power." 
Harvard Law Review 118(3): 833-913.
Bebchuk, L. A. and M. J. Roe (2004). A theory of path-dependence in 
corporate ownership and governance. Convergence and 
persistence in Corporate Governance. J. N. Gordon and M. J. 
Roe, Cambrige University Press.
Berend, I. T. (2006). An economic history of 20th century Europe, 
Cambridge University Press.
668
Berghe, L. v. d. (2002). Corporate Governance in a Globalising World: 
Convergence or Divergence? A European perspective, Kluwer.
Berle, A. and G. Means (1932). The modern corporation and private 
property. New York, Harcourt Brace.
Berle, A. and G. Means (1932). The modern corporation and private 
property. New York, Harcourt Brace.
Bernhardt, W. (2000). "Acquisitions, mergers and cancelations in 
Germany - in the white water of shareholder value." Corporate 
Governance 8(4): 327-334.
Berrar, C. (2001). Die entwicklung der Corporate Governance in 
Deutschland im internationalen vergleich. Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft.
Berthold, N. and O. Stettes (2001). Der Flächentarifvertrag - von 
wegbereiter der Wirtschaftswunders zum Verursacher der 
Beschäftigungsmisere. Okonomische Analyse des Arbeitsrechts. 
C. Ott and D. Schäfer, Mohr Sibeck.
Berthold, N., B. M., et al. (2003). "Betrieblische bündnisse für arbeit. 
Eine empirische untersuchung fur den deutschen maschinen- und 
anlagenbau." Wissenschaftliche Beiträge des Lehrstulls für 
Volkswirtschaftslehre,  Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik 68.
Bessy, C. and E. Brousseau (1998). "Technology licensing contracts. 
Features and diversity." International Review of Law and 
Economics 18(4): 451-489.
Beyer, J. (2003). Corporate Governance in Deutschland, Max Planck 
Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Beyer, J. and M. Höpner "The disintegration of organised capitalism: 
German corporate governance in the 1990s." West European 
Politics 26(4): 179-198.
Beyer, J. and M. Höpner "The disintegration of organised capitalism: 
German corporate governance in the 1990s." West European 
Politics 26(4): 179-198.
Beyer, J. and M. Höpner Alle macht den Aktionären? 
Unternehmenskontrolle in Deutschland, Max Planck Institute für 
Gesellschaftsforschung.
Biagi, M. (2003). Forms of employee representational participation. 
Marco Biagi, selected writings. K. Law: 191-233.
Bispink, R. and T. Schulten (2003). "Decentralisation of German 
collective bargaining - current trends and assessments from a 
works and staffs council perspective." WSI Mitteilungen(special 
issue): 24-41.
Blainpain, R. (2004). Comparativism in Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations. Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
Industrialised Market Economies. R. Blainpain, Kluwer.
Blair, M. M. (1999). "Team Production Theory of Corporate Law." Virginia 
Law Review 85: 247 ff.
Blair, M. M. (1999). "Team Production Theory of Corporate Law." Virginia 
Law Review 85: 247 ff.
Blair, M. M. and M. J. Roe, Eds. (1999). Employes and Corporate 
Governance, The Brookings Institution.
Blair, M. M. and M. J. Roe, Eds. (1999). Employes and Corporate 
Governance, The Brookings Institution.
669
Blanke, T. (2002). Workers' right to information and consultation within 
the undertaking (art.27). European Labour Law and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. B. Bercusson, ETUI.
Blanke, T. (2003). "Arbeitsgruppen und Gruppenarbeit in der 
Betriebsverfassung - direkt demokratische Mitbestimmung als 
"zweiseitig paktierte Delegation"." Recht der Arbeit(3): 140-155.
Blanpain, R. (2008). European Labour Law, Kluwer.
Blanquet, F. (2001). "Enfin la societé européenne la "SE"." Revue du 
Droit de L'Union Européenne(1): 115-128.
Bloch, L. and E. Kremp (1999). Ownership and voting power in France. 
The Control of Corporate Europe. F. Barca and M. Becht, Oxford.
Bloch, L. and E. Kremp (1999). Ownership and voting power in France. 
The Control of Corporate Europe. F. Barca and M. Becht, Oxford.
Boni, G. (2008). "Regards extérieurs et comperés sur les accords 
collectifs conclus lors des restructurations." Semaine Sociale 
Lamy(1376): 47-58.
Borenfreund, G. (2004). "La négotiation collective dans les entreprises 
dépourvues de délégués sindicaux." Droit Social(6): 606-620.
Borenfreund, G. (2009). "La renouveau du droit syndical dans 
l'entreprise: entre faveur et défiance?" Droit Social(6): 700-710.
Bouère, J.-P. (2001). "P-DG ou président et directeur général?" Bull.jolly: 
695 ff.
Bourne, N. (2008). Bourne on Company Law, Routledge-Cavendish.
Bourne, N. (2008). Bourne on Company Law, Routledge-Cavendish.
Braendle, U. C. (2006). Shareholder protection in the USA and 
Germany: on the fallacy of LLSV. German Working Papers on 
Law and Economics, University of Machester.
Braendle, U. C. and J. Noll (2004). The Societas Europaea – A Step 
Towards Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems?, 
SSRN.
Braendle, U. C. and J. Noll (2005). "On the convergence of national 
corporate governance systems." Journal of Interdisciplinay 
Economics 16.
Bratton, W. W. and J. A. McCahery (2002). Comparative Corporate 
Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference. Corporate 
Governance Regimes - convergence and diversity J. A. 
McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog, 
Oxford.
Bratton, W. W. and J. A. McCahery (2002). Comparative Corporate 
Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference. Corporate 
Governance Regimes - convergence and diversity J. A. 
McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog, 
Oxford.
Brewster, C. (1992). Collective agreements: old and new styles. A 
Handbook on Industrial Relations Practice: Practice and Law in 
the Employment Relationship B. Towers, Kogan Page: 152-166.
Brill-Venkatasamy, T. (2006). "The information and consultation Directive 
of 11 March 2002 and its transposition into French law." 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 22(2): 259-277.
670
Brors, T. (2004). Das system der Arbeitnehmer-Beteiligungs-Richtlinien - 
grundlage für eine Europäische Betriebsverfassung? Baden-
Baden, Köln.
Buchner, H. (2003). "Kommentar BAG 10.12.2002." Recht der Arbeit: 
367 ff.
Buck, T., A. Bruce, et al. (2003). "Long-term incentive plans, executive 
pay and UK company performance." Journal of Management 
Studies 40(7): 1703-1721.
Buck, T., A. Bruce, et al. (2003). "Long-term incentive plans, executive 
pay and UK company performance." Journal of Management 
Studies 40(7): 1703-1721.
Busch, M. (2003). Arbeitsgruppen und gruppenarbeit im 
Betriebsverfassugsgesetz, Tenea 
Cafaggi, F. (2004). Il governo della rete: modelli organisativi del 
coordinamento inter-imprenditoriale. Reti di imprese tra 
regolazione e norme sociali. Nuove sfide per diritto ed economia. 
F. Cafaggi. Bologna, Il Mulino.
Cafaggi, F. and P. Iamiceli (2007). Le reti di picolle e medie imprese tra 
proprietà familiare e nuovi scenari finanziari. Reti di impresa tr 
crescita e innovazione organizzativa. F. Cafaggi and P. Iamiceli, Il 
Mulino.
Calabresi, G. (1961). "Some thoughts on risk distribution and the law of 
torts." Yale Law Journal 70: 35-46.
Callaghan, H. and M. Höpner "European Integration and the Clash of 
Capitalisms: political cleavages over takeover liberalisation." West 
European Politics 26(4): 179-198.
Callaghan, H. and M. Höpner "European Integration and the Clash of 
Capitalisms: political cleavages over takeover liberalisation." West 
European Politics 26(4): 179-198.
Calvão da Silva, J. (2007). "Responsabilidade civil dos administradores 
não-executivos, da comissãõ~de auditoria e do conselho geral e 
de supervisão." Revista da Ordem dos Advogadod 67(1).
Calvão da Silva, J. (2007). "Responsabilidade civil dos administradores 
não-executivos, da comissãõ~de auditoria e do conselho geral e 
de supervisão." Revista da Ordem dos Advogadod 67(1).
Câmara, P. (2008). O governo das sociedades e a reforma do Código 
das Sociedades Comerciais Código das Sociedades Comerciais 
e Governo das Sociedades. P. Câmara, R. d. Oliveira Neves, A. 
Figueiredo, A. Fernandes de Oliveira and J. Ferreira Gomes, 
Almedina.
Câmara, P. (2008). O governo das sociedades e a reforma do Código 
das Sociedades Comerciais Código das Sociedades Comerciais 
e Governo das Sociedades. P. Câmara, R. d. Oliveira Neves, A. 
Figueiredo, A. Fernandes de Oliveira and J. Ferreira Gomes, 
Almedina.
Cameira, M. A. (2006). "Portuguese companies and the new e-
commerce environment." International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 17(3): 108-113.
Carneiro da Frada, M. (2007). "A Business Judgement Rule no quadro 
dos deveres gerais dos administradores." Revista da Ordem dos 
Advogadod 67(1).
671
Carneiro da Frada, M. (2007). "A Business Judgement Rule no quadro 
dos deveres gerais dos administradores." Revista da Ordem dos 
Advogadod 67(1).
Casey, N. (2000). The European Social Charter and the Revised 
European Social Charter. Fundamental Social Rights. Current 
European Legal Protection and the Challange of the EU Charter 
on Fundamental Rights. C. Costello, European Commission.
Casper, M. (2007). Informationsrechte der Aktionäre. Aktienrecht im 
Wandel - Grundsatzfragen des Aktienrechts. W. Bayer and M. 
Habersack, Mohr Siebeck. II: 546-578.
Cesaro, J.-F. (2009). "La négotiation dans les entreprises porvoues de 
délégués syndicaux." Droit Social(6): 658-668.
Chalmers, D., C. Hadjiemmanuil, et al. (2006). European Union Law, 
Cambridge University Press.
Charlton, L. W. o. (2002). "Employees, partnership and company law." 
Industrial Law Journal 31(2): 99-111.
Cheffins, B. R. (1997). Company Law. Theory, structure and operation 
Clarendon Press.
Cheffins, B. R. (2006). Dividends as a substitute for corporate law: the 
separation of ownership and control in the United Kingdom, 
European Corporate Governance Institute.
Cioffi, J. W. and M. Höpner (2005). "Left-Wing support for shareholder 
capitalism." Mitbestimmung(8): 57-61.
Clark, I., P. Almond, et al. (2005). "The Americanisation  of the European 
Business System?" Industrial Relations Journal 36(6): 494-517.
CMVM (2002). A indústria dos fundos de investimento em Portugal, 
CMVM.
CMVM (2006). O Governo das Sociedades Cotadas em Portugal: 
situação em Dezembro de 2005, CMVM.
CMVM (2006). O Governo das Sociedades Cotadas em Portugal: 
situação em Dezembro de 2005, CMVM.
Coase, R. (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." Economica 4(16): 384-405.
Coase, R. (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." Economica 4(16): 384-405.
Coase, R. (1937). "The nature of the firm." Economica 4(16): 386-405.
Coase, R. (1960). "The problem of social cost." Journal of Law and 
Economics 3(1): 1-44.
Coase, R. (1960). "The problem of social cost." Journal of Law and 
Economics 3(1): 1-44.
Coates IV , J. (2003). Ownership. takeovers and EU Law: how 
contestable should EU Corporations be?, Harvard Law School.
Coates, D. (1980). Labour in Power. London, Longman.
Cohen, M. (1994). "L'application des nouvelles dispositions relaties à lá 
représentation du personnel." Droit Social(2): 147-153.
Cohen, M. (1996). "La réduction "négociée" des avantages des 
salariés." Droit Social(1): 18-20.
Coin, G. (1996). "L'accord interprofessionnel du 31 octobre 1995 sur la 
politique contractuelle." Droit Social(1): 3-11.
Colaianni, L. (1996). Title European works councils : a legal and 
practical guide : information and consultation of employees in 
multinational companies : what management needs to know 
before starting negotiations with the workforce, Sweet & Maxwell.
672
Collins, H. (2001). "Regulating the employment relation for 
competitiveness." Industrial Law Journal 30: 17-46.
Collins, H. (2003). Employment Law, Oxford University Press.
Collins, H., K. D. Ewing, et al. (2005). Labour Law: texts and materials, 
Oxford.
Colombera, M. (1996). "Le regole di corporate governance nel Regno 
Unito: il Cadbury Committee e il Greenbury Committee." Rivista 
delle società: 440-464.
Combrexelle, J.-D. (2008). "Loi du 4 mai 2004: quel bilan? Quelles 
perspectives?" Droit Social(1): 20-23.
Commission, E. (2007). Report on the proportionality principle in the 
European Union, European Commission.
Commission, E. (2007). Report on the proportionality principle in the 
European Union, European Commission.
Costa, C. T. d. and A. d. M. Bilreiro (2003). The European Company 
Statute, Kluwer.
Cozian, M., A. Viandier, et al. (2002). Droit des Societés. Paris, Litec.
Cozian, M., A. Viandier, et al. (2002). Droit des Societés. Paris, Litec.
Crafts, N. (2006). The world economy in the 1990s: a long-run 
perspective The Global Economy in the 1990s: a long-run 
perspective. P. W. Rhode and G. Toniolo, Cambridge.
Craig, P. and G. De Búrca (2002). EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials 
Oxford.
Craig, P. and G. De Búrca (2002). EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials 
Oxford.
Criqui, J. L. and Peter Holt (2002). "Collective redundancies in Europe." 
Business Law Review: 2-4.
Crouch, C. (2005). The place of networks in governance theory. 
Corporate Governance, Networks ed Innovazione. F. Cafaggi.
Cunha, P. O. (2007). Direito das Sociedades Comerciais. Lisboa, 
Almedina.
Cunha, P. O. (2007). Direito das Sociedades Comerciais. Lisboa, 
Almedina.
Daelen, M. M. A. v. (2008). Risk management solutions in business law: 
Prospectus Disclosure Requirements, Tilburg University.
Daicle-Duclos, B. (1998). "Le devoir de loyauté du dirigeant " Semaine 
Juridique - edition entrepreise: 1486.
Däubler, W. (2001). "Die novellierte Betriebsverfassung." Industrielle 
Beziehungen 8(4): 364-378.
Däubler, W. (2002). Betriebsverfassungsgesetz: kommentar für die 
praxis, Bund Verlag.
Däubler, W. (2006). Das Arbeitsrecht - die gemeinsame Wahrung von 
Interessen um Betrieb, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag 
Däubler, W. (2006). Das Arbeitsrecht - die gemeinsame Wahrung von 
Interessen um Betrieb, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag 
Däubler, W., M. Kittner, et al., Eds. BetrVG mit Wahlordnung und EBR-
Gesetz, Bund-Verlag.
Davies, P. (2002). Introduction to Company Law, Clarendon Law series.
Davies, P. (2002). Introduction to Company Law, Clarendon Law series.
Davies, P. and G. P. Stapledon (1993). Corporate Governance in the 
United Kingdom. Aspects of Corporate Governance. M. Isaksson 
and R. Skog, Juristförlaget.
673
Davies, P. and G. P. Stapledon (1993). Corporate Governance in the 
United Kingdom. Aspects of Corporate Governance. M. Isaksson 
and R. Skog, Juristförlaget.
Davies, P. and M. Freedland (2004). National Report United Kingdom. 
The evolving structure of collective bargaining in Europe 2004. S. 
Sciarra, European Commission, University of Florence.
Davies, P. L. (1994). "A challange to the single channel." Industrial Law 
Journal 23: 272 ff.
Davies, P. L. (2003). Employee involvement in the European Company. 
La Société Européenne – organization juridique et fiscale, 
intérêts, perspectives, Dalloz: 67-79.
Davies, P. L. and C. Kilpatrick (2004). "UK Worker Representation after 
the Single Channel." Industrial Law Journal 33(2): 121-151.
Davies, P. L. and C. Kilpatrick (2005). La représantation des travailleurs 
au Royaume-Uni après le canal unique. Recomposition des 
systèmes de représentation des salariés en Europe. S. Laulom, 
Publications de L'Université de Saint-Étienne.
Davies, P. L. and M. Freedland (2007). Towards a Flexible Labour 
Market: labour legislation and regulation since the 1990s, Oxford.
De Poorter, I. (2008). "Auditor’s liability towards third parties within the 
EU:  A comparative study between the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Belgium." Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 3(1): 68-75.
De Poorter, I. (2008). "Auditor’s liability towards third parties within the 
EU:  A comparative study between the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Belgium." Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 3(1): 68-75.
Deakin, S. (1999). Two types of regulatory competition: competitive 
federalism vs reflexive harmonisation: a law and economics 
perspective on Centros. Cambridge Yearbook of Legal Studies, 
Hart Publishing: 231-260.
Deakin, S. (1999). Two types of regulatory competition: competitive 
federalism vs reflexive harmonisation: a law and economics 
perspective on Centros. Cambridge Yearbook of Legal Studies, 
Hart Publishing: 231-260.
Deakin, S. (2007). Reflexive Governance and European Company Law. 
U. o. C. Centre for Business Research.
Deakin, S. (2007). Reflexive Governance and European Company Law. 
U. o. C. Centre for Business Research.
Deakin, S. and A. Hughes (1999). Economic efficiency and the 
proceduralisation of company law, ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge 
Deakin, S. and S. Konzelmann (2006). Corporate Governance after 
Enron: an age of enlightenment? . After Enron. Improving 
Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe 
and in the US. J. Armour and J. A. McCahery, Hart Publishing.
Deakin, S., Hugh Whittaker (2007). "Re-embedding the corporation? 
Comparative perspectives on corporate governance, employment 
relations and corporate social responsibility " Corporate 
Governance 15(1).
Deakin, S., Hugh Whittaker (2007). "Re-embedding the corporation? 
Comparative perspectives on corporate governance, employment 
674
relations and corporate social responsibility " Corporate 
Governance 15(1).
Deakin, S., Richard Hobbs, et al. (2001). Partnership, ownership and 
control: the impact of corporate governance on employment 
relations, ESCR Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambidge.
Deakin, S., Richard Hobbs, et al. (2001). Partnership, ownership and 
control: the impact of corporate governance on employment 
relations, ESCR Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambidge.
Deakin, S., Richard Hobbs, et al. (2005). Anglo-American Corporate 
Governance and the employment relationship: a case to answer?, 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
Deakin, S., Richard Hobbs, et al. (2005). Anglo-American Corporate 
Governance and the employment relationship: a case to answer?, 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
Deakin, S., William S. Morris (2005). Labour Law. Oxford, Hart 
Publisher.
Deakin, S., William S. Morris (2005). Labour Law. Oxford, Hart 
Publisher.
Delga, J. (2002). "L'administrateur indépendant n'existe pas: dangers ; 
une reference inapproprié au système anglo-saxon " Reccueil 
Dalloz: 2858.
Delga, J. (2004). "L'administrateur indépendant en France: un mythe?" 
Semaine Juridique(5).
Didry, C. and A. Jobert (2008). Les accords de méthode en matière de 
restructurations : un nouveau champ du dialogue social 
Didry, C. and A. Mias (2004). Au-delá des politiques de l'emploi: le temps 
de travail à la recherche d'une représentation européenne des 
travailleurs. Recomposition des systèmes de représentation des 
salariés en Europe. S. Laulom, Publications de l'Université de 
Saint Etienne.
Dignam, A. and M. Galanis (2008). "Corporate Governance and the 
importance of Macroeconomic context." Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 28(2): 201-245.
Dignam, A. and M. Galanis (2008). "Corporate Governance and the 
importance of Macroeconomic context." Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 28(2): 201-245.
Dignam, A. and M. Galanis (2008). "Corporate Governance and the 
importance of Macroeconomic context." Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 28(2): 201-245.
DiMaggio, P., Ed. (2001). The Twenty-First Century Firm Oxford, 
Princeton University Press.
Dockés, E. (2008). Doit du Travail Dalloz.
Dom, J.-P. (2001). "La protection des minoritaires." Revue des Sociétés 
119: 533-560.
Dom, J.-P. (2001). "La protection des minoritaires." Revue des Sociétés 
119: 533-560.
Dorssemont, F. (2006). "Case C-55/02, Commission of the European 
Communities v. Portuguese Republic, judgment of the Second 
Chamber of the Court of Justice of 12 October 2004 ; Case C - 
188/03, Imtraud Junk v. Wolfgang Kühnel, judgment of the 
675
Second Chamber of the Court of Justice of 27 January 2005." 
Common Market Law Review 43: 225-241.
Drummond, F. (2005). "L'information des actionnaires et des 
investisseurs." Revue de Jurisprudence Commerciale: 15 ff.
Dufour, C. and U. Rehfeldt (1991). "Existe-t-il un modèle européen de 
représentation des salariés dans l'entreprise." Travail et Emploi
(14 ff).
Easterbrook, F. and D. R. Fischel (1986). "Close corporations and 
agency costs." Stanford Law Review 38(2): 271-301.
Easterbrook, F. and D. R. Fischel (1986). "Close corporations and 
agency costs." Stanford Law Review 38(2): 271-301.
Easterbrook, F. and D. R. Fischel (1996). The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law, Harvard University Press.
Easterbrook, F. and D. R. Fischel (1996). The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law, Harvard University Press.
Ebke, W. (2004). Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence. 
Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe. G. FerrarIni, 
K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Ebke, W. (2004). Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence. 
Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe. G. FerrarIni, 
K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Ebke, W. and A. Jurisch (2000). "Der unerwünschte Abschlussprüfer: 
Ersetzungsverfahren (§319(3)HGB) vs Anfechtungsklage (§243
(1)AktG)." Die Aktiengesellschaft 45: 208 
Edwards, T. (2004). "Corporate Governance, industrial relations and 
trends in company-level restructuring in Europe: convergence 
towards the Anglo-American model?" Industrial Relations Journal 
35(6): 518-535.
Edwards, V. (1999). EC Company Law, Clarendon Press.
Ehlers, M. (2008). "Personalkosten und Bündnisse für Arbeit." Recht der 
Arbeit 61(2): 81-91.
Eichengreen, B. (2006). Managing the world economy in the 1990s. The 
Global Economy in the 1990s: a long-run perspective. P. W. 
Rhode and G. Toniolo, Cambridge.
Eichengreen, B. (2007). The European Economy since 1945 - 
coordinated capitalism and beyond  Princeton University Press.
Eichengreen, B. (2007). The European Economy since 1945 - 
coordinated capitalism and beyond  Princeton University Press.
Eisenberg, M. A. (1976). The structure of the corporation: a legal 
analysis. Boston, Little Brown.
Eisenberg, M. A. (1999). "The Conception that the Corporation is a 
Nexus of Contracts and the Dual Nature of the Firm." Journal of 
Corporate Law 24: 819-816.
Eisenberg, M. A. (1999). "The Conception that the Corporation is a 
Nexus of Contracts and the Dual Nature of the Firm." Journal of 
Corporate Law 24: 819-816.
Ekstedt, E. (2007). A New Division of Labour: the "projectification" of 
working and industrial life.
Ekstedt, E. (2007). A New Division of Labour: the "projectification" of 
working and industrial life.
676
Elst, C. v. d. (2008). Shareholder mobility in five countries. ECGI 
Working Papers in Law, European Corporate Governance 
Institute.
Erzegovesi, L. (2004). Soluzioni di rete per la finanzia delle piccole e 
medie imprese. Reti di imprese tra regolazine e norme sociali. 
Nuove sfide per diritto ed economia. F. Cafaggi, Il Mulino.
Estrin, P. (1999). State ownership, corporate governance and 
privatisation. Corporate Governance, State Owned Entreprises 
and Privatisation. OCDE. Paris, OCDE.
Ewing, K. D. and G. M. Truter (2005). "The Information and Consultation 
of Employees Regulations: voluntarism's bitter legacy." Modern 
Law Review 68(4): 629-641.
Falkner, G. (1996). "The Maastricht  protocol on social policy: theory and 
practice." Journal of European Social Policy 6(1): 1-16.
Favennec-Héry, F. (2007). "La GPEC: l'environment juridique." Droit 
Social: 1068-1073.
Favennec-Héry, F. (2009). "La représentativité syndicale." Droit Social
(6): 630-640.
Fernandes de Oliveira, A. (2008). Responsabilidade Civil dos 
Administradores. Código das Sociedades Comerciais e Governo 
das Sociedades. P. Câmara, R. d. Oliveira Neves, A. Figueiredo, 
A. Fernandes de Oliveira and J. Ferreira Gomes, Almedina.
Ferran, E. (2005). Company Law Reform in the UK: a progress report, 
European Corporate Governance Institute.
Ferran, E. (2005). Company Law Reform in the UK: a progress report, 
European Corporate Governance Institute.
Ferrarini, G. (2006). One share - One vote: a European rule?, European 
Corporate Governance Institute.
Ferrarini, G. and N. Moloney (2004). Executive remuneration and 
Corporate Governance in the EU: convergence, divergence and 
reform perspectives. Reforming Company and Takeover Law in 
Europe. G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch, 
Oxford.
Ferrarini, G. and N. Moloney (2004). Executive remuneration and 
Corporate Governance in the EU: convergence, divergence and 
reform perspectives. Reforming Company and Takeover Law in 
Europe. G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch, 
Oxford.
Ferrarini, G., N. Moloney, et al. (2003). Executive Remuneration in the 
EU: Comparative Law and Practice, European Corporate 
Governance Institute.
Ferreira Gomes, J. (2008). A responsabilidade civil dos auditores. 
Código das Sociedades Comerciais e Governo das Sociedades. 
P. Câmara, R. d. Oliveira Neves, A. Figueiredo, A. Fernandes de 
Oliveira and J. Ferreira Gomes, Almedina.
Ferreira Gomes, J. (2008). A responsabilidade civil dos auditores. 
Código das Sociedades Comerciais e Governo das Sociedades. 
P. Câmara, R. d. Oliveira Neves, A. Figueiredo, A. Fernandes de 
Oliveira and J. Ferreira Gomes, Almedina.
Figueiredo, A. (2008). Auditor Independence and the Joint Provision of 
Audit and Non-Audit Services. Código das Sociedades 
Comerciais e Governo das Sociedades. P. Câmara, R. d. Oliveira 
677
Neves, A. Figueiredo, A. Fernandes de Oliveira and J. Ferreira 
Gomes, Almedina.
Figueiredo, A. (2008). Auditor Independence and the Joint Provision of 
Audit and Non-Audit Services. Código das Sociedades 
Comerciais e Governo das Sociedades. P. Câmara, R. d. Oliveira 
Neves, A. Figueiredo, A. Fernandes de Oliveira and J. Ferreira 
Gomes, Almedina.
Fischel, D. R. (1984). "Labour markets and labour law compared with 
capital markets and capital law." University of Chicago Law 
Review 51: 1061-1077.
Fleischer, H. (2005). "Legal transplants in European Company Law - the 
case of Fiduciary Duties." European Company and Financial Law 
Review(3): 378-398.
Frada de Sousa, A. (2008). The cross-border merger directive and the 
non-EU initiatives on the cross-border transfer of registered office, 
Europa Institute, Trier.
Frada de Sousa, A. (2009). "Cartesio: regresso a Daily Mail e 
encerramento de um ciclo." Cadernos de Direito Privado.
Freedman, D. (2001). "L'américanisation du droit français par la vie 
économique." Archives de Philosophie du Droit 45: 207-211.
Freedman, J. (2004). Limited Liability Partnerships in the United 
Kingdom: do they have a role for small firms. The Governance of 
Close Corporations and Partnerships. Us and European 
perspectives. J. A. McCahery, T. Raaijmakers and E. P. M. 
Vermeulen, Oxford.
Frege, C. M. (2002). "A critical assessement of the theoretical and 
empirical research on German works councils." British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 40(2): 221-248.
Freitag, R. and M. Riemenschneider (2007). "Die 
Unternehmergesellschaft - "GmbH light" als konkurrenz für die 
Limited? ." Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 32: 1485-1492.
Frenz, W. (2004). Handbuch Europarecht, Springer.
Frenz, W. and V. Götzkes (2007). "Ein europäisches Grundrecht der 
Arbeitnehmerin und Arbeitnehmer auf Unterrichtung und 
Anhörung im Unternehmen?" Recht der Arbeit(4): 216-218.
Freyssinet, J., H. Krieger, et al. (2005). Pacts for Employment and 
Competitiveness, European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions.
Friedman, M. (1970). The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits The New York Times Magazine.
Fuchs, M. (2004). "The bottom line of European Labour Law." 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 20(2 and 3): 155-176 and 423-444.
Fuchs, M. (2004b). National report Germany. The evolving structure of 
collective bargaining in Europe. U. o. F. European Commission. 
Florence.
Fuchs, M. (2004b). National report Germany. The evolving structure of 
collective bargaining in Europe. U. o. F. European Commission. 
Florence.
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press.
Funder, M. (1999). Paradoxien der Reorganisation - eine empirische 
Studie strategischer Dezentralisierung von 
678
Konzernunternehmungen und ihrer Auswirkungen auf 
Mitbestimmung und Industrielle Beziehungen, Rainer Hampp 
Verlag.
Funder, M. (1999). Paradoxien der Reorganisation - eine empirische 
Studie strategischer Dezentralisierung von 
Konzernunternehmungen und ihrer Auswirkungen auf 
Mitbestimmung und Industrielle Beziehungen, Rainer Hampp 
Verlag.
Gaudu, F. (2008
Gaumann, R. and M. Schafft (1998). "Tarifvertragliche Öffnungsklauseln 
- ein sinnvolles Flexibilisierungs instrument." Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht(4): 177-187.
Gauriau, B. (2009). "Les répresentants des syndicats dans l'entreprise." 
Droit Social(6): 641-647.
Gentz, M. (1998). Werden die geltenden Tarifverträge der betrieblichen 
Praxis gerecht? Tarifautonomie für ein neues Jahrhundert - 
festschrift für Günther Schaub zum 65 Geburtstag. M. Schlachter, 
R. Ascheid and H.-W. Friedrich. München, 1998: 205-217.
Gilson, R. N. and B. Black (1995). The Law and Finance of Corporate 
Acquisitions, University Casebook series.
Goergen, M., M. Martynova, et al. (2005). Corporate Governance 
Convergence: evidence from takeover regulation, European 
Corporate Governance Institute.
Goergen, M., M. Martynova, et al. (2005). Corporate Governance 
Convergence: evidence from takeover regulation, European 
Corporate Governance Institute.
Golden, J. B. and D. Fischer-Appelt (2004). The EU Prospectus and 
Transparency Directives - towards a unified European Capital 
Markets Regime. Corporate Law and Practice Handbook, 
Practice Law Institute.
Gomes, J. (2001). A jurisprudência recente do TJCE em matéria de 
transmissão de empresa, estabelecimento ou parte de 
estabelecimento: inflexão ou continuidade? Estudos do Instituto 
de Direito do Trabalho. Lisboa, Almedina.
Gomes, J. (2005). "Comentário de urgência ao acórdão do TJCE de 
20.11.2003, proc. nº. C-340/01." Revista de Direito e Estudos 
Sociais: 213-219.
Gomes, J. V. (2004). National Report Portugal. The evolving structure of 
collective bargaining in Europe 1990-2004. S. Sciarra. Florence, 
European Commission, University of Florence.
Gomes, J. V. (2004). National Report Portugal. The evolving structure of 
collective bargaining in Europe 1990-2004. S. Sciarra. Florence, 
European Commission, University of Florence.
Gomes, J. V. (2007). Direito do Trabalho - relações individuais. Porto, 
Coimbra.
Gomes, J. V. (2007). Direito do Trabalho - relações individuais. Porto, 
Coimbra.
Gonçalves da Silva, L. (2004). Princípios gerais da contratação colectiva 
no Código do Trabalho. Estudos de Direito do Trabalho, 
Almedina. I: 167 ff.
679
Gonçalves da Silva, L. (2004). Princípios gerais da contratação colectiva 
no Código do Trabalho. Estudos de Direito do Trabalho, 
Almedina. I: 167 ff.
Gordon, J. N. and M. J. Roe, Eds. (2004). Convergence and Persistence 
in Corporate Governance, Cambridge.
Gospel, H. and A. Pendleton (2003). "Finance, Corporate Governance 
and the management of labour: a conceptual and comparative 
analysis." British Journal of Industrial Relations 41(3): 557-582.
Gospel, H. and A. Pendleton (2003). "Finance, Corporate Governance 
and the management of labour: a conceptual and comparative 
analysis." British Journal of Industrial Relations 41(3): 557-582.
Gospel, H. and A. Pendleton (2005). Markets and Relationships: 
Finance, Governance and Labour in the United Kingdom. 
Corporate Governance and Labour Management: an international 
comparison H. Gospel and A. Pendleton, Oxford.
Gospel, H. and A. Pendleton (2005). Markets and Relationships: 
Finance, Governance and Labour in the United Kingdom. 
Corporate Governance and Labour Management: an international 
comparison H. Gospel and A. Pendleton, Oxford.
Gospel, H. and A. Pendleton, Eds. (2005). Corporate Governance and 
Labour Management - an international comparison, Oxford.
Gospel, H. and A. Pendleton, Eds. (2005). Corporate Governance and 
Labour Management - an international comparison, Oxford.
Gower, L. C. B. (1997). Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 
Sweet & Maxwell.
Gower, L. C. B. (1997). Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 
Sweet & Maxwell.
Goyer, M. (2002). The transformation of Corporate Governance in 
France and Germany: the role of workplace institutions, Max 
Planck Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Goyer, M. (2002). The transformation of Corporate Governance in 
France and Germany: the role of workplace institutions, Max 
Planck Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Goyer, M. (2007). Institutional Investors in French and German 
Corporate Governance: The Transformation of Corporate 
Governance and the Stability of Coordination 
Goyer, M. (2007). Institutional Investors in French and German 
Corporate Governance: The Transformation of Corporate 
Governance and the Stability of Coordination 
Goyer, M. and B. Hancké (2005). Labour in French Corporate 
Governance: the missing link. Corporate Governance and Labour 
Management: an international comparison. H. Gospel and A. 
Pendleton, Oxford.
Goyer, M. and B. Hancké (2005). Labour in French Corporate 
Governance: the missing link. Corporate Governance and Labour 
Management: an international comparison. H. Gospel and A. 
Pendleton, Oxford.
Goyer, M. and B. Hancké (2005). Labour in French Corporate 
Governance: the missing link. Corporate Governance and Labour 
Management: an international comparison. H. Gospel and A. 
Pendleton, Oxford.
680
Guéry, G. (1999). Restructuration d'entreprises en Europe : dimension 
sociale, Université de Boeck.
Gumbrel-McCormick, R. and R. Hyman (2006). "Embeded collectivism? 
Workplace representation in France and Germany." Industrial 
Relations Journal 37(5): 473-491.
Guyon, Y. (2001). "Présentation générale des réformes apportées au 
droit des sociétés par la loi du 15 mai 2001 relative aux nouvelles 
régulations économiques " Revue des Sociétés 119: 503-515.
Guyon, Y. (2002). "Les dispositions du décret du 3 mai 2002 relatives 
aux assemblées générales d'actionnaires." Revue des Sociétés 
120: 421-429.
Guyon, Y. (2002). "Les dispositions du décret du 3 mai 2002 relatives 
aux assemblées générales d'actionnaires." Revue des Sociétés 
120: 421-429.
Habersack, M. (1999). Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, C.H. Beck.
Habersack, M. (1999). Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, C.H. Beck.
Hall, M. (1996). "Beyond recognition: employee representation and EU 
Law." Industrial Law Journal 25(1): 15-27.
Hall, M. (1999). Trade Union Recognition and the Employment Relations 
Bill, EIRO.
Hall, M. (2006). "A cool response to the ICE regulations? Employer and 
Trade Union approaches to the new legal framework for 
information and consultation." Industrial Relations Journal 37(5): 
456-472.
Hall, P. and D. Sokice, Eds. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: the 
institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
Hall, P. and D. Sokice, Eds. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: the 
institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
Hamann, D. (2009). "Iura novit Curia and the Principle of Equal 
Treatment of Shareholders." European Law Reporter(4): 152 ff.
Hanau, P. (1998). "Der Tarifvertrag in der Krise." Recht der Arbeit 51(2): 
65-71.
Hannoun, C. (2008). L'impact de la financiarisation de l'economie sur le 
droit du travail. Le droit du travail à l'epreuve de la mundialisation. 
A. Lyon-Caen and Q. Urban, Dalloz: 35-51.
Hansmann, H. (1993). "Worker participation and corporate governance." 
University of Toronto Law Journal 43: 589-606.
Hansmann, H. (1993). "Worker participation and corporate governance." 
University of Toronto Law Journal 43: 589-606.
Hansmann, H. (1993). Probleme von kollektiventscheidungen und 
Theorie der Firma. Ökonomische Analyse des 
Unternehmensrechts. C. Ott and H.-B. Schäffer, Physika Verlag: 
287-305.
Hansmann, H. (1996). Comments. Employees and Corporate 
Governance. Columbia Law School.
Hansmann, H. (2004). Corporation and Contract. Annual Meeting of the 
American Law and Economics Association Yale.
Hansmann, H. (2004). Corporation and Contract. Annual Meeting of the 
American Law and Economics Association Yale.
681
Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman (2000). "The essential role of 
organizational law." Yale Law Journal 110(3): 387 ff.
Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman (2000). "The essential role of 
organizational law." Yale Law Journal 110(3): 387 ff.
Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman (2000). The end of history for corporate 
law. Program for studies in law, economics and public policy, Yale 
Law School.
Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman (2000). The end of history for corporate 
law. Program for studies in law, economics and public policy, Yale 
Law School.
Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman (2002). Towards a single model of 
corporate law. Corporate Governance regimes: convergence and 
diversity. J. A. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. 
Renneboog, Oxford.
Happ, W. (2005). "Deregulierung der GmbH im Wettbewerb der 
Rechtsformen." Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und 
Wirtschaftsrecht 169(1): 6-34.
Harbula, P. (2008). "The ownership structure, governance and 
performance of French companies." Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 19(1): 88-101.
Harbula, P. (2008). "The ownership structure, governance and 
performance of French companies." Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 19(1): 88-101.
Hassel, A. (1999). "The erosion of the German system of Industrial 
Relations." British Journal of Industrial Relations 37(3): 483-505.
Hassiotis, A. (2000). Die entwicklung des rechts der 
Arbeitnehmervertretung auf Information und Consultation in der 
Europäischen union - unter berücksichtigung des deutschen, 
französischen, britischen und schweizerischen rechts, Schulthess 
Juristische Medien AG Zürich / Verlag Stämpfli+Cie Bern 
Heidenreich, M. (1998). "Die organisation von Arbeit in der 
Wissensgesellschaft " Industrielle Beziehungen 5(1): 13-44.
Helfert, M. (1992). "Betriebsverfassung, neue Rationalisierungsformen, 
lean production." WSI-Mitteilungen 8: 505-521.
Henssler, M. (1994). "Flexibilisierung der Arbeitsmarktordnung." 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht: 487 ff.
Henssler, M. (1998). "Firmentarifverträge und Unternehmensbezogene 
Verbandstarifverträge als instrument einer "flexiblen" 
Betriebsnahen Tarifpolitik." Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 29(4): 
517-542.
Henssler, M. (2003). Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung in der Societas 
Europeae – Neue Denkanstöβe für die “Corporate Governance” 
Diskussion. Festschrift für Peter Ulmer. M. Habersack, De Gruyter 
Recht.
Herkommer, S. (1996). Lean production: between myth and reality. 
Changing Europe: some aspects of identity, conflict and social 
justice. A. Erskine, M. Elchardus, S. Herkommer and J. Ryan, 
Avebury.
Herkommer, S. (1996). Lean production: between myth and reality. 
Changing Europe: some aspects of identity, conflict and social 
justice. A. Erskine, M. Elchardus, S. Herkommer and J. Ryan, 
Avebury.
682
Herrmann, K. K. (2004). "Corporate Social Responsiblity and 
Sustainable Development: the European Union as a case-study." 
Industrial Journal of Global Legal Studies 11: 205-232.
Hertig, G. and H. Kanda (2004). Related Party Transactions. The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law. H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman. 
Oxford, Oxford.
Hertig, G. and J. A. McCahery (2004). An Agenda for Reform: Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe. Reforming Company and Takeover 
Law in Europe. G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. 
Wymeersch, Oxford.
Hertig, G. and J. A. McCahery (2006). Company and Takeover Law 
Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonisation Efforts or 
Regulatory Competition. After Enron : improving corporate law 
and modernising securities regulation in Europe and the US. J. 
Armour and J. A. McCahery, Hart.
Hertig, G., R. Kraakman, et al. (2004). Issuers and Investor Protection. 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law. H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, 
Oxford.
Hertig, G., R. Kraakman, et al. (2004). Issuers and Investor Protection. 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law. H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, 
Oxford.
Hetherington, J. A. C. (1969). "Special characteristics, problems and 
needs of the close corporation." University of Illinois Law Review: 
1-29.
Hetherington, J. A. C. (1969). "Special characteristics, problems and 
needs of the close corporation." University of Illinois Law Review: 
1-29.
Higgs, D. (2002). Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors, Department of Trade and Industry.
Higgs, D. (2002). Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors, Department of Trade and Industry.
Hillebrandt, F. and R. Schremper (2001). "Analyse des 
Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes beim Rückkauf von 
Vorzugsaktien  " Betriebs-beräter 56(11): 532-538.
Hirte, H. (2005). "The Takeover Directive - a mini-directive on the 
structure of the corporation: is it a Trojan horse?" European 
Company and Financial Law Review(1): 2-14.
Hirte, H. (2005). "The Takeover Directive - a mini-directive on the 
structure of the corporation: is it a Trojan horse?" European 
Company and Financial Law Review(1): 2-14.
Hommelhoff, P. (1998). "Die neue Position des Abschlussprüfers im 
Kraftfeld der Aktienrechtlichen Organisationsverfassung " 
Betriebs-beräter: 2567-2573; 2625-2632.
Hommelhoff, P. and D. Mattheus (1998). "Corporate Governance nach 
dem KonTraG." Die Aktiengesellschaft 43(6): 249-259.
Höpner, M. (2003b). Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Shareholder 
value, Managerherrschaft und Mitbestimmung in Deutschland 
Campus Verlag.
Höpner, M. (2005). Corporate Governance in transition: ten empirical 
findings on shareholder value and industrial relations in Germany, 
Max Planck Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung.
683
Höpner, M. (2005). Corporate Governance in transition: ten empirical 
findings on shareholder value and industrial relations in Germany, 
Max Planck Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Höpner, M. (2005). Politisch-institutionelle Determinanten 
aktionärsorientierter Reformen, Max Planck Institute für 
Gesellschaftsforschung.
Höpner, M. (2005b). "What connects Industrial Relations and Corporate 
Governance? Explaining institutional complementarity." Socio-
Economic Review 3(2).
Höpner, M. (2005b). "What connects Industrial Relations and Corporate 
Governance? Explaining institutional complementarity." Socio-
Economic Review 3(2).
Höpner, M. (2005b). "What connects Industrial Relations and Corporate 
Governance? Explaining institutional complementarity." Socio-
Economic Review 3(2).
Hopt, K. J. (2002). Common principles of Corporate Governance in 
Europe. Corporate Governance Regimes - convergence and 
diversity. J. A. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. 
Renneboog, Oxford.
Hopt, K. J. (2003). Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, 
Modernisierung des Aktienrechts - zum Bericht der Kommission 
Corporate Governance Corporate Governance. P. Hommelhoff, 
M. Lutter, K. Schmidt, W. Schön and P. Ulmer. Heidelberg, Recht 
und Wirtschaft.
Hopt, K. J. (2005). European Company Law and Corporate Governance: 
where does the Action Plan of the Commission lead?, ECGI - 
European Corporate Governance Institute.
Hopt, K. J. (2006). Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: 
Improving European Corporate Governance After Enron. After 
Enron: improving corporate law and modernising securities 
regulation in Europe and in the US. J. Armour and J. A. 
McCahery, Hart.
Hopt, K. J. (2007). "Feindliche übernahmen, protektionismus, one share 
one vote?" Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 18(9): 257.
Hopt, K. J. and P. C. Leyens (2004). Board Models in Europe. Recent 
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy., European 
Corporate Governance Institute.
Hudson, M., Suzanne Konzelmann, et al. (2002). Partnership in practice, 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
Hueck, G. (2007). Gesellschaftsrecht, C.H Beck.
Hueck, G. (2007). Gesellschaftsrecht, C.H Beck.
Hüffer, U. (1995). Aktiengesetz Kommentar, C.H Beck.
Hunold, W. (1993). Lean Production: rechtsfragen bei der Einführung 
neuer arbeitsformen und techniken, C.H. Beck.
Hunold, W. (1993). Lean Production: rechtsfragen bei der Einführung 
neuer arbeitsformen und techniken, C.H. Beck.
Hutchinson, E. A. S. and R. C. H. Thomas (1982). Company Law in 
Europe: the Vth Directive and the Harmonisation Programme, 
Institute of Directors.
Hyman, R. (2007). Labour Markets and the Future of 
"Decommodification". Social Embedding and the Integration of 
684
Markets. O. Jacobi, M. Jepsen, B. Keller and M. Weiss, Hans 
Böckler Stiftung.
Iamiceli, P. (2004). Le reti di imprese: modelli contrattuali di 
coordinamento. Reti di imprese tra regolazione e norme e sociali. 
F. Cafaggi, Il Mulino.
Igalens, J. (2007). "La GPEC: intérêts et limites pour la gestion du 
personnel." Droit Social: 1074-1080.
Isaksson, M. and R. Skog, Eds. (1994). Aspects of Corporate 
Governance Juristförlaget.
Jackson, G., M. Höpner, et al. (2005). Corporate Governance and 
Employees in Germany: changing linkages, complementarities 
and tensions. Corporate Governance and Labour Management: 
an international comparison. H. Gospel and A. Pendleton, Oxford.
Jackson, G., M. Höpner, et al. (2005). Corporate Governance and 
Employees in Germany: changing linkages, complementarities 
and tensions. Corporate Governance and Labour Management: 
an international comparison. H. Gospel and A. Pendleton, Oxford.
Jacoby, S. M. (2002). "Corporate Governance in Comparative 
Perspective. Prospects for Covergence." Comparative Labor Law 
and Policy Journal 22(1).
Janning, F., Ed. (2002). Abschied von der Hierarchie - dezentralisierung 
in mittelständichen Unternehmen München und Meering, Rainer 
Hampp Verlag.
Janning, F., Ed. (2002). Abschied von der Hierarchie - dezentralisierung 
in mittelständichen Unternehmen München und Meering, Rainer 
Hampp Verlag.
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976). "The Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." 
Journal of Financial Economy 3.
Jobert, A. and J. Saglio (2004). "Ré-institutionnaliser la négociation 
collective en France." Travail et Emploi(100): 113-127.
Johnston, A. (2003). Theories of the Company, Employees and Takeover 
Regulation Law. Florence, European University Institute. Doctor 
of Laws.
Joost, D. (2007). "Unternehmergesellschaft, Unterbilanz, 
Verlustanzeige." ZIP 48: 2242-2248.
Julliot, S. (2005). Les turbulences au sein du double canal de 
représentation en France. Recomposition des sistèmes de 
représentation des salariés en Europe. S. Laulom, Publications 
de l'Université de Saint-Étienne.
Jürgens, U. and J. Rupp (2002) "The German system of Corporate 
Governance: characteristics and changes."  DOI: FS II 02-203.
Jürgens, U. and J. Rupp (2002) "The German system of Corporate 
Governance: characteristics and changes."  DOI: FS II 02-203.
Jürgens, U. and J. Rupp (2002) "The German system of Corporate 
Governance: characteristics and changes."  DOI: FS II 02-203.
Jürgens, U., D. Sadowski, et al., Eds. (2007). Perspecktiven der 
Corporate Governance, Nomos-Nomos.
Jürgens, U., J. Rupp, et al. (2000). Corporate Governance and 
Shareholder Value in Deutschland, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung.
685
Justiz, B. d. (2008). Schwerpunkte des Gesetzes zur Modernisierung 
des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Mißbräuchen 
(MoMiG). B. d. Justiz.
Kahan, M. and E. B. Rock (2006). Hedge funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, European Corporate 
Governance Institute.
Karmel, R. S. (2005). "Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe." 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 
26(3).
Kellerhals, A. and D. Trüten (2002). "The creation of the European 
company." Tulane European and Civil Law Forum(17): 71-80.
Kirr, B. Corporate Governance und Arbeitsbeziehungen in Deutschland, 
Groβbritannien und Polen.
Kittner, M. (1998). Öffnung des Flächentarifvertrags. Tarifautonomie für 
ein neues Jahrhundert - festschrift für Günther Schaub zum 65 
Geburtstag. M. Schlachter, R. Ascheid and H.-W. Friedrich. 
München, C.H Beck: 389-420.
Kittner, M. (1998). Öffnung des Flächentarifvertrags. Tarifautonomie für 
ein neues Jahrhundert - festschrift für Günther Schaub zum 65 
Geburtstag. M. Schlachter, R. Ascheid and H.-W. Friedrich. 
München, C.H Beck: 389-420.
Kluth, W. (1997). "Abschaffung von Mehrstimmrechtsaktien 
verfassungswidrig?" ZIP(28): 1217-1224.
König, K.-M. (2004). "Die neue europäische Prospektrichtlinie. Eine 
kritische Analyse und Überlegungen zur Umsetzung in das 
deustche Kapitalmarktrecht." Zeus(2): 251-288.
Kraakman, R. (1994). "When are shareholder suits in shareholder 
interests?" Georgetown Law Journal 82: 1733 ff.
Kraakman, R., P. Davies, et al. (2004). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a 
Comparative and Functional Approach, Oxford.
Kraakman, R., P. Davies, et al. (2004). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a 
Comparative and Functional Approach, Oxford.
Kriebel, V. (1984). Zentralisation und dezentralisation im Tarifsystem - 
möglichkeit und rechtliche Zulässigkeit einer dezentralisierten 
Tarifpolitik  Berlim, Duncker & Humblot.
La Nabasque, H. (1999). "Le développement du devoir de loyaulté en 
droit des sociétés." Revue Trimmestriele de Droit Commerciale: 
273 ff.
La Nabasque, H. (2001). "La SAS et la loi sur les nouvelles régulations 
économiques." Revue des sociétés 119: 589-616.
La Porta, R., F. Lopes-de-Silanes, et al. (1999). "Corporate ownership 
around the world." The Journal of Finance 54(2): 471-517.
La Porta, R., F. Lopes-de-Silanes, et al. (1999). "Corporate ownership 
around the world." The Journal of Finance 54(2): 471-517.
Laborde, J.-P. (2007). Closer to involvement than to participation: the 
role of employees in decision-making in large companies and 
enterprises in general according to French labour law.  . 
Perspektiven der Corporate Governance. U. Jürgens, D. 
Sadowski, G. F. Schupert and M. Weiss, Nomos-Nomos.
Laulom, S. (2005). Le cadre communautaire de la représentation des 
travailleurs dans l'entreprise. Recomposition des systèmes de 
686
représentation des salariès en Europe. S. Laulom, Publications 
de l'Université de Saint-Étienne.
Laulom, S., Ed. (2005). Recomposition des systèmes de représentation 
des salariés en Europe. Saint-Étienne, Publications de 
l'Université de Saint-Étienne.
Lawlor, D. G. (2007). "Reform der englischen Limited und ihre 
praktischen Auswirkungen " ZIP 47(2002-2005).
Lawrence, P. (1980). Managers and management in West-Germany. 
London, Croomhelm.
Lee, J. (2007). "Shareholders' derivative claims under the Companies 
Act 2006: market mechanism or asymmetric paternalism." 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 18(11): 
378-392.
Leite, J. (2004). Direito do Trabalho. Coimbra, Serviços de Acção Social 
da Universidade de Coimbra.
Lessner, J. (2005). "Chancen dezentraler Tarifpolitik - 
herausforderungen für die gewerkschaftliche Willensbildung." 
Recht der Arbeit(5): 285-294.
Leyens, P. C. (2007). "Corporate Governance: Grundsatzfragen und 
Forschungsperspektiven." Juristen Zeitung 26(22): 1061-1112.
Lingemann, S. and D. Wasmann (1998). "Mehr Kontrolle und 
Transparenz im Aktienrecht: Das KonTraG tritt in Kraft " Betriebs-
beräter 53(17): 853-862.
Lingemann, S. and D. Wasmann (1998). "Mehr Kontrolle und 
Transparenz im Aktienrecht: Das KonTraG tritt in Kraft " Betriebs-
beräter 53(17): 853-862.
Lobo Xavier, B. (2004). Curso de Direito do Trabalho, Verbo.
Lobo Xavier, B. (2004). Curso de Direito do Trabalho, Verbo.
Lobo Xavier, B. (2004). Curso de Direito do Trabalho, Verbo.
Lorber, P. (2006). "Implementint the Information and Consultation 
Directive in Great Britain: a new voice at work." International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 22
(2): 231-258.
Lorenz, E. (1995). "Promoting workplace participation: lessons from 
Germany and France." Industrielle Beziehungen 2(1): 46-63.
Löwisch, M. (1997). "Tariföffnung bei Unternehmens- und 
Arbeitsplatzgefährdung." Neue Juristische Wochenschrift(14): 
905-911.
Macey, J. R. (2008). Corporate Governance - promisses kept, promisses 
broken, Princeton University Press.
Magnier, V. (2001). "Réception du droit américain dans l'organisation 
des sociétés commerciales " Archives de Philosophie du Droit 45: 
213-225.
Mann, A. (2003). Corporate Governance systeme - funktion und 
entwicklung am beispiel von Deutschland und Groβbritannien, 
Duncker & Humblot.
Mann, A. (2003). Corporate Governance systeme - funktion und 
entwicklung am beispiel von Deutschland und Groβbritannien, 
Duncker & Humblot.
Marhold, F. and M. Fuchs (2001). Europäisches Arbeitsrecht. Wien, 
Springer.
687
Maul, S. (2005). Gesellschaftsrechtliche Entwicklungen in Europa - 
bruch mit deutschen traditionen. Rechtsfragen der europäischen 
integration. Bonn, Zentrum für europäisches wirtschaftsrecht.
Mazeaud, A. (2006). Droit du Travail, Montchrestien.
Mazeaud, A. (2006). Droit du Travail, Montchrestien.
Mazeaud, A. (2009). "La négotiation des accords d'entreprise en 
l'absence de délégué syndical." Droit Social(6): 669-678.
McCahery, J. A. and E. P. M. Vermeulen (2004). The evolution of closely 
held business forms in Europe. The Governance of Close 
Corporations and Partnerships. US and European Perspectives. 
J. A. McCahery, T. Raaijmakers and E. P. M. Vermeulen, Oxford.
McCahery, J. A., E. P. M. Vermeulen, et al. (2006). The new company 
law: what matters in an innovative economy, European Corporate 
Governance Institute.
McCahery, J. A., E. P. M. Vermeulen, et al. (2006). The new company 
law: what matters in an innovative economy, European Corporate 
Governance Institute.
McCarthy, W. E. J. and N. D. Ellis (1973). Management by agreement - 
an alternative to the Industrial Relations Act Hutchinson of 
London.
Menezes Cordeiro, A. and P. Câmara, Eds. (2007). Jornadas de 
Homenagem ao Prof. Raúl Ventura. A Reforma do Código das 
Sociedades Comerciais Almedina.
Menezes Leitão, L. (2007). Voto por correspondência e realização 
telemática de reuniões de órgãos sociais. A reforma do Código 
das Sociedades Comerciais: jornadas em homenagem ao Prof. 
Raul Ventura. A. Menezes Cordeiro and P. Câmara. Lisbon, 
Almedina.
Menezes Leitão, L. (2007). Voto por correspondência e realização 
telemática de reuniões de órgãos sociais. A reforma do Código 
das Sociedades Comerciais: jornadas em homenagem ao Prof. 
Raul Ventura. A. Menezes Cordeiro and P. Câmara. Lisbon, 
Almedina.
Menezes Leitão, M. J. (2001). "General features of collective bargaining 
in Portugal " International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations: 441 ff.
Menezes Leitão, M. J. (2001). "General features of collective bargaining 
in Portugal " International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations: 441 ff.
Menjucq, M. (2006). Corporate Governance Issues in France. Corporate 
Governance Post-Enron. Comparative and International 
Perspectives. J. Norton, J. Rickford and J. Kleineman, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law.
Menjucq, M. (2006). Corporate Governance Issues in France. Corporate 
Governance Post-Enron. Comparative and International 
Perspectives. J. Norton, J. Rickford and J. Kleineman, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law.
Merle, P. (2008). Droit Commercial. Societés commerciales, Dalloz.
Merle, P. (2008). Droit Commercial. Societés commerciales, Dalloz.
Mestre, B. (2007). "The ruling CGT & others vs Ministre de l'emploi. 
Commission vs UK revisited." European Law Reporter(4).
688
Mestre, B. (2009). The Right to Information and Consultation of the 
Workforce: context and content of a fundamental right. The 
Fundamentalisation of Social Rights. M.-A. Moreau and B. d. 
Witte. Florence, European University Institute.
Mestre, J. and M.-E. Pancrazi (2003). Droit Commercial: droit interne et 
aspects de droit international. Paris, LGDJ.
Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social (2006). Livro Verde 
sobre as Relações Laborais.
Molitor, K. (1998). Ende oder Reform der Flächentarifverträge? 
Tarifautonomie für ein neues Jahrhundert - festschrift für Günther 
Schaub zum 65 Geburtstag. M. Schlachter, R. Ascheid and H.-W. 
Friedrich. München, C.H Beck: 487-496.
Monks, R. A. G. (2002). "Creating value through corporate governance." 
Corporate Governance 10(3): 116-123.
Monks, R. A. G. and N. Minow (1995). Corporate Governance, Blackwell 
Business.
Monteiro Fernandes, A. (2004). Direito do Trabalho, Almedina.
Monteiro Fernandes, A. (2004). Direito do Trabalho, Almedina.
Moreau, M.-A. (2001). "L'implication des travailleurs dans la société 
européenne." Droit Social: 967-976.
Moreau, M.-A. (2004). National Report France. The Evolving Structure of 
Collective Bargaining in Europe. S. Sciarra. Florence, European 
Commission, University of Florence.
Moreau, M.-A. (2004). National Report France. The Evolving Structure of 
Collective Bargaining in Europe. S. Sciarra. Florence, European 
Commission, University of Florence.
Moreau, M.-A. (2006). "Restructurations et Comité d'Entreprise 
Européen." Droit Social(March ).
Moreau, M.-A. (2006). Normes sociales, droit du travail et 
mondialisation, Dalloz.
Moreau, M.-A. (2007). The originality of transnational social norms as a 
response to globalisation. Regulating Labour in the Wake of 
Globalisation. New challanges, new institutions. B. Bercusson 
and C. Estlund, Columbia.
Moreau, M.-A. (2008). Les échanges entre les droits, l'expérience 
communautaire - une lecture des phénomènes de régionalisation 
et de mondialisation du droit Collection Droit de L'Union 
Européenne. S. Robin-Olivier and D. Fasquelle.
Moreau, M.-A. (2008). Les échanges entre les droits, l'expérience 
communautaire - une lecture des phénomènes de régionalisation 
et de mondialisation du droit Collection Droit de L'Union 
Européenne. S. Robin-Olivier and D. Fasquelle.
Morel, F. (2009). "La rénovation de la démocratie sociale: ves une 
société de dialogue." Droit Social(9/10): 885-886.
Morin, F. (1999). The privatisation process and corporate governance: 
the French case. Corporate Governance, State Owned 
Entreprises and Privatisation. OCDE. Paris, OCDE.
Morin, F. (2000). " A transformation in the French model of shareholding 
and management 
Morin, F. and E. Rigamonti (2002). "Évolution et structure de 
l'actionnariat en France." Revue Française de Gestion 5(141): 
155-181.
689
Morin, F. and E. Rigamonti (2002). "Évolution et structure de 
l'actionnariat en France." Revue Française de Gestion 5(141): 
155-181.
Morin, M.-L. (1994). "Sous-traitance et relations salariales. Aspects de 
droit du travail." Travail et Emploi 60(3): 23-43.
Morin, M.-L. (1996). "L'articulation des niveaux de négociation dans 
l'accord interprofessionnel sur la politique contractuelle." Droit 
Social: 11-18.
Morin, M.-L. (2005). "Labour Law and new forms of corporate 
organisation." International Labour Review 144(1): 5-30.
Morse, G. (2004). Limited Liability Partnerships and Partnership Law 
Reform in the United Kingdom. The Governance of Close 
Corporations and Partnerships. US and European Perspectives. 
J. A. McCahery, T. Raaijmakers and E. P. M. Vermeulen, Oxford.
Mota Pinto, A. (2007). The Europeanisation of legal capital: searching for 
new ways of protecting creditors in limited liability companies. 
Law. Florence, European University Institute. PhD.
Moura Ramos, L. and R. Martins (2002). Privatisation in Portugal: 
Employee Owners or Just Happy Employees? . G. d. E. M. e. 
Financeiros. Coimbra, Faculdade de Economia da Universidade 
de Coimbra.
Moura Ramos, L. and R. Martins (2002). Privatisation in Portugal: 
Employee Owners or Just Happy Employees? . G. d. E. M. e. 
Financeiros. Coimbra, Faculdade de Economia da Universidade 
de Coimbra.
Mouret, J. (2007). Collective Relations in France: a multi-layered system 
in mutation. Decentralizing Industrial Relations and the Role of 
Labour Unions and Employee Representatives. R. Blainpain, 
Kluwer: 41-65.
Mouret, J. (2007). Collective Relations in France: a multi-layered system 
in mutation. Decentralizing Industrial Relations and the Role of 
Labour Unions and Employee Representatives. R. Blainpain, 
Kluwer: 41-65.
Mückenberger, U. and H.-H. Lühr (1980). "Dokumentation zum 
Rationalisierungsschutz." Kritische Justiz 13(84-102).
Nagel, B. (2001). Tarifstrukturen und Zukunft des Flachentarifvertrages 
im Deutschland. Okonomische Analyse des Arbeitsrechts. C. Ott 
and H.-B. Schäffer, Mohr Sibeck.
Natzel, I. (2001). "Die delegation von aufgaben an Arbeitsgruppen nach 
dem neuen §28a BetrVG." Der Betrieb(25): 1362-1364.
Neau-Leduc, C. (2007). "Les sanctions de la GPEC." Droit Social: 
1081-1085.
Nietsch, M. (2005). "Corporate Governance and Company Law Reform - 
a German perspective." Corporate Governance 13(3): 368-376.
Noack, U. (2006). "Der Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie über Rechte von 
Aktionären börsennotierter Gesellschaften " Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht: 321 ff.
Noack, U. and D. Zetzsche (2006). "Die Informationsanfechtung nach 
der Neufassung des §243Abs4 AktG." ZHR(218-246).
Noack, U. and D. Zetzsche (2006). "Die Informationsanfechtung nach 
der Neufassung des §243Abs4 AktG." ZHR(218-246).
690
Norton, J., J. Rickford, et al., Eds. (2006). Corporate Governance Post-
Enron. Comparative and International Perspectives, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law.
Nunes de Carvalho, A. (1996). "Primeiras notas sobre a contratação 
colectiva atípica." Revist de Direito e de Estudos Sociais 14: 9-36.
Nunes, J. and L. Montanheiro (1997). "Privatisation in Portugal: an 
insight into the effects of a new political strategy." 
Competitiveness Review 7(2): 59-78.
Nunes, P. C. (2005). Corporate Governance. Lisboa, Almedina.
O'Connor, M. (1993). "The Human Capital Era: reconceptualizing 
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation  " 
Cornell Law Review 78.
OECD (1999). Corporate Governance, State Owned Enterprises and 
Privatisation, OECD.
Oliner, S. D. and D. E. Sichel (2000). "The resurgence of growth in the 
late 1990s: is information technology the story?" Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14: 3-22.
Oliveira Neves, R. d. (2008). O Administrador Independente. Código das 
Sociedades Comerciais e Governo das Sociedades. P. Câmara, 
R. d. Oliveira Neves, A. Fernandes de Oliveira and J. Ferreira 
Gomes, Almedina.
Oliveira Neves, R. d. (2008). O Administrador Independente. Código das 
Sociedades Comerciais e Governo das Sociedades. P. Câmara, 
R. d. Oliveira Neves, A. Fernandes de Oliveira and J. Ferreira 
Gomes, Almedina.
Olivier, J.-M. (2009). "Rapport de synthèse." Droit Social(6): 687-698.
Orlandini, G. (2004). Diritto del lavoro e regolazione delle reti. Reti di 
imprese tra regolazione e norme socialli. Nuove sfide per diritto 
ed economia. F. Cafaggi, Il Mulino.
Palley, T. I. (2007). Financialisation: what it is and why it matters 
Washington D.C, Economics for Democratic and Open Societies.
Parkinson, J. (2003). "Models of the company and the employment 
relationship." British Journal of Industrial Relations 41(3): 
481-509.
Pélissier, J., A. Supiot, et al. (2008). Droit du Travail, Dalloz.
Pélissier, J., A. Supiot, et al. (2008). Droit du Travail, Dalloz.
Pellens, B. and F. Hillebrandt (2001). "Vorzugsaktien vor dem 
Hintergrund der Corporate Governance-Discussion." Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 46(2): 57-67.
Pellens, B. and F. Hillebrandt (2001). "Vorzugsaktien vor dem 
Hintergrund der Corporate Governance-Discussion." Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 46(2): 57-67.
Peltier, F. (1997). "La convergence du droit français avec les principes 
de la Corporate Governance américaine." Revue du Droit 
Bancaire et de la Bourse 60: 53 ss.
Peltier, F. (1997). "La convergence du droit français avec les principes 
de la Corporate Governance américaine." Revue du Droit 
Bancaire et de la Bourse 60: 53 ss.
Perulli, A. (2007). "Diritto del lavoro e decentramento produtivo in una 
perspectiva comparata: probleme e prospettive." Rivista Italiana 
di Diritto del Lavoro(I): 29-65.
691
Perulli, A. (2008). Marché sans droit. Le droit du travail à l'epreuve de la 
globalisation. A. Lyon-Caen and Q. Urban, Dalloz: 53-59.
Peters, T. J. and R. H. Waterman (1982). In Search of Excellence Profile 
Business.
Petrovski, M. and D. Paucard "Les accords de méthode et leur impact 
sur les procédures d’information et de consultation des 
représentants du personnel : quelques résultats à partir de huit 
études de cas." Revue de L'IRES 50(1): 103-136.
Peyrevalade, J. (1999). "Le gouvernment d'entreprise ou les fondements 
incertains d'un nouveau pouvoir? ." Economica.
Poole, M., Roger Mansfield, et al. (2005). "British managers' attitudes 
and behaviour in industrial relations: a twenty year study." British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 43(1): 117-134.
Posner, R. A. (2007). Economic analysis of law, Aspen.
Powell, W. W. (2001). The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First 
Century:emerging patterns in western entreprise. The Twenty-
First Century Firm: Changing Economic Organisation in 
International Perspective. P. DiMaggio, Princeton University 
Press.
Powell, W. W. (2001). The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First 
Century:emerging patterns in western entreprise. The Twenty-
First Century Firm: Changing Economic Organisation in 
International Perspective. P. DiMaggio, Princeton University 
Press.
Power, D., G. Epstein, et al. (2003). Trends in the rentier income-share 
in OECD countries, 1960-2000, Department of Economics, 
Power, D., G. Epstein, et al. (2003). Trends in the rentier income-share 
in OECD countries, 1960-2000, Department of Economics, 
Prétot, X. (1994). "Le Conseil constitutionnel et la participation des 
travailleurs." Droit Social(2): 139-141.
PriceWaterHouse Coopers and BDI (2005). Corporate Governance im 
Deutschland. Entwicklungen und Trends von Internationalem 
Intergrund.
Raab, T. (2004). "Betriebliche Bündnisse für Arbeit - königsweg aus der 
Beschäftigungskrise?" Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 35(3): 371-403.
Raiser, T. (2007). Aktionärsklagen. Aktienrecht im Wandel - 
Grundsatzfragen des Aktienrechts. W. Bayer and M. Habersack, 
Mohr Siebeck.
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (2003). "The great reversals: the politics of 
financial development in the 20th century." Journal of Financial 
Economics 69: 5-50.
Rao, J. M. and A. Krishna Dutt (2002). A decade of Reforms: the Indian 
Economy in the 1990s.
Rappaport, A. (1986). Shareholder value - the new standard for business 
performance. New York, The Free Press.
Ravaran, A. d. (2006). "Négocier les restructurations après la loi du 18 
janvier 2005: aspects pratiques " Droit Social(3): 298-302.
Ray, J.-E. (1994). "Regard sur un lifting législatif nécessaire (articles 24 
à 32, relatifs aux institutions représentatives du personnel)." Droit 
Social(2): 142-146.
Ray, J.-E. (2004). "Les curieux accords dits "majoritaires" de la loi du 4 
mai 2004 " Droit Social(6): 590-600.
692
Ray, J.-E. (2006). Droit du Travail - droit vivant, Editions Liaisons.
Ray, J.-E. (2006). Droit du Travail - droit vivant, Editions Liaisons.
Ray, J.-E. (2008). "Quel droit pour la négociation collective de demain?" 
Droit Social(1): 3-15.
Reichert, J. (2000). Aktionärsrechte und Anlegerschutz - Stellungnahme 
zu den Vorschlägen der Coporate Governance Kommission 
Corporate Governance. P. Hommelhoff, M. Lutter, K. Schmidt, W. 
Schön and P. Ulmer. Heidelberg, Recht und Wirtschaft.
Reichold, H. (2003). "Durchbruch zu einer europäischen 
Betriebsverfassung - die Rahmenrichtlinie 2002/14/EG zur 
Unterrichtung und Anhörung der Arbeitnehmer." Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht 20(6): 289-299.
Reisberg, A. (2007). Derivative actions and corporate governance, 
Oxford 
Rémy, P. (2004). Une redistribuition des competences entre syndicats et 
conseils d'etablissement en Alemagne. Récomposition des 
systémes de representation des salariés en Europe. S. Laulom, 
Publications de l'Université de Saint Étienne.
Rhode, P. W. and G. Toniolo, Eds. (2006). The Global Economy in the 
1990s Cambridge.
Richardi, R. and O. Wlotzke (2000). Münchener Handbuch zum 
Arbeitsrecht. München, C.H Beck.
Rickford, J. (2004b). "The emerging european Takeover Law from a 
British perspective." European Business Law Review: 1379-1421.
Rickford, J. (2004b). "The emerging european Takeover Law from a 
British perspective." European Business Law Review: 1379-1421.
Rico, L. (1987). "The new industrial relations: British electricians' new 
style agreements." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41(1): 
63-78.
Rieble, V. (1996). "Krise des Flächentarifverträges?" Recht der Arbeit 49
(3): 151-158.
Rieble, V. (1999). "Bündnis für Arbeit - "Dritter weg" oder Sackgasse?" 
Recht der Arbeit 52(3): 169-177.
Rieble, V. (2004). "Die akteure im kollektiven Arbeitsrecht." Recht der 
Arbeit 57(2): 78-86.
Rieble, V. (2004b). "Öffnungsklauseln und Tarifverantwortung." 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 35(3): 405-429.
Ripert, G. and R. Roblot (1996). Traité de Droit Commercial, LGDJ.
Robert, L. (2004). "Betriebliche Bündnisse für Arbeit versus 
Tarifautonomie?" Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht(12): 633-640.
Rock, E. B. and M. L. Wachter (2004). Waiting for the omelet to set: 
match-specific assets and minority oppression in close 
corporations. The governance of close corporations and 
partnerships. J. A. Mccahery, T. Raaijmakers and E. P. M. 
Vermeulen, Oxford: 93-133.
Rock, E. B., H. Kanda, et al. (2004). Significant Corporate Actions. The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law. R. Kraakman and H. Hansmann, 
Oxford University Press.
Romano Martinez, P. (2008). Direito do Trabalho, Almedina.
Romano Martinez, P. (2008). Direito do Trabalho, Almedina.
Romano, R. (1985). "Law as a Product: some pieces of the incorporation 
puzzle." Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation.
693
Romano, R. (1996). "Corporate Law and Corporate Governance." 
Industrial and Corporate Change 5(3).
Rose, C. (2007). "The new corporate vehicle Societas Europeae: 
consequences for European Corporate Governance " Corporate 
Governance Review 15(2): 112-121.
Rouilleault, H. (2007). "Obligation triennale de négocier, où est-on?" 
Droit Social(9-10): 988-995.
Rouilleault, H. (2007). Anticiper et concerter les mutations. Rapport sur 
l'obligation triennale de négocier, Gouvernement Français - 
Ministere des Finances.
Ruigrok, W. and R. v. Tulder (1995). The Logic of International 
Restructuring, Routledge.
Ruigrok, W. and R. v. Tulder (1995). The Logic of International 
Restructuring, Routledge.
Saenger, I. (1997). "Mehrstimmrechte beim Aktiengesellschaften." ZIP
(42): 1813-1821.
Saintourens, B. (2001). "Les organes de direction de la société anonyme 
après la loi relative aux nouvelles régulations économiques " 
Revue des Sociétés 119: 515-533.
Saintourens, B. (2002). "Les dispositions du décret du 3 mai 2002 
relatives aux organes de directions de la société anonyme." 
Revue des Sociétés 120: 430-440.
Schäfer, K. (2005). "Die Binnenhaftung von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat 
nach der Renovierung durch das UMAG." Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht 26(29): 1253-1259.
Schaub, G. (1996). Arbeitsrechtshandbuch - systematische darstellung 
und nachschlagewerk fur die praxis, C.H Beck.
Schaub, G. (1996). Arbeitsrechtshandbuch - systematische darstellung 
und nachschlagewerk fur die praxis, C.H Beck.
Schilling, F. (2001). "Corporate Governance in Germany: the move to 
shareholder value." Corporate Governance 9(3): 148-151.
Schmidt, H., J. Drukarczyk, et al. (1997). Corporate Governance in 
Germany. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlaggesellschaft.
Schmidt, J. (2006). "Stimmrechtsvertretung und stimmrechtsansübung 
"in absentia" in Deutschland und Großbritannien - speziel von der 
Hintergrund der aktuellen Gesellschaftsrechtsreform in 
Großbritannien sowie der geplanten EU-Aktionärsrechte-
Richtlinie." Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht(13): 487 ff.
Schmidt, J. (2007). "German Company Law Reform: makeover for the 
GmbH, a new mini-GmbH and some important news for the AG " 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 18(9): 
306-311.
Schmidt, K. (2002). Gesellschaftsrecht, Carl Heymanns 
Schmidt, K. (2002). Gesellschaftsrecht, Carl Heymanns 
Schnabel, C. (1998). The reform of collective bargaining in Germany: 
corporatist stability vs firm flexibility. The German Model of 
Industrial Relations between Adaptation and Erosion. R. Hoffman, 
O. Jacobi, B. Keller and M. Weiss. Düsseldorf.
Schneider, U. H. (2006). Corporate Governance Issues in Germany - 
Between Golden October and Nasty November Corporate 
Governance Post-Enron. Comparative and International 
694
Perspectives J. Norton, J. Rickford and J. Kleineman, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law.
Schneider, U. H. (2006). Corporate Governance Issues in Germany - 
Between Golden October and Nasty November Corporate 
Governance Post-Enron. Comparative and International 
Perspectives J. Norton, J. Rickford and J. Kleineman, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law.
Schwark, E. (2002). Corporate Governance: Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat. 
Corporate Governance. P. Hommelhoff, M. Lutter, K. Schmidt, W. 
Schön and P. Ulmer. Heidelberg, Recht und Wirtschaft: 77-118.
Sciarra, S. (2004). The Evolving Structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990-2004. Florence, University of Florence, European 
Commission.
Sealy, L. and S. Worthington (2008). Cases and Materials in Company 
Law, Oxford University Press.
Seifert, H. and H. Massa-Wirth (2005). "Pacts for employment and 
competitiveness in Germany." Industrial Relations Journal 36(3): 
217-240.
Seitz, K. (2004). Europäisches Rahmenrecht für eine Europäische 
Betriebsverfassung - stand und perspectiven. Tübingen, Köhler-
Druck.
Sheehan, B. (2000). "Partnership Agreements may Point the Way 
Forward." from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/01/
feature/ie0001204f.htm.
Siems, M. M. (2008). Convergence in shareholder law, Cambridge.
Siems, M. M. and P. P. Lele (2007). "Shareholder protection - a 
leximetric approach." Jornal of Corporate Law Studies 7: 17-50.
Silva, A. S., António Vitorino, et al. (2006). Livro Branco sobre Corporate 
Governance em Portugal, Instituto Português de Corporate 
Governance.
Simon, H. A. (1991). "Organisations and Markets." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 5(2): 25-44.
Slinger, G. and S. Deakin (1999). Company Law as an instrument of 
inclusion: re-regulating stakeholder relations in the context of 
takeovers, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge.
Slinger, G. and S. Deakin (1999). Company Law as an instrument of 
inclusion: re-regulating stakeholder relations in the context of 
takeovers, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge.
Social, M. d. T. e. d. S. (2008). Livro Branco sobre as Relações 
Laborais.
Social, M. d. T. e. d. S. (2008). Livro Branco sobre as Relações 
Laborais.
Solomon, R. (1999). The transformation of the world economy, 
Macmillan.
Souriac, M.-A. (2004). "L'articulation des niveaux de négotiation." Droit 
Social(6): 579-590.
Souriac, M.-A. (2009). "Les réformes de la negociation collective " 
Revue de Droit du Travail(1): 14-23.
695
Steele, M. T. (2007). "Judicial scrutiny of fiduciary duties in Delaware 
limited partnerships and limited lability companies." Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 32: 1-32.
Stevenson, J. E. (2002). "Auditor Independence:  A Comparative 
Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy 
Stevenson, J. E. (2002). "Auditor Independence:  A Comparative 
Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy 
Stockhammer, E. (2007). "Charakteristika eines finanz-dominierten 
Akkumulationsregimes in Europa." WSI-Mitteilungen 60(12): 
643-649.
Streeck, W. and B. Rehder (2003). Der Flächentarifvertrag: Krise, 
Stabilität und Wandel Max Planck Institute für 
Gesellschaftsforschung.
Tamajo, R. d. L. (2007). "Diritto del lavoro e decentramento produttivo in 
una perspectiva comparata: scenari e strumenti." Rivista Italiana 
di Diritto del Lavoro(I): 3-29.
Taylor, P., C. Baldry, et al. (2007). The Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations: an Analysis of their Effectiveness in 
Relation to Corporate Restructuring and Redundancy, Amicus.
Teller, M. (2007). "L'information des sociétés cotées et non cotées: une 
évolution certaine, de nouveaux risques probables." Revue 
Trimmestriele de Droit Commerciale: 17 ff.
Terry, M. (1999). "Assessing the significance of partnership agreements." 
from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1999/07/feature/
uk9907214f.htm.
Teubner, G. (1982). Reflexive Rationalität des Rechts. Working Papers. 
Florence, European University Institute.
Teubner, G. (2004). Netzwerk als Vertragsverbund, Nomos.
Teyssié, B. (2009). "A propos de la rénovation de la démocratie sociale." 
Droit Social(6): 627-629.
Tiberghien, Y. (2007). Entrepreneurial States. Reforming Corporate 
Governance in France, Japan and Korea, Cornell University 
Press 
Tiberghien, Y. (2007). Entrepreneurial States. Reforming Corporate 
Governance in France, Japan and Korea, Cornell University 
Press 
Tierry, D. and C. Sauret (1990). La gestion prévisionelle des emplois et 
des compétences, L'Harmattan.
Trefil, B. (2003). Die Niederlassungsfreiheit fur Gesellschaften in der 
Rechtsprechung des EuGH und ihre Auswirkungen auf nationales 
Recht Law Working Papers. Florence, European University 
Institute.
Trefil, B. (2003). Die Niederlassungsfreiheit fur Gesellschaften in der 
Rechtsprechung des EuGH und ihre Auswirkungen auf nationales 
Recht Law Working Papers. Florence, European University 
Institute.
Tricker, B. (1998). "The role of the institutional investor in Corporate 
Governance." Corporate Governance 6(4): 213-216.
University of Massachusetts.
University of Massachusetts.
696
Urbain-Parléani, I. (2003). "Les nouvelles obligations d'information des 
dirigeants envers les actionnaires." Revue des Sociétés 121: 
779-793.
Urbain-Parléani, I. (2003). "Les nouvelles obligations d'information des 
dirigeants envers les actionnaires." Revue des Sociétés 121: 
779-793.
Valuet, J.-P. (2001). "Identification et vote des actionaires non résidents 
des sociétés cotées." Revue des Sociétés 119(571-581).
Valuet, J.-P. (2001). "Identification et vote des actionaires non résidents 
des sociétés cotées." Revue des Sociétés 119(571-581).
Valuet, J.-P. (2002). "Les dispositions du décrét du 3 mai 2002 relatives 
à l'identification et au vote des actionnaires non résidents des 
sociétés cotées." Revue des Sociétés 120.
Van der Berghe, L., C. Van der Elst, et al., Eds. (2002). Corporate 
Governance in a Globalising World: convergence or divergence? 
A European perspective, Kluwer.
Van der Berghe, L., C. Van der Elst, et al., Eds. (2002). Corporate 
Governance in a Globalising World: convergence or divergence? 
A European perspective, Kluwer.
Vanderloo, J. C. (2004). "Encouraging corporate governance for the 
closely held business." Mississipi College School of Law Review 
24: 39-48.
Vendeuil, S. d. (2001). "NRE et dissociation des fonctions du président 
du conseil et directeur général." JCP E: 1315.
Verdier, J.-M. (1983). "La présence syndicale dans l'entreprise et la loi 
du 28 octobre 1982 relative au développement des intitutions 
représentatives du personnel." Droit Social(1): 37-54.
Verkindt, P.-Y. (2009). "Les elections professionnelles dans l'entreprise." 
Droit Social(6): 648-657.
Viandier, A. (2008). "L'administrateur indépendant des sociétés cotées." 
RJDA: 599.
Viswanathan, A. (2007). "The Companies Act 2006: towards shareholder 
engagement and streamlining the decision-making process " 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 18(6): 
199-202.
Viswanathan, A. (2007). "The Companies Act 2006: towards shareholder 
engagement and streamlining the decision-making process " 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 18(6): 
199-202.
Vivien, P. (2007). "Quelques réflexions sur la mise en oeuvre de la 
GPEC." Droit Social: 1093-1094.
Vredeling, H. and R. Blainpain (1983). The Vredeling proposal : 
information and consultation of employees in multinational 
enterprises, Kluwer.
Waas, B. (2007). Decentralizing Industrial Relations and the Role of 
Labour Unions and Employee Representatives - Germany  
Decentralizing Industrial Relations and the Role of Labour Unions 
and Employee Representatives. R. Blainpain, Kluwer: 17-41.
Wand, P. (2006). "EU-Richtlinienvorschlag zur Erleichterung der 
Ausübung von aktionärsrechten." Der Aktiengesellschaft 51(12): 
443-450.
697
Wendeling-Schröder, U. (2005). Auf der suche nach einem modernen 
Tarifvertragsrecht. Arbeitsrecht im sozialen Dialog - Festschrift für 
Hellmut Wissmann zum 65 Gerburtstag. W. Kohte, H.-J. Dörner 
and R. Anzinger. München, C.H Beck: 174-184.
West, M. D. (2002). Legal determinants of World Cup sucess, Michigan 
Law and Economics Research Paper 
White, E. (2006). Bubbles and busts: the 1990s and the 1920s. The 
Global Economy in the 1990s. A Long Run Perspective. P. W. 
Rhode and G. Toniolo, Cambridge.
Williamson, O. E. (2003). "Examining economic organisation through the 
lens of contract." Industrial and Corporate Change 12: 917-942.
Windbichler, C. (2002). Der Gemeinsinn der juristischenPerson. 
Grossunternehmen zwischen Shareholder-value, Mitbestimmung 
und Gemeinwohl Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn im Recht. H. 
Münkler and K. Fischer, Akademie Verlag: 165-179.
Wirtz, P. (2001). The changing institutions of governance in Corporate 
France: what drives the process?, FARGO - Centre de Recherche 
en Finance, Archichecture et Gouvernance des Organisations.
Wirtz, P. (2001). The changing institutions of governance in Corporate 
France: what drives the process?, FARGO - Centre de Recherche 
en Finance, Archichecture et Gouvernance des Organisations 
Wirtz, P. (2001). The changing institutions of governance in Corporate 
France: what drives the process?, FARGO - Centre de Recherche 
en Finance, Archichecture et Gouvernance des Organisations.
Witte, B. d. (2005). The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the 
European Union. Social Rights in Europe. G. De Búrca and B. d. 
Witte, Oxford.
Witte, B. d. (2005). The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the 
European Union. Social Rights in Europe. G. De Búrca and B. d. 
Witte, Oxford.
Womack, J. P. and D. Jones (1996). Lean thinking: banish waste and 
create wealth in your corporation, Simon & Schuster.
Wood, S. (2000). From voluntarism to partnership: a third way overview 
of the public policy debate in British industrial relations. Legal 
Regulation of the Employment Relation. H. Collins, P. L. Davies 
and R. Rideout, Kluwer Law International.
Wouters, J. (2000). "European Company Law: quo vadis." Common 
Market Law Review 37: 257-307.
Wymeersch, E. (2002). Convergence or divergence in Corporate 
Governance patterns in Western Europe. Corporate Governance 
Regimes - convergence and diversity. J. A. McCahery, P. 
Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog, Oxford.
Zachert, U. (1996). "Krise des Flächentarifverträges?" Recht der Arbeit 
49(3): 140-151.
Zachert, U. (1996). "Krise des Flächentarifverträges?" Recht der Arbeit 
49(3): 140-151.
Zachert, U. (1996). "Krise für den Flächentarifvertrafes? 
Herausforderungen für das Tarifrecht." Recht der Arbeit: 140-151.
Zachert, U. (2005). Dezentralisierung des Tarifvertrages: der einzelne 
Arbeitgeber als Tarifpartei Arbeitsrecht im sozialen Dialog - 
Festschrift für Hellmut Wissmann zum 65 Geburtstag. W. Kohte, 
H.-J. Dörner and R. Anzinger. München, C.H. Beck: 201-212.
698
Zorzi, A. (2004). Reti di imprese e modelli societari di coordinamento. 
Reti di imprese tra regolazione e norme sociali. F. Cafaggi, Il 
Mulino.
Zumbansen, P. (2007). Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: 
Corporate Governance and Labour in the Context of 
Contemporary Developments in European and German Company 
Law. U. o. C. Centre for Business Research.
Zumbansen, P. (2007). Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: 
Corporate Governance and Labour in the Context of Contemporary 
Developments in European and German Company Law. U. o. C. Centre 
for Business Research.
699
